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ABSTRACT 
The seemingly endless possibility of reflecting upon psychological theories 
and 'knowledge' has created an intractable difficulty in understanding what 
psychology is about and what it produces. This 'problem of reflexivity' was 
therefore adopted as the focus of this dissertation. The aim was to 
determine whether it is possible for psychology to be understood clearly 
without ignoring or denying the 'problem of reflexivity'. Selected 
dichotomies and debates representative of various subject areas and 
theoretical and philosophical 'levels' within psychology were outlined and 
examined. These included: the prospects for theoretical unity in 
psychology; the distinction between 'pure' and 'applied' psychology; 
difficulties with the concepts of 'consciousness' and 'perception'; and 
theories concerning the nature and status of knowledge in psychology. In 
each of these areas reflexive problems were found that originated in two 
incommensurable versions of the concept of 'meaning': meaning as 
reference and meaning as an activity or use over time. Radical 
behaviourism, despite its uniqueness, was found to be unable to resolve 
these difficulties, especially in its characterization of 'private events'. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein's investigations into the limits of sense were found to 
provide a way to reconcile the two versions of meaning and to thus resolve 
reflexive problems. It was concluded that reflexive problems must be 
approached grammatically if any sense is to be made of them. Therefore, 
psychological theories can be understood as language-games which both 
explore and provide 'training' in the grammatical possibilities of human 
action. Finally, it was claimed that reflexivity should be understood 
grammatically and not as a psychological (orcausal ) ability or process. Thus 
theorizing in psychology has an unavoidable grammatical aspect. In this 
aspect the study of psychology finds a clear home in the world of 'ordinary', 
meaningful human action. 
CHAPTER ONE 
1 REFLEXIVE ISSUES IN 
PSYCHOLOGY 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
1 
The most interesting thing about psychology is how peculiar an activity it 
can sometimes appear. Even the novice in psychology early in his or her 
career is likely to wonder if there may not be something ironic about the 
attempt to understand oneself. This wondering is not confined to the 
novice, however. To 'know thyself' has been recognized for millenia as one 
of the most subtle and difficult of human activities. Like apostates walking 
boldly and defiantly across 'holy ground' there may remain for the 
psychologist a small doubt as to whether, after all, there is good reason for 
the ground trodden being called 'holy'. 
A great deal of the thrust of modern (20th century) intellectual activity may 
reinforce this doubt. Examples of this modern trend are numerous and 
cover many areas. Hofstadter's (1979) book Goedel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal 
Golden Braid is a collection of intellectual threads bearing the same 
recursive birthmark. From an Escher drawing of a picture in a gallery 
somehow containing the gallery, to infinite loops in computer 
programming; from the limitative theorems of Goedel in mathematics to 
Russell's Liar Paradox the unfortunate ability to apply meaningful 
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statements to themselves has haunted some of the greatest intellects of the 
century. And prior to the present century such recursion has had its 
philosophical counterparts in various idealist and solipsist philosophies. 
But it is not because of discoveries in the highly abstract areas of 
mathematics, logic and metaphysics that psychologists have had to face the 
possibility of the reflexive nature of their pursuit acting as a highly subtle 
confounding variable. Rather, it is in the midst of observation, theory, 
application and assessment of application that the question of the influence 
of 'reflexivity' arises. The following quote from Margolis (1989) shows just 
how the reflexive features of psychology are linked to the more diffuse 
problems of reflexivity found in so many intellectual endeavours; 
Psychology is a reflexive discipline, however 
cleverly it may camouflage its practice in 
surveys and experiments. The observers and 
observed are one. All the human sciences are 
infected with that benign disease. Hence, on a 
reasonable theory, even the physical and 
formal sciences owe their objective standing 
to a steady orderliness perceived within the 
flux of the other. It is that reflexiveness, of 
course, that accounts for the otherwise 
extraordinary speculative leap that connects 
the fate of our theories of persons and selves 
to the fortunes of the largest philosophical 
puzzles. (p.329). 
Certainly the "infection" of reflexivity -or at least the awareness of 
reflexivity- seems to be spreading most rapidly in the human sciences. This 
spread has already reached the point at which some sociologists and 
anthropologists are attempting the unenviable intellectual task of 
examining and 'analysing' the phenomenon of reflexivity in its own right 
«e.g.) Wool gar (1988) has edited a book devoted to examining the extremely 
complicated connections between knowledge and reflexivity). However, the 
problem of reflexivity has been around for a long time, as has already been 
suggested. And, indeed, the awareness of the problem has not been 
restricted to the 'human' sciences or to 'human' scientists. The growing 
obsession of the modern mind with the phenomenon of reflexivity is clearly 
manifested in the following quotes from the physicist Heisenberg (1958) -
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perhaps the most famous advocate from the physical sciences of the need to 
be aware of reflexivity; 
... for the first time in the course of history 
modern man on this earth now confronts 
himself alone. (p. 23) . 
... this new situation emerges most clearly in 
modern science itself where ... we can no 
longer consider 'in themselves' those 
building-stones of ).::latter which we originally 
held to be the last'objective reality. This is so 
because they defy all forms of objective 
location in time and space. (p. 24). 
Thus even in science the object of research is 
no longer nature itself, but man's 
investigation of nature. (p. 24). 
The new mathematical formulae no longer 
describe nature itself but our knowledge of 
nature. We have had to forego the 
description of nature which for centuries was 
considered the obvious aim of all exact 
sciences. (p. 25). 
The scientific method of analysing, 
explaining and classifying has become 
conscious of its limitations, which arise out of 
the fact that by its intervention science alters 
and refashions the object of investigation. In 
other words method and object can no longer 
be separated. The scientific world-view has 
ceased to be a scientific view in the true sense 
of the word. (p. 29). 
For psychologists the problem of reflexivity can be put quite simply: Is it 
possible to know what people are really like? In particular, are people really 
collections of traits, drives, attributional dispositions, learned behaviours -or 
whatever form of psychological explanation is being favoured? It may be a 
commonplace in the philosophy of science to speak of the theory-laden 
nature of observations but is there anything left of an observation in 
psychology after the theory has been carefully dissected out? Even the pre-
theoretical existence of the psychological subject or organism has been 
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challenged «e.g.) Harre, 1984; Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, Venn, and 
~01kerdine, 1984). 
And when psychological knowledge is applied controversy does not subside. 
The practical fruits of an approach can be judged as tasteless or poisonous. 
For example, Schwartz, Schuldenfrei, and Lacey (1978) argued that the 
success of operant psychology methods employed in factories is not because 
people necessarily behave according to operant principles but because the 
factory environment has been so arranged that that is how people will act. If 
they are correct (and it is difficult to see how such a claim could be 
disproved) then the psychologist qua technician could be in the god-like 
position of imposing a view of people onto society which in essence is 
arbitrary. Dixon (1983) termed this "the circular path of a single theory 
science" (p. 338). 
This criticism, of course, is not limited to the behaviourist approach. If 
psychologists are not careful they could bequeath, as Howard (1985) said, "an 
impoverished view of humanity ... [by] viewing humans from an unduly 
narrow perspective, ... " (p.264. Brackets added). 
Yet the alternative may not be much better. While the hegemony of one 
particular approach in psychology may be undermined by pointing out the 
reflexive nature of psychologizing, neither the option of theoretical 
pluralism (Dixon, 1983), nor that of a relativistic social constructionist view 
of psychological theorizing -and knowledge in general «e.g.) Gergen, 1985 )-
are without similar problems. 
Advocating theoretical plurality simply moves the problem of reflexivity 
one step further back. For how is it to be decided which criteria should be 
used to determine which psychological theory is appropriate in any 
particular situation? Psychology may become little more than a factory 
producing psychological theories which the 'powers that be' can peruse at 
their leisure selecting and promoting any theories that suit their needs. Or, 
in less conspiratorial language, psychology may fragment, theoretically, ad 
infinitum losing forever any prospect of communication and comparison 
between different theoretical schools. 
In other words, the political strategy of adopting theoretical pluralism to 
avoid theoretical hegemony should not be misunderstood as an 
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epistemological strategy aimed at discovering or establishing 'warranted' 
knowledge. 
Similarly, a social constructionist view of psychological theories is in the 
paradoxical situation of asserting the very type of theorizing that it claims 
cannot be asserted justifiably. If all knowledge is the product of social forces 
unrelated to any standards of rationality (for any such standards are 
similarly 'socially constructed') then all assertion becomes propaganda. At 
least that would be the feared endpoint of such a relativistic view. Even 
liberal, humanistic values would suffer from this criticism. Is it possible to 
find middle ground between the extremes of dogmatism and relativism -or 
does an entirely new ground need to be found? 
The picture drawn above is in many ways an oversimplification. It serves 
only as an initial introduction to the main argument of this thesis. 
Before outlining the structure that this argument will take, it is necessary to 
clarify three senses in which the phenomenon of reflexivity will be 
discussed. 
(1) Reflexivity as a property of psychology's subject matter. That is, is it 
useful in doing psychology to conceive of people as reflexive? Associated 
with this conceptualization is the characterisation of people as active agents. 
(2) Reflexivity of psychological explanation. That is, can psychological 
explanation give a philosophically coherent account of its own production? 
Or is it either self-refuting or confused? 
(3) Reflexivity in the production and the evaluation of psychological 
theories. That is, is a psychological theory assessable only from within the 
assumptions of that particular theory? Can psychological theories be 
compared within psychology or must it be left to philosophy to sort out the 
theoretical wheat from the chaff? This relates to the issue of whether or not 
there are psychological facts independent of the theory in which they are 
housed. 
In Chapter 1 the possible role of reflexivity in psychology, as just defined, 
will be described in greater detail. Topics such as the desirability of unity in a 
scientific discipline, the place of values in psychology, the existence of two 
competing "cultures" ("scientific" and "humanistic") in psychology (Kimble, 
1984), and the problematic nature of the relationship of clinical psychology 
and psychotherapy to "pure" research will be discussed. 
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Also in Chapter 1 the role of the concept of reflexivity at the level of 
psychology's subject matter and theorizing will be discussed. The conceptual 
confusion surrounding theoretical constructs such as the 'self', the 
'psychological subject' and 'consciousness' will be described, as will the 
debate surrounding the theory of perception initiated by J.J. Gibson (1966; 
1979) and representational theories of perception. 
The topics to be discussed in Chapter 1, Sections 1.2 to 1.7 by no means 
account for all the areas of psychology within which reflexive problems can 
be found. A complete investigation of psychology in this regard would not 
just be exhaustive, it would also be exhausting. Nevertheless, the areas that 
will be covered should at least provide evidence for both the breadth and 
depth of the prevalence of reflexive problems in psychology. 
Chapter 1, Section 1.8 will involve a critical discussion of attempts to bring 
sense to the theoretical diversity and conceptual confusion in psychology - as 
these were outlined in Sections 1.2 to 1.7- at least at the philosophical level. 
The discussion will concentrate on presenting particular theories of 
knowledge that have been mentioned in relation to psychology. 
Chapter 2 will be devoted to a discussion of radical behaviourism insofar as 
it can be seen as providing a coherent philosophical attempt to clarify the 
psychologist's response to the issue of reflexivity. 
The central argument of Chapters 1 and 2 is that attempts made to date have 
not and will not provide a common intellectual foundation for psychology 
which would allow some degree of meaningful communication between 
psychologists of different persuasions. When division seems as inevitable 
and intransigent as it appears in psychology it is likely that any resolution 
will involve a dramatic reorientation towards some fundamental and 
previously unchallenged assumptions. It is not that the rules of the game 
need changing but a whole new game must be played. 
In order to begin to explore such a possibility an interpretation of the 
philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein will be discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. 
This will involve reworking the concepts of 'meaning' and 'epistemology' 
in order to provide the intellectual space and flexibility needed to view the 
phenomenon of reflexivity in psychology less problematically. 
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Chapter 5 will present just such a non-problematic view of the status of 
reflexivity in psychology with reference to the issues discussed in Chapters 1 
and 2. 
Finally, Chapter 6 will summarise and conclude. 
1.2 UNITY IN PSYCHOLOGY? 
1.2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Armstrong (1980) stated that one advantage of the scientific approach is its 
ability to produce a consensus amongst reasonable people. If this is correct 
then an observer could be forgiven for thinking that psychologists are a 
particularly unreasonable and argumentative group of people. For not only 
does psychology manifest 'theoretical diversity' but there is also debate about 
the necessity and desirability of a unified view in psychology. 
Does theoretical disunity in psychology result from the continuing influence 
of the "specter of psychism" (Observer, 1982, p. 293), "animism", and 
"spiritistic philosophy" (Kantor, 1984a, p. 69,70)? Or does it justifiably arise 
because psychological phenomena are "sufficiently dynamic, 
interdependent, and multidimensional as to require multiple theoretical 
renderings and multiple modes of inquiry" (Dixon, 1983, p. 337)? 
For Observer (1971; 1982) unity in science is seen as bringing about the 
efficient and effective orientation to things and events and is undermined 
by a disunity stemming from mentalistic approaches that reinforce the 
"mind-body dogma". Such mentalism with its invisible constructs «e.g.) 
'sensations', 'perceptions', 'ego', etc.) produces unnecessary disagreement 
about "the very nature of what is being studied, rather than how events are 
described and evaluated or the method of investigating them." (Observer, 
1982, p. 292). According to Kantor (1984a) mentalistic notions are nothing 
more than hangovers from spiritistic explanations and are to be contrasted 
with the naturalistic approach of science. 
However, Dixon (1983) believed theoretical diversity should be encouraged 
in "every aspect and at every stage of scientific and philosophical 
investigation." (p. 338). Dixon based this belief on the philosophical work of 
Feyerabend and Popper (termed "fully discredited, irrational and 
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antiscientific" by Kantor, 1984a, p. 70). Feyerabend in particular, according to 
Dixon (1983), sees intellectual (and personal) development as being 
enhanced by a freedom arising from a pluralistic approach where theories 
must be compared with theories as well as with data, facts or experience. 
Dixon (1983) is not alone in advocating pluralism. Walsh and Peterson 
(1985) in a comparison of psychodynamic, humanistic and behaviouristic 
paradigms stated that these three approaches are based on the three 
philosophical schools of idealism, interactionism and empiricism, 
respectively. Since it is not possible, according to them, to reject any of these 
world-views out of hand then the psychological theories based on them 
should not be rejected at present. Also, premature attempts at synthesising 
these theories should not be made as in the past this has "consistently led to 
unsatisfying technical eclecticism and conceptual confusion" (Walsh and 
Peterson, 1985, p. 152). 
Further support for pluralism can be found in the field of 'scientific 
morality' where Leary (1983) advocated a plurality of values. What should 
be noted is that for both Leary (1983) and Dixon (1983) pluralism is not seen 
as a way of arriving at a final 'correct' psychology or morality. Rather, its 
benefit is in preventing the dominance of anyone psychology or morality. 
As Dixon (1983) pointed out, this is based on an evolutionary epistemology 
and a critical realist ontology. Just as organic evolution is a non-teleological 
process of adaptation and change, so too, according to this view, is the 
accrual of knowledge about the world. 
But it is just this metaphysics that Kantor (1984a; 1984b) objected to, 
ironically because of its absolutist and transcendental character. According 
to Kantor (1984b), "Acquaintance with a scientific type of psychology passes 
entirely by all the metaphysical aspects of traditional philosophy." (p. 168). 
And again, "modern psychology ... demands the full participation of 
observers in scientific situations." (p. 168). 
A clue exists here as to how the division between the 'pluralist' and the 
'unificationist' arises (at least in the debate outlined). Put simply, the 
pluralist is concerned with emphasizing scientific theories as 'pictures' of 
how the world is. Thus, it is important that a science -particularly a 'young' 
science- should not be captivated by a single 'picture'. This can only be 
guarded against by having many competing 'pictures'. Conversely, Kantor 
seems more concerned with science as an activity rather than as a collection 
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of 'pictures' of the world. That is, the actual procedure carried out in time is 
ultimately more important to him than judging the validity of a particular 
'picture'. Simply interacting with confrontable events produces the efficient 
and effective orientation toward them that is so essential to science. 
Presumably no 'picture' or theory can provide the information necessary for 
this orientation to take place. 
Armstrong (1985) made a similar point in discussing the difference between 
experience and sensation. A sensation is traditionally viewed as an 
instantaneous awareness of something. Experience, however, according to 
Armstrong, involves "bestirring oneself" (p. 483) and "a movement through 
our circumstances" (p. 484). And Armstrong believed this to be the value of 
the experiment in that it involves directly interacting with the world: 
"Hence for the attainment of knowledge it [experience] implies not just 
watching our circumstances detachedly but engaging with them and seeing 
how we fare" (p. 485). It is commitment to experiencing in this sense that 
Kantor (1984b) seemed to consider the hallmark of a scientific psychology. 
Now, it may be argued that Kantor is himself producing a 'picture' (or 
theory) of what scientific activity is. But, conversely, a pluralist's belief that 
a theory is a picture of reality can be seen as a pattern of behaviour (or, in 
Kantor's case 'interbehaviour') over time. Which is the more fundamental 
view? Do people actually 'picture' and therefore perhaps have mental 
images or representations, or do people actually behave and therefore 
believing in mental images is simply a pattern of behaviour? This 
intriguing question is closely linked to the issue of reflexivity. Does viewing 
thoughts on reflexivity themselves as behaviour over time free the 
psychologist from the reflexive trap? Or is it a 'meta-example' of being in a 
reflexive trap; that of limiting oneself to viewing one's thoughts on 
reflexivity as behaviour over time? 
This dilemma is analogous to the difficulty Wittgenstein found in attempts 
to philosophically reconcile two views of meaning. That of meaning as 
"grasped in a flash" versus meaning as "use extended over time" (Finch, 
1977, pp. 30-33). What eventuated in the philosophy of Wittgenstein from 
the attempt to reconcile these views is discussed in Chapter 4. Of interest, 
although not directly relevant to research in psychology, is that a similar 
duality is found in quantum physics. Specifically, in the wave/particle 
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duality of both light and matter. It is not the purpose of this discussion, 
however, to expand on or try to explain this similarity. 
What are the future prospects for unity in psychology? Lichtenstein (1980) 
predicted and hoped that a "metasystemic" unification will eventually be 
achieved with a "contextualist" or "interactionist" approach (p. 456). This 
would bring together strands including interbehavioural psychology, 
ecological psychology and interactionist and contextualist approaches in both 
cognitive and behaviourist psychology. (For a recent outline of contextualist 
thinking see Jaeger and Rosnow (1988).) 
At another level Giorgi (1985) saw unity in the very idea of scientists seeking 
unity. That is, the scientist "is being guided by a possible unity rather than 
an actual one" (p. 179). He therefore rejected Dixon's (1983) argument on the 
grounds that it does not even seek this unity. Similarly Lee (1985) criticized 
Dixon (1983) for advocating lack of agreement "about fundamental matters" 
(p. 290). She cannot envisage the possibility of psychology becoming a 
science if there is no consensual knowledge at all. 
1.2.2 SUMMARY: UNITY IN PSYCHOLOGY 
Armstrong (1980) suggested that what is good about science is that it 
produces consensus. Lee (1985), however, claimed that psychology needs 
consensus to be a science. It seems that if unity does not exist in fact in 
psychology at some level, then achieving unity in psychology is inevitably 
problematic. 
In Chapter 5, following a discussion of the philosophy of Wittgenstein, an 
attempt will be made to show that the disunity in psychology results, 
paradoxically, from a view of meaning, epistemology and reality that 
psychologists have in common. This common view involves the 
possibility of two seemingly incommensurable approaches to, or outlooks 
on, the 'real' world. 
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1.3 VALVES IN PSYCHOLOGY 
1.3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Discussion of the place of values in psychology is not a recent phenomenon. 
In the first volume of the Journal of Applied Psychology , Roback (1917) 
published an article on the moral issues involved in applying psychology. 
And, as recent comments by Myers and Tweney (1983) and Morawski (1983) 
reveal, psychologists such as Miinsterberg, Hall and McDougall debated the 
values and morality that psychology should possess earlier this century. 
But the particular aspect of the role of values in psychology to be discussed 
here relates directly to the issue of reflexivity. For Howard (1985), 
characteristics of humans such as active agency, reflexivity and human 
values bring into psychology value questions not encountered in other 
sciences. While acknowledging that psychology's claim to be scientific must 
lie "in its adherence to the epistemic values of science ll , Howard (1985) 
insists that the characteristics of humans mentioned above present "a major 
problem in studying humans scientifically. II (p. 259). According to Howard 
(1985), not only does reflexivity influence the psychologist's view of what 
she or he is studying but there is also the problem unique to psychology that 
the 'subject matter' can reflexively interact with the theory the psychologist 
is employing. 
Of course, it could be argued that reflexivity is a problem for psychology in 
this way only because humans are assumed to be reflexive, active agents 
possessing values. But, ironically, such a criticism seems to imply that 
Howard, for example, has acted as a reflexive active agent possessing values. 
To be completely fair this may appear to be ironic only because of the 
necessity of using a language replete with reflexive, agentic, value-ridden 
terms. 
Nevertheless, it seems that there are two options which seem incapable of 
being compared directly. Either psychologists should incorporate the 
reflexive nature of their subject matter and their own activity into their 
theorizing explicitly or they should suspend making such explicit 
assumptions and continue to observe and experiment, interacting directly 
with the subject matter. 
An interesting point is made by Howard (1985) in the following passage; 
Any discussion of human reflexivity begins 
with a consideration of language as the 
mechanism underlying the operation of the 
phenomenon and ends with the role of 
values in steering reflexive human action .... 
These steering values are often embedded in 
one's culture and influence not only 
individuals' everyday actions, but science as 
well. (p. 261). 
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Here is the connection envisaged between values and reflexive human 
action with language acting as the underlying (causal?) mechanism. Such 
an explanation of the operation of reflexivity is similar to the approach of 
Manicas and Secord (1983) towards explanation. This approach will be 
discussed later in this Chapter in Section 1.8.3 as alluded to in the 
'Introduction'. Despite the partisan approach of Howard (1985) the 
connection between a view of language and an understanding of the 
problem of reflexivity is also considered crucial in the present discussion. A 
clear, or at least novel, view of this connection is vital before questions of 
value can be discussed. (See Chapters 3, 4 and 5). 
A point less central to the argument being constructed in these opening 
considerations is also made in the passage quoted above from Howard 
(1985). If values steer reflexive human action, including scientific activity, 
then the door is wide open, of course, to questioning the legitimacy of 
advocating the scientific world-view because of its supposed 'superiority' 
over other world-views. John (1984) picked up on the possibility of this 
questioning occurring in society at large, and in fact claims it has already 
begun. He suggested, therefore, that it may not necessarily be wise for 
psychology to justify its existence as a social institution by claiming a 
scientific status. 
An issue closely related to the place of values in psychology has been 
discerned by Kimble (1984). He presented the results of an empirical study 
that he claims suggests the presence of two distinct cultures within 
psychology. Kimble (1984, p. 833) named these cultures the "scientific" 
(valuing "scientific scholarly values"; (Le.), observation, laboratory work, 
nomothetic laws, elementistic-atomistic analysis) and the "humanistic" 
(valuing "humanistic scholarly values"; (Le.), intuition, field study, 
idiographic laws, holistic level of analysis). 
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A similar distinction on assumptions about psychology and scientific 
epistemology between behaviourist psychologists and non-behaviourist 
psychologists was found by Krasner and Houts (1984). Inevitably, 
considering that what is being debated is a reflexive phenomenon (that is, 
the effect of values on the type of science done), Messer (1985) noted that 
both Kimble's (1984) and Krasner and Houts' (1984) studies have unstated 
assumptions which have determined the method of scientific investigation 
used. (One can imagine a never-ending procession of such articles 
criticizing the previous article for having 'unstated assumptions'- perhaps 
still reflecting the belief that there exists some divine objective standard 'out 
there' coldly judging our best efforts as not objective enough.) 
Despite this criticism the observations of Kimble (1984) and Krasner and 
Houts (1984) can be seen as restating, in a systematic way, the division 
amongst psychologists stemming from the unresolved issue of reflexivity at 
all levels including subject matter, methodology and philosophical outlook. 
As for the future, it is hoped by Krasner (1978) that behaviourists and 
humanists will merge into some form of 'ecological' or 'environmental' 
approach to psychology based on their common values of desiring a "better 
world" and an emphasis on individualism (p. 803). Interestingly, it has 
already been noted in Section 1.2 that there is the hope that a 'contextualist' 
or 'interactionist' approach may unite psychology in a theoretical sense. 
Similarly, Aanstoos (1985) agreed that psychology remains in conflict over 
its scientific and humanistic concerns. However, he believed this conflict 
can be resolved in what he terms "psychology as a human science" (p. 1417). 
To quote Aanstoos (1985); 
Descriptive, phenomenological, qualitative 
procedures are more successful than 
experimen tal, statistical, hypothetico-
deductive ones at disclosing the unique 
meaningfulness of human behaviour. Yet the 
former methods need be no less rigorous, 
systematic, or empirical than the latter. (p. 
1417). 
However, it seems unlikely that such a proclamation would make many 
converts in the behaviourist camp, either methodological or radical. The 
"unique meaningfulness of human behaviour" may seem vital to Aanstoos 
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but such meaningfulness may be easily dispensed with by the behaviourist 
in terms of stimulus-controlled sequences of behaviour formed by 
contingencies of reinforcement or fields of interbehaviour, without recourse 
to phenomenological, qualitative procedures. For example, it was Kantor's 
(1976; cited in Wolf, 1984) aim that "all psychological behavior from the 
simplest reflexes to the most complicated acts of thinking and reasoning 
could be described and interpreted in completely naturalistic terms 
[Emphasis added], analogously to that of the other sciences" (p. 451). 
1.3.2 SUMMARY: VALUES IN PSYCHOLOGY 
It seems then, that the place of values in psychology depends in part upon 
the understanding a researcher has of the role of reflexivity in theorizing. 
The question of values is just one aspect of the treatment of morality. As 
concisely put by Woolfolk and Richardson (1984), "Within a technological 
society the real, objective external reality of the world is constituted 
exclusively by empirically derived 'facts'. Morality comes to be viewed as 
subjective and relative ... " (p. 780). 
This subjectivising and relativising of morality as a concept gives rise to the 
question that Haan (1982; 1983) posed; "Can research on morality be 
'scientific'?". Her own answer is that morality can only be perceived as a 
consensual activity and, indeed, she sees "most social-psychological 
knowledge" (Haan, 1982, p. 1098) in the same light. 
Again, the argument of this thesis, to be outlined in Chapters 1 to 4, implies 
that the subjectivising and relativising of values has an important 'cause' 
and 'effect' in psychology. The 'cause' is to be found in a particular, shared, 
view of epistemology, meaning and reality. The 'effect' is that it suggests the 
possibility of two equally valid positions on values; either minimize or 
eradicate subjective values, or admit that values are inevitable and so always 
make attempts to explicate them. Which option is chosen depends in part 
upon one's understanding of the role of reflexivity in research. As Kimble 
(1984) stated; 
What is still at stake is basic, and interestingly 
the residual sticking points are identical to 
those that have existed for millenia -a 
concern for a subject matter for its own sake 
versus "man as the measure of all things." 
(p.839) 
1.4 'PURE' AND 'APPLIED' PSYCHOLOGY 
1.4.1 INTRODUCTION 
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The issue of values becomes most poignant when the activity of 
psychologists enters the lives of non-psychologists. The difficulties that arise 
at this interface were discussed by Reese and Fremouw (1984). They asked 
whether the normal ethics of science (those ethics actually in use) conform 
to the normative ethics of society (those ethics prescribed and generally 
agreed upon in society), If a conflict exists here/ how is it to be resolved? 
However/ despite the importance of such questions the issue to be examined 
here is more internal to psychology. How is the conceptualization of the 
relationship between theory and application formed and influenced by 
issues of reflexivity? This will be discussed particularly with regard to 
clinical psychology and psychotherapy. 
Middleton and Edwards (1985) believed that the traditional distinction 
between 'pure' and 'applied! research needs to be circumvented. This, they 
c1aimed/ can be done by conceptualizing psychology as both "theory" and 
"need" driven and/ as a consequence, emphasizing understanding "how 
people function in naturally occurring circumstances ... " (p. 149). That is, 
useful theory is not produced in the laboratory and then taken into the 'real 
world' fully formed and ready to be applied. Rather/ theory should develop 
amidst "reality-determined issues and phenomena" to produce "a more 
natural relationship between ... 'theory-driven' and 'need-driven' research .. " 
(p.146). 
Whether correct or not such a call reveals a loss of faith in a world 
composed of facts which can be treated in isolation. Instead the distinction 
between fact and theory blurs to the extent that the 'ecological validity' of 
theories must be sought. The phenomenon studied in the laboratory is not 
the same as the natural phenomenon. While not stated explicitly by 
Middleton and Edwards (1985) it appears that one implicit reason for 
believing there is a difference between phenomena in the laboratory and 
phenomena in the natural situation is likely to be an assumed reflexive 
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capacity in humans. That is, a capacity to 'reflect' on situations in 
unpredictable ways. 
Within clinical psychology (at least in Great Britain) a trend exists in which 
clinical work is seen as research in its own right rather than merely the 
application of methods and principles developed in 'pure' research. Shapiro 
(1985) stated this directly by claiming that there should be no difference 
between clinical work and research. The clinician should "try to make 
explicit the role of scientific method in every aspect of practical work, even 
in the most intimate and moment-to-moment interactions with patients." 
(Shapiro, 1985, p. 2). And Watts (1984) wanted to see clinical psychologists 
carrying out 'applicable' research, that is, research related directly to some 
issue of immediate clinical concern. He criticized the 'applied' research 
being carried out in Britain as being aimed at theoretical or methodological 
ill umina tion. 
Levy (1984) noted the growing pluralistic nature of clinical psychology in the 
United States which now deals with issues such as racism, delinquency, and 
the prevention and management of general health problems. Because of 
this trend Levy (1984) wanted to rename clinical psychology "human 
services psychology" (p. 492). This again suggests that 'applied' psychology is 
a field of research in its own right and does not simply involve the 
application of 'pure' research. 
To summarise; Middleton and Edwards (1985) suggested that 'pure' research 
should be developed in natural situations. Some clinical psychologists 
reflect this view (although no causal connection is being claimed) in their 
desire to be seen as scientific researchers in their own right (Shapiro, 1985; 
Watts, 1984) developing a "human services psychology" (Levy, 1984). 
A shift is occurring here which is important to recognize. Scientific 
psychology is no longer being perceived as a provider of methods and 
techniques, which the practitioner can choose to use or not use at his or her 
discretion. Rather, it is the 'scientific approach' or orientation to the world 
(in this case to clients) which is advocated in itself. It is worth repeating the 
following quote from Shapiro (1985); scientific method should be made 
explicit "even in the most intimate and moment-to-moment interactions 
with patients." (p. 2). 
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But in this area as in other areas of psychology (and perhaps more so) the 
divisions noted in previous sections are present. The trend within clinical 
psychology, as described above, has its antithesis in some psychotherapeutic 
approaches. The nature of an interaction between a client and a therapist in 
psychotherapy is far more controversial and far harder to define and 
prescribe than it is for Shapiro (1985). This indefiniteness is taken to the 
extent where the success of a therapist such as Milton Erickson, for example, 
can seem forever inexplicable. Feldman (1985) suggested that Erickson's 
successful use of a wide variety of methods is explicable in terms of a 
"multisystem model of eclectic therapy." (p. 154). However, without being 
glib it seems that what this means is that Erickson treated all his clients 
individually and simply had a 'knack' for doing the right thing at the right 
time. 
It is interesting to compare this account of Erickson with Kantor's (1984a; 
1984b) and Observer's (1982) accounts of the scientist in action. According to 
Kantor the scientist should relinquish metaphysical speculation and simply 
get on interacting with events so that the most efficient and effective 
orientation to events can be brought about. Similarly, for many 
psychotherapists, conceptualizing what is happening between themselves 
and their clients either while they are interacting or after, seems secondary 
to actually having the effective interaction. 
What Rogers and Stevens (1967) termed "congruence" emphasizes the 
directness necessary in a client-therapist encounter; 
By this [congruence] we mean that the 
feelings the therapist is experiencing are 
available to him, available to his awareness, 
and he is able to live these feelings, be them, 
and able to communicate them if 
appropriate... One of the things which 
offends us about radio and T.V. commercials 
is that it is often perfectly evident from the 
tone of voice that the announcer is "putting 
on," playing a role, saying something he 
doesn't feel. (p. 53. Brackets added). 
'Congruence' is not a prescriptive method. That is, no criterion can be 
explicated as to what a therapist should say or how a therapist should act 
towards a client. It would seem paradoxical if congruence were prescriptive, 
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much as the instruction "Be spontaneous!" would seem paradoxical. That 
is, trying to be spontaneous is likely to stifle rather than enhance 
spontaneity. Similarly, if a therapist 'pictures' to himself or herself how to 
be congruent and then tries to apply that 'picture' in a therapeutic session, 
the chances are the therapist will not be practising congruence. This, of 
course, contrasts with the prescriptive advocacy of a 'scientific method' by 
Shapiro (1985). 
1.4.2 SUMMARY: 'PURE' AND 'APPLIED' PSYCHOLOGY 
The traditional view of 'pure' research providing a prevalidated technology 
for 'applied' workers to use places the question of values at the point of 
application. Value judgments needed to be made only in deciding on the 
applied objectives. This is stated by Wilson and O'Leary (1980; cited in 
Woolfolk and Richardson, 1984) quite clearly; 
Selecting effective techniques with which to 
change behaviour is an empirical question in 
which the therapist is presumably an expert; 
choosing therapeutic objectives is a matter of 
value judgment. .. (p. 782). 
But with the blurring of the distinction between 'pure' and 'applied' 
research, as highlighted by Middleton and Edwards (1985), once again two 
distinctly different possibilities arise. Either the methods of 'pure' research 
can be used more directly in the natural situation (for example, in the 
clinician-client situation) while still retaining the belief in the value-free 
status of these methods (or in their positive value); or, value questions can 
be seen as permeating all aspects of what was previously the two separate 
areas of 'pure' and 'applied' research. In the latter case the practitioner -for 
example, in the 'Rogerian' client-therapist situation- must abandon all 
prescriptive methodologies. In their place stand 'congruence' and 
"unconditional positive regard" (Rogers and Stevens, 1967, p. 54). 
Of course, the alternatives described in this section are the two extremes. 
They have been emphasized because they are consistently derived from the 
two options that arise when the distinction between 'pure' and 'applied' 
research is blurred. In turn, it is suggested here, this blurring has resulted 
from a more reflexive view of theorizing. That is, the kind of theory used 
depends on the observations made which depend, to an extent, on the 
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theory used. Because of this, so it is assumed, 'pure' research can no longer 
play the role of the provider of theory to be used in 'applied' research. 
Resolving the question of where values enter into applied research in 
psychology rests, once again, on the understanding one has of reflexivity in 
psychology. 
1.5 'CONSCIOUSNESS' IN THE HISTORY OF 
PSYCHOLOGY 
1.5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The revival within psychology of interest in concepts such as 
'consciousness', 'self', and 'psychological subject' is generally explained in 
terms of the decline of behaviourism. 'Consciousness' in particular is seen 
by some as a much neglected concept, if not a battered and abused child, in 
psychology. Mandler (1975) spoke of the "harm that consciousness suffered" 
(p. 229) during the ascendency of behaviourism, and Jaynes (1976) of the 
"very real hypocrisy abroad" in that no behaviourist "really believed he was 
not conscious" (p. 15). And Natsoulas (1983) noted the lack of clear thinking 
about consciousness in contemporary psychology, directly attributing this 
state of affairs to the half-century delay in the "development and refinement 
of the conceptual apparatus" (p. 4) necessary to deal with consciousness. 
However, if today's psychologist is not to commit the 'fundamental 
attribution error' by blaming 'narrow-minded' behaviourists for preventing 
the discussion of consciousness and the mind, then an explanation of the 
revival of interest in consciousness, as well as the denial of the importance 
of conceptions of consciousness during this century, must be found. Despite 
the fact that it can be stated in a psychology journal (admittedly by a 
philosopher) that, "[a]lmost any sane psychological theory will account for 
behaviour by reference to internal mental structure" (Morton,1980, p. 29), it 
would be too parochial for the "thoroughly modern mentalist" (Fodor, 1980, 
p. 63), to write off the era of behaviourism as a case of temporary insanity. 
Buss (1978) described the history of psychology in terms of a series of 
revolutions and counter-revolutions based on a "transformation of the 
subject-object relationship. " (p. 59). Buss (1978) derived this view from the 
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transformative method of the German philosopher Feuerbach. Feuerbach's 
insight initially concerned religion and was the realization "that it is 
humanity which is the subject, and God the object, and, in this way, 
humanity can recover its primacy in the natural order" (p. 59). This 
transformation placed humanity in an active rather than a passive role. 
Within psychology Buss (1978) saw transformations occurring between the 
two options of: (a) Person constructs Reality; and, (b) Reality constructs 
Person. The historical changes from structuralism to behaviourism and 
behaviourism to cognitive psychology, and the psychoanalytic and 
humanistic 'revolutions' are all interpreted by Buss (1978) as 
transformations between these two perspectives. According to Buss (1978) 
the end to such non-progressive transformations is the dialectical paradigm 
which "emphasizes the reciprocal, interactive relationship between the 
person and reality" (p. 62). 
As has been discussed in previous sections the call for some type of 
'interactionist' approach within psychology does have support «e.g.) 
Krasner, 1978; Lichtenstein, 1980). However, what is particularly relevant in 
Buss' (1978) analysis is the following statement; 
Such a characterization of revolutionary 
paradigms within psychology is unique to the 
human or social sciences since they are 
reflexive studies. The objects of study in the 
social sciences (people) are also subjects. (p. 
59). 
Once again reflexivity is the issue. If the objects of study in psychology are 
also subjects it is no wonder that violent paradigmatic oscillations can occur. 
But the question must be asked: Is it in fact possible to study a subject qua 
subject? Would such a study result in objectifying the subject (or 'de-
subjectivising' the subject) and thus eliminate subjectivity from the subject? 
Is it possible to have a psychological theory which has a construct, called the 
'subject', which captures the 'subject nature' of being a subject? 
Natsoulas (1978a) in a discussion entitled "Residual Subjectivity" did not 
think so. He states; "A thoroughly objective science cannot include 
concepts whose rules of application require having the respective 
experiences" (p. 275). That is, that one determinant of behaviour involves 
'having' a particular experience. This point is very closely connected to a 
21 
debate in the philosophy of mind literature concerning the existence or non-
existence of 'qualia' (Churchland, 1985; Dennett, 1979; Jackson, 1982; Nagel, 
1974). 'Qualia' are, "certain features of the bodily sensations especially, but 
also of certain perceptual experiences, which no amount of purely physical 
information includes" (Jackson, 1982, p. 127). 
For Nagel (1974) it is these phenomenological features of experience that 
comprise the irreducible subjective character of experience. And Nagel 
(1974) linked this to the concept of consciousness: "the fact that an organism 
has conscious experience at all means, basically, that there is something it is 
like to be that organism "(p. 436). 
The following passage from Dennett (1979) helps to clarify the link Nagel 
(1974) made between conscious experience and being a particular organism -
that is, a subject; 
We are all, I take it, unshakably sure that we 
are each in a special position to report, or to 
know, or to witness or experience a set of 
something-or-others we may call, as neutrally 
as possible, elements of our own conscious 
experience. In short, we all believe in the 
doctrine of privileged access.... There is a 
temptation at this point to analyze this 
privileged access to which experience one is 
having in terms of one's privileged authority 
about the existence or presence or occurrence 
in the experience of such entities as 
sens a tions, men tal images, sense 
impressions, qualia, etc. (p. 93). 
Dennett (1979) did not wish to succumb to such a temptation. Rather, he 
wished to defend the view that "our privileged access extends to no images, 
sensations, impressions, raw feels, or phenomenal properties "(p. 94). 
Now, Buss (1978) said that the objects of study in psychology are also 
subjects. It seems that both Nagel and Dennett would disagree with this 
statement but for different reasons. Nagel (1974) stated that; "My realism 
about the subjective domain in all its forms implies a belief in the existence 
of facts ['realities'] beyond the reach of human concepts" (p. 441. Brackets 
added). So, for Nagel the subjective is a fact but it cannot be conceptualized. 
Therefore, it could not be studied directly by psychology. 
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Dennett (1979) however, would most likely claim that the objects of study in 
psychology are not 'also subjects' because the traditional, intuitive view of 
what makes a subject a subject is simply incorrect. The subject has no 
private access to various qualities such as images, sensations or sense 
impressions. An objective account, according to this view, would leave 
nothing out, including an explanation of everything involved in being a 
subject. 
This distinction between the positions of Dennett and Nagel seems a more 
fundamental difference between the two paradigmatic approaches within 
psychology than does Buss' (1978) explanation of transformations of the 
person/reality polarity. Buss' transformations explain well the distinction 
between cognitive psychology ('Person constructs Reality') and what will be 
termed here, following Skinner (1945, p. 292), methodological 
behaviourism ('Reality constructs Person'). However, at the philosophical 
extremes of radical behaviourism and phenomenological psychology the 
traditionally defined and intuitively grasped concepts of 'Person' and 
'Reality' no longer remain, at least recognizably, in the picture. Nagel's 
(1974) phenomenological reality is essentially inexpressible and thus 
conflicts with common sense reality which, at the very least, can be pointed 
to if not described. Similarly, for Dennett (1979) there is no traditional 
subject ('Person') living in a qualitative world of its own conscious 
experiences. 
A simplified picture may help here. Cognitive psychology and 
methodological behaviourism can be seen as implicitly endorsing the 
intuitive and commonsensically understood concepts of 'Person' and 
'Reality'. However, each approach either ignores one or the other of these 
concepts or encounters serious conceptual problems when attempting to 
accommodate the ignored concept. In this regard some criticisms of the way 
methodological behaviourism treats the mental will be mentioned in the 
discussion of radical behaviourism in Chapter 2. And in Section 1.7 below, 
concerning 'Gibsonian' and representational theories of perception, the 
conceptual problems involved in incorporating 'reality' into cognitive 
psychology will be discussed. 
1.5.2 SUMMARY: 'CONSCIOUSNESS' IN THE HISTORY OF 
PSYCHOLOGY. 
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The above discussion provides a way of understanding the historical shifts 
within psychology in conceptual terms. If paradigmatic shifts are to be 
avoided in the future a conceptual resolution is required which quells the 
.. two fears psychologists have of, as Dennett (1979) termed them, "leaving 
something out [the subject] and multiplying entities beyond necessity [the 
mental realm]" (p. 93. Brackets added). The difficulty is in developing an 
approach to consciousness without presupposing a viewpoint that entails 
either leaving out the subject or multiplying mental entities ad infinitum. 
Given this, one strategy is to examine why it appears unavoidable to adopt 
one of these viewpoints at the start. This examination is a further reason for 
confronting the basic philosophical concepts of meaning and knowledge. 
For philosophy, perhaps, these concepts need only be viewed as abstract 
topics for debate. However, for psychology they represent real problems and 
confusions whose clarification is of great practical import. This is so, firstly, 
because much time and effort is spent on the politics of promoting and 
financing particular approaches. Secondly, and more importantly, 
psychology plays a role in humanity's self-perception through its theoretical 
understanding of human consciousness. Understanding what it could 
possibly mean for humanity to have a 'self-perception' of course brings 
discussion back to the question; "What is consciousness?". 
1.6 'CONSCIOUSNESS' IN CONTEMPORARY 
PSYCHOLOGY 
1.6.1 INTRODUCTION 
According to Natsoulas (1983) contemporary theorizing on consciousness is 
in the position of "virtually starting from scratch" (p. 4). In accordance with 
this belief Natsoulas (1983) presented a rigorous discussion of diverse 
problems of consciousness. These problems were those of conscious 
experience, intentionality, imagination, awareness, introspection, personal 
unity, the subject, 'consciousness' (as more or less), the normal waking state, 
conscious behaviour, and explicit consciousness. 
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It is neither the aim nor within the scope of the present discussion to detail 
all of these problems. Rather, it will now be argued that all of these 
'problems of consciousness' arise from the difficulty of coherently 
incorporating meaning into psychological theories of consciousness. As 
Weimer (1976) persuasively argued: 
And; 
In this sense there is only one problem in 
psychology, and everything in the field is a 
manifestation of it in a particular area. We 
have been grappling with this same problem 
since the dawn of reflective thought, grasping 
at it without ever reaching it at all... The 
problem of when stimuli are equivalent is 
the problem of stimulus recognition which is 
the problem of concept formation, ad 
infinitum, all of which together constitute 
the problems of meaning. Stimuli are 
equivalent, in the last analysis, only because 
they mean the same thing to the organism. 
(p.14). 
The only way to solve the mind-body 
problem is to resolve what meaning is, and 
explicate how it is manifested in the natural 
order. (p.15). 
Hofstadter (1979) stated that it is the perceptions of "isomorphisms" between 
known structures that "create meanings in the minds of people" (p. 50). 
And again; "In my opinion, in fact, the key element in answering the 
question 'What is consciousness?' will be the unravelling [of] the nature of 
the 'isomorphism' which underlies meaning" (p. 82. Brackets added). 
However, such statements manifest the difficulty of incorporating meaning 
rather than helping to overcome this difficulty. That is, perceiving 
isomorphisms is not the explanation but the problem restated. As will be 
discussed in Section 1.7 below, the field of perception in psychology is itself 
embedded in the conceptual difficulties surrounding consciousness and 
meaning. At what point meaning is said to enter the perceptual process can 
determine the type of theory of perception used. Does perception 'create' 
meaning- or as Ullman (1980) would prefer to say, "extract it, integrate it, 
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make it explicit and usable" (p. 381)- or is meaning perceived directly in the 
external world? 
The problem of incorporating meaning into theories of consciousness is 
clearly illustrated using Natsoulas' (1981) 'problem of awareness' as an 
example, although any other problem mentioned by Natsoulas (1981) could 
have been used. According to Natsoulas (1981) an awareness has an 
'intrinsic character' which makes, or at least defines, an awareness as an 
awareness. Distinct from this character are the 'particular contents' of an 
awareness. As he says, "[i]f awarenesses are occurrences, they must have 
further dimensions of characterization than merely their contents" (p. 146. 
Brackets added). Immediately this approach encounters a problem of 
reflexivity (see Reflexivity (2) in Section 1.1 above). How could the 
distinction between the intrinsic character and the contents of an awareness 
have become the contents of someone's awareness? How does the 'intrinsic 
character', existing as a content of an awareness, relate to the actual or 'real' 
intrinsic character of awarenesses? In general, how do contents relate to 
character or nature? 
The above questions are similar to a question Wittgenstein (1974a) posed in 
the Tractatus-Logico Philosophicus : Is it logically possible for a picture to 
picture the way in which it is a picture? That is, of course, given that the 
picture is meant to relate to what it is a picture of in some systematic way. In 
similar vein, Rorty (1973) attacked the coherence of the view that knowledge 
'mirrors' nature. These lines of thinking will be developed more fully in 
Chapter 3. However, with regards to theories of consciousness it seems that 
if contents of awareness are seen as referring to objects then at least one 
approach -that of Wittgenstein (1974a)- suggests that it may be logically 
impossible to know what it means for a 'content' to refer to its own 
'intrinsic character'. That is, there may be no logical way to determine how 
such constructs should be used. Almost paradoxically, the use of these 
constructs may be in showing that they cannot be used. 
These questions are very difficult to answer while maintaining the view 
that awarenesses are occurrences having contents. Only by saying that 
awarenesses, like perceptions, picture or represent the 'real' world does it 
seem possible to claim that the awareness of the intrinsic character of 
awarenesses reveals what the real intrinsic character of awarenesses is like. 
But such a strategy, of course, simply solves the difficulty by fiat. The 
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problem here is similar to the dilemma posed by the 'cognitive paradox' 
which will be discussed in Section 1.7 below. 
Often these problems with the concept of 'awareness' are obscured by 
referring to the phenomenon of 'being aware of being aware'. But exactly 
the same difficulties arise at this level. Natsoulas (1981) saw 'being aware of 
being aware' as the problem of introspection and claims that it is distinct 
from the problem of awareness in the sense of experience. But this depends 
on hypothesizing experience without consciousness so that "one can 
countenance a bat that perceives its environment and feels its body but does 
not know that it does so." (p. 150). The problem with this formulation of 
unconscious 'perception' and 'feeling' is not so much whether such 
phenomena are possible but whether it is possible to talk about and use such 
concepts with sense. Does defining 'perception' and 'feeling' as unconscious 
disallow knowledge of how such concepts can be used? 
Certainly it is difficult to imagine 'consciously' what unconscious perception 
may involve but does that mean that it is logically impossible to express 
such a concept in language? It was questions of this sort that gave rise to 
'logical positivism' and contemporary developments in the philosophy of 
science, which will be briefly discussed in Section 1.8 below. While 
theoretically expedient, making a distinction between 'conscious' and 
'unconscious' hides important differences between the usual ways of 
speaking about these phenomena. 
The difficulty is that an 'awareness' must serve two purposes in theorizing. 
Firstly, it must be a describable and distinct event. It must have 'uni.que 
dimensions of characterization'. Secondly, it must be that which produces, 
and therefore is in some way connected to, the phenomenon of awareness 
of particular contents. The former purpose is involved in developing an 
objective account of awareness. The latter purpose is involved in 
explaining the subjective experience of being aware of particular contents. 
Mandler (1975), in a discussion of consciousness, used the construct of the 
unconscious in a different way from Natsoulas (1981). For Mandler (1975) it 
was the result of thinking, not the process of thinking that appeared 
'spontaneously' in consciousness. He believed that "the solipsisms and 
sophisms of philosophies of mind" are avoided by emphasizing that "the 
conscious individual cannot be conscious... of theoretical processes 
involved to explain his actions" (p. 231). Similarly, Ullman (1980) stated 
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that "the perceptual processes are not necessarily open to conscious 
introspection" (p. 380). However, the philosophical solipsist could well ask 
how unconscious processes 'spontaneously' give birth to consciousness. As 
Miller (1980) expressed with clarity; 
... the discrepancy between a computational 
system that exhibits conscious awareness and 
a computational system that does not requires 
some comment. Either consciousness will be 
dropped from the list of cognitive 
phenomena, or the unconscious system will 
remain a metaphorical account of the 
conscious system. Neither alternative is 
attractive. (p. 146). 
In simple terms, behaviour may be explicable in terms of 'unconscious' 
cognitive processes but is consciousness? 
Returning to Natsoulas (1981), the 'intrinsic character' of awarenesses seems 
analogous to Nagel's (1974) 'subjective character' of experience. Yet, while 
Nagel (1974) admitted that this essential subjectivity is ultimately beyond the 
scope of human concepts, Natsoulas (1981) apparently considered that the 
'intrinsic character' of awarenesses is the very thing that a theory of 
consciousness should aim at encompassing in human concepts. 
As was mentioned with regards to theories of perception one of the 
difficulties with theories of consciousness is determining where meaning 
enters the process. If meaning is not an aspect of consciousness then an 
extremely careful analysis of 'meaning' as a concept is required. (The 
'Skinnerian' understanding of meaning is an attempt at just such an 
analysis- see Chapter 2.) If meaning is an aspect of consciousness then, in 
Natsoulas' (1981) terms, it must occur in either the 'intrinsic character' or 
the 'contents' of an awareness. In this case the difficulty again is in 
explaining how the content of an awareness· might be said to refer to an 
intrinsic character which by definition is distinct from any contents. 
Yet if it is not the 'contents' but the 'intrinsic character' that carries meaning 
then the distinction between content and intrinsic character collapses. This 
is because it would be difficult to defend as meaningful talk about contents 
that by definition are considered to be meaningless when taken on their 
own. Everything would then be a matter of 'intrinsic character' and nothing 
could sensibly be termed 'contents'. And if there is no distinction between 
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contents and intrinsic character then perhaps Marx and Hillix (1979) were 
correct in saying that consciousness is only a tool of study and not an object 
of study. 
However, by invoking reflexivity this conclusion can be shown to be as 
paradoxical as attempts at forming a coherent theory of consciousness. 
Psychologists should be perfectly able to study and theorize about whatever 
appears as or is called consciousness if actual consciousness is truly an 
'unknowable tool'. This is because no a priori limit can be set on how an 
'unknowable tool' can or should be used. To set such a limit -for example, 
that consciousness should not be studied- assumes that it is known that the 
unknowable tool cannot be studied. Possibly, what is implied in stating that 
consciousness should not be studied is that; (a) the commonsensical notions 
of consciousness characterize it correctly, and, (b) such a consciousness is 
incapable of being studied. 
Skinner (1974) suggested that this stance is taken by methodological 
behaviourists and criticized them for thus allowing the existence of the 
mental world. It is true that some species of mental world seems to 
characterize the predominant commonsensical notions about consciousness. 
In particular, the commonsense belief seems to involve, as an essential 
element, a private mental world. As Mandler (1975) said; 
The individual experiences feelings, attitudes, 
thoughts, images, ideas, beliefs and other 
contents of consciousness, but these contents 
are not accessible to anyone else. Briefly 
stated, that is the special problem facing 
psychologists. There are no evasions possible. 
(p.231). 
This is the doctrine of 'privileged access' mentioned in the previous section 
in a quote from Dennett (1979). Further discussion of the question of 
privacy arises in Chapter 2, Sections 2.3 and 2.4 and in Chapter 5, Section 
5.3.4-- in overviews of the radical behaviourist and 'Wittgensteinian' 
approaches, respectively. 
Once a mental world is accepted then the mental can be regarded as having 
either a causal or non-causal role in the physical world. These possibilities, 
of course, are the traditional positions taken by philosophers on the mind-
body problem. Postulating a causal role for the mental world reflects the 
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philosophical position of interactionism while holding to a non-causal role 
reflects either epiphenomenalism or psycho-physicoparallelism. 
If interactionism is assumed then psychological theories face the problem of 
explaining how consciousness interacts with the world. If the mental world 
has a physical substrate then there remains the problem of how meaning, as 
'referring' or 'intending', could arise from the physical substrate. However, 
if the mental world is independent of the physical world then the means of 
interaction becomes inexplicable almost by definition. 
Terms such as 'will' or 'agentic nature' which might be used in attempts to 
bridge the gap between the mental and the physical have meaning in the 
sense of being the referents of causal, explanatory constructs. Nevertheless, 
they seem to lack meaning in the sense of having 'unique dimensions of 
characterization' that are distinct from the behavioural phenomena they 
seek to explain. 
Alternatively, if epiphenomenonalism or psycho-physicoparallelism are 
assumed then the familiar solipsistic difficulties are encountered. That is, if 
consciousness is an epiphenomenon then it is difficult to explain how an 
epiphenomenon could be said to have 'knowledge of' the phenomena of 
which it is an epiphenomenon. (At least that is, without making arbitrary 
assumptions about the nature of the world. And, of course, as discussed 
above in Section 1.2, it is the apparent arbitrariness of such assumptions that 
is at the heart of much of the theoretical disunity in psychology.) The 
'intentional' connection that links theoretical constructs to the phenomena 
they refer to would thus be undermined. This in turn would weaken any 
claims to knowledge of the world 'as it is'. 
For example, if consciousness were an epiphenomenon -in the way in 
which the noise of an engine is to the functioning of an engine- then is it 
possible to even imagine how such a noise could ever meaningfully refer to 
anything, including the fact of its being a noise? 
An alternative to all of the above approaches to consciousness is a strict 
physical monism. This position is found in the interbehavioural 
psychology of Kantor as the assumption of naturalism, and in the radical 
behaviourism of Skinner. In Chapter 2 radical behaviourism will be 
examined to determine how satisfactory it is as a treatment of consciousness 
and reflexivity in general. 
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While the above discussion is an extreme simplification -a more detailed 
account is presented by Weimer (1976)- the aim was to show that 
contemporary attempts in psychology to understand consciousness are 
founded on the traditional philosophical positions taken on the mind-body 
problem. These positions all have their idiosyncratic difficulties. The claim 
made here is that the difficulties arise from an inability to accommodate the 
two views of meaning. That is, meaning as 'reference' (the mind) and 
meaning as 'activity over time' (the body). Attempts to explain how 
meaning as reference might arise in the natural order themselves risk 
becoming meaningless since it is unclear what the referents of their own 
explanatory constructs could possibly be. 
lt is because of this difficulty that a philosophical investigation of meaning is 
considered necessary before satisfactory psychological theorizing on 
consciousness can be achieved. Despite claims by some «e.g.) Libet's (1985) 
attempt to combine "unconscious cerebral initiative" and the "conscious 
will" -po 529) perhaps Hilgard (1980) was right when he said with respect to 
the mind-body problem; 
My reaction is that psychologists and 
physiologists have to be modest in the face of 
this problem ... I do not see that our methods 
give us any advantage [over philosophers] at 
the ultimate level of metaphysical analysis. 
(p. 15. Brackets added). 
But Hilgard (1980) does advocate what he terms a 'heuristic' use of the 
concept of consciousness. Whatever, it is a fact that consciousness is once 
more being widely discussed in psychology. Neisser (1979) stated, " I am not 
sure whether psychology is ready for consciousness even now" (p. 100) but 
many psychologists are prepared to take the risk that it is «e.g.) Globus, 
Maxwell and Savodnik, 1976; Hilgard, 1980; Mandler, 1975; Natsoulas, 
1978a; 1978b; 1981; 1983). 
1.6.2 THE 'SUBJECT' IN PSYCHOLOGY 
Associated with the revival of interest in consciousness within psychology 
has been a discussion in the philosophy of mind literature on the 
distinctiveness of human consciousness, particularly in connection with the 
advances made in the field of artificial intelligence «e.g.) Baker, 1981; Block, 
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1980; Dennett,1980; Eccles, 1980; Fodor, 1981; Hofstadter, 1980; Natsoulas, 
1980; Searle, 1980). An important corollary to both the philosophy of mind 
literature and discussion of consciousness in psychology is the nature and 
role of the subject. For the purposes of this discussion 'subject' refers to 
what Natsoulas (1981) called the traditional view of the subject as a "causal 
agent self" (p. 156). 
Searle (1980) claimed that intentionality is not explicable in terms of 
"instantiating a computer program" since "it is possible for something to 
instantiate that program and still not have any mental states." (p. 424). 
Instead, Searle (1980) considered intentionality to result from the 'causal 
powers' of the brain. Now, intentionality can be seen as a distinguishing 
characteristic of a conscious agent. In fact Baker (1981) suggested that 
formulating intentions is necessary in order for something to be an agent. 
Therefore, arguments about how and where intentionality is produced 
implicate particular understandings of 'what it is like to be a subject.' 
But the idea of an individualized intentional being is itself being addressed 
with renewed interest in the psychology literature. For example, Harre 
(1974) produced an embryonic theory of "a human being as a responsible 
agent, capable of constructing and managing his social world." (p. 243). 
Later, Harre (1979; 1983; 1984) came to see the mind and even the 'self' as 
having social origins, which brings the causal explanation full circle. 
Because of this the role of reflexivity, at least in social psychological 
theorizing, presumably becomes vital. That is, to what extent is the social 
psychologist to be considered as a responsible agent, constructing and 
managing his social world as opposed to a socially constructed product? It 
should be noted that the implication that this represents an intractable 
ambiguity is not being made here. Rather, this dilemma simply emphasizes 
the difficulty of understanding the place of values in psychology as was 
discussed in Section 1.3 above. 
More radical analyses of the socially constructed and mediated nature of the 
subject in psychology include Harre (1989), Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, 
Venn and Wolkerdine (1984), Sampson (1983; 1985; 1989) -for a recent 
compilation see Shotter and Gergen (1989). In these approaches theoretical 
problems associated with consciousness and the nature of the subject are 
avoided by emphasizing the processes that produce and maintain concepts 
of individualism and personal identity. In particular, Henriques et al (1984) 
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focused on revealing what influence psychology and psychologists have on 
the formation of constructs in the social world. Under this view even 
humanistic psychology is seen as reinforcing individualism (a point made 
by Krasner (1978) as a reason for the reconciliation of behaviourism with 
humanistic psychology-- see Section 1.3 above). But even with such radical 
formulations of the subject the problem of incorporating meaning into the 
social world, if not into the consciousness of the individual, is still present. 
The difficulties of a social constructionist epistemology will be discussed in 
Section 1.8.4. However, brief mention of these difficulties should be made 
here. 
If intentionality is at least an aspect of what it is to be a 'subject' then, if the 
revised theories of the subject and personal identity are intended as 
assertions- and presumably they are- it follows that a subject of a sort still 
exists. Whether this subject should be properly understood as occupying the 
minds of individuals or as the product of some socially mediated process is a 
question at a different level. That is, primarily, it is the phenomenon of 
intentionality (meaning as 'reference') that is problematic and relevant to 
the present discussion, not the ontological status of the subject. This is 
because the ontological status of the subject follows from a referential view 
of meaning. It is the subject as 'causal agent self' rather than as metaphysical 
being that needs explicating. To this extent a 'causal agent social process' is 
just as problematic as a 'causal agent self'. 
1.6.3 SUMMARY: 'CONSCIOUSNESS' IN CONTEMPORARY 
PSYCHOLOGY 
An attempt has been made to show how some conceptual problems to do 
with theorizing on consciousness in psychology stem from two distinct 
views of meaning. While consciousness is a phenomenon that all people 
feel able to 'refer to' great difficulties remain in using the construct in a 
psychological theory. Furthermore, it has been suggested that this 
distinction is analogous to, and in fact underlies, problems in understanding 
what it means to be a subject. 
Psychological approaches to understanding consciousness have been viewed 
in this context as reflecting traditional philosophical positions on the mind-
body problem «e.g.) interactionism, epiphenomenalism, psycho-physico 
parallelism, physical monism). Because of the philosophical basis of 
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theories of consciousness it is considered necessary to carry out a 
philosophical examination of the concept of 'meaning'. This will be 
attempted in Chapters 3 and 4 using the philosophy of Wittgenstein as one 
possible approach. 
1.7 THEORIES OF PERCEPTION IN 
PSYCHOLOGY 
1.7.1 INTRODUCTION 
For the cognitive psychologist perception is the basis of all cognitive 
processes. Conceptually it is an important area for two reasons. Firstly, as 
Neisser (1976) stated, "perceiving is the basic cognitive activity out of which 
all others must emerge" (p. 9). If cognition is the activity of knowing then it 
"seems obvious that we have to obtain knowledge before we can use it" (p. 
13). Perception is this process of obtaining knowledge. Secondly, 
"perception is where cognition and reality meet" (Neisser, 1976, p. 9). 
Having a clear understanding of this encounter must be essential to any 
theory of perception, and, because of the first point, any cognitive 
psychology. 
The following discussion highlights some of the problems and debates at 
this interface between cognition and reality. In the wider sense this 
discussion will attempt to show once again how different understandings of 
reflexivity and meaning intrude to create divisions. To achieve this the 
'Gibsonian' or ecological approach to perception will be contrasted with 
what can be termed the 'representational' view of perception. 
1.7.2 PERCEPTION AS REPRESENTATION 
Fodor (1980) characterized what he called the "representational theory of the 
mind" as having two basic assumptions. Firstly, "[t]o think (e.g.) that 
Marvin is melancholy is to represent Marvin in a certain way" (p. 63. 
Brackets added). And, secondly, "we are in some or other relation to a 
representation of Marvin" (p. 63. Emphasis added). For the purposes of this 
discussion the term 'representational theory of mind' will include both 
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information processing and schemata based theories of cognition and 
perception. In both approaches reality is mediated in order to be perceived. 
The information processing view of perception is part of the "computational 
theory of mind" (Fodor, 1980, p. 63) and is called "indirect perception" by 
proponents of "Gibsonian" or "direct" perception (Michaels and Carello, 
1981, p. 2). In the computational approach "the regularities of perception 
must be stated over perceived properties- i.e. over internal representations" 
(Pylyshyn, 1980, p. 112). That is, the complexity of patterns of behaviour is 
best explained by hypothesizing the existence of an internal representation 
from which particular behaviours can be predicted. 
It is in this sense that internal representations serve to categorize 
phenomena in the world. In fact, Bruner (1973) claimed that "all perceptual 
experience is necessarily the end product of a categorization process" (p. 8). 
Already it can be seen that the representational approach is emphasizing 
meaning as 'reference'. A mental entity in some way refers to ('means') the 
world it represents. This entity explains behaviour just because it refers. 
At this point, in order to avoid confusion, it should be noted that Ullman 
(1980) admits that the "mediating processes in the 
computational/representational theory do not operate on subjective 
experiences ... nor are they intended to account for their origin" (p. 380). 
Also, the perceptual processes "are not necessarily open to conscious 
introspection" (p. 380). Rather, the "complexity of these underlying 
processes may be veiled by the subjective ease and immediacy of perception" 
(p. 380). Thus, it is not the subjective experience of perceiving or 'knowing' 
-or what one 'thinks' one perceives or knows- that a computational 
approach tries to explain, but, instead, behaviour. As has already been 
noted (See Section 1.6.1) it was because of this inability to explain conscious 
experience that Miller (1980) found computational theories essentially 
disappoin ting. 
However, this relegation of perceptual processes to the unconscious is more 
than disappointing, it also creates severe conceptual difficulties. Miller 
(1980) feared using the unconscious computational theory of mind as a 
model of consciousness. But what may be even more deceptive, 
conceptually, is modelling unconscious computation along the lines of an 
implicit view of consciousness. That is, the computational! representational 
account of perception may be employing a vital aspect of traditional accounts 
35 
of subjective experience (or consciousness) which Ullman (1980) admits the 
computational/representational approach cannot explain. That 'vital 
aspect' is, of course, representation itself. 
It is suggested here that the concepts of 'representation' and 'computation' 
are used most often when the presence of a subject is being implied. This is 
where the computer analogy has difficulties. For while the computer can be 
said to have internal representations from the perspective of the 
programmer the machine itself can have no such knowledge of 
representations. The programmer may be able to compare the computer's 
physically realized representations with what they represent but the 
machine must forever be confined to its 'representations.' The computer 
qua machine does not 'compute' (See Harris, 1988, for a very interesting 
discussion of what he terms the 'language machine'). 
Heil (1981) made the same point in criticizing Fodor's (1975) computational 
approach in the following terms; 
This is not to deny that we may choose to 
regard particular goings-on inside a digital 
computer as standing for various things. But 
it is we, a community of language-users, who 
bestow significance on these goings-on. 
Programmers provide an essential link 
between their computing machines and the 
world. (p. 341). 
However, subsequently Fodor (1980) made the same point, and quite 
rigorously, so it would be worth relating it here in some detail. While 
accepting that there are such things as mental representations Fodor (1980) 
argued that they are not involved in mental processes via their semantic 
properties (which include the property of being a representation) but rather 
through their formal ("non-semantic") properties. He termed this the 
"formality condition." In his own words; 
If mental processes are formal, then they 
have access only to the formal properties of 
such representations of the environment as 
the senses provide. Hence, they have no 
access to the semantic properties of such 
representations, including the property of 
being true, of having referents, or indeed, the 
property of being representations of the 
environment (Fodor, 1980, p. 65). 
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Fodor (1980) claimed that psychology must at least accept this formality 
condition particularly because it is differences in formal properties that 
allow differences in causal role. And, "it is hard to see how internal 
representations could differ in causal role unless they differed in form" 
(Fodor, 1980, p. 68). 
Fodor (1980) concluded that acceptance of the formality condition creates 
methodological solipsism . This is because 'being a representation' is a 
semantic property of a representation and therefore, under the formality 
condition, not psychologically explicable. Yet, the only way that a mental 
state or process can avoid solipsism, so it seems, is by virtue of it being a 
representation. Fodor (1980) thus deemed a naturalistic psychology of 
mental states (one which incorporates semantic properties into mental 
processes) a virtual impossibility and that therefore a computational 
psychology is all that should be expected. 
Despite these arguments for methodological solipsism Fodor (1980) 
remained certain that semantic properties do exist in that they have 
something to do with how people are "embedded in the world" (p. 66). As 
he continued, "it's just that truth, reference and the rest of the semantic 
notions aren't psychological categories. What they are is: they're modes of 
Dasein ." (p. 71). 'Dasein' is a concept of the philosopher Heidegger and 
refers to the transcendental situation of being-in-the-world without the 
Cartesian subject/object split. This as opposed to being solipsistically isolated 
from the world. 
However, Globus (1984) argued that Fodor was wrong to confine solipsism 
to psychology by asserting the reality of 'Dasein.' Rather, Globus (1984) 
claimed that even Dasein must be 'supervenient' on the brain. And, after 
critiquing three theories of perception ('classical representation theory,' 
'information pick-up theory' and 'feature detection theory') with regard to 
their physical realization in terms of brain functioning, he concluded that 
the brain was necessarily a "windowless monad" (p. 243). That is, the brain 
operates in brain terms and can never know reality in 'reality terms.' 
Therefore, solipsism must be the reality and not just a methodological 
strategy in psychology. 
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This brings the discussion to the question of how a representational theory 
of perception incorporates reality. Of course, for Fodor such a theory cannot 
incorporate an independent reality because of the necessity for 
methodological solipsism. But, traditionally, representational theories have 
assumed the presence of an independent reality. Katz and Frost (1979) 
claimed that such representational theories end in the "cognitive paradox" 
(pp.41-42). The paradox arises from assuming that perception is determined 
both by a structured world and a structuring organism who reconstructs the 
world. According to Katz and Frost (1979), in order to reconstruct the world 
"a comparison between a mental structure and a real world standard" (p. 42) 
is required. But under the representational theory of mind no such real 
world standard is available as that would imply direct access to the real 
world. And, if direct access were a possibility then what purpose would 
mental structure serve? 
Wilcox and Katz (1981) made similar criticisms of the idea of 'stored mental 
representations' in theories of memory. Rakover (1983) responded to these 
criticisms by claiming that the false alternatives of solipsism and direct 
access are avoided if a "computer-like" rather than a "human-like" model of 
mental processes is used (pp. 55-56). Solipsism could be avoided, according 
to Rakover (1983) by making the (familiar) strategic move of dividing the 
output of a mental process (in this case 'recognition' using a feature analyzer 
schema) in two. In a way that is reminiscent of Natsoulas' (1981) distinction 
between the content and the intrinsic character of an awareness, Rakover 
(1983) hoped to distinguish the content of the product of a feature analyzer 
schema (which content is provided by "the stimulus itself") from the 
"categories of observation and analysis" (p. 59). The real world thus enters 
as content. But, a content that is distinct from "categories of observation and 
analysis" at the very least is theoretically redundant and unverifiable and at 
worst is an illusory impediment to a clear account of perception. This is 
why Bruner (1973) saw categorization as the whole of the phenomenon of 
perception. As he said: 
Andi 
[t]he rather bold assumption that we shall 
make at the outset is that all perceptual 
experience is necessarily the end product of a 
categorization process. (p. 8. Brackets added). 
If perceptual experience is ever had raw, that 
is, free of categorial identity, it is doomed to 
be a gem, serene, locked in the silence of 
private experience. (p. 9). 
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Perhaps 'content' as a theoretical concept could be used as a catch-all term 
for what has not yet been explicitly shown to be the result of categorization. 
But that usage would not avoid solipsism which was Rakover's (1983) aim. 
While pure content may be a compelling commonsensical picture of a 
person's relationship to reality it remains anomalous. 'Content' -or 'private 
experience' or "perceptual fulfillment" (Globus, 1984, p. 239)- is, by 
definition, invulnerable to analysis. To use it as a way of avoiding solipsism 
is akin to invoking God to avoid meaninglessness. 
It is convenient at this point to note the way in which meaning is 
incorporated into the approaches to perception discussed so far. 
For Fodor (1980) meaning does not enter into a psychological theory of the 
mind at all. Meaning exists, he insists, but has nothing to do with 
psychologically explaining behaviour. For other representational theories of 
perception meaningful knowledge of the world is produced as the end 
product of a mental process. That is, meaning emerges from a pre-
meaningful process. This process was referred to by Bruner (1973) in the 
following terms; 
If we have implied that categorizing is often a 
silent or unconscious process, that we do not 
experience a going-from-no-identity to an 
arrival-at-identity, but that the first hallmark 
of any perception is some form of identity, 
this does not free us of the responsibility of 
inquiring into the origin of categories. (pp. 9-
10). 
Perception from this viewpoint incorporates meaning as a referential «Le.) 
'categorizing', 'propositional') end-product of a cognitive process. And part 
of the responsibility of psychology, presumably, would be to theorize 
concerning this process. 
Before seeing how Gibsonian perception incorporates meaning, Neisser's 
(1976) schemata based theory of perception will be examined. 
Neisser's (1976) 'schemata' can be seen as an attempt to amalgamate 
representational and Gibsonian approaches to perception. For Neisser 
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(1976), "[a] schema is that portion of the entire perceptual cycle which is 
internal to the perceiver, modifiable by experience, and somehow specific to 
what is being perceived" (p. 54. Brackets added). A schema can act as both 
an information-accepting format and as a plan for finding information to fill 
the format. Neisser (1976) believed this dual-aspect of schemata to be 
necessary because, on the one hand, "perception, like evolution, is surely a 
matter of discovering what the environment is really like and adapting to 
it" (p. 9). And, on the other hand, "[t]here must be definite kinds of 
structure in every perceiving organism to enable it to notice certain aspects 
of the environment rather than others, or indeed to notice anything at all." 
(p.9. Brackets added). 
However, rather than avoiding conceptual difficulties the dual purpose of 
Neisser's schemata brings these difficulties into starker contrast. The whole 
thrust of the 'cognitive paradox' and Fodor's (1980) argument for accepting 
the formality condition is that perception cannot both represent reality as a 
mental structure and hope to be involved in discovering what "the 
environment is really like and adapting to it." Simply stating that schemata 
can do this does not really allay the concerns underiying these criticisms. 
If representational perception is caught between solipsism and paradox one 
alternative is to dispense with representation altogether. Gibsonian 
perception will now be examined as an attempt to resolve this dilemma. 
1.7.3 GIBSONIAN PERCEPTION 
Over recent decades an approach to perception has been developed variously 
referred to as 'Gibsonian', 'Direct' and 'Information pick-up' perception 
«e.g.) Gibson, 1966; 1979; Michaels and Carello, 1981). From this, a new 
approach to psychology has begun to emerge called 'ecological psychology' 
«e.g.) Shaw and Bransford, 1977; Shaw, Turvey, and Mace, 1982). A full 
account of this approach is impossible here. However, points of contrast 
with representational theories of perception can still be usefully noted. 
One of the central concepts of Gibsonian perception is that of information 
Information "is structure that specifies an environment to an animal" and it 
"is carried by higher-order patterns of stimulation ... complex structures often 
given over time" (Michaels and Carello, 1981, p. 9). The connection to the 
environment is direct -thus, 'direct perception'- in that this information is 
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already in the environment and it is immediately 'picked up' by the 
organism. No processing or internal representations of any kind are 
required. 
The philosophical foundation of this approach has been termed direct 
realism (Katz and Frost, 1979; Michaels and Carello, 1981). The 
environment is directly perceived (and therefore reality is directly 
perceived) because, from· the ecological perspective, the environment is 
informa tion. 
This point can be clarified by mentioning how 'time' and 'stimuli' are 
reconceived in ecological psychology. Michaels and Carello (1981) suggested 
that it is not absolute time -the Newtonian clock ticking away outside the 
universe- but change that is more fundamental to an organism in its 
environment. And this leads to an emphasis on events as stimuli rather 
than moment-by-moment sensory 'snapshots'. An event "lasts as long as it 
has to" (p. 10) in that it provides particular information -manifest over 
(absolute) time- specifying a particular environment. 
Thus an organism can be said to have perceived a particular event when it 
can be shown that an organism's history of activity corresponds, in the ideal 
research situation, to the picking up of exactly this information. More to 
the point, what the organism must be shown to have 'picked up' (the term 
'pick up' is not really adequate as it can appear to imply 'recognition' which 
is part of the mentalistic paradigm that the ecological approach seeks to. 
avoid) is the environmental invariant comprising the particular 
information. 
An invariant is that specification in a pattern of energy stimulating the 
senses over time and space that is unchanged by certain transformations. 
For example, when a person walks around a rectangular table it must be 
shown that there is an aspect of the pattern of energy stimulating the eyes 
that remains constant while walking, and which specifies 'rectangular', To 
complete the nomenclature a structural invariant is that which specifies an 
object while a transformational invariant specifies an event (Michaels and 
Carello, 1981, p. 19ff.). 
Direct perception challenges two assumptions of tradi tional thinking in 
perception. These are; 
... the assumed distinction between the object 
of reference and the object of experience, and 
the assumption of perception as propositional 
and error-prone. (Shaw, Turvey and Mace, 
1982, p. 161). 
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These two assumptions are related and can be demonstrated with an 
example. A (perhaps distracted) perceiver may hear what appears to be the 
onset of an earthquake when 'in reality' it is only his partner snoring. The 
object of reference (the partner snoring) and the object of experience (the 
beginnings of an earthquake) are distinct, insofar as they differ as 
propositions about reality. The ecological approach, however, would treat 
the perception of an earthquake nonpropositionally, as part of the ongoing 
adaptive orientation of the perceiver. That is, the perception of an 
earthquake may form part of the perceiver's exploratory and investigatory 
activity leading to a further perception (also treated nonpropositionally) of 
the partner snoring. 
To treat perceptions as propositional can lead only to the philosophical 
'black-hole' of unrelenting scepticism. For how is the veridicality of a 
perception to be judged except by using another perception? By treating 
perceptions nonpropositionally there is therefore no need to distinguish 
between the object of reference (which, when treated propositionally, turns 
out to be another perception) and the object of perception. With the collapse 
of this distinction perception can be of the real world. 
Even with such a brief outline of Gibsonian perception the way in which the 
concept of meaning is incorporated is evident. The 'meaning' of a 
perception is not its propositional or referential aspect. A perception does 
not refer to the world. Rather, from the Gibsonian perspective, the 
'meaning' of a perception is to be found in the ongoing activity of an animal 
in its environment. A perception is not a momentary end-product of a 
process but is an event in time and space. So the meaning of a perception is 
to be studied as an activity. 
Furthermore, meaning is primary and is not constructed. That is, 'meaning' 
is the starting point of perception and is to be found in the information the 
environment provides, via the organism's activity. Gibson (1979) termed 
this providence affordance. As Michaels and Carello (1981) explained; 
And; 
... at its simplest, it could be said that an 
affordance is what the environment means to 
a perceiver. . .. That chairs afford sitting and 
cliffs afford avoiding is news to no one; but 
for Gibson, it is the affordance that is 
perceived. (p.42). 
To say that affordances are perceived means 
that information specifying these affordances 
is available in the stimulation and can be 
detected by a properly attuned perceptual 
system. To detect affordances is, quite simply, 
to detect meaning. (p.42). 
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Therefore, for an ecological psychologist it seems that the affordance (the 
meaning) is the starting point of any study of perception. 
One possible criticism of this approach reflects its ecological and 
evolutionary basis. Just as evolutionary biology and ecology have been 
criticized for inviting essentially tautological 'adaptationist' explanations of 
biological phenomena «e.g.) Gould and Lewontin, 1979), so too, 
'affordances' could be similarly criticized. For example, if a cliff affords 
avoidance might it also afford throwing oneself off. If so, then how can it be 
shown that a particular affordance was perceived? Simply by what the 
person does? Is this not tautological? 
Fortunately for the ecological psychologist this criticism arises from 
picturing the process of perceiving an affordance in representational terms. 
That is, the criticism assumes that a mental representation of an affordance, 
or some such thing, is reqUired in order to perceive an affordance. But, of 
course, affordances are not mentally represented by a perceiver but "belong 
to animal-environment systems and nothing less" (Michaels and Carello, 
1981, p. 42). While calculating exactly which affordance a perceiver will 
perceive in a certain situation may be an extremely complex task (perhaps 
requiring as yet undeveloped mathematics and technology) it would be 
possible, at least in principle. This is because an affordance is manifested in 
the energy patterns stimulating the senses, and energy is considered an 
objective, measurable entity. 
A more damaging criticism of Gibsonian perception, insofar as it is 
unanswerable, lies external rather than internal to the approach. This 
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criticism invokes the issue of reflexivity. Gibsonian perception, or, more 
accurately, ecological psychology, avoids internal conceptual difficulties (for 
the sake of argument this will be conceded) only by redefining all perceptual 
phenomena and concepts at the start. Thus, the criticism can be made that 
difficulties of perception are simply being denied by edict. Like the fabled 
emperor dissuaded from trusting the evidence of his own eyes (regarding 
his nakedness) psychologists may be being dissuaded from trusting the 
evidence of their own 'minds' (regarding the mental world). 
1.7.4 SUMMARY: THEORIES OF PERCEPTION 
It has been suggested that different approaches to perception 
(representational, computational, schemata-based, Gibsonian) incorporate 
the concepts of meaning and reality differently into their theories. Meaning 
is constructed (representational), ignored (computational), primary 
(Gibsonian), or both constructed and primary (schemata-based). Reality is 
mediated (representational), ignored (computational), directly perceived 
(Gibsonian), or both mediated and directly perceived (schemata-based). 
In simplified terms the representational, computational, and schemata-
based approaches to perception are faced with the dilemma of either 
solipsism or paradox. Gibsonian perception avoids this dilemma but 
perhaps only by the strategy of programmatic denial. 
Whether it is necessary to decide between the different approaches relates to 
the issue of unity versus plurality in science already discussed (Section 1.2). 
But, the question of whether it is possible to make such a decision must wait 
for an answer until after an examination of the concepts of 'meaning', 
'knowledge' and 'reflexivity' is carried out. 
1.8 THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE IN 
PSYCHOLOGY 
1.8.1 INTRODUCTION 
Epistemology is of interest in the present discussion since theories of 
knowledge are related to understandings of reflexivity in all three senses 
defined in Section 1.1. What is of particular relevance, and that which will 
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now be outlined, is the debate in the literature as to what knowledge does 
and should involve in terms of psychological theories. Consistent with the 
discussions presented above, the aim of this section will be to reveal implicit 
views of the concept of 'meaning' in the various proposed epistemologies. 
Critiques of three approaches will be discussed. First, what has been called 
the "positivist program" (Gergen, 1979) and, one of its offshoots, the 
"standard view of science" (Manicas and Secord, 1983) will be presented. 
Second, the "realist" view of science as outlined by Harre and Secord (1972), 
Harre (1974) and Manicas and Secord (1983) will be discussed. Third, the 
"social constructionist" approach to knowledge as described by Gergen (1985; 
1986; 1988) will be outlined. 
1.8.2 THE POSITIVIST APPROACH IN PSYCHOLOGY 
As is usually the case, an implicit approach is often first explicated by those 
critical of the approach. Gergen (1979; 1985) mentioned some psychological 
assumptions he thought implicit in what he termed the "positivist 
program." In particular, he emphasized that this program was based on a 
subject-object dualism (Gergen, 1985). Thus, Gergen (1979) believed that 
psychology was inheriting its most basic assumption about what a 
psychological being is, from the positivist philosophy of science. As he 
remarked, the positivist philosophy of science assumes that there is "a world 
of palpable substance that may be explored and understood through proper 
employment of our human faculties" (Gergen, 1979; p. 195). That is, the 
"dualist" epistemology underlying positivism presupposed a particular 
psychology. 
Gergen (1979) also listed other psychological assumptions of the positivist 
approach. The list included the distinguishing of cognitive from affective 
processes and seeing the latter as inferior in the "quest for fundamental 
truth." But it is the presence of the untested assumption that there is an 
independent subject exploring an independent world that is at the heart of 
Gergen's criticisms. In summary, knowledge, in the positivist approach, 
involves discovering what the world is like. 
One manifestation of the positivist program has been termed the "standard 
view of science" by Manicas and Secord (1983). They described several 
philosophical aspects of this view including; a foundationalist epistemology 
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(in which scientific propositions are founded on "facts"), a "Humean" 
conception of causality (in which "causal relations are regular contingent 
relations between events", Manicas and Secord, 1983, p. 400), and a 
conception of explanation as subsumption under a law. That is, something 
is explained when it can be shown to be an example of a general principle. 
The accuracy of this characterization of the "standard view of science" will 
be judged when the realist alternative presented by Manicas and Secord 
(1983) is discussed. But for the moment this characterization will be accepted 
as accurate. Of present interest is the exploration of the philosophical roots 
of foundationalist epistemology. 
The assumption that propositional knowledge, if it is knowledge at all, must 
be founded on an axiom that is absolutely indubitable served as the 
motivation for the famous meditations of Descartes. According to Descartes, 
radical doubt must stop with the axiom "I think, therefore I am" because 
doubting must involve thinking and to think is to be. It is impossible, so 
the argument goes, to think and not to be. 
Husserl's (1960) not quite so famous meditations on Descartes' meditations, 
however, claimed that Descartes missed the 'transcendental turn'. 
Essentially, Husserl (1960) believed that Descartes made the mistake of 
considering the 'I' in his famous axiom to be a "substantia cogitans ". That 
is, seeing the 'I' as referring to a substantively existing ego. As such, this ego 
of substance, indubitably known in the content of an axiom, could be the 
"foundation for a deductively explanatory world-science, a nomological 
science" (Husserl, 1960, p. 24). 
But, according to Husserl (1960), that the 'I' has substance is not to be found 
in the observation of one's thoughts. Rather, the 'I' of phenomenological 
experience is the "transcendental ego". In simple terms this "ego" is prior to 
any knowledge claim (including Descartes' axiom) and so cannot serve as 
the basis of the objective, positive sciences. The 'I' referred to as 
substantively existent simply cannot be the 'I' that is actually thinking 
Descartes' axiom. 
It follows from Husserl (1960) that if psychology tries to be a positive science 
it must accept Descartes' 'ego'. Yet this acceptance entails ignoring the 
transcendental ego. In the context of this thesis the problem of leaving out 
the transcendental ego is the problem of reflexivity. For the transcendental 
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ego provides the 'space' in which reflection (in particular, 'self-reflection') 
can be pictured as occurring. 
Hayes' (1984) behavioural analysis of the concept of spirituality is relevant 
here. Simplifying Hayes' (1984) analysis, the spirit seems to have an 
equivalent role to Husserl's 'transcendental ego'. Knowing the 'spirit' 
propositionally is as difficult (and as fundamentally incorrect, in Husserl's 
terms) as proposition ally knowing the ego (as Descartes claimed was 
possible). 
Hayes (1984) likened the impossibility of objectively pinning down the 
'spirit' to the impossibility of 'seeing' the perspective from which one's eyes 
are looking. In fact, whether or not it would make sense to speak of such a 
perspective is debatable and forms part of the philosophical issue as to what 
can and cannot be said with sense. This issue is partly responsible for the 
shift in philosophy that has occurred this century (Ayer, 1985, p. 142) from a 
concern for 'epistemology' to a concern for 'meaning'. 
This extended critique of foundationalist epistemology has deliberately gone 
further than Manicas and Secord's (1983) critique. For while Manicas and 
Secord (1983) were content to establish a "fallibilist" epistemology (p. 401), 
the above discussion has questioned whether any notion of a rationally-
based epistemology makes sense. In order to retain even a fallibilist 
epistemology some notion such as "warranted assertibility" (as used by 
Dixon, 1983) seems necessary. Unfortunately, "warranted assertibility" does 
not itself seem like a warranted assertion, since determining explicit criteria 
for what is warranted is the whole problem of knowledge in a nutshell. 
Further discussion of the standard view of science occurs in the next section 
where it is contrasted with the realist view of science. 
1.8.3 THE REALIST VIEW OF SCIENCE 
The term scientific realism has been used to cover a variety of intellectual 
positions (see Putnam, 1982). But recently within psychology a particular 
formulation of scientific realism has been put forward (Manicas and Secord, 
1983). In Gergen's (1979) terms this realism remains positivistic but 
challenges the 'empiricist' positivism discussed in the previous section. 
A critical review of this formulation can begin by examining its proposed 
epistemology. If the standard view of science has a foundationalist 
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epistemology in which the truth of a knowledge claim depends on its 
correspondence with the 'facts', then this epistemology is rejected by the 
new scientific realism. Instead, "knowledge is a social and historical 
product" (Manicas and Secord, 1983, p. 401). Accepting or rejecting a theory 
("knowledge claim") is determined by the criteria that a particular science 
"generates". Nevertheless, according to Manicas and Secord (1983), these 
criteria are rational (and not purely arbitrary) because a real world exists that 
is independent of cognizing experience. 
However, asserting the existence of such a world itself may not be rationally 
justified. For if this precognitive world exists its connection to cognition 
must be unknowable ('uncognizable'). In fact, it is this world's 
unknowableness that gives it its justifying role (as is the case with the 
concept of God). 
As Mulaik (1984) commented, in the new philosophy of science most 
philosophers are ontological fallibilists as well as epistemological fallibilists. 
But Manicas and Secord (1984) believed it necessary to have a realist 
ontology in order to "make sense of scientific change and criticism" (p. 922), 
and "if both commonsense experience and science are to be possible" (p. 923). 
But if "make sense ofll means little more than "justify" then Leary's (1984) 
complaint that Manicas and Secord had transformed the "philosophy of 
science into an apologetics of science" (p. 918) seems understandable. Of 
course, one person's apologetics is another person's causal explanation. For 
the realist, making sense of ('explaining') scientific activity involves noting 
a pattern «e.g.) that science is 'adaptive') and then postulating a causal 
mechanism «e.g.) the efficacy of presuming a realist view of science) to 
explain the pattern. 
This production of a causal explanation involves using retroductive logic. 
Such logic is exemplified in the statement by Bhaskar (1975) that "given that 
science [a particular pattern of human activity explicated by Bhaskar] does or 
could occur, the world must be a certain way" (p. 29. Brackets added). The 
difficulty for the non-realist, however, is that in order to reach the same 
conclusions as Bhaskar on how the world must be one must initially share 
his realist view of science. 
Manicas and Secord (1983) also wish to reject what they characterize as 
'Humean' causality in favour of "a realist concept in which structures have 
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causal powers" (Manic as and Secord, 1984, p. 923). This causation can be 
termed "generative". It then follows that; 
[the] task of psychology as a science ... is to 
identify patterns in its subject of study, and to 
try to conceive of the means of production of 
those patterns. (Harre, 1974, p. 243. Brackets 
added). 
Manicas and Secord (1983) claim that this generative causality differs from 
Humean causality in which "causal relations are regular contingent 
relations between events" (p. 400). However, in fairness to Hume the 
following quote from his A Treatise of Human Nature should be 
considered; 
... where several different objects produce the 
same effect, it must be by means of some 
quality which we discover to be common 
amongst them. For as like effects imply like 
causes, we must always ascribe the causation 
to the circumstance wherein we discover the 
resemblance. (Hume, 1978; Book I, Part III, 
Section XV, Point 5. Emphasis added). 
Hume's point here is that there is a 'quality' that 'generates' the causation. 
This 'quality', however, cannot be separated from, and is therefore 
equivalent to, the circumstance in which the resemblance is found. 
Once again it is the dual aspect of meaning that seems to be creating the 
distinction between "Humean" and "generative" causality. Humean 
causality emphasizes the 'meaning as use' conception of meaning, whereas 
generative causality emphasizes 'meaning as referring' to something. Thus, 
generative causation involves emphasizing content (the substantive thing 
which can be referred to as the cause). For example, Harre (1974) stated; 
A real scientist tries to discover what 
produces patterns which he observes; that is, 
what mechanisms are responsible for them. 
He requires that his theories have a certain 
kind of content. (p. 241). 
However, in Humean causation when any content is analysed ('thought 
about', 'reflected upon') it reduces to contingent relations. That is, it reduces 
to an event or circumstance. The realism being discussed here is essentially 
49 
opposed to such a reduction. This opposition seems to arise from the desire 
to 'make sense' of both commonsense belief and scientific activity as was 
discussed above. 
Ruse (1986) attempted to picture these two views of causality in the same 
frame using an evolutionary, Darwinian epistemology. Simply put, seeing 
'causes' as things "like powers or invisible fluids" has, up to the present, 
been to the evolutionary advantage of humans (Ruse, 1986, p. 174). 
Following Wilson's sociobiology, Ruse (1986) proposed that 'epigenetic 
rules' -essentially developmental constraints- would cause humans to see 
'causes' as things. And humans who see causes as things are naturally 
selected. 
However, seeing 'causes' as things does not inhibit humans from realizing 
that what may be biologically advantageous at present need not mirror what 
is logically consistent or meaningful. Therefore, "as philosophers, we 
should not try to make more of the regularities than they are" (Ruse, 1986; 
p. 174). Thus, Humean causality is the philosophically rigorous view of 
causality while generative causality is more what humans naturally do. 
But this attempt by Ruse (1986) just will not do for the psychologist. Firstly, 
the whole concept of 'seeing a cause' -either as a 'thing' or as a 
'contingency'- is problematic for psychology. Does a psychologist explain 
'seeing a cause' in a realist sense, by postulating a causal mechanism for 
such seeing, or in a Humean sense, by describing a pattern of behaviours 
called 'seeing a cause'? Secondly, 'epigenetic rules' do not help the 
psychologist answer the above question. While for the sociobiologist an 
epigenetic rule may appear to be an adequate causal mechanism to explain 
the generation of culture from genes, the psychologist/philosopher should 
be well versed in the conceptual pitfalls of connecting such disparate 
concepts. For example, generating the mind from the body has never been 
an easy conceptual task. 
In the natural sciences (physics, chemistry) realist causal explanation may 
appear to be the goal. However, when there is controversy over what a 
phenomenon actually is then the assertion that there is a natural necessity 
involved, to any degree, in the causal production of an idiosyncratic vision 
of the phenomenon, may seem to some as nothing more than an attempt at 
intellectual or ideological imperialism under the cover of the successes of 
natural science. Thus, claiming that there is an 'epigenetic rule' entailing 
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natural necessity for any social or psychological phenomenon may appear 
philosophically objectionable «e.g.) Gergen, 1985; 1986. See Section 1.8.4). 
Finally, and very briefly, for the realist explanation involves postulating an 
appropriate "contingent concatenation of real structures" (Manicas and 
Secord, 1983; p. 403). since these structures are real, by natural necessity they 
produce the phenomenon to be explained. This view of explanation follows 
directly from understanding causality as generative. And, once again, it will 
seem a satisfactory (realist) explanation of what an explanation is if one is 
already a realist. 
1.8.4 THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONIST APPROACH 
The realist approach discussed in the previous section claimed that 
knowledge, including scientific knowledge, is a "social and historical 
product" (Manicas and Secord, 1983; p.401). Despite this there could still be 
valid rational criteria developed within each of the sciences to assess that 
knowledge. 
In contrast, social constructionism, while agreeing that knowledge is a social 
and historical product takes a far more radical position on the problem of 
knowledge. Social constructionism, according to Gergen (1985); 
'" begins with radical doubt in the taken-for-
granted world -whether in the sciences or 
daily life- and in a specialized way acts as a 
form of social criticism. (p. 267). 
All and every theoretical term in psychology is open to a social 
constructionist analysis aimed at undermining the 'reality' of such a 
construct. The social origins of "assumptions about the mind -such as the 
bifurcation between reason and emotion, the existence of motives and 
memories, and the symbol system believed to underlie language" (p. 267) are 
all open to inspection. While the realist perspective of Manicas and Secord 
(1983) still has as its aim the construction of theories that provide causal 
explanations, social constructionism has as its aim the ongoing criticism 
and, in a special sense, debunking of such explanations. 
These epistemological conclusions are linked by Gergen (1985) to the 
realization that scientific theory does not reflect or map reality "in any direct 
or decontextualized manner" (p. 266). Given this, for the social 
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constructionist any attempt in psychology to reflect or map reality must be 
subjected to exhaustive social analysis and criticism. This contrasts with the 
assertion by Manicas and Secord (1983) that "it is precisely the task of science 
to invent theories that aim to represent the world" (p. 401). 
What is important to keep clear is that the criticism made by the social 
constructionist is not aimed at discovering which psychological theory can 
withstand the greatest social criticism and thus to serve as a method of 
theory assessment. Rather, social constructionism aims to portray all 
psychological knowledge as a social product. And a social process can only 
be a non-rational cause and not a rational justification. Thus, knowledge is 
not rationally justifiable. 
This distinction between causation and justification is part of what Toulmin 
(1976) saw as a continuing source of philosophical perplexitYi 
... we are still unclear about the relationship 
between the ideas of rationality and causality 
-between what is involved in discovering the 
"causes" influencing a person's thoughts or 
actions and the "reasons" he had for thinking 
and acting as he did. (p. 45). 
From this perspective a simplistic description of the difference between the 
realist and social constructionist follows. The realism of Manicas and Secord 
(1983) is a rational account of causality in scientific theorizing while the 
social constructionism of Gergen is a causal account of rationality in 
scientific theorizing. Social constructionism, by giving a causal explanation 
of knowledge undermines the very possibility of 'knowledge' being 
'warranted' or 'justifiable'. As Gergen (1985) statedi 
Yet although casting doubt on the process of 
objective warranting, constructionism offers 
no alternative truth criteria. Accounts of 
social construction cannot themselves be 
warranted empirically... the success of such 
accounts depends primarily on the analyst's 
capacity to invite, compel, stimulate or 
delight the audience, and not on criteria of 
veracity. (p. 272). 
Such an open confession of the primary efficacy of methods of persuasion 
traditionally perceived as non-rational may disturb some. However, both 
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those so disturbed and Gergen may be missing a vital point -a point central 
to Wittgenstein's (1969) work On Certainty. 
In short, for Wittgenstein (1969) both the concept of absolute objective 
certainty and absolute doubting are equivalent in their being senseless, and 
not just impossible. In detail, Wittgenstein (1969) critiqued G.B. Moore's 
famous essay Proof of an External World in which Moore claimed to know 
for certain,while holding up his hand, that "Here is a hand". According to 
Wittgenstein (1969), Moore's mistake was to equate a situation where it 
makes sense to doubt with the situation of knowing for certain. Rather, for 
Wittgenstein (1969), where there is no doubt there is no knowledge (O.c. 
121). 
The idea of absolute certainty (,final objective warranting') presupposes the 
possibility of a 'super doubt'. That is, the possibility of doubting everything. 
For Moore, when the process of doubting becomes nonsensical -the 'super 
doubt', as it were, self-destructs- what is left is certain knowledge, as it was 
for Descartes. Wittgenstein's (1969) counter to this attacks the possibility of a 
'super doubt'; 
If you tried to doubt everything you would 
not get as far as doubting anything. The game 
of doubting itself presupposes certainty. (O.c. 
115). 
Doubting requires language. A 'super doubt' would leave no language in 
tact in which to doubt. 
For Wittgenstein (1969) this presupposed certainty is the only kind of 
certainty there is and it is not knowledge: 
And; 
I should like to say: Moore does not know 
what he asserts he knows, but it stands fast for 
him... (O.c. 151). 
I do not explicitly learn the propositions that 
stand fast for me. I can discover them 
subsequently like the axis around which a 
body rotates. This axis is not fixed in the 
sense that anything holds it fast, but the 
movement around it determines its 
immobility. (O.C. 152). 
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These "ordinary certainties" (Finch, 1977) are not explicit, immutable 
ontological propositions. Rather, they are taken as certain rather than 
known as certain (Finch, 1977; p. 222). They simply are not doubted in 
actual practice. As Wittgenstein (1969) stated; 
As if giving grounds did not come to an end 
sometime. But the end is not an ungrounded 
presupposition: it is an ungrounded way of 
acting. (O.c. 110). 
So, Gergen (1985) was 'wrong' to doubt "the process of objective 
warranting". This is because, as Finch (1977) noted; "Objective certainty has 
no grounds because it is itself what we take as grounds. " (p. 231). 
Gergen's radical doubting thus verges on the 'super doubt' described above 
which Wittgenstein (1969) variously termed "idle" (O.C. 117) and "illusory" 
(O.C. 19). "Idle", because by raising doubt to the status of methodology it 
ultimately produces nothing. "Illusory", because such doubting is linked to 
the concept of the possibility of certain knowledge, and as such is senseless. 
Therefore, social constructionism can be seen as an invitation to accept 
different objective certainties -those which facilitate radical doubt. More 
accurately, it does not even involve acceptance, which may imply rational 
assessment. It simply involves doing things differently. As Finch (1977) 
explained; 
We do not ... start with knowing. There is no 
given which is epistemologically primary. 
Rather we start with acting-with-certainty ... 
Ordinary certainties are the roads on which 
we walk without question, not because they 
are the only possible roads or the right 
roads ... but because they are the roads which 
we are on, and no occasion has arisen for 
leaving them. (p. 229). 
For the moment the following conclusion is all that is required. Social 
constructionism, as outlined by Gergen (1985), does not finally avoid the 
epistemological problem of how we know what we know. To the extent 
that, viewed from the perspective of 'meaning as referring', social 
constructionism makes a knowledge claim -that knowledge is a social and 
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historical product and as such cannot be objectively warranted- it 
undermines itself. To the extent that, viewed from the perspective of 
'meaning as use', social constructionism is a language activity, it is senseless 
to speak of rationally deciding between it and any other language activity. 
There is no neutral ground outside of all language activities from which to 
make such a decision. 
So, social constructionism does not reconcile the two aspects of meaning. 
But the task is clarified. Causal understanding -'meaning as use over time'-
and rational understanding -'meaning as reference'- must converge; and 
must be seen to converge whichever approach is followed. 
1.8.5 SUMMARY: THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE IN 
PSYCHOLOGY 
Posi tivism, realism and social constructionism, the three theories of 
knowledge discussed above, can be characterized as follows. Positivism and 
realism both assume the existence of a real, independent world. The realist 
view suggests that science explains this world by hypothesizing the existence 
of structures possessing causal properties which generate the phenomena of 
the world. The 'standard' positivist view suggests that science explains this 
world by showing that a contingent relationship between events instantiates 
a general law. 
Thus, for realism an explanation is achieved when an appropriate causally 
generative structure can be referred to. In contrast, positivism explains in 
terms of contingent events occurring over time. This distinction parallels 
the distinction made previously between 'meaning as reference' and 
'meaning as use over time'. 
Social constructionism attempts to avoid this dichotomy by undermining 
the epistemological and ontological status of a real independent world. This 
is done by critically analysing the usage of such a concept and showing it to 
be determined by social and historical factors. However, social 
constructionism can itself be analysed as being based on the same type of 
implicit knowledge claims as the approaches it criticizes. And, social 
constructionism could not avoid this analysis by claiming that it is not 
making a knowledge claim because that claim would be a knowledge claim. 
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It is suggested here that even social constructionism is unable to reconcile 
the two aspects of meaning. 
The reason for the controversy over the nature of psychological knowledge 
can be demonstrated using two examples from the literature. Crawford 
(1985) saw the possibility that the 'new realism' of Manicas and Secord (1983) 
could be used to justify and integrate the technological and professional 
sides of psychology. In essence, realism, once accepted, would justify the 
application of psychological knowledge. 
In contrast, Koch (1981) spoke of the essential ambiguity and uncertainty of 
the human condition. Tha t realism, social cons tructionism or any 
epistemology should be used as an intellectual sedative to alleviate the pain 
or remove the necessity of facing this uncertainty would be anathema to 
Koch. Even tentative justifications such as those advanced by Crawford 
(1985) would dull the psychologist's moment by moment awareness of this 
uncertainty and therefore lose sight of the responsibility present in the 
application of knowledge. Poetically, Koch (1981) warned; 
The false hubris that has been our way of 
containing our existential anguish in a 
terrifying age has led us to prefer easy yet 
grandiose pseudoknowledge to the hard and 
spare fruit that is knowledge. (p. 269). 
So the question of knowledge takes on a moral tone when knowledge 
'enters' the world through application. The question of how knowledge (or 
thought) interacts with the world, if answered, will determine the issue of 
reflexivity. A consistent answer to this question can be found in the 
philosophy of radical behaviourism which is the subject of the following 
section. 
CHAPTER TWO 
2 RADICAL BERA VIOURISM AND 
ISSUES OF REFLEXIVITY 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
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Skinner (1974) began his book About Behaviorism with the following 
comments; 
Behaviorism is not the science of human 
behavior; it is the philosophy of that science. 
Some of the questions it asks are these: Is 
such a science really possible? (p. 3). 
The following discussion will assume that a necessary (though not 
sufficient) requirement of any answer to the question tlls such a science 
really possible?" would be a consistent treatment of the issues of reflexivity, 
as outlined in Chapter 1. It is also assumed that without such a treatment 
no such singular 'science' is possible. Rather, it would only be possible to 
have "psychological studies" (Koch, 1981). That is, a collection of disparate 
approaches. Radical behaviourism -being that form of behaviourism 
espoused by Skinner (1938; 1945; 1953; 1957; 1971a; 1974; 1984a; 1984b; 
1984c)- will be examined below to determine if its treatment of reflexivity is 
consistent and successful. 
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Before beginning this examination it will be useful to discuss two related 
concepts which help reveal the particular difficulty psychology, as opposed 
to other sciences, has with reflexivity. 
Hooker (1975) discussed what can be termed a general or "global" theory in 
the following way; 
... a general theory of a given domain worth 
its salt is a much more general, encompassing 
affair than the traditional simple model 
would have us believe -it has global 
properties, it covers every aspect of the 
domain. (p. 155). 
Quantum mechanics is such a theory and, according to Hooker (1975), its 
characteristics include: prescribing the terms in which observations are to be 
described; specifying what is and is not observable as well as the conditions 
under which what is observable, is observable; specifying the means and 
reliability of measurements; and specifying what is causally, statistically and 
accidentally connected. 
Compare this description of a global theory with the following comments by 
Bartlett (1986) on the invulnerability of "ideological philosophy"; 
External questions rely upon alien 
presuppositions not admitted by the position 
and hence are subject to the charge of petitio 
principii. Often, such questions will 
therefore make no sense from the point of 
view of the internal dynamics of the position. 
(p.7). 
A global theory in psychology risks becoming an ideological philosophy 
because its "given domain" includes all language activity, whether language 
activity is viewed as the expression of beliefs and desires, as verbal 
behaviour or in some other way. Therefore, there are no 'external 
questions' in the purest global theory since all questions are simply more 
subject matter for the theory. As an example of this Day (1969a) has stated; 
In responding to professional language, the 
radical behaviorist has his own new course to 
follow: he must attempt to discover the 
variables controlling what has been said. (p. 
320). 
58 
To those who are not radical behaviourists this "new course" may seem like 
a betrayal of the act of communication, a deceptive manipulation of the art 
of conversation. What is worse, it may seem that the radical behaviourist 
would no longer be concerned with 'exchanging views' and thus become 
impregnable to attempts at a rational 'conversion' away from radical 
behaviourism. However, for the moment, it must be said that these fears do 
not tell the whole story. The ide'a that communication involves or should 
involve an 'exchange of views' is by no means itself beyond debate. 
'Grasping the meaning of something' does not necessarily imply that there 
is a meaning somehow embedded in the sentence or utterance. Therefore, it 
is possible to claim, like Rorty (1979), that it is not necessary to believe that; 
... when we say something we must 
necessarily be expressing a view about a 
subject. We might just be saying something -
participating in a conversation rather than 
contributing to an inquiry. (p. 371). 
Rorty (1979) even spoke of the need to prevent conversation "degenerating" 
into an exchange of views. So, at the level of professional debate amongst 
psychologists there seems no agreement even as to how such debate should 
be understood. 
Radical behaviourism will be discussed below in the context of the possible 
criticism that it is a particularly dogmatic ideological philosophy that ignores 
or redefines all phenomena of real interest in psychology. That it is, as 
Scriven (1972) claimed "a mere monument to the seductive power of 
ancient fallacies and fantasies" (p. 423). The justification for such a criticism 
will be examined. 
The structure of the discussion will be as follows. Firstly, the concepts of 
'meaning' and 'knowledge' as they are understood in radical behaviourism 
will be discussed. Secondly, the distinctive approach to causality and 
explanation taken by Skinner will be presented. Thirdly, the role of private 
events in radical behaviourist explanation will be examined and criticized. 
Finally, a concluding section will consider how well radical behaviourism, 
as presented, copes with issues of reflexivity. 
2.2 AN OUTLINE OF RADICAL 
BEHA VIOURISM 
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The first difficulty in discussing radical behaviourism is that of clearly 
distinguishing the type of behaviourism that is meant. It is not difficult to 
find in the literature diametrically opposed accounts of radical 
behaviourism. For example, Sinha (1982), in summarily dispensing with 
radical behaviourism, stated; 
Classical forms of psychological reductionism, 
such as Skinnerian behaviourism, solved the 
problem of understanding mind and mental 
processes by the simple expedient of ruling 
them out of the scientific court, and 
relegating them to epiphenomenal status. (p. 
26). 
In contrast, Day (1969b) argued for Skinner's non-reductionism, while 
Flanagan (1980), and Skinner (1945; 1974, p. 16) himself, stated that radical 
behaviourism rejects the epiphenomenalism implicit in the 
"methodological behaviourism" of behaviourists such as Stevens and 
Boring. In fact, the differences between radical behaviourism and what is 
commonly understood as behaviourism are so great that it may be valid to 
ask whether Skinner should still be considered a behaviourist (Day, 1969b). 
A useful and comprehensive guide in answering this question is Zuriff's 
(1985) reconstruction of behaviourism as a whole which reveals in detail 
Skinner's position relative to other behaviourists. However, the details do 
not need recounting here. 
Perhaps one reason for such divergent understandings of radical 
behaviourism can be traced, as Hineline (1980) suggested, to the 'distortions' 
present in a language that is not used to conveying the kind of world-view 
necessary to understand what Skinner meant in many of his writings. It 
certainly seems to be Skinner's view that predilections for 'cognitive' 
constructs and explanations are to be found in linguistic history rather than 
in the fact that people perceive their own minds (Skinner, 1989). 
Hackenberg (1988) took the same argument further by suggesting that the 
special type of language and explanation favoured by behaviourists is often 
misunderstood because everyday language is constrained by the use of 
nouns and agent-action terms. These terms, Hackenberg (1988) claimed, 
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tend to favour mechanistic explanations and understandings of causality 
(See Sections 2.2.3 and 2.2.4, below, for a discussion of causality and 
explanation in radical behaviourism). 
Among the most distinctive features of radical behaviourism -features that 
bear directly on issues of re£1exivity- are the interpretations it provides of the 
concepts of 'meaning', 'knowledge' and 'causality'. It is these concepts that 
will now be examined. 
2.2.1 MEANING IN RADICAL BEHAVIOURISM 
'Meaning', according to Skinner (1974); 
And again; 
[I]s not properly regarded as a property either 
of a response or a situation but rather of the 
contingencies responsible for both the 
topography of behavior and the control 
exerted by stimuli. (p.90. Brackets added). 
One of the unfortunate implications of 
communication theory is that the meanings 
for speaker and listener are the same ... that 
the speaker transmits information, or imparts 
knowledge... There are no meanings which 
are the same in the speaker and listener. 
Meanings are not independent entities. (p. 
92). 
In other words, 'meaning' is an intrinsically relational concept that cannot 
be isolated outside of a functional analysis. That is, 'words', 'thoughts', 
'ideas', 'subjective impressions', 'wishes', 'beliefs', 'desires', etc., do not 
have meanings as a property. Rather, any meanings they appear to 'have' 
result from an analysis of the environmental contingencies which are 
causally responsible for the form of a response and the control a stimulus 
exerts over a response. 
For example, when someone works at a job for a week the meaning of the 
purposive behaviour of working is not to be found, according to Skinner, 
isolated in some internal psychological entity. That is, there is no entity, 
such as a belief, that has a meaning equivalent to "after working for a week I 
will receive a wage". Instead, the meaning of such behaviour is to be found 
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in the historical contingencies responsible for the form and occurrence of 
the behaviour of working. 
It is important for Skinner (1983, p. 10) that there is no present 
internalization of these past contingencies. No representations or rules 
relating behaviour to consequences are to be found in the organism 
(Skinner, 1974, p. 84). According to Skinner (1985a) representations are used 
by cognitive psychologists to explain behaviour "by pointing to conditions 
present at the time the behavior occurs." (p. 295. Emphasis added). As will 
be discussed below (Section 2.2.3), the necessity for a pre-existing mechanism 
to generate purposive behaviour is rejected by Skinner and is replaced by a 
different type of causality. 
Given this approach to the concept of meaning it is possible to develop a 
new understanding of where the purposiveness in a particular behaviour is 
to be located. And, of course, 'purpose' (or 'intentionality') is important in 
any understanding of the potential for reflexive behaviour in humans. 
'Seeing the meaning (or purpose)' of something is itself a form of 
behaviour. In particular, it is a behaviour that involves 'perceiving' the 
antecedent conditions and consequences of an event. But to be consistent 
with a radical behaviourist account this 'perceiving' is not to be modelled 
along the lines of a representational theory of perception (at least, not one in 
which the 'meaning' of an antecedent condition or consequence is being 
represented). Rather, the radical behaviourist's observation of these 
contingencies is itself susceptible to analysis. In interpreting Skinner, Day 
(1969b) made an interesting comment in this regard; 
In contrast to a view popularly attributed to 
Bume, Skinner holds that certain events are 
seen to have their effect upon events... For 
Skinner, natural controlling contingencies 
are observed to take place. Yet the perception 
in this is not totally trusted: the disposition is 
there to regard whatever is seen as dependent 
upon a previous history of reinforcement. 
What is seen in observation is simply a part 
of the behavior-game that a man plays, a 
behavior-game that is often critically and 
dangerously linguistic. (p. 505). 
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The view that natural contingencies are actually seen may seem a surprising 
view for a behaviourist to hold. However, recently Skinner (1985b) has 
stated that while behaviourists often say that perceiving is behaving, this is 
not the whole story. For example, seeing something like a tree involves 
"responding up to the point of specific action", and "it is the product of 
many instances in which action has followed" (p. 76). 
Importantly, this seeing does not involve inference between what is seen 
and how the world is (Skinner, 1974, p. 75). Instead, it is reminiscent of the 
phenomena-in-itself of the phenomenologist. However, it seems to differ 
from the phenomenological account in that while, in any particular instance 
of seeing and behaving, it comes first temporally, it is in fact the historical 
product of many occasions where action has followed. What is seen is not 
the foundation or cause of the following behaviour. (See Section 2.3 below 
on 'causality' in radical behaviourism). That is, behaviour is not explained 
in terms of psychophysical sensory data arising from the perceptual process. 
Given all of the above, it then becomes possible for a person to 'see' that he 
or she has 'seen' natural controlling contingencies in a certain situation and, 
further, to 'see' a connection between 'seeing' these contingencies and 
subsequent behaviour. It is at this point, that verbal behaviour might arise 
that refers to the purposivity of behaviour. But for the radical behaviourist 
this seeing of a connection is a product of previous contingencies of 
reinforcement, if it is anything, rather than a cause of the subsequent verbal 
behaviour. The cause remains the history of reinforcement. 
At the risk of deviating from Skinner's own understanding of this concept 
of 'seeing', further elaboration is required. Since this seeing is the common 
product of many instances of a large variety of different behaviours 
including the behaviour of introspectively identifying what is seen, 
presumably it has no describable characteristics. This is because describing is 
itself a behaviour which is determined not by the properties of what is 
described but by the particular history of reinforcement an organism has 
been subjected to with regards to its 'describing behaviour'. This is a similar 
point to the one made in Chapter I, Section 1.6 where the difficulty of 
specifying the content of consciousness was discussed. However, despite this 
necessary restriction on identifying 'what is seen' independently of the 
behaviours which follow it, Skinner (1985b) still stated; 
Whatever it [seeing something] is 
physiologically... it cannot have been 
strengthened by reinforcing consequences 
until behavior followed. But it can occur 
whether actions follow or not. (p. 76. 
Brackets added). 
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In psychological theorizing the danger of making such comments is that it 
could be inferred that 'what is seen' has a physical, and hence a causal, role 
in a psychological account of behaviour. This was the point Schnaitter 
(1984) made when he expressed concern at Skinner's propensity for tying 
operants and stimuli to factors specifiable in the language of physics «e.g.) 
Skinner, 1983, p.16). While this is a methodologically advantageous strategy 
in that it adds rhetorical support for an experimental analysis of behaviour, 
in the present context such an ontological assumption can be misleading. 
Skinner (1945), in criticizing the methodological behaviourism of Stevens 
and Boring commented; 
What is lacking is the bold and exciting 
behavioristic hypothesis that what one 
observes is always the 'real' or 'physical' 
world (or at least the 'one' world). (p. 293. 
Emphasis added). 
The afterthought in the brackets suggests that Skinner's bedrock 
philosophical position is monism rather than physicalism. 
Schnaitter (1984) believed that while it may be unarguable that an operant is 
a physical event, "it is far from clear that an operant class itself specifies a 
category of physical event expressible in terms per se (contrary to type 
physicalism)" (p. 12). Further, Schnaitter (1984, p. 11) suggested that the 
operant analysis of behaviour is inconsistent with "type physicalism" in 
which an operant class could be translated with a one to one correspondence 
into a class of physical event. A similar point has been made by Fodor (1981) 
in order to defend a functionalist account of mental states. 
To summarize: according to radical behaviourism 'what is seen' in 
perception is the one world. This world is not necessarily the world of 
physics. In fact, as will be argued below, to 'know' what the substantive 
nature of this world is may be inconsistent with the 'one world' 
assumption. The most impressive aspect of this assumption is that what is 
usually termed perception -that is, seeing objects, hearing sounds, etc.- can be 
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treated exactly the same as less tangible phenomena. For example, 
phenomena such as 'seeing' the meaning of what someone has said, 
'seeing' a person's emotions, attitudes and thoughts, 'seeing' the answer to a 
problem or its cause and, of course, 'seeing' the natural contingencies of 
behaviour. Thus, according to Hocutt (1985); 
... a knowledgeable observer can quite literally 
see a man's emotion in the flush of his face, 
hear it in the shrillness of his voice, and feel 
it in the menace of his posture. (p. 81). 
Defined in this relational way, meaning, for radical behaviourism, becomes 
the central subject matter of psychology. Following on from this approach to 
meaning, the concept of 'knowledge' can be re-examined from the radical 
behaviourist perspective. 
2.2.2 KNOWLEDGE AND RADICAL BEHAVIOURISM 
Parrott (1983) stated that there are two main classes of 'knowing' or 
'knowledge' that Skinner refers to. The first class is contingency shaped 
knowing. Skinner (1974, p. 138) subdivided this knowledge into the 
following three categories: 
(a) knowing through direct contact -(e.g.) to 
know sorrow; 
(b) knowing how to do something -(e.g.) to 
know how to open a window; and, 
(c) knowing about things -(Le.) being able to 
carry out certain behaviours with respect to 
these things. 
The second class is rule-governed knowing. This type of knowing involves 
being able to state "instructions, directions, rules or laws" pertaining to a 
particular situation. It may also involve being able to carry out effective 
behaviour because of exposure to these rules. However, Skinner (1974) 
stated; 
Knowledge which permits a person to 
describe contingencies is quite different from 
the knowledge identified with the behavior 
shaped by the contingencies. Neither form 
implies the other. (p. 139) 
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That is, there is an independence between behaviour under the control of 
contingencies pertaining to stating and following rules, and behaviour 
controlled 'directly' by environmental contingencies. 
As a footnote, to remain consistent with the understanding of meaning 
discussed above the important realization must be made that there is no 
meaning in a rule that determines how it is to be followed or, in fact, stated. 
There is no 'Platonic Idea' awaiting expression or manifestation as a verbal 
rule. 
In the context of this discussion scientific knowledge is a particularly 
relevant type of knowledge. Scriven (1972) commented that Skinner "in his 
overweening commitment to the natural-sciences model for psychology" 
believes in "objectivity as separation" and thus has ignored "the extreme 
epistemological significance of the self-referent nature of psychology". 
However, this criticism is dependent on a mistaken understanding of the 
conception of knowledge in radical behaviourism that has been presented 
above. Scientific knowledge, according to the radical behaviourist, is not 
just about the subject matter. As Lee (1985) has stated, it is "about the 
subject matter in its relation to the investigative behavior of observers ." (p. 
188). That is, scientific statements are descriptive rules that specify 
contingencies "between what an investigator does and what she or he 
observes as a result." (p. 188). 
Therefore, radical behaviourism dispenses with 'facts' in the sense of 
propositions that characterize the nature of an independently existing world. 
As Day (1969a) said, Skinner opposes the notion of knowledge as a comment 
on the nature of the object of knowledge. Any interpretation implying that 
knowledge makes such a comment is, therefore, not scientific. Which is not 
to say such knowledge is 'invalid'. 
However, it may be argued that 'contingency specifying rules' still 'assume' 
or 'presuppose' a particular metaphysics or ontology which, of course, does 
comment on the nature of the object of study. But perhaps it is a lack of 
understanding of the concepts of 'assuming' and 'presuppposing' that gives 
validity to such an argument. That is, firstly, the view that a hidden 
assumption or metaphysics generates a particular contingency-specifying 
66 
rule seems wedded to a type of psychological explanation and understanding 
of causality that is essentially alien to radical behaviourism. (See Sections 
2.2.3 and 2.2.4 on 'causality' and 'explanation' in radical behaviourism, 
respectively). Therefore the validity of judging radical behaviourism from 
this viewpoint is debatable. 
Secondly, Wittgenstein (1953), in the following remarks, made a point that is 
relevant to the present discussion; 
Disputes do not break out (among 
mathematicians, say) over the question 
whether a rule has been obeyed or not... That 
is part of the framework on which the 
working of our language is based (for 
example, in giving descriptions). 
"So you are saying that human agreement 
decides what is true and what is false?" -It is 
what human beings say that is true and false; 
and they agree in the language they use. 
That is not agreement in opinions but in 
form of life. (P.L 240,241). 
It is suggested here that when someone observes and then questions 
another's 'assumptions' the disagreement is not a disagreement in opinions 
but in 'form of life'. (The concept 'form of life' will be discussed more fully 
in Chapter 4, Section 4.3) In radical behaviourist terms people do not 
possess such and such an assumption -they simply 'follow' the contingency-
specifying rule ('blindly', as Wittgenstein would say). Mathematicians do 
not "come to blows" over whether 2+2=4. But that is not because they are all 
of the same opinion (if that were so what alternative 'opinions' might they 
have?) but because for them such things as 2+2=4 are exactly what count as 
the framework of their corlVersations. This is what Wittgenstein (1953) 
meant when he said; 
If language is to be a means of 
communication there must be agreement not 
only in definitions but also (queer as this may 
sound) in judgments. (P.I. 242). 
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It seems to be a similar insight that is at the heart of Skinner's operationism. 
For example, Skinner (1945), in criticizing the "arid philosophy" of truth by 
agreement, stated; 
The ultimate criterion for the goodness of a 
concept is not whether two people are 
brought into agreement but whether the 
scientist who uses the concept can operate 
successfully upon his material -all by himself 
if need be. (p.293). 
And Skinner (1945) went on to say that it is the 'workability' of a concept 
that aids agreement rather than the other way round. Such 'workability' can 
be shown using the mathematical example already mentioned. Ultimately, 
the 'contingency-specifying rule' of "If you observe '2' and you add another 
'2' you will get (observe) '4' " says nothing about the necessary or essential 
nature of numbers; it simply specifies what to do. And it is this feature of 
the rule, as it is used, that allows mathematics as an activity to occur. A 
mathematician trying to explain why '2+2=4' will only find an answer in 
terms of the activities of mathematicians doing mathematics rather than in 
some supposed quality of numbers. 
For Skinner (1974) the 'truth' or 'meaning' of rules is not to be found in the 
logic, or any other property, of the rule. This is because; 
.. , rules are never the contingencies they 
describe; they remain descriptions and suffer 
the limitations inherent in verbal behavior . 
... a proposition is 'true' to the extent that 
with its help the listener responds effectively 
to the situation it describes. (p. 235. Emphasis 
added). 
Zuriff's (1980) discussion of radical behaviourist epistemology highlighted 
this 'pragmatic' approach to truth. Crucially, as Zuriff (1980, p.348) noted, 
Skinner manages to avoid the infinite regress that begins when the question 
is asked as to what criterion a response must meet in order to be called 
'effective'. Skinner avoids this regress, according to Zuriff (1980), by 
eliminating the concept of 'choice' in the performance of a response. 
Scientific knowledge, as behaviour, is not exempt from this analysis. 
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In fact, it is probably because Skinner is aware of the "extreme 
epistemological significance of the self-referent nature of psychology " 
(Scriven, 1972) that he locates scientific knowledge within the subject area of 
radical behaviourism. Scientific knowledge, then, is not 'chosen' as true 
because of its concordance with truth criteria, including the criterion of 
'effectiveness'. Rather, the cause of this behaviour, as with any other, is to 
be understood in terms of the distinctive approaches to causality and 
explanation to be described in the following sections. 
2.2.3 CAUSALITY IN RADICAL BEHAVIOURISM 
Skinner (1974) rejected the common view of causality in which it is said that 
"if one thing follows another, it was probably caused by it" (p. 9). According 
to Hineline (1980) this "adherence to contiguous causality is, in effect, an 
adherence to a 19th century conception of science" (p. 69). Presumably, 
Hineline (1980) was thinking of a 19th century conception of science 
associated most closely with physics. For Skinner (1974) claimed that radical 
behaviourism employs a kind of causality discovered "very late in the 
history of thought"; specifically the type of causality used in Darwin's -19th 
century- theory of natural selection. As Skinner (1974) remarked; 
Darwin simply discovered the role of 
selection, a kind of causality very different 
from the push-pull mechanisms of science up 
to that time. ... There was little or nothing in 
physical or biological science that 
foreshadowed selection as a causal principle. 
(p.36). 
One of the advantages Skinner sees in such a view of causality is that 
purpose can be placed 'after the fact' and can, therefore, reflect on the 
question of creative design (See Smith, 1983, for a discussion of the analogy 
between Skinner's environmentalism and the theory of natural selection). 
In biological science natural selection accounts for the variety and 
adaptiveness of species through a process of differential survival of 
randomly, and naturally, occurring variation. The random variation occurs 
at the genetic rather than the organismic level. Similarly, radical 
behaviourism accounts for the variety and adaptiveness of behaviour in 
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terms of the differential survival of randomly varying operants. (The 
'randomness' is relative to the area of interest of an operant analysis). 
Copious misunderstandings of radical behaviourist concepts occur in the 
scientific literature because the significance of this view of 'causality' is not 
appreciated. For example, Williams (1986), in discussing the role of theory 
in behaviour analysis, has argued that; 
'" all theoretical terms, including those 
commonly used by radical behaviorists ... 
involve the postulation of unobservable 
entities or processes as causes of behavior. In 
other words, theory construction inherently 
entails conjectures about a level of reality not 
available for direct empirical observation, and 
the failure of radical behaviorists to 
appreciate this fact has created a needless 
schism between themselves and other 
approaches to psychology. (p. 112). 
In citing the example of the concept of 'reinforcement' Williams (1986) 
insisted that it is being used as an explanation of behaviour in the sense of 
being a generative mechanism. Williams (1986) went even further by 
suggesting that the tendency to explain phenomena by hypothesizing 
underlying mechanisms is a fundamental aspect of the nature of human 
cognition. 
Williams' (1986) comments exemplify a phenomenon Day (1969a) has 
observed among some behaviourists; 
It is not so widely recognized that it is possible 
to 'mentalize' environmental events, as 
where reinforcers are endowed, often in the 
thinking of avowed Skinnerians, with some 
sort of demoniacal power to forge the chains 
of a reified conception of conditioning. (p. 
320). 
Reinforcement as a causal principle cannot be reified in this way because its 
causal role is only ever understood retrospectively. This is clearly Skinner's 
(1984c) view; 
... we discover the events that reinforce an 
individual's behavior and use them 
subsequently for that purpose. Why they are 
reinforcing is another question. 
I know of no way in which a reinforcer can be 
identified in advance. (p. 704). 
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Any attempt to understand reinforcement, in a particular situation, prior to 
a functional analysis involves failing to see the relationship between the 
observer and what is observed -in this case an instance of reinforcement. 
There is no stimulus that is reinforcing because of its non-functional 
characteristics. 
In other words, (and contra Williams, 1986) reinforcement, or any other 
radical behaviourist concept is not to be thought of as an explanation in 
terms of underlying causal mechanisms. This is because concepts in radical 
behaviourism do not describe the nature of the world, but instead describe 
the relation between a behaviour and its consequence. A radical 
behaviourist does not generalize reinforcement principles into new 
situations because he has 'hypothesized' a common process underlying 
topographically distinct patterns of behaviour. That explanation is an 
attempt at a logical justification of the behaviourist's behaviour. Rather, the 
radical behaviourist continues to employ reinforcement principles because 
that behaviour has, in turn, been reinforced. This approach is taken to 
ensure consistency. The radical behaviourist's behaviour as a researcher 
cannot be explained in the 'mentalistic' tradition anymore than can the 
subjects of study (Moore, 1981). 
Of course, it can and has been said that this approach makes 'reinforcement' 
a circularly defined if not tautological concept «e.g.) Eysenck, 1984, p. 687). 
Moore (1981) has replied to such criticism by arguing that the term 
reinforcement is used Ctacted') only when the following conditions are 
observed: 
(a) The response produces the consequence; 
(b) The response occurs more often when it 
produces the consequence than when it does 
not; and, 
(c) The increased responding occurs because 
the response has that consequence. 
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According to Moore (1981) such a definition is not circular. However, 
Paniagua (1985) argued that even this definition is circular since the only 
way of determining which consequence is reinforcing remains the frequency 
of response. He did not see this as a problem but simply as a fact. 
Reinforcement is a relational concept similar to concepts such as 
'simultaneity' in physics and 'fitness' in genetics. While it is a "relational 
concept that requires a relational definition that is inherently circular" 
(Paniagua, 1985, p. 200) there is no reason to believe it will be any the less 
useful than relational concepts in other sciences. 
2.2.4 EXPLANATION IN RADICAL BEHAVIOURISM 
With such a characteristic approach to causation it follows that radical 
behaviourism requires a distinctive conception of explanation. 
In an interesting discussion of the philosophy of explanation Garfinkel 
(1981) took the lead from Aristotle's Metaphysics . In this approach a 
question that demands an explanation has two terms. The first term is the 
"substance" term. The referent of this term is always an unchanging subject 
that does not admit contraries. The second term is the problematic term in 
which the predicate admits the possibility of contraries or alternatives. For 
example, in physics, the question "Why does object 'X' have acceleration 
'A'?", has a substance term -object 'X', fixed and unvarying- and a 
problematic term -acceleration 'A'- which could be different. 
Furthermore, the form of explanation that is appropriate will be determined 
by the category type to which the substance term belongs. For example, the 
explanation of why a metal bar increases in length will be of a different 
form from the explanation of why a tree increases in length. 
Conveniently, Garfinkel (1981, p. 26) gave an historical example taken from 
biology of a change in the type of explanation used by scientists. According 
to Garfinkel (1981), Aristotelian biology attempted to explain why present 
species exist rather than other possible species. In contrast Darwinian 
approaches attempt to explain why particular species remain extant rather 
than become extinct. The latter explains, using the mechanism of natural 
selection, the survival of species instead of their origin -the Aristotelian 
emphasis. 
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Analogously, it is proposed here that an "intentional psychology" «e.g.) 
Rosenberg, 1986a; 1986b) -that is, a psychology seeking to explain behaviour 
in terms of 'beliefs', 'desires', etc.- asks why present behaviours occur rather 
than other possible behaviours. To this end it is hypothesized that the 
beliefs causing the behaviour are in some way invested with an intensional 
character (Searle's, 1979, "intensionality-with-an-s"). The 'intensional' 
character of a belief relates the object of a belief to the content of that belief. 
And it is this projective relationship between the content and object of a 
belief that is used to explain why the behaviour that actually occurs, occurs 
rather than other possible behaviours. 
Continuing the analogy, Skinnerian behaviourism, like Darwinian 
explanations in biology, does not try to explain the origin of particular 
behaviours but instead seeks to explain why particular behaviours 'remain 
extant' rather than become 'extinct'. The intentionality of behaviours, and 
the 'intensionality' of behaviour, is explained in terms of differential 
survival of behaviours, just as teleological aspects of biological adaptation 
are explained in terms of differential survival. The survival 
(reinforcement) of a class of operant behaviours depends on the 
consequences that class has in the environment. 
Therefore, in giving a causal account of, for example, hunger, Skinner (1974) 
claimed; 
It is a mistake to say that food is reinforcing 
because we feel hungry or because we feel the 
need for food... It is the condition felt as 
hunger which would have been selected in 
the evolution of the species as most 
immediately involved in operant 
reinforcement. (p. 50). 
As Hayes and Brownstein (1987) emphasized, for radical behaviourists an 
adequate explanation must allow both prediction and control . An 
explanation emphasizing the analysis of environmental contingencies 
responsible for the differential 'survival' of behaviours is well suited to 
achieving these twin aims. 
This view of explanation contrasts sharply with those proposing 'capacities' 
and 'powers' as causes of behaviour. Secord (1984), for example, advised 
using 'capacities' and 'powers' as theoretical constructs in part to preserve 
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the, at least, theoretical possibility of some form of "free will" and the "self 
as agent". Secord (1984) commented: 
The potentiality, capacity, or power of a thing 
depends upon its nature, which must be 
sharply separated from prevailing conditions. 
(p.25). 
And, therefore; 
From the fact that an individual has the 
capacity and opportunity to act, we cannot 
predict that he will act. "Opportunity" cannot 
be assimilated to external circumstances, as in 
the case of a thing. (p. 25). 
Secord's (1984) position relies in part on arguments presented by Ayers 
(1968) aimed at refuting determinism. Briefly, in order to justify talk of 
organisms possessing 'powers', 'capacities' and 'potentialities', Ayers (1968) 
drew a distinction between extrinsic conditions and intrinsic nature. 
Given this distinction the question arises as to what criteria can be used for 
making this distinction? This question is particularly important as it is 
suggested that these powers exist even when they are not being exercised 
(Secord, 1984, p. 26). Ayers (1968) argued that the possibility of borderline 
cases between extrinsic conditions and intrinsic nature does not invalidate 
the distinction. Further, the distinction can be made on empirical grounds. 
For example, in discussing an example of changes to a car Ayers (1968) asked: 
And answered; 
Why should altering the position of certain 
pedals be a part of testing a car, while altering 
the position of some other part would come 
nearer to a modification ? (p. 85). 
This much surely depends on the empirical 
matter of how a car works, and how to drive 
it. (p. 85. Emphasis added). 
However, a conceptual difficulty arises when this method of distinguishing 
'extrinsic' from 'intrinsic' properties is used in theories explaining human 
behaviour -or even 'human nature'. To use Ayers' (1968) example of a car, 
it is not simply an empirical matter as to how a car works and how it can be 
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driven. To try to discover how a car actually 'works' and, especially, to work 
out how to use a car implies that there is a single possible answer to those 
questions. Clearly a car could be used for many things other than driving 
and could be 'worked' in ways that did not involve internal combustion. 
The danger in using the example of a car is that it is too easy to assume that 
what a car is designed for will -and should- determine an empirical 
understanding of how it works and how it is to be used. The difficulty is 
that there is no sensible way in which something understood along the lines 
of a purpose-built machine could be said to be explained or understood 
without assuming or taking as given the purpose towards which the 
machine is designed. Once again, it is the possibility that theorizing has a 
reflexive aspect that underlies this criticism since the purpose of a machine 
can ultimately only be given by the assumptions -or in the behaviour- of the 
theoretician. 
In other words, what counts as the 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic' properties of a 
thing may not be a matter awaiting empirical discovery but may depend on 
how the thing is used. Even studying a thing empirically is already using it 
a certain way. In Chapters 3 and 4 Wittgenstein's philosophy will be 
discussed and this should help clarify the relationship between a thing's 
nature (or essence) and its use. 
From the radical behaviourist viewpoint, however, powers and capacities 
are likely to be seen as "fanciful internalizations of contingencies of 
reinforcement" (Skinner, 1983, p. 10). Apparently Skinner terms them 
"fanciful" mainly because of what he sees as their total lack of explanatory 
efficacy. As Skinner (1984) stated: 
The objection is not that these things [mental 
predicates] are mental but that they offer no 
real ~xplanation and stand in the way of a 
more effective analysis. (p. 615. Brackets 
added). 
That is, it is possible to answer the question 'Why did the individual 
perform behaviour A?' by replying that the individual, having powers A', 
B', C', D', exercised power A' which led to the performance of behaviour A. 
The question of why power A' was exercised instead of the other powers, 
Skinner would claim, is no advance on the original question. All that is 
achieved is the preservation of the concept of "autonomous man". It is this 
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concept that Skinner (1971a) felt had to be abolished so that the "real causes 
of human behaviour" could be dealt with, thus preventing "the abolition of 
the human species." (p. 196). 
For this reason, and no doubt others, radical behaviourism avoids 
organocentrism -behaviour understood as a function of internal states- and 
follows contextualism -behaviour understood as a function of context. 
These terms are borrowed from Schnaitter (1987). (The term 'contextualism' 
is perhaps preferable to the term 'environmentalism' as the latter may be 
too readily identified with the physical environment. As already mentioned 
this identification with the language of physics, while methodologically 
convenient, is not philosophically necessary to radical behaviourism.) If 
Schnaitter's (1987) concept of contextualism is made to include the history of 
reinforcement then the complete behaviouristic explanation is to be found 
in the context. Zuriff (1985, p. 165), in similar vein, confirmed that the 
history of interaction with the environment is deemed an environmental 
variable by behaviourists. 
A difficulty arises at this point in trying to integrate what have been called 
'private events' into such a contextualist explanation. This difficulty will 
now be examined in detail. 
2.3 PRIVATE EVENTS AND RADICAL 
BEHA VIOURISM 
Zuriff (1980) defined private events as "covert events accessible only to the 
subject and about which the subject may report" (p. 339). Essentially, private 
events are those events people report that they 'see' or 'experience' when 
introspecting. Zuriff (1985, pp. 16-28) reviewed arguments about how first-
person reports of private events should be treated in a science of behaviour. 
However, the following discussion will focus on Skinner's treatment of 
private events. Other approaches will be mentioned only by way of contrast. 
It has been suggested by Zuriff that it is possible to interpret Skinner's view 
of private events in two ways. Zuriff (1980) commented that the most 
consistent and logically feasible view is that "[i]n Skinner's system, private 
events are theoretical entities, ... they are inferred rather than observed" (p. 
339. Brackets added). But, on the other hand, Skinner can be interpreted as 
76 
maintaining that private events "are observed stimuli rather than inferred 
hypothetical constructs" (Zuriff, 1985, p. 234). This apparent ambiguity may 
have occurred because of Skinner's view of 'seeing' in consciousness. 
Skinner (1984b) stated: 
The heart of the behavioristic position on 
conscious experience may be summed up in 
this way: Seeing does not imply something 
seen. (p.619). 
This approach, of course, applies to other modalities besides vision. The 
ambiguity, it is suggested here, arises from this distinction between 'seeing' 
and 'seeing something'. The 'somethings' for Skinner (1984b) are 
apparently 'actual' or physical objects: 
We acquire the behavior of seeing under 
stimulation from actual objects, but it may 
occur in the absence of these objects under the 
control of other variables. (p. 619). 
Confusion in understanding private events results from this strategy of 
appealing to 'actual' objects to explain perception. Zuriff (1980, pp. 343-344) 
has pointed out that, despite being "inconsistent with the rest of Skinner's 
radical behaviorism", there remain threads of a "correspondence theory of 
truth" in Skinner's writings. Zuriff (1980) quoted Skinner's references to 
reinforcing systems existing prior to any effect on an organism and to an 
environment that "lies outside the behaving person" (Skinner, 1974, p. 144). 
However, it is possible, even likely, that Skinner was aware of the 
inconsistency apparent in interpreting such comments as references to a 
metaphysical and transcendentally existent world. Perhaps it is simply the 
case that a verbal community that rarely, if ever, discourages talk of an 
independent 'real' world as part of what can loosely be called 'self-
justificatory' behaviour, establishes a verbal environment in which such 
comments are more likely. The present scientific intellectual climate may be 
such that any serious attempt to question the relevance or importance of the 
notion of the real, independent world is, at best, seen to be of no 
consequence, and, at worst, is condemned as vague philosophizing or 
playing with words. 
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If this is in fact the case there should be no surprise that Skinner anchors 
radical behaviourism and, more importantly, the experimental analysis of 
behaviour to this a priori reality. For whatever reasons, scientists seem 
loathe to abandon ontological talk of such a reality as a method of justifying 
and making sense of scientific knowledge. 
If in perception -to return to the question of Skinner'S treatment of private 
events- controlling stimuli can be identified with 'actual' objects then the 
temptation may remain to view perception as resulting from a dualistic 
encounter with a transcendent reality. However, it is fundamental to radical 
behaviourism that a stimulus does not elicit or determine a response, it 
simply makes it more likely. (Skinner, 1974, p. 74). Since talk of a 
controlling stimulus is part of 'observing behaviour' then there is no need 
to speak of a controlling stimulus anywhere else. The intuition that what is 
seen in the first-person case (one's own 'percept') is somehow the self-same 
'thing' as the 'stimulus' defined in the third-person case by an observer is 
part of the Cartesian picture of the world. 
Skinner distinguishes between 'seeing' and 'seeing something' in order to 
explain phenomena such as dreaming, imagining and remembering. 
Unfortunately, and probably unwittingly, by denying that seeing behaviour 
necessarily requires something seen ('actual' objects) Skinner may have 
helped perpetuate the notion that sometimes -when one is not dreaming, 
imagining or remembering- something is seen when one is 'seeing'. And 
further, that this something is an 'actual' object. 
It is clear that Skinner understood, at least to some extent, that this 
distinction is not sustainable. As he stated; 
It is a mistake ... to say that the world 
described by science is somehow or other 
closer to "what is really there," but it is also a 
mistake to say that the personal experience of 
artist, composer, or poet is closer to "what is 
really there." ... the behaviors of both 
scientist and nonscientist are shaped by what 
is really there but in different ways. (Skinner, 
1974, p. 127). 
While this shows a rejection of the inherent priority or validity of anyone 
description of the world there remains in the final sentence quoted a 
shadowy reality that has only one property left that can be described -it has 
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the power to shape, that is, cause behaviour. Zuriff (1980) has noted this 
"almost Kantian metaphysics" (p. 342) in Skinner's writings. A vestigial, 
noumenal world, however, has one disadvantage. Like Descartes' 
apodictically certain "I think, therefore I am" Skinner's "tag end of the 
world" may rapidly become enlarged and occupied. Candidates for such an 
occupation are likely to be physically defined 'controlling stimuli' and 
'contingencies of reinforcement'. (See Chapter 1, Section 1.8.2 on Husserl's 
critique of Descartes). 
It is unfortunate that Skinner has made comments about "what is really 
there". It is unlikely that they will be understood in any sense other than a 
dualistic one. 
Common understandings of stimulus and response classes are one example 
of an area where such dualism can cause conceptual problems. As Zuriff 
(1985, pp. 48-49) explained, functional stimulus and response classes in 
practice "must be specified independently" of each other. For example, if a 
response class is specified functionally «e.g.) depressing a lever) then the 
stimulus (the lever) must be specified by "its ordinary dictionary meaning" 
rather than as a function of the functional response. 
However, it is important to note that this is a strategic move taken to enable 
the performance of an experimental analysis of behaviour. This strategy 
does not imply that there must be an ontological 'essence' to such a 
stimulus. And it certainly does not imply that the ontological essence «e.g.) 
'leverness') of a stimulus somehow 'elicits' or causes the functional 
response. When "what is really there" is equated with the 'essential 
meaning' or 'absolute substantive nature' of a stimulus, or any other 
phenomenon, then the equation is basically dualistic in spirit. 
The fact remains that a 'controlling stimulus' is incorrectly understood if it 
is given some ontological status. Without such status the stimulus is 
simply an aspect of the behaviour of an observer. 'Actual' objects, as 
controlling stimuli, remain, quite literally, a third-person phenomenon. By 
way of comparison it is interesting to note that one of the pivotal 
distinctions in Wittgenstein's (1953) treatment of psychological phenomena 
is between the first and third-person cases (See Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, 
Section 5.3.4). 
79 
Any discussion of the problematic nature of private events will include 
comment on the distinction between the first-person and third-person case. 
The methodological behaviouristic viewpoint that Skinner (1974, pp. 14-15) 
criticized for its logical positivist or operationist interpretations of 
psychological phenomena, was called by Skinner (1974) the "psychology of 
the other one" (p. 13), after Max Meyer. One effect of this type of psychology 
is that first-person phenomena reduce to third-person operations. That is; 
We cannot measure sensations and 
perceptions as such, but we can measure a 
person's capacity to discriminate among 
stimuli, and the concept of sensation or 
perception can then be reduced to the 
operation of discrimination. (Skinner, 1974, 
p.14). 
Interestingly, the character of sensation -or of the concept of sensation- is 
that of an instantaneous experience, while the character of an operation is 
that of a sequence of events over time. So the distinction between the first 
and third-person cases is reminiscent and perhaps symptomatic of the two 
types of meaning referred to in previous Chapters; meaning as 'grasped in a 
flash' and meaning as 'use over time.' Successfully integrating these two 
aspects of meaning should therefore dissolve difficulties in understanding 
private events. 
The above operationism was criticized by Skinner (1974) because it grants the 
"existence of mental events while ruling them out of consideration" (p. 15). 
Alternatively, such operationism could terminate in what Hayes and 
Brownstein (1987) call "Watsonian metaphysical behaviorism" and thus 
deny the reality of mental events because they are not publicly observable or 
verifiable. Skinner is well known for his rejection of such "truth by 
agreement." (1945, p. 293). 
Also, Skinner (1979), as noted by Flanagan (1980), resisted a materialistic 
reduction of first-person experiences to physiology; 
The events observed through introspection 
were physiological (all behavior was 
physiological) but they were stimuli and 
responses, not nerve impulses or states of the 
nervous system. (p. 295). 
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No reduction, either physiological or operational, is required because there 
is nothing to reduce. There is nothing to reduce not because a metaphysics 
is being proposed in which people delude themselves into 'seeing' non-
existent things. It would, in fact, be a product of the very viewpoint Skinner 
wished to avoid if first-person experiences were considered to be delusions. 
Rather, and more simply, there is nothing to reduce because private 
sensations are interpreted as behaviour and not as objects -either 
physiological or mental. And there is no sense in which one behaviour 
(having sensations) reduces to another (observing someone 'having 
sensations'). 
In fact, it is because behaviourist terms such as 'operant', 'stimulus' and 
'reinforcer' are defined relationally and not just topographically that operant 
behaviours cannot even be reduced into sub-units of operant behaviour. 
Operants are not determined by physical states of affairs which is why it is a 
misconception to believe they can be subdivided in any reductionistic sense. 
In the same way it has already been noted that direct perceptionists believe 
that it is a mistake to subdivide the 'event' into temporal 'snapshots' (See 
Chapter 1, Section 1.7.2. Also, see Michaels and Carello, 1981). 
Skinner (1974, p. 220; 1984b, p. 619) also distinguished between "seeing 
something" and "seeing that you are seeing something." The latter 
behaviour is a result of contingencies set up by the verbal community rather 
than of natural contingencies. Just as with seeing, "seeing that you are 
seeing" can occur in the presence or absence of actual objects. The important 
point is an epistemological one. "Seeing that you are seeing" is not a 
confirmation or checking procedure. It produces no additional evidence 
for the presence or 'reality' of a phenomenon. Instead, "seeing that you are 
seeing" involves "self-descriptive responses describing the behavior of 
seeing" even when the thing seen may not be present (Skinner, 1984b, p. 
619). 
It should now be possible to understand the ambiguity Zuriff (1980) 
discovered in Skinner's treatment of private events. Skinner (1984b) asked; 
What are the private events which, at least 
in a limited way, a man may come to respond 
to in ways we call knowing? (p. 618). 
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What private events are not are the causes of behaviour (Skinner, 1974, p. 
17). Also, private stimuli are not the causes of behaviour -they merely 
indicate (or would indicate) to the observing scientist that a certain response 
has a certain probability of occurring, exactly as do public stimuli. The 
private stimulus is to be described and defined in the language of physics, 
preferably (Skinner, 1957, p. 130). It is this physical stimulus that the 
behavioural scientist deals with "even if only as an inference. "(Skinner, 
1953, p. 282). The stimulus is "only an inference" because the technology to 
observe it in a particular case has not yet been developed or used. 
However, in a special sense the private stimulus can be said to be 'observed' 
or 'known', but -and this is the vital point- not as some referential object. 
Neither mental nor physical objects are observed in introspection. As has 
already been discussed, Skinner eschewed such knowing even in the case of 
perceiving ( See Section 2.2.2). Instead 'knowledge' refers to a particular type 
of behaviour relative to the stimulus to be called knowledge of or about the 
stimulus. 
The special sense of 'knowing' that occurs during introspection is similar to 
that revealed in the following remarks by Wittgenstein (1953): 
And; 
It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a 
joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it 
supposed to mean -except perhaps that I am 
in pain? 
Other people cannot be said to learn of my 
sensations only from my behaviour, -for I 
cannot be said to learn of them. I have them. 
The truth is: it makes sense to say about other 
people that they doubt whether I am in pain; 
but not to say it about myself. (P.I. 246). 
"Only you can know if you had that 
intention." ... (And here 'know' means that 
the expression of uncertainty is senseless.) 
(P.I. 247). 
Thus, knowledge of private events is like the "ordinary certainties" 
discussed by Wittgenstein (1969) and already mentioned in Chapter 1, 
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Section 1.8. In Wittgenstein's terms such knowledge is not properly 
considered knowledge at alL 
Similarly, Skinner's view of private events is related to Wittgenstein's 
(1953) remark that; 
The proposition "Sensations are private" is 
comparable to: "One plays patience by 
oneself." (P.I. 248). 
In other words, the privacy of sensations does not arise because there is 
something present «e.g.) a 'pain') about which only the experiencer knows. 
Instead, the 'privacy' is simply the fact that the activity is enacted by one 
individual. And this is so by convention and not by public agreement. 
However, as will be discussed in Chapter 4, Wittgenstein's analysis of 
privacy goes far beyond suggesting that private experience is thus amenable 
to a functional analysis. For Skinner, concluding that private events can be 
included in a behavioural analysis was the endpoint of the radical 
behaviourist treatment of privacy. For Wittgenstein such an understanding 
of privacy was the starting point for a unique type of philosophizing. 
Philosophizing that, when directed at radical behaviourism, can produce 
very different understandings of concepts such as 'control', 'stimulus', 
'response' and 'values' than those advocated by Skinner. 
The following section will examine how Skinner incorporated first-person 
reports of private events into an analysis of verbal behaviour. Then, in the 
final section of this chapter, conclusions will be made as to the adequacy of 
radical behaviourism, as presented here, in dealing with the issues of 
reflexivity mentioned in the Introduction. 
2.4 PRIVATE EVENTS AND 'TACTS' 
In his discussion of verbal behaviour, Skinner (1957) mentioned three types 
of verbal operants whose prior stimuli are verbal. These three are 'echoic', 
'textual', and 'intraverbal' operants. However, there are two types of 
controlling stimuli that are nonverbal. The first of these is what Skinner 
(1957) termed the 'audience'. But it is the second type that is of interest here. 
Skinner (1957) commented; 
The other [type of controlling stimulus] is 
nothing less than the whole of the physical 
environment -the world of things and events 
which a speaker is said to "talk about." Verbal 
behavior under the control of such stimuli is 
so important that it is often dealt with 
exclusively in the study of language and in 
theories of meaning. (p.81. Brackets added). 
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The type of operant controlled by such stimuli was termed by Skinner (1957) 
a "tact." A tact is defined as; 
... a verbal operant in which a response of 
given form is evoked (or at least 
strengthened) by a particular object or event 
or property of an object or event. (pp.81-82). 
An important feature of the tact, particularly as regards private events, is 
that while the tact "is more likely to be 'asserted' than any other type of 
operant", by itself it is not an assertion (Skinner, 1957, p. 83). Semantic 
properties such as assertion and other "autoclitic" (Skinner, 1957, p. 311ff.) 
functions are carried by parts of utterances other than the tact (Skinner, 
1985b, p. 75). 
A tact is exemplified by the "unique control exerted by the prior stimulus" 
(Skinner, 1957, p. 83). Consequently, the control exerted by factors such as 
deprivation state and the audience on the emission of tacts is minimal. 
Therefore, a listener can infer something about the external circumstances 
regardless of the condition of the speaker (Skinner, 1957, p. 83). For this 
reason Hayes and Brownstein (1987) claimed that the purpose of a scientific 
methodology is to ensure that scientific observations are tacts (p. 212; Also, 
see Skinner, 1957, pp. 83-84). And the extent to which a verbal operant is a 
reliable tact depends on the consistency with which a verbal community 
reinforces the verbal response in the presence of a given stimulus. 
It is because of this last point that incorporating first-person reports of 
private events into an analysis of verbal behaviour presents difficulties. 
Tacts are set up through reinforcement contingent upon the 'presence' of 
some object or event. But if first-person reports are, at least in part, 
responses to private stimuli to which the verbal community has no contact, 
then can they be considered to be composed of tacts? By definition, the 
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verbal community cannot reinforce contingent on the presence of a private 
event. 
Without specifying exactly how, Hayes and Brownstein (1987) claimed that 
"private observations can be tacts given the proper prior history" (p. 212). 
But, as discussed in the previous section, if private observations result from 
introspection then the thing 'observed' may be present or absent. 
Establishing its presence remains a function of the reinforcement 
contingencies of the verbal community and, therefore, remains problematic. 
However, Skinner (1957) was more cautious in applying the term tact to the 
case of responses to private stimuli. As he stated; 
In setting up the type of verbal operant called 
the tact, the verbal community 
characteristically reinforces a given response 
in the presence of a given stimulus. This can 
be done only if the stimulus acts upon both 
speaker and reinforcing community. A 
private stimulus cannot satisfy these 
conditions. (pp. 130-131). 
Rather than calling first-person reports 'tacts' Skinner (1957) spoke of 
"verbal responses to private stimuli" (p. 131) and "verbal behavior under 
the control of private stimuli" (p. 130). The contingencies establishing such 
verbal behaviour under the control of private stimuli were called 
"defective", by Skinner (1957, p. 134). This is primarily because the verbal 
community has no direct access to the private stimuli. 
As already mentioned, a tact on its own carries no semantic load. Skinner 
(1957) considered it misleading; 
to call a tact an "announcement," 
"declaration," or "proposition," or to say that 
it "states," "asserts," or "denotes" something 
or that it "makes known" or "communicates" 
a condition of the stimulus. (p.82). 
Instead, it is the controlling relation that makes a tact a tact. Again; 
The tact is a relation, not merely a response, 
and in the absence of a controlling stimulus 
no relation can be established. (Skinner, 1957, 
p.l05). 
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An interesting point, noted by Zuriff (1979, pp. 129-130), follows from all of 
this. In a physiological experiment it may be possible to train a subject to 
emit a verbal response if a certain physiological event, measured by some 
instrument, occurred in his or her body. Such a verbal response could 
correctly be termed a tact of the event as measured by the instrument. A 
subject trained in this way may come to respond differentially to the 
occurrence, intensity, etc. of the measured event. In fact, as Zuriff (1979) has 
suggested, a person trained in this way may be found to be, for example, 
anxious without being aware of it, or, alternatively, may be considered 
'defective' in reporting on such events. 
However, that such training is possible need not lead the radical 
behaviourist to conclude that private stimuli exist in the usual situation 
where no training or measurement has occurred. Such a conclusion is 
yielding, perhaps, to the temptation mentioned by Day (1969a) -and already 
quoted in Section 2.2.3- of reifying the concept of conditioning. Only a 
reified view of operant conditioning as an absolute, existent process could 
explain why it would seem that first-person reports must, in part, be 
responses to private stimuli. And Skinner (1957), it would seem, is one who 
feels certain that such must be the case. He insists, "[t]here is no question 
that responses to private stimuli are established." (p. 131. Brackets added). 
But, in fact, it is quite possible to question whether such relationships are 
established. If the term 'private stimulus' is itself being used as a tact -thus 
ranking as a scientific observation according to Hayes and Brownstein (1987)-
then its controlling stimulus must be public and observable. (Of course, if 
the utterance "private stimuli" is found not to be a tact there would be no 
need to look for the object or event in the presence of which it is evoked.) 
So if the term 'private stimuli' is a tact then the controlling stimulus for its 
emission cannot be either an actual private stimulus or the stimulus-
response relationship between first-person reports and their supposed 
private stimuli. If it were possible to tact stimulus-response relationships or 
private stimuli then first-person reports could themselves be established as 
tacts. But Skinner began by assuming that there are stimuli which a listener 
is not in the position to reinforce in the manner characteristic of the tact. 
Hence the original problem. 
Exactly what feature of the environment might be controlling the emission 
of 'private stimuli' as a tact is not vital to this discussion. Most likely it 
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would be some feature(s) that circumstances surrounding first-person 
reports share with other circumstances where stimulus-response 
relationships have been found. That is, situations where stimulus-response 
relationships have been actually observed Ctacted') by the behaviourist. 
Whatever, the behaviourist should be aware that the utterance "private 
stimuli" cannot be a tact of a private stimulus or of a stimulus-response 
relationship and so should be wary of how first-person reports are to be 
treated. 
There is an aspect of first-person reports that makes a full acceptance of the 
approach of radical behaviourism unwise. It has been mentioned that the 
verbal community cannot reinforce first-person reports contingent on a 
particular internal event. Yet a behavioural analysis must seek to discover a 
particular private stimulus controlling a first-person report in order to 
facilitate prediction and control. But, ultimately, 'discovering' a particular 
private stimulus is indistinguishable from establishing a particular 
controlling relationship. This follows from the fact that radical behaviourist 
causality (See Section 2.2.3, above) is based on contingency-determined 
differential survival of behaviours and not on a mechanistic principle. 
Nothing is contingent on a first-person report being a response to a 
particular internal event. Until, of course, reinforcement does become 
contingent on a particular event. 
Now, Skinner's comment that there is no question that responses to private 
stimuli are established seems to imply that some knowledge can be had of 
the nature of the world prior to carrying out a behavioural analysis. This 
implied knowledge is seen by Flanagan (1980) as reflecting ontological and 
metaphysical commitments. In particular, commitments to a material and 
lawful (causal) world. Yet a radical behaviouristic conception of knowledge 
(See Section 2.2.2) only allows for contingency-governed and rule-governed 
knowledge. 
Knowledge of private stimuli cannot be contingency-governed since private 
stimuli for Skinner are just those stimuli a listener cannot behave with 
respect to. And rule-governed knowledge only involves being able to state 
contingency-specifying rules pertaining to a certain situation. Since 
Skinner's (1957) comment does not specify any contingencies then, 
according to the radical behaviourist understanding of knowledge, it does 
not represent an example of knowledge. 
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It would not be unfair to see the comment that "there is no question that 
responses to private stimuli are established " as being analogous to a 
comment such as "there is no question that God exists." Neither comment 
involves knowledge because of the role the concepts 'private stimuli' and 
'God' are asked to fulfil elsewhere. Just as 'God' is beyond human 
comprehension, so too 'private stimuli' are events beyond any possible 
contingent relationship that can be established with the behaviour of a 
listener. And in analysing first-person reports the behaviourist is a listener. 
The preceding argument reduces to the point that the terms 'private' and 
'stimuli' are not really compatible in a behavioural treatment. Skinner 
(1953) understood as much when he stated; 
Our survey of the ways in which a 
community. may impart a subjective 
vocabulary did not reveal any means of 
setting up a discriminative response to 
privacy as such. A world of experience 
which is by definition available only to the 
individual, wholly without public 
accompaniment, could never become the 
discriminative occasion for self-description. 
(p.280). 
However, it is argued here that Skinner does try to say something about the 
existence of private stimuli prior to the isolation of stimuli controlling first-
person reports of private events. As mentioned in the previous section, the 
behavioural scientist treats private stimuli as "inferences." (Skinner, 1953, p. 
282). The inference is achieved (and makes sense) only if a physicalist or 
materialist metaphysics is adopted. 
The argument can be reiterated and summarized in the following way. 
(1) For observation reports to be scientific they must, in 
part, be composed of tacts. 
(2) Tacts are established through the reinforcement 
contingencies of a verbal community. 
(3) Prior to the establishment of a controlling relation 
between a 'private' stimulus and a verbal response 
there is no sense to the notion that stimuli or stimulus-
response relationships exist. That is, the claim that 
there are as yet undiscovered private stimuli 
controlling first-person reports of private events should 
not be seen as implying knowledge. 
(4) In order to make sense of (or justify) attempts to 
'discover' controlling stimuli for first-person reports, 
radical behaviourism adopts a metaphysics. This 
metaphysics takes as axiomatic the theses that 
behaviour is material and, most importantly, lawful 
(Flanagan, 1980, discussed this "Skinnerian 
Metaphysics"). 
(5) The behavioural scientist infers the existence of 
private stimuli controlling first-person reports of 
private events through adopting the metaphysics in (4) 
(Zuriff, 1979, described how first-person reports can be 
treated inferentially). 
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Some interesting points can be made with regards to this summary. Firstly, 
Skinner (1974) noted that; 
Plato is said to have discovered the mind, but 
it would be more accurate to say that he 
invented one version of it. (p. 31). 
Similarly, it could be said that a behavioural analysis does not so much 
discover private stimuli as invent them. It is possible that Skinner would 
not object to such a comment. Instead, the behaviour of 'inventing' private 
stimuli is likely to be defended in terms of the radical behaviourist's 
conception of values. In particular, with regards to the 'value' of survival. 
That is, it could be argued that inventing private stimuli facilitates survival. 
The next section, therefore, includes discussion of values in analysing the 
treatment of reflexivity by radical behaviourism. 
Secondly, Skinner's (1957) list. of the four ways in which a verbal 
community might establish the "contingencies of reinforcement which 
produce verbal responses to private stimuli" (p. 131) can be reinterpreted. 
The four ways are: 
(1) Reinforce public accompaniments of private stimuli 
-(e.g.) reinforce the response "That hurts!" when 
someone has been hit; 
(2) Reinforce in the presence of collateral responses to 
the private stimuli -(e.g.) reinforce the response "My 
tooth aches" when the person is also holding his or her 
jaw; 
(3) Reinforce a response to a public stimulus "only to 
have the response transferred to a private event by 
virtue of common properties, as in metaphorical and 
metonymical extension"; 
(4) Reinforce responses self-descriptive of the speaker's 
behaviour followed by a reduction in the magnitude of 
this behaviour so that a response is "eventually made to 
a private stimulus which is similar except in magnitude 
to private stimuli otherwise accompanied by public 
manifestations". 
(pp. 132-133). 
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In each of these four ways the epistemological mission of the inferred 
'private stimulus' is revealed. It is suggested here that the term 'private 
stimulus' is a paradox and functions as an attempt to claim that an 
epistemological gap has been bridged that, in fact, cannot be bridged. The 
implied claim is that first-person reports of private events provide 
knowledge of the presence of yet to be analysed private, physical stimuli. 
And, in turn, this knowledge justifies talk of public "accompaniments" and 
"collateral responses." 
In other words, for Skinner, private events are not private events at all. 
They are public events pictured as being 'hidden' beneath the skin. The 
difference here is not trivial. If private events are only hidden public events 
then discovering their role as stimuli by means of a behavioural analysis 
seems not only sensible but obligatory. That is, such a picture of private 
events seems to 'suggest' the best way to deal with private events. 
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However, if it is true that there is no sense to talk of having any knowledge 
at all of private events then there need be no sense of obligation in treating 
them according to the approach of radical behaviourism. Also, if true, this 
suggests that radical behaviourism may not have completely freed itself 
from the problems of reflexivity outlined in the Introduction. Radical 
behaviourism may, therefore, be susceptible to the charge of being an 
"ideological philosophy" in the pejorative sense in which the term is used 
by Bartlett (1986; See Section 2.1, above). 
Of course, an alternative to the approach of radical behaviourism has been 
to treat first-person reports of private events as reports about mental objects 
and events. This contrasts with Skinner's (1953, p. 282; 1984b, p. 618) belief 
that first-person reports are best treated, inferentially, as reports of internal 
physical objects and events. 
However, there is at least one other possibility. First-person reports need 
not be treated as reports of anything specifiable at all. That is, in traditional 
terms a referent of first-person utterances need not be sought, or, in 
Skinner's terms, no internal controlling stimuli need be discovered. There 
is no need to think of first-person utterances as responses that are lawfully 
related to specifiable internal events. 
An example of this alternative view is to understand first-person reports 
simply as discriminative stimuli controlling the behavioural responses of 
others or of the individual making the report. Rather than treating first-
person reports as responses to stimuli they could instead, and just as 
validly, be thought of as part of the 'natural expression' of particular 
phenomena. The main advantage of this viewpoint is that it avoids having 
to explain how responses to private stimuli could possibly be established by 
the reinforcing practices of a verbal community. 
As already mentioned (Section 2.3), in practice functional stimuli and 
responses are often specified purely in the language of physics (Zuriff, 1985, 
pp. 48-49). This practice is to enable an experimental analysis of behaviour 
to be performed. For example, in the operant chamber, the bar has to be 
specified independently of the bar-pressing response otherwise an infinite 
regress would occur in any attempt to record the occurrence of either the bar 
or the bar-press. 
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That this practice is only a strategic, methodological move, and thus in a 
sense arbitrary, finally becomes philosophically important when dealing 
with first-person reports of private events. Since a stimulus is often 
specified in physical terms it is very tempting for the behaviourist to see 
first-person reports as responses to internal physical stimuli. But, tempting 
as this conclusion may be, it ignores, at the risk of philosophical 
inconsistency and incoherence, the fact that a private physical event can 
never be a stimulus in a functional analysis. In the example of bar-pressing 
the 'bar' can easily move between its roles as physical object and functional 
stimulus class, without serious objections being raised. However, just 
because events 'within the skin' are physical -and that is not being denied- it 
does not follow that they therefore act as stimuli (or responses) in the sense 
used in operant psychology. 
In the world of public events a behaviourist can be said to actually see 
contingent relationships between events (Day, 1969b, p. 505). However, by 
definition no such relationship involving private events could be 'seen'. 
(Although such a relationship could be 'imagined', perhaps. But 
'imagining' is a very different concept from that of 'seeing'.) What can be 
observed are relationships between first-person reports and subsequent 
behaviours both by the individuals making the reports and others. But, 
since in the latter scheme first-person reports are treated as stimuli rather 
than responses, there is no suggestion as to how to behaviourally control the 
occurrence of such reports. 
In other words, the term 'private stimuli' simply denotes the point at which 
structure and function become indistinguishable. To say a first-person 
report can be considered as part of a unitary 'natural' phenomenon is to see 
the situation structurally. Whereas, to say a first-person report is a response 
to private stimuli amounts to dissecting the phenomenon and thus to see it 
functionally. 
The point being made here is that there is nothing to suggest which 
interpretation is best or more appropriate. In more pragmatic tone, the 
division between structure and function is of no use here. And the division 
between structure and function is nothing more than yet another 
manifestation of the two types of meaning that have been mentioned in 
previous Chapters. That is, meaning as instantaneous, 'grasped in a flash' 
(structural), and meaning as 'use over time' (functional). 
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One possible solution would be to treat first-person reports as responses to 
some sort of 'global' stimulus composed of all events occurring both 
immediately and distally prior to the report. Obviously, specifying and 
measuring such a stimulus would be impossible in practical terms and 
perhaps even impossible in logical terms. It would certainly be more 
convenient for first-person reports to be responses controlled by punctate, 
clearly specified private stimuli. While daunting, the technological task of 
identifying such stimuli would not be impossible. But, if calling a first-
person report a response to a private stimulus is akin to calling the 
silhouette of a particular building a response to concrete and steel arranged 
in a certain way, then it can be seen that seeing first-person reports as either 
responses or stimuli is relative to the observer. 
It is probably worth making this point in another way. Skinner (1953) 
claimed tha ti 
"I was on the point of going home" may be 
regarded as. the equivalent of "I observed 
events in myself which characteristically 
precede or accompany my going home." (p. 
262). 
But, this suggested equivalence is misleading. As has often been pointed out 
«e.g.) Falk, 1987) certain, and perhaps the most frequent, uses of the personal 
pronoun 'I' do not stand substitution by terms like 'someone' or even 'the 
utterer of this utterance.' It is suggested here that the former of the two 
statements mentioned by Skinner could stand such substitution. That is, it 
is possible to imagine someone in normal conversation saying 'Someone 
was on the point of going home' and meaning himself or herself. (In a 
similar way people sometimes say 'Someone is getting angry as a warning to 
a listener that they are getting angry). 
However, the second of Skinner's two statements could not stand such 
substitution. The statement "Someone observed events in myself ... " could 
only occur, outside of 'idle' philosophizing, when, for example, someone 
was recounting what happened when she or he had surgery -or perhaps by 
someone who believed other people had the power of x-ray vision. In these 
cases "e could substitute for "someone" «e.g.) a person might observe 
events in his or her body during surgery using a local anaesthetic). But in 
the usual case where there is no surgery or x-ray vision it would be a 
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mistake to substitute "I" for "someone." By calling the two utterances ("I 
was on the point of going home" and "I observed events in myself ... ") 
equivalent , Skinner has made the latter, mistaken, substitution seem like a 
valid possibility. That is, given that the substitution is valid in the first 
utterance ("I was on the point of going home"), a nd given the two 
utterances can be treated as equivalent, Skinner has concluded that it must 
be possible to make the substitution in the second utterance. 
Zuriff (1979) examined the 'logic' of first-person reports and arrived at much 
the same conclusion. He argued that a first-person report should not be 
understood as a data report. That is, an utterance such as "I have a 
toothache" is not a report of a scientific datum which just happens to be 
inside the speaker's body. So a scientific report would not include the 
datum "a toothache occurred." Instead, Zuriff (1979) suggested that the 
datum to be recorded should be "the subject reported a toothache occurred." 
(p. 131). The subject thus becomes an instrument "to discover the nature of 
private events II (p. 131). And it is for the scientist to determine how to 
interpret the 'readings' of this instrument. Most importantly, Zuriff (1979) 
clearly stated that the scientist thus "hypothesizes," "postulates" and "infers" 
concerning covert stimuli and responses. Only by hypothesis can private 
events be said to exert stimulus control. Neither the behaviourist nor the 
subject observes this relationship between private events and first-person 
reports. 
In summary, the present section has attempted to show, using several 
different approaches, that first-person reports of private events are best not 
regarded as tacts. One problem that remains is just how the reinforcing 
practices of a verbal community could establish a first-person report as a tact 
of a private event. It has been suggested that the only way that radical 
behaviourism could avoid this problem would be to either make ontological 
and metaphysical claims about private events and their relationship to first-
person reports (See Flanagan, 1980), or to treat comments about such 
relationships as hypotheses and inferences (See Zuriff, 1979). 
The following section draws some conclusions regarding radical 
behaviourism's treatment of the issues of reflexivity. 
2.5 CONCLUSION: RADICAL 
BEHAVIOURISM AND ISSUES OF 
REFLEXIVITY 
2.5.1 INTRODUCTION 
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In Chapter One three issues of reflexivity were listed. They were termed 
'reflexive' issues because they shared a recursive, self-referential aspect. 
These three issues are: 
(1) The usefulness of conceiving of people as reflexive, 
active agents; 
(2) The ability of a psychological explanation to provide 
a coherent account of its own production; 
(3) The possibility of evaluating a psychological theory 
or approach independently of its own particular 
assumptions. 
How radical behaviourism fares with each of these three issues will now be 
discussed in the light of the account of radical behaviourism presented in 
preceding sections. 
2.5.2 RADICAL BEHAVIOURISM AND THE AGENT 
It is clear that for Skinner a behavioural analysis does not need to create 
room for an active agent. Furthermore, much of the book Beyond Freedom 
and Dignity (Skinner, 1971a) can be read as a warning about the unfortunate 
consequences of holding to the doctrine of autonomous man. "A person is 
not an originating agent", claimed Skinner (1974), " he is a locus, a point at 
which many genetic and environmental conditions come together in a joint 
effect." (p. 168). Failure to realize this could result in the "abolition of the 
human species." (Skinner, 1971a, p. 196). 
Most importantly, for the behaviourist, there is no advantage to be gained by 
incorporating an active agent as a theoretical construct into a causal 
95 
explanation of behaviour. Zuriff (1985) concisely commented in this regard 
that; 
Lawfulness, objectivity, observability, and 
scientific explanation, the hallmarks of 
behaviorist science, as well as prediction and 
control, the goals of that science, can be 
achieved only if, as a working assumption, 
agency is abandoned. (p.178). 
Behaviourist explanation, analogous as it is to 'Darwinian' explanation in 
evolutionary biology (See Section 2.2.4, above), seeks to explain why one 
behaviour occurs rather than another. But, more than this, such 
explanation must also make possible prediction and control. This is only 
achieved once an external, environmental cause has been given. Agentic 
'powers,' 'capacities,' 'beliefs' and 'desires' can only ever be inaccurate 
estimations of the environmental variables and contingencies responsible 
for particular behaviours, according to the behaviourist. 
An important consequence of the behaviourist approach is that the 
knowledge a person has is not construed as a collection of beliefs. Instead, 
knowledge is viewed as a repertoire of behavioural responses (See Section 
2.2.2, above). Therefore, aspects of behaviour which might traditionally be 
viewed as reflexive, such as self-knowledge and awareness, are analysed in 
terms of the reinforcement contingencies of the verbal community 
(Skinner, 1974, pp. 168-171). 
On first inspection, then, radical behaviourism appears to avoid any 
problems that might arise from the inclusion of a reflexive agent in a causal 
explanation of behaviour. However, in Skinner's approach to private 
events there are hints that a reflexive aspect might return (Skinner, 1957, p. 
13 Off; 1974, p. 17; 1984, pp. 617-618). Reflexivity returns in the limited yet 
still possible personal knowledge of private events. Skinner (1984b) asked; 
"What are the private events which, at least in a limited way, a man may 
come to respond to in ways we call knowing?" (p. 618). As was discussed in 
Sections 2.3 and 2.4, above, there are problems in accounting for any 
knowledge at all that individuals may be said to have of their own private, 
internal events. It is not that discriminations of internal events cannot be 
taught 'as effectively as' discriminations of public stimuli, it is that they 
cannot be taught at all . 
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It is suggested here that this problem arises because the kind of knowledge 
Skinner implies it is possible for an individual to have is essentially 
reflexive knowledge. That is, knowledge of such a personal nature that it 
depends on discriminations which cannot have been taught by the verbal 
community . It was suggested in Section 2.4 that this kind of implied 
knowledge serves as a justification for treating first-person reports as 
responses to private stimuli. 
So, at least at the philosophical level, radical behaviourism, as espoused by 
Skinner, readmits a reflexive aspect into the study of human behaviour. 
This, despite Skinner's many comments that try to connect personal 
knowledge of internal events to the reinforcing practices of a verbal 
community ((e.g.) "Self-knowledge is of social origin, and it is useful first to 
the community which asks the questions" (Skinner, 1974, p. 169). 
In practice this reflexive aspect can be ignored by viewing first-person reports 
as unreliable reports of internal events. But the problems of reflexivity are 
not thereby dissolved. An individual who can respond discriminatively to 
internal events that have not been differentiated in the reinforcement 
contingencies of the verbal community must be making discriminations in 
some as yet unexplained way. Therefore, an element of unpredictability in 
her or his behaviour must remain at least as far as the verbal community is 
concerned. 
The alternative is to treat private events as inferences, made by the scientist, 
from first-person reports (Zuriff, 1979). But this may simply move the 
problems of reflexivity to a different level. In particular, difficulties may re-
emerge in the evaluation of different philosophies of science. 
2.5.3 RADICAL BEHAVIOURISM AND REFLEXIVE FEATURES 
OF PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS 
Can behavioural analysis successfully explain its own occurrence in the 
verbal behaviour of certain humans without being self-refuting or 
confused? The short answer seems to be 'yes', but with a caveat. 
Central to a behaviourist account of how behavioural analysis could have 
arisen as a natural activity is the radical behaviourist epistemology discussed 
above (See Section 2.2.2). In this epistemology, according to Lee (1985b), 
there is knowledge which consists of 'rules' (statements describing 
97 
contingencies), and there is knowing, which consists of effective behaviour. 
This distinction is found in science. As Lee (1985b) stated; 
The scientist as experimenter participates in 
investigative contingencies. As theoretician, 
the scientist formulates rules that describe the 
investigative contingencies. (pp. 189-190). 
A "rule" is "above all else" a discriminative stimulus and discriminative 
stimuli are "objects or events that occasion effective behaviour." (p. 184). 
Therefore, behavioural analysis exists because the laws it produces act as 
discriminative stimuli that lead to "effective" behaviour in a particular 
situation. Behavioural laws result in effective behaviour because they are 
concerned with the con seq u e n c e s of an action above all other 
considerations. The challenge can be made that the 'effectiveness' of a 
particular behaviour can only be assessed by further behaviour, which in 
turn must be assessed for its own 'effectiveness' with further behaviour, ad 
infin itum. Finally determining the 'effectiveness' of a behaviour thus 
seems like an inevitably elusive goal. 
But Zuriff (1980) explained how such an infinite regress can be avoided in a 
radical behaviourist epistemology. Zuriff (1980) claimed that Skinner's 
radical behaviourism has a "Theory of Truth" that does not depend on 
correspondence, intersubjective agreement, or incorrigibility. Instead, 
radical behaviourism employs a pragmatic theory of truth housed in a 
naturalized epistemology. The 'pragmatic' label refers to the criterion of 
'effectiveness.' Verbal behaviour is true if it produces effective behaviour. 
The important feature, however, is the naturalized epistemology. Simply 
put, biological and cultural evolution has produced humans who accept 
certain verbal behaviour as true without using any explicit truth criteria. 
In time a science of behaviour emerges and produces 'effectiveness' as an 
explicit criterion of truth. This science also provides methods specifying 
how effectiveness is to be defined and measured. Finally, the criterion and 
methods "are accepted... mostly because humans simply find them 
acceptable." (Zuriff, 1980, p. 348). No choice is involved in accepting the 
criterion and methods. And, presumably, the methods just do come to 
constitute the criterion. Thus, no infinite regress is initiated by attempting 
to determine the 'effectiveness' of the methods and criterion. After all, the 
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methods and criterion come to count as just what is meant by 
'effectiveness.' 
This then is a naturalistic explanation of how humans come to know certain 
verbal behaviour as being true. In this sense, as Zuriff (1980) argued, the 
acceptance of 'effectiveness' as a criterion of truth is a prediction rather than 
a recommendation of a science of behaviour. It is predicted that individuals 
and verbal communities will establish 'effectiveness' as a criterion of truth. 
In its barest and boldest form the prediction, derived from a behavioural 
analysis, is that verbal communities that are guided by behavioural analyses 
of events will out-survive all other competitors (See Section 2.5.4, below). 
It appears then that radical behaviourism is not self-refuting or 
contradictory. The fact that a science of behaviour produces both a criterion 
for truth as well as the means of defining and measuring the criterion does 
not, of course, make such a science self-refuting. As discussed at the 
beginning of this Chapter, "global theories" have just this form and it can be 
argued that this form is desirable rather than offensive (Hooker, 1975). 
Nevertheless, the following section discusses how such all-encompassing 
approaches are to be evaluated, which is the concern expressed above as the 
third issue of reflexi vi ty. 
Serving as an introduction to the following section a caveat must be added 
to the present conclusion, however. If a science of behaviour predicts 
'effectiveness' being accepted as a criterion of truth then it should be 
informative to examine how radical behaviourism understands the status of 
predictions made by a science of behaviour. 
Zuriff (1980) did not state exactly what methods and means of measurement 
a science of behaviour specifies to determine the effectiveness of a particular 
example of verbal behaviour. But presumably the most important feature 
determining effectiveness would be the extent to which the verbal 
behaviour is reinforced. And, since Skinner (1984c, p. 704) said "I know of 
no way in which a reinforcer can be identified in advance", effective 
behaviour would simply be behaviour that continues to occur. 
Here, effectiveness is similar to fitness in evolutionary biology. Central to 
evolutionary biology is the insight that fitness is measured by survival and 
not vice versa. In a particular instance biologists may state that an 
organism's survival is caused by some particular adaptation. But the 
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adaptation does not therefore constitute fitness. The adaptation does not 
survive because it is 'fit'. Rather, its survival is dependent on the complex 
of selection pressures present at the time. In this sense there can be no 
'theory' of what underlies or causes fitness. Survival is simply a 
measurement that, at any particular time, biologists use as an indication of 
fitness. Even specifying definitions and methods of measuring fitness 
cannot be said to constitute fitness since no specified rule can also specify 
how it is to be used (See Hofstadter, 1979 and Wittgenstein, 1953, (e.g.) P.1. 84-
86 for two discussions of why following a rule is not as simple to explain as 
it is easy to perform). It is by this means that evolutionary biology dispenses 
with design, and a designing agent, in its explanation of the variety of life 
forms. Fitness is not so much an explanation of survival but rather an 
invitation to describe what is observed or measured as surviving. 
Analogously, at the most fundamental level, there can be no 'theory' of 
what causes effectiveness. In any particular instance a behaviour may be 
judged to be effective. A theory could then be proposed to explain why that 
behaviour is effective. For example, it may be effective because it 
corresponds to the nature of the world. But, if it is the behaviour of 
'judging-behaviour-as-effective' that is to be explained rather than 
effectiveness itself, then nothing is gained by having a theory of 
effectiveness. This is because an explanation of how a theory could cause a 
person to behave one way «e.g.) judging a behaviour as effective) or another 
«e.g.) judging a behaviour as not effective) would still be needed. 
Now, if an explicit theory of effectiveness is unimportant in a causal 
explanation of 'judging-behaviour-as-effective', then the question of what 
characteristics a behaviour must possess to be effective remains open-ended. 
Finally, then, the prediction that effectiveness will arise as a criterion of 
truth, ironically, does not predict what particular forms of behaviour might 
survive. In simple terms the functional behaviour class of 'seeing the 
effectiveness of verbal behaviour' may take on any number of imaginable 
forms. The prediction predicts nothing specific. 
In fact, given a radical behaviourist epistemology and Zuriff's (1980) 
pragmatic theory of truth, no prediction need be thought of as predicting 
anything in particular. Just as first-person reports of private events provide 
knowledge of, or point to, 'no-thing' in the private world, so too predictions 
point to, or provide knowledge of, 'no-thing' in the future. Of course, this 
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does not mean that predictions are therefore unjustified or worthless. 
Rather, it is just one more reason for seeking a new understanding of the 
status of knowledge and meaning, particularly knowledge and meaning as 
related to psychological phenomena. Chapter 3 begins that search. 
2.5.4 RADICAL BEHAVIOURISM, REFLEXIVITY AND THE 
EVALUATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS 
Just as radical behaviourism gives a naturalistic account of epistemology, 
which leads to the prediction of effectiveness emerging as a criterion of 
truth, so too it provides a naturalistic account of ethics and values. 
In simple terms, 'evaluating' something involves assessing its worth in 
some way. This section will discuss how radical behaviourism assesses 
psychological explanations and approaches, including itself, in the light of 
reflexive aspects of the process of evaluation. 
The first point to be made is that the explicit criteria of prediction and 
control that are said, by both behaviourists and non-behaviourists, to 
characterize a behaviourist explanation of human behaviour are not the 
ultimate source of radical behaviourist evaluations. If prediction and 
control were arbitrary standards accepted unquestioningly then it would be 
possible to argue that there are other, equally valid, criteria to use in 
evaluating psychological explanations. Examples of such criteria are 
'explanatory power', 'systemic worth' and 'fruitfulness'. But, for Skinner, 
prediction and control are not arbitrary in the sense of being on a par with 
other criteria. Instead the two criteria are unique in the direct way they 
relate to the only value that eventually matters (Skinner, 1953, p. 43 Off; 
1971a, p. 126). That value is survival. 
In operant terms survival is the ultimate consequence by which all 
behaviour is to be judged. The worth of a psychological explanation, 
therefore, is not dependent on any intellectual properties it may possess. 
Unless, of course, the intellectual properties can be translated into 
behaviours that contribute to survival. In keeping with the radical 
behaviourist outlook this could be thought of as involving the survival of 
one idea in competition with other ideas <C.f. Dawkins', 1978, discussion of 
the "meme"). Survival of behaviourist explanation involves the survival 
of cultural practices . 
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This type of survival operates through a certain kind of selection. Just as 
natural selection operates on genes and reinforcement operates selectively 
on behaviour, so too competition between social groups and interactions 
between social groups and the non-social environment select cultural 
practices. As Skinner (1953) commented; 
Cultural practices which are advantageous 
will tend to be characteristic of the groups 
which survive and which therefore 
perpetuate those practices. Some cultural 
practices may therefore be said to have 
survival value, while others are lethal in the 
genetic sense. (p. 430). 
While conceding that survival value is "not an unchanging criterion, for 
what may be a 'good' culture in one period is not necessarily 'good' in 
another" (p. 431) Skinner (1953) concluded that; 
In the long run, however, the most effective 
control from the point of view of survival 
will probably be based upon the most reliable 
estimates of the survival value of cultural 
practices. Since a science of behaviour is 
concerned with demonstrating the 
consequences of cultural practices, we have 
some reason for believing that such a science 
will be an essential mark of the culture or 
cultures which survive. The current culture 
which, on this score alone, is most likely to 
survive is therefore, that in which the 
methods of science are most effectively 
applied to the problems of human behavior. 
(p.446). 
Skinner's conclusion (or prediction) is that the most effective means of 
ensuring the survival of a culture involves a deliberate analysis of the 
functional relationships between cultural practices and their consequences. 
Behavioural analysis, of course, is just such a deliberate analysis. 
So the ultimate value of behaviourist explanation is that, according to 
Skinner's prediction, it is comprised of cultural practices -such as assessing 
the consequences of cultural practices- that aid in the survival of a culture. 
In turn, the survival of the culture results in the survival of those practices. 
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Thus, just as epistemology is 'naturalized' by radical behaviourism, so too, 
values and the process of evaluation are naturalized. 
It may appear that such naturalized evaluation avoids the reflexive question 
of how behaviourist explanation can be evaluated independently of 
behaviourist assumptions. Since it is a prediction that the value of survival 
will become adopted as a prior condition for cultural design, then it may 
seem that the correctness of this prediction will be decided empirically. This 
may be so, but as has just been argued (Section 2.5.3) the status of predictions 
in radical behaviourism leads to some interesting conclusions. The 
behaviours involved in prediction are themselves cultural practices. 
Skinner believes it reasonable to consider that the practice of 'deliberately' 
and explicitly assessing the survival value of cultural practices must itself 
have survival value. But, strictly speaking, from a radical behaviourist 
view of knowledge, explanation and causality there is no 'must' here at all. 
Knowledge, for the behaviourist is never of the nature of the world (See 
Section 2.2.2). Therefore, knowledge of survival value can never be 
descriptive of the nature of a certain cultural practice. 
If the cultural practice of "assessing the survival value of cultural practices" 
itself survives it will not be because of any quality such a practice possesses, 
according to radical behaviourism. This is because such an explanation 
would be an explanation in terms of causal mechanisms, and radical 
behaviourism eschews explanations that speak of causal mechanisms. If a 
behaviour analytic explanation of why a behaviour or cultural practice 
survives is requested, then it will be given in terms of the reinforcement 
histories of those individuals who respond to the behaviour or practice in 
ways called "seeing that it survives." Certainly, physiological, chemical, 
physical or logical explanations could also be given but they are the tasks of 
physiologists, chemists, physicists and logicians, and not of psychologists. 
So, what of Skinner's prediction that the culture that most effectively 
applies the methods of science to the area of behaviour is most likely to 
survive? Ultimately, from the radical behaviourist perspective, this 
prediction is a manifestation, or example, of the continuing survival of the 
practice of behavioural analysis. That is, it would be contrary to the spirit of 
radical behaviourism to respond to the prediction as if it were some form of 
description of future events -a description founded on the presumed causal 
or, perhaps, logical structure of the world. However, this does not make 
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predictions weak or worthless. Instead, radical behaviourism simply 
presents a distinctive account of how predictions predict. 
Traditionally a prediction may have been thought of as a probe into the 
future that relied for its justification on the secure inevitability that 
underpins a mechanistic account of causality. But the image of such 
absolute security is lost in radical behaviourism. Therefore, a prediction 
becomes, first and foremost, a behaviour to be analysed as any other. It may 
act as a discriminative stimulus controlling responses but this is not a 
unique feature of predictions. In the last analysis, predictions are predictions 
because they are responded to as predictions. And, applying the "methods of 
science ... to the problems of human behaviour" is predicted as aiding in the 
survival of a culture ultimately because individuals 'see' that the methods 
of science when applied to the problems of human behaviour aid in the 
survival of a culture. 
Such apparently anticlimactic conclusions, it is suggested here, are at the 
heart of radical behaviourism. Depending on the viewpoint taken they can 
be seen as the most trivial or most profound insights radical behaviourism 
has to offer. 'Trivial' to the extent that these conclusions do not seem to 
explain what, for example, prediction actually is in substantive terms. 
'Profound' to the extent that these sorts of conclusions can seem to dispense 
with the need to ask such questions in the first place. 
This, then, is the radical behaviourist approach to evaluation. At bedrock 
there is no reflexive problem in evaluating a form of psychological 
explanation because there is no internal process of evaluation occurring. An 
evaluation only happens in the sense that one or another response occurs. 
But of course, in order to realize that there is no reflexive problem a radical 
behaviourist posture must first be taken. 
It would be easy at this point to conclude that there are two completely 
incommensurable world-views in operation. One world-view terminates in 
seemingly endless agonizing over what have here been called the issues of 
reflexivity. Meanwhile, the other world-view -radical behaviourism-
terminates in a scientific version of Calvinist predestination. That is, even 
the process of evaluation is interpreted as being caused by 'external' factors. 
And, of course, it is simply unfortunate, for either the individual or the 
culture, if the 'response', in this case the approach taken to psychological 
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phenomena, does not have survival value. This view was clearly stated by 
Skinner (1971b); 
Those who are induced by their culture to act 
in its service will do so, and the culture will 
benefit. They will not do so because of any 
certain knowledge in advance of where the 
culture is going. Those who want to know 
now what will be right in the future miss the 
whole point of evolution. '" There is no way 
in which one can predict later stages in an 
evolutionary history. It is not in the nature 
of evolution that this should be possible. (pp. 
550-551). 
Since it is so difficult, even impossible, to know what will be right in the 
future then the problem of evaluating different approaches to lithe problems 
of human behaviour" will not be solved by an evaluation. Only the 
evolutionary process finally 'solves' the problem as it works to select a 
certain approach. 
However, the incommensurability of these two 'world-views' will not be 
taken as the final conclusion here. Within radical behaviourism the issues 
of reflexivity are, to varying degrees, treated coherently and consistently. 
However, when it comes to discussing and evaluating approaches to 
psychological phenomena it is not considered satisfactory to end such 
discussion by claiming that the final arbiter is a process essentially external 
to all discussion. But also, it is not considered satisfactory to claim that the 
final arbiter is essentially an internal process. 
To seek an alternative to these two approaches is the purpose of the 
following Chapters. 
CHAPTER THREE 
3 WITTGENSTEIN'S EARLY 
PHILOSOPHY AND ISSUES OF 
REFLEXIVITY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
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Ludwig Wittgenstein has often been accredited as one of the most important 
and influential philosophers of the twentieth century. Even Ayer (1985), 
while disagreeing with much of what Wittgenstein said, rated the 
philosophical influence of Wittgenstein in this century as second only to 
that of Bertrand Russell's. 
Certainly Wittgenstein has been linked to, categorized with, and used to 
provide support for, many intellectual 'schools'. Logical positivism, 
structuralism, logical behaviourism, conventionalism, ordinary language 
philosophy, phenomenalism, phenomenology, idealism, realism and 
mysticism have all been linked in one way or another to the philosophy of 
Wittgenstein. 
From within psychology examples of a Wittgensteinian 'influence' include 
Day's (1969b) comparison of Skinner's operationism with Wittgenstein's 
Philosophical Investigations; Coulter's (1983) 'rethink' of cognitive theory 
based on a 'Wittgensteinian' view; the claimed philosophical support 
Wittgenstein's 'Early' philosophy lends to paradoxical psychotherapy 
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(Watzlawick, Beavin and Jackson, 1967); and Ground's (1987) use of 
Wittgenstein's 'Late' philosophy to reconceptualize descriptive 
psychopathology. 
What is surprising is that these various intellectual approaches when 
compared with each other often appear incompatible. In most cases this 
inconsistency can be explained in terms of two broad phases in 
Wittgenstein's philosophical career. Usually these two phases are called the 
'Early' and 'Late' Wittgenstein. For example, the 'Early' philosophy was 
embraced by the logical positivists in the 'Vienna Circle' (Engelmann, 1967) 
while the 'Late' philosophy has been seen as influencing, if not initiating, 
linguistic philosophy and 'ordinary language philosophy'. (See Ayer, 1985, 
for a discussion of the influence of Wittgenstein's philosophy). 
However, the extent to which the 'Early' and 'Late' philosophies represent a 
philosophical about-face has itself been questioned (Johnson, 1977; 
Finch,1977). In particular, Finch (1971; 1977) has argued that the goals that 
Wittgenstein kept in view always remained the same even though the 
'method' for achieving those goals underwent an apparently radical change. 
But this is not to say the 'method' or approach is secondary to the aims. 
More likely, the change in method reflects a completely altered view of the 
nature of the goals which, for example, included having a clear 
understanding of how language functions. Certainly, this likelihood seems 
to be confirmed in the first part of the Philosophical Investigations where 
Wittgenstein critiqued his own earlier understanding of how language 
functions. 
Nevertheless, even within the 'Early' and 'Late' philosophies there are 
often apparently contradictory positions which could easily have given rise 
to contradictory intellectual approaches. For example, in the Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus Wittgenstein (1974a) relegated all propositions that 
are not those of the natural sciences -including 'propositions of logic' and all 
talk of ethics (T. 6.1, 6.11, 6.42) - to the realm of nonsense. And yet he 
seemed convinced of the importance of ethics and aesthetics and the 
"absolute value" of certain experiences despite the fact they cannot be talked 
about with sense (Wittgenstein, 1965, p. 6). Also, in the 'Late' philosophy 
there is the distinction between seeing the meaning of a word as its use in 
language (P.I. 43) and, alternatively, seeing the meaning of words, and 
phenomena in general, in their 'physiognomies' (P.I. p. 218). 
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More will be said about all of these topics subsequently. For the moment the 
simple point is being made that if Wittgenstein's philosophy in some sense 
can be said to span apparently antithetical intellectual approaches then it 
may be of interest to apply it to some of the apparently irreconcilable 
dichotomies and dilemmas in psychology that have been discussed in 
previous chapters. 
Before outlining the philosophy of Wittgenstein as it relates to the topic of 
this thesis, some cautionary points should be made. It seems that 
Wittgenstein was not confident that his work would be understood by his 
contemporaries. For example, in the Foreword to the Philosophical 
Investigations Wittgenstein commented; 
I make them [his 'remarks'] public with 
doubtful feelings. It is not impossible that it 
should fall to the lot of this work, in its 
poverty and in the darkness of this time, to 
bring light into one brain or another - but, of 
course, it is not likely. (p. x. Brackets added). 
And, in the Preface to the Philosophical Remarks (Wittgenstein, 1975) spoke 
of the difference between the spirit in which the remarks had been written 
and the spirit that "instils much of Western society" suggesting that it is 
unlikely his work would be understood. That these comments are more 
than the expression of arrogance or preciousness is best supported by those 
who testified to his exacting and ruthless self-honesty «e.g.) Engelmann, 
1967). 
It is possible , then, that a very different kind of attitude from that normally 
taken by philosophers, is required to understand what Wittgenstein has said. 
It is possible that Finch (1977) is correct in saying that Wittgenstein " ... is the 
first philosopher who is really outside of modern philosophy - that is, 
outside the philosophy of the last three hundred years. In an exact way he is 
the first philosopher of our times who is not a Cartesian" (p. vii). It is this 
possibility in the work of Wittgenstein that should attract psychologists. 
One final comment should be made before continuing. The following 
discussion is not intended to be what Begelman (1978) called "tombstone 
polishing." (p. 222). That is, the aim is not primarily to defend or even 
define what Wittgenstein meant in his philosophy. Debating precisely what 
Wittgenstein was saying presumably is an activity for philosophers. 
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Although, as Germana (1977) intimated, there is a curious sense in which 
assuming there is some ethereal 'essence' to Wittgenstein's philosophy is, 
potentially at least, extremely 'un-Wittgensteinian. Instead, the following 
discussion presents a viewpoint that mayor may not be consistent with 
what philosophers finally determine to be Wittgenstein's 'viewpoint', but 
which, nevertheless, is believed to help sort out issues of reflexivity as they 
affect psychology. In this sense the discussion below stands on its own and is 
not simply an appeal to the philosophical authority of Wittgenstein. 
3.2 WITTGENSTEIN'S TRACTATUS AND 
REFLEXIVITY 
The Tractatus can be seen as an attempt to construct a grand metaphysics 
about the nature of language and how it functions. But if this is so it would 
nevertheless be wrong to view the Tractatus simply as a 'theory' about 
language. In order to understand the intellectual importance and power of 
the Tractatus it is essential to understand the purpose for which it was 
written. Wittgenstein (1974a) stated his aim clearly in the Preface; 
Thus the aim of this book is to draw a limit to 
thought, or rather to the expression of 
thoughts: for in order to be able to draw a 
limit to thought, we should have to find both 
sides of the limit thinkable (i.e. we should 
have to be able to think what cannot be 
thought). 
It will therefore only be in language that the 
limit can be drawn, and what lies on the 
other side of the limit will simply be 
nonsense. (p. 3). 
This passage shows that Wittgenstein was interested in limits. Drawing the 
boundaries between sense and nonsense, between what can and cannot be 
said and between what can be said and what can only be shown were the 
tasks the Tractatus was designed to achieve. Immediately it can be seen that 
these tasks were aimed at 'solving' the 'problem of reflexivity'. But in 
trying to explain the limits of language by using language Wittgenstein was 
face to face with the fact that "a theoretical treatment [of the limits of 
109 
language] demands an unworkably reflexive use of language." (Costall, 1980, 
p. 126. Brackets added) This remained a problem insofar as Wittgenstein 
had to conclude that his own statements on the form and structure of 
language were nonsensical. As he put it; 
My propositions serve as elucidations in the 
following way: anyone who understands me 
eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, 
when he has used them - as steps - to climb 
up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, 
throwaway the ladder after he has climbed 
up it.). (T. 6.54). 
All that is left is what cannot be said but can be "shown" or "meant" (T. 
5.62). A residuum without substance that belongs to what Wittgenstein 
termed the "mystical" - the "things that cannot be put into words" (T. 6.522). 
It may in fact be that this journey into the 'mystical' is a result of trying to 
include the origins of a phenomenon in the phenomenon itself. In this 
respect it is interesting to note the similarities between the final conclusion 
of the Tractatus and the following remark by Davies (1981) on the possibility 
of explaining the origin of the universe; 
Once again, I must stress that the big bang is 
not the appearance or expansion of a blob of 
matter into a pre-existing void, but the 
appearance of spacetime itself. Thus, 
questions about what 'caused' the big bang, or 
what 'happened before' it, are meaningless . 
We must face the fact that the big bang 
singularity is apparently naked and therefore 
in any case unpredictable. We might expect 
anything that came out of it to be completely 
random... (p. 66. Emphasis added). 
Of course, it is the distinction here between what can be 'said' and what can 
only be 'shown' or 'meant' that is relevant to psychology and the issues of 
reflexivity discussed in Chapter 1. For this distinction is very closely related 
to that between meaning as sheer reference and meaning as use over time. 
And, of course, the problematic nature of this latter distinction has been 
emphasized throughout previous Chapters. Right from the start of his 
philosophical career, then, Wittgenstein's interest was in the very problem 
that, it is suggested here, underlies many debates and dichotomies within 
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psychology. It is therefore worth exammmg, in some detail, what 
Wittgenstein (1974a) believed to be "on all essential points, the final 
solution of the problems" (p. 4). 
The Tractatus presents a highly systematic analysis of these problems. But 
also, and more importantly, by taking these problems to the extreme it 
reveals quite c1earlyhow they are produced by a particular, and widely held, 
view of language and the world. 
However, it should be kept in mind throughout the following discussion 
that Wittgenstein himself came to reject this view as being too limited and 
recognized "grave mistakes" (Wittgenstein, 1953; p. x) in the Tractatus . 
3.2.1 THE TRACTATUS AND THE NATURE OF LANGUAGE 
The format of the Tractatus with its systematic and hierarchical decimal 
notation for each proposition visibly reflects the highly structural view of 
language as an exact calculus that it presents. (See Finch, 1971, for a 
discussion of the interesting structure of the Tractatus). It is no coincidence 
that it was while working with Bertrand Russell and Alfred North 
Whitehead at Cambridge before World War I that Wittgenstein focussed on 
this view of language. At the time (1911) Russell and Whitehead were 
concerned with the fundamental mathematical problems dealt with by the 
famous Principia Mathematica -an attempt to translate the foundations of 
mathematics into logic. In this attempt Russell, in particular, pursued "a 
kind of philosophical analysis that proceeds by the piecemeal decomposition 
of any complex subject into its logically ultimate components" (Barrett, 1978, 
p.32). 
This 'logical atomism' used by Russell merely as a procedure was, in the 
Tractatus , applied in an altered and extreme form to language itself. The 
following discussion describes the nature of 'logical atoms' and the 
structures they form in language as presented in the Tractatus . 
3.2.1.1 Language as Picturing 
Given that people can say and/or think things about the world then the 
world and language must have something in common (T. 2.16-2.182). And 
language must "correlate" (T. 2.15-2.1515) with reality. These two 
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requirements are the basis to understanding language as 'picturing' the 
world. 
The pictorial view of language begins, for Wittgenstein, by seeing that "[a] 
picture is a model of reality." (T. 2.12. Brackets added). Then, if the 
requirement that language must correlate with reality is to be met, the 
determinate way in which the elements of a picture relate to one another 
"represents that things [in reality] are related to one another in the same 
way." (T. 2.15; Brackets added). The connection of the elements is the 
structure of the picture and, most importantly, the possibility of this 
structure is the pictorial form of the picture (T. 2.15). That is, the ability of a 
picture to be a picture must depend on the possibility that its structure shares 
the same structure as reality. 
The relationship here between picture and reality is exceedingly intimate. In 
fact, so intimate that, "a picture, conceived in this way, also includes the 
pictorial relationship, which makes it into a picture." (T. 2.1513). Picture and 
reality remain separate but there is no gap between them. Thus, the 
"pictorial relationship" is inherent in the picture, for there is no other place 
for it. The picture "is laid against reality like a measure." (T. 2.1512). There 
is no intermediary between picture and reality -such an intermediary could 
only be another picture. 
It is not at all difficult to see the parallels between this picturing view of 
language and representational views of perception and cognition in 
psychology «e.g.) See Fodor (1981) on methodological solipsism, discussed in 
Chapter 1, Section 1.7.1, above). However, the parallels become even more 
interesting when the second requirement is examined. 
If there are correlations between pictures and reality then, "There must be 
something identical in a picture and what it depicts, to enable the one to be a 
picture of the other at all." (T. 2.161). The form of a picture is what enables it 
to depict reality. Examples of forms are spatial, temporal and coloured 
forms. And, "[a] picture can depict any reality whose form it has." (T. 2.171. 
Brackets added). But one thing a picture cannot depict is its own pictorial 
form. Rather, it 'displays' its form (T. 2.172). One form that all pictures 
have is logical form (T. 2.182). In contrast, not all pictures have, for 
example, spatial form. So, logical form is what any picture must have to 
depict reality "- correctly or incorrectly -in any way at all ."(T. 2.18. Emphasis 
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added). It is 'logico-pictorial form' that pictures must have in common with 
what they picture (T. 2.2). 
It must be seen that logical form is as much a requirement of pictures as a 
discovery about pictures. Because it is a requirement and not just a 
discovery then the limits of logic become the limits of the world. If, that is, 
by 'the world' is meant the "totality of facts, not of things" (T. 1), and if "A 
picture is a fact." (T. 2.141). 
As already mentioned, one of the limits of picturing is that a picture cannot 
depict its own pictorial form (T. 2.172). This is related to the fact that in 
order for a picture to be correct or incorrect, it must represent" its subject 
from a position outside it [the subject]." (T. 2.173. Brackets added). In other 
words, the truth or falsity of a picture is determined by comparing it with the 
part of reality of which it is a picture. 
The next step in Wittgenstein's (1974a) argument is stated in the following 
proposi tions; 
What a picture represents it represents 
independently of its truth or falsity, by means 
of its pictorial form. 
What a picture represents is its sense. 
(T. 2.22,2.221) 
The 'sense' of a picture is represented by means of the pictorial form of the 
picture. The sense of a picture is represented -without intermediary- by the 
picture. This point is crucial in understanding how 'propositions' and 
'propositional signs' differ from pictures. Significantly, -and of relevance to 
the psychologist- it is 'thoughts' that play the central role in this difference. 
3.2.1.2 Thoughts, Propositions and Sense 
From T. 3 to T. 3.13 Wittgenstein (1974a) describes the relationship between 
'propositions', 'sense' and 'thoughts'. He begins by asserting that, "A logical 
picture of facts is a thought." (T. 3). And, if thoughts are pictures then "The 
totality of true thoughts is a picture of the world." (T. 3.01). In passing, it can 
be noted that thinking all true thoughts would still only produce a picture. 
This is analogous to the dilemma posed by the 'cognitive paradox' (Katz and 
Frost, 1979, discussed in Chapter 1, Section 1.7.1). 
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Thoughts play a central role in relating propositional signs to propositions 
and in distinguishing propositions from pictures. Wittgenstein (1974a) 
stated; 
In a proposition a thought finds an 
expression that can be perceived by the senses. 
We use the perceptible sign of a proposition 
(spoken or written, etc.) as a projection of a 
possible situation. 
The method of projection is to think of the 
sense of the proposition . 
I call the sign with which we express a 
thought a propositional sign. - And a 
proposition is a propositional sign in its 
projective relation to the world. (T. 3.1 -3.12. 
Emphasis added). 
Propositional signs «e.g.) spoken and written words) express thoughts, 
which are pictures of facts. But, on the one hand, pictures represent their 
sense 'directly', as it were, because the pictorial relationship -which "consists 
of the correlations of the picture's elements with things" (T. 2.1514)- is 
included in the picture. On the other hand, a propositional sign does not 
'directly' relate to that of which it is a sign. Instead, it "projects" onto the 
world. And, revealing the absolute importance of thinking and thoughts, 
the method of projection is to think of the sense of a proposition. 
It is no coincidence that the two aspects of thought mentioned here parallel 
the two aspects of meaning emphasized in previous Chapters. As pictures, 
thoughts have inherent sense. But propositional signs do not have 
inherent sense -they do not relate to the world in the same way as pictures-
so thought must provide the sense. That is, something has to be done to a 
propositional sign to make it a proposition. So, in a picture 'sense' is 
instantaneous and inherent whereas in propositions 'sense' is the product 
of a process operating on the proposition over time. 
Finch (1971, p. 57-58) makes the same point by noting the contrast between 
propositions T. 3 and T. 4 in the Tractatus . The former, as already 
mentioned, says itA logical picture of facts is a thought", and the latter states 
itA thought is a proposition with sense." Finch (1971) noted that there is a 
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contrast between the "passive" and the "active" in the roles the word 
'thought' plays in these two propositions: 
And, also; 
As a 'logical picture' a thought is 'passive' 
and does not assert anything. As a 
'proposition with a sense,' on the other hand, 
it is 'active' and refers to the world to 'say' 
something. (p. 58). 
Another way of putting this might be to say 
that a picture has an intrinsic potential 
'referentiality.' But it has no actual reference 
until we add in effect 'That is how what it is a 
picture of is.' The that has to be added to the 
how. A propositional sign, on the other 
hand, has to be thought of if it is to have any 
application at all. 'Thinking the sense of a 
proposition' gives a propositional sign its 
possible references. (p.58). 
The point is the same. A propositional sign only has a use when thought 
acts upon it. It has no intrinsic reference. Conversely, a picture 'refers' or 
relates to the world intrinsically without having to assert anything. 
Following on from this view of propositions Wittgenstein (1974a) stated; 
A proposition includes all that the projection 
includes, but not what is projected. 
Therefore, though what is projected is not 
itself included, its possibility is. 
A proposition, therefore, does not actually 
contain its sense, but does contain the 
possibili ty of expressing it. 
('The content of a proposition' means the 
content of a proposition that has sense.) 
A proposition contains the form, but not the 
content of its sense. (T.3.13). 
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'Sense as contenf here seems to be referring to some sort of private, 
qualitative experience of the sense of a proposition. As Finch (1971, p. 185) 
pointed out it is connected to Wittgenstein's idea of the 'experience' that is 
needed in order to understand logic. However, the latter 'experience' is not 
an experience (T. 5.552). That is, it is the 'experience' that something is 
«Le.) pure qualitative content) rather than the experience that something is 
so. It is not really an experience for the simple reason that it comes 'before' 
any experience that can actually be talked about. Language, including the 
language of metaphysics, cannot express this experience. 
Despite this inexpressibility 'content' is not denied. It is part of what 
Wittgenstein (1974a) terms "substance." And; 
Substance is what subsists independently of 
what is the case. 
It [substance] is form and content. (T. 2.024, 
2.025. Brackets added). 
As such, content is presupposed by language. It is a presupposition; it 
cannot itself be supposed. In this way content is neither real nor illusory 
simply because nothing at all can be said about it (Finch, 1971, p. 187). 
In summary, the sense of a proposition when understood as content has to 
be thought in order to be projected onto the world. This is contrasted with 
pictures which "reach right out to" reality (T. 2.1511) via the "correlations of 
the picture's elements with things" (T. 2.1514). These correlations actually 
"touch" reality (T. 2.1515). This distinction between pictures and 
propositions finds its final -and perhaps most problematic- expression in 
thoughts. A thought can be either a "logical picture of facts" (T. 3), or a 
"proposition with a sense" (T. 4). 
It is this view of thought with its dual nature that, in psychology, makes 
explanations of cognition vulnerable to the problems of reflexivity. As a 
'thought picture,' an explanation of cognition, and the resulting behaviour, 
pictures the world with sense but "independently of its truth or falsity" (T. 
2.22). As a proposition, however, an explanation must be thought (an 
activity over time) in order to have a sense. If thoughts are part of the 
natural, physical world -as they are assumed to be in psychology- then their 
presence in every explanation having sense brings physical causation into 
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the heart of rationality. The concepts of 'truth' and 'falsity' then lose their 
meaning. 
The full impact of this dilemma becomes even clearer in the Tractatus 
when Wittgenstein turns his attention to the role and nature of logic and 
what, therefore, can be said about logic. 
3.2.1.3 Logic 
In the Tractatus , propositions are described as having elements that 
correspond to "the objects of thought" (T. 3.2). These elements, or "simple 
signs" (T. 3.201) are called "names" (T. 3.202). For Wittgenstein, "A name 
means an object" (T. 3.203) and, "In a proposition a name is the 
representative of an object" (T. 3.22). 
Part of the 'atomism' of the Tractatus depends on the fact that objects can 
only be named -they cannot even be described. As Wittgenstein (1974a) 
stated; 
Objects can only be named. Signs are their 
representatives. I can only speak about them: 
I cannot put them into words. Propositions 
can only say how things are, not what they 
are. (T.3.221). 
The impossibility of saying what things are can seem surprising since it may 
appear that propositions often speak of nothing else. But in a "completely 
analysed" proposition (T. 3.201) -one in which the "elements of the 
propositional sign correspond to the objects of thought!! (T. 3.2)- names 
represent the bottom line of analysis. And this is why Wittgenstein (1974a) 
went on to say that a name !!cannot be dissected any further by means of a 
definition: it is a primitive sign" (T. 3.26). Since objects can only be named 
(they can be neither defined nor described) then names must mean objects 
just by sheer reference .. Therefore, what an object is can only be spoken of by 
saying how the object is in terms of other objects. 
Much more could be said here about propositions that are concerned with 
material properties (See Finch, 1971, Chapter 2), matter and the search for 
the atom in physics. However, it is enough for the purposes of the present 
discussion to note that since objects can only be named, then everything that 
can be said must be in terms of structures of objects and not objects 
themselves. 
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Two vital points are related to the above. Firstly, the reason why names 
must be possible is linked in the Tractatus to the very possibility of 
propositions having sense: "The requirement that simple signs [names] be 
possible is the requirement that sense be determinate" (T. 3.23. Brackets 
added). That is, the reason why "simple signs" must be present in 
propositions is that without them the sense of a proposition would be 
indeterminate. And, in the context of turn-of-the-century philosophy, an 
indeterminate sense is not really a sense at all. (The realization that 
language did not have to be seen as having such a determinate structure was 
in part responsible for Wittgenstein's return to philosophy after a ten year 
hiatus.) 
Secondly, this view of language implies that there is a limit to sense since 
the analysis of language is limited by 'names' and 'objects' serving as 
fundamental atoms. This outer limit of sense can be defined in terms of 
what Wittgenstein (1974a) called his "fundamental idea". He stated; 
The possibility of propositions is based on the 
principle that objects have signs as their 
represen ta ti ves. 
My fundamental idea is that the 'logical 
constants' are not representatives; that there 
can be no representatives of the logic of facts. 
(T.4.0312). 
If the view of language as being composed of signs that represent objects is 
correct then the signs that appear to stand for logical relations and properties 
in fact do not stand for anything. This is all part of Wittgenstein's (1974) 
distinction between what can be said and what can only be shown (T. 
4.1212). It is also part of what Wittgenstein saw as philosophy's function in 
setting limits to "the much disputed sphere of natural science" (T. 4.113) and 
to thought (T. 4.114 -via language. Also, Preface p. 3) 
This view of language as 'limited' is central to the ideas in the Tractatus and 
is worth quoting at length; 
Propositions can represent the whole of 
reality, but they cannot represent what they 
must have in common with reality in order 
to be able to represent it -logical form. 
In order to be able to represent logical form, 
we should have to be able to station ourselves 
with propositions somewhere outside logic, 
that is to say outside the world. 
Propositions cannot represent logical form: it 
is mirrored in them. 
What finds its reflection in language, 
language cannot represent. 
What expresses itself in language, we cannot 
express by means of language. 
Propositions show the logical form of reality. 
They display it. (T. 4.12,4.121). 
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The limit which Wittgenstein is describing here is the very limit that seems 
to make reflexive issues so problematic. Given that objects and "states of 
affairs" (fixed structures of a world", Finch, 1971, p. 2) exist -and this must be 
given if exactness and determinacy of sense are to be possible- then even 
such things as properties and relations must be represented -if they are to be 
talked about with sense- as objects when propositions are "completely 
analyzed". Thus, "the differences between what is represented being a thing, 
or being a property or being a relation is conveyed entirely by syntax." 
(Finch, 1971, p. 4). Therefore, a true description of the underlying a priori 
logical form of language must forever be just out of reach and just out of the 
realm of sense (Much as the attempt to directly see oneself in profile in a 
mirror must remain an impossibility). 
Yet, it may seem that logical form is the very essence of language and 
thought. That it is the one thing of which so much needs to be said. Logical 
form seen in this way resembles an ultimate structure determining what 
people can and cannot say and think. 
So, to state that logical form can only be shown and can never be said is in a 
sense to undermine any rational (logical) attempt to explain language and 
thought. In fact, the rest of the Tractatus is a perfect example of this 
undermining process in action. 
119 
Before detailing this process, however, it is of interest to see how 
Wittgenstein's approach deals with the so-called logico-semantical 
paradoxes such as Russell's famous Liar Paradox. 
3.2.2 SELF-REFERENTIAL SENTENCES AND PARADOX 
Immediately after stating that, "What can be shown, cannot be said" (T. 
4.1212), Wittgenstein (1974a) discussed "formal properties and relations" and 
"formal concepts." Formal properties and relations are also called 
"internal" in the case of facts to emphasize that, unlike "external" properties 
and relations, they can be 'manifested' in propositions but not 'asserted' as 
obtaining (T. 4.122). In other words, they can be 'shown' but not 'said'. 
Wittgenstein (1974a) explained this in another way by stating that, "A 
property [for example] is internal if it is unthinkable that its object should 
not possess it" (T. 4.123. Brackets added). So, internal properties of a fact 
(and internal relations of facts) are just those properties without which it 
would be impossible to think of the fact. 
Similarly, formal concepts cannot be spoken of in isolation from the objects 
that fall under such concepts. That is, in contrast to concepts proper "Formal 
concepts cannot, in fact, be represented by means of a function" (T. 4.126). 
Instead, they are expressed by means of "propositional variables". That an 
object falls under a certain formal concept is shown in the very sign for the 
object and "this cannot be expressed by means of a proposition" (T. 4.126). 
It seems that formal concepts are those whose 'form' underlies or stands in 
an a priori relationship to language. Thus, formal concepts and properties 
cannot rely on being said or stated in order to be recognized or understood. 
That is, they must already be given if they are to serve this formal role. 
In respect of formal properties Wittgenstein (1974a) stated; 
It is impossible to distinguish forms from one 
another by saying that one has this property 
and another that property: for this 
presupposes that it makes sense to ascribe 
either property to either form. (T. 4.1241). 
(This 'presuppositional problem' is very reminiscent of the difficulty in 
representational approaches to perception of grounding the process of 
'categorization' and recognition. See Chapter 1, Section 1.7, above.) 
Also, in respect of formal concepts, Wittgenstein (1974a) commented; 
A formal concept is given immediately any 
object falling under it is given. It is not 
possible, therefore, to introduce as primitive 
ideas objects belonging to a formal concept 
and the formal concept itself. So it is 
impossible, for example, to introduce as 
primitive ideas both the concept of a function 
and specific functions, as Russell does; or the 
concept of a number and particular numbers. 
(T. 4.12721). 
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Here Wittgenstein is saying that it is impossible to introduce a formal 
concept and its objects as independent entities. A formal concept is just the 
type of concept that cannot be separated from its objects. Thus, formal 
concepts are at the limits of sense because they can only be shown -and then 
only by the objects falling under them. Further, being at the limits of sense 
means that, "To ask whether a formal concept exists is nonsensical. For no 
proposition can be the answer to such a question." (T. 4.1274). 
It is absolutely vital in understanding the Tractatus and in 'solving' self-
referential paradoxes to be aware of two assumptions. 
(1) Since determinate sense exists language must have 
an underlying formal structure. This formal structure 
must be at the very limits of sense if it underlies all 
language. Also, it must produce just the kind of 
structure that is found in language. 
Actually, the emphasis on the form of language is even more radical than it 
may at first appear. The Tractatus , as Finch (1971, p. 229) argues, is not an 
attempt to construct a 'metaphysical picture' or a 'theory' about language 
and the world. Instead, it is concerned with formulating "not a likeness of 
the truth, but the truth itself in its entirety" (T. 5.5563). 
This claim, which must seem like a gigantic delusion to the modern 
scientific mind, trained as it is in treating all knowledge claims as if they 
were fallible theories, is actually consistent with the overall approach of the 
Tractatus . If Wittgenstein wants to 'mean' logic as that which gives 
language its form then it would be inconsistent for him to also hold that his 
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propositions in fact only 'mean' a theoretical construct that somehow 
'models' or represents the real, underlying logic. 
Wittgenstein here 'bites the bullet' of structuralism. If a structural account 
is to be given of something as all-encompassing as the form of language, 
then the claim should be made that what is being described is the truth. 
That is, what is meant to be explained (logic) is logically beyond the scope of 
theories understood themselves as 'pictures'. To treat the propositions of 
the Tractatus as a theory would only lead to the production of a paradox. 
That is, one of the characteristics of a 'theory' about the underlying structure 
of language would be that such a 'theory' could not itself be considered a 
theory. As Wittgenstein (1974a) pointed out; 
And anyway, is it really possible that in logic I 
should have to deal with forms that I can 
invent? What I have to deal with must be 
that which makes it possible for me to invent 
them. (T.5.555). 
If Wittgenstein, or anyone else, has anything at all to say about logic then 
what is said cannot be mere invention. In making these claims 
Wittgenstein is simply staying true to the whole structuralist orientation of 
the rest of the Tractatus . 
This conviction is probably the reason that the propositions of the Tractatus 
have the feel of unsupported ex cathedra pronouncements to those who 
like to take their thinking in moderation. 
However, -and secondly- there is another side to these apparently arrogant 
claims. 
(2) As well as such a formal structure being necessary it 
must also only be shown. It must be impossible to say 
anything about this formal structure. 
This feature is itself paradoxical and therefore is perhaps the more difficult 
point of the two to understand. Not least because the prohibition on saying 
anything sensible about such form may seem to imply a prohibition on 
thinking anything about such form. But it is possible that, as Finch (1971, p. 
229-230) argued, it is only in language and not in thought that the difficulty 
of making sense arises (See Section 3.3, below). Whatever, the problem of 
how language can say anything about itself is exactly the same, in the 
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Tractatus ' scheme of things, as how any individual proposition can say 
anything about itself. And this is why understanding the 'logico-semantical 
paradoxes' should be very useful in understanding the Tractatus and the 
problems of reflexivity. 
The application of the above approach to the logico-semantical paradoxes 
produces a solution that Goldstein (1983), at least, thinks is "the best on the 
market" (p~ 138). Referring to the classic paradox 'This statement is false' -in 
the following discussion the terms 'proposition' and 'statement' are used 
interchangeably- Goldstein (1983) argued; 
In such examples, the contained expression 
'statement' poses as a proper concept-word 
and cannot be represented in the prescribed 
manner [that is, by using variablesl. (p. 141. 
Brackets added). 
Goldstein (1983) suggested that Wittgenstein viewed the concept 'statement' 
as a formal concept. This seems more than likely given Wittgenstein's 
(1974) argument that a proposition cannot make a statement about itself. 
The reason given is that "a propositional sign cannot be contained in itself" 
(T.3.332). And the same reason is used to explain why a function cannot be 
its own argument (T. 3.333). A propositional sign could not be contained 
within itself if 'being a proposition' is an internal or formal property of the 
sign. 
The 'Liar Paradox' was problematic for Russell because, as Finch (1971, pp. 
90-92) pointed out, he rejected internal relations and therefore the 
immanence of forms in objects, language and the world. This meant that 
Russell was forced to introduce formal concepts separately, in the form of 
rules and meanings for signs. Wittgenstein (1974a), however, was 
convinced that this was a mistake (T. 3.331) and that at some point the 
symbols in language had to "speak for themselves" (T. 4.12721). 
From Russell's viewpoint the sentence 'This statement is false' can appear 
paradoxical because the expression 'This statement' is allowed to be 
externally related to the whole sentence via the 'meanings' -supposedly 
introduced independently of any variables- of 'This' and 'statement'. 
From Wittgenstein's viewpoint of internal relations and forms, however, it 
is impossible for a proposition to say something about itself. When the 
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concept 'statement' is used as if it were a proper concept rather than a formal 
concept the 'meaning' of the concept is substituted for the concept word -and 
this is how the paradox arises. But, when understood in formal terms, a 
symbol is recognized from its sign by observing "how it is used with a sense" 
(T.3.326). That is; 
A sign does not determine a logical form 
unless it is taken together with its logico-
syntactical employment. (T. 3.327) 
The meanings of signs -which set up external relations with other 
propositions -just do not enter into the process of recognizing a symbol from 
a sign. It is only "logical syntax" or "logical grammar," with its 
'unspeakable' internal relations that can achieve this recognition (T. 3.33). 
Therefore, without 'meanings,' and with only structure left, there is no way 
a propositional sign can be contained in itself. In the same way, even the 
Escher drawing of an art gallery that on closer inspection turns out to only 
exist in one of the paintings it is exhibiting, cannot literally contain its 
entirety as an element in itself. (The drawing, in fact, can only be 
understood because it is 'in reality' a drawing. And, that it is a drawing 
'shows' itself and cannot be 'said' by the drawing.) 
Returning to Goldstein's (1983) argument, the assertion that a propositional 
sign cannot be contained within itself can be seen as "an instance of a 
general thesis about the incorrect use of those words that signify formal 
concepts" (p. 141). Therefore, the discussion above expressed as it is in terms 
of 'signs' and 'symbols' and 'meanings' can be restated in the language of 
formal concepts as they were previously outlined. 
In the sentence 'This statement is false' the concept-word 'statement' is 
being used as a proper concept-word. That is, it is being used without 
representing it in terms of variables and therefore, according to 
Wittgenstein, it leads to "nonsensical pseudo-propositions" (T. 4.1272). In 
this way self-referential sentences fail to be statements. And only a 
statement can produce a paradox since only statements have 'sense'. 
Such 'pseudo-statements' are nonsensical because formal concepts cannot be 
expressed as functions or classes (T. 4.1272). That is, logically there is no 
room outside a formal concept to draw a boundary around it or to define it 
and therefore give its sense. So any proposition that appears to be defining 
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or stating something about a formal concept must be 'stating' nonsense. Of 
course, this means such a proposition actually states nothing. 
With the sentence 'This statement is false' there is a real difficulty in 
locating a variable for the concept-word 'statement' - that is, in answering 
the question 'What statement is false?' It is not satisfactory to say that the 
variable is the very sentence 'This statement is false/ since there is nothing 
to show that this sentence is in fact a statement, and therefore its own 
referent. That is, the original difficulty is discovering whether in fact these 
propositional signs have a sense -and thus form a statement - that can be 
true or false. 
In other words, logical syntax seems to have broken down or be missing 
entirely. Only by first assuming that the sentence is in fact a statement can it 
be considered its own referent. However, in that case the only 'evidence' for 
it being a statement would be the assumption that it is a statement. In a 
superficial sense anything could be assumed or imagined to be a statement. 
But such 'assuming' or 'imagining' is not the same as the symbol for a 
variable showing that the variable falls under a particular formal concept. 
As Wittgenstein (1974a) said, the sign for a formal concept is "a distinctive 
feature of all symbols whose meanings fall under the concept" (T. 4.126), 
If the word 'statement' represented a proper concept rather than a formal 
concept, other propositions that described the characteristics of statements 
could be used to determine whether 'This statement is false' is a statement. 
But no such possibility exists for formal concepts. The emptiness of the 
sentence 'This statement is false' is revealed by the question 'What is false?' 
No propositions can reply to this question. 
So Wittgenstein's (1974a) response to the self-referential paradoxes, as 
Goldstein (1983) argued, is that they arise out of a failure to understand the 
nature of the concept-word 'statement' as a formal concept. 
3.2.3 SUMMARY STATEMENT ON WITTGENSTEIN AND 
SELF-REFERENTIAL PARADOXES 
To summarize, Wittgenstein used the self-referential nature of sentences 
such as 'This statement is false' to undermine their status as statements and, 
therefore, the belief that they say something. It is the idea of formal concepts 
that allowed him to do this .. Formal concepts are 'given' as soon as variables 
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falling under them are used. Propositions that talk about such concepts 
without using variables are empty and nonsensical 'pseudo-propositions'. If 
such propositions were to make sense then, conversely, it could not be 
formal concepts they were talking about. It is only by assuming that they do 
mean formal concepts that the paradox occurs. 
As may have been noticed throughout this section the Tractatus itself is in 
danger of trespassing against its own stipulations as to what cannot be .said 
but can only be shown. The extent to which the propositions of the 
Tractatus are about the underlying logical form of language is the extent to 
which it may appear that Wittgenstein has built his own metaphysical 
paradox. However, Wittgenstein was aware of this fact and it is on this that 
the conclusions of the Tractatus centre. The following is a discussion of 
Wittgenstein's response to the apparent paradox contained within the 
Tractatus . 
3.3 THE PARADOX OF THE TRACTATUS 
3.3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous section the logico-semantical paradoxes were presented as 
examples of what lies beyond the limits of sense. Since one of the aims of 
the Tractatus was to draw a limit to what can be said this treatment of the 
paradoxes may at first sight seem quite appropriate. But in order to draw a 
boundary to what can be said the Tractatus must, and in fact does, say what 
'things' cannot be said. It is obvious that 'saying what cannot be said' is 
itself a paradox. 
Wittgenstein (1974a) was well aware of this paradox (T. 6.54) yet this did not 
deter him from writing the Tractatus or from being convinced of the truth 
of the thoughts communicated in the Tractatus (Preface, p. 4). So how can 
Wittgenstein on the one hand consider the propositions of the Tractatus 
nonsensical while maintaining that the thoughts expressed in the Tractatus 
are true? 
One hint about the answer to this question can be found in the opening 
words of the Preface; 
Perhaps this book will be understood only by 
someone who has himself already had the 
thoughts that are expressed in it -or at least 
similar thoughts.- So it is not a textbook. -Its 
purpose would be achieved if it gave pleasure 
to one person who read and understood it. 
(p.3). 
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These comments may seem more appropriate for a work of serious fiction 
than for a philosophical treatise. However, they do suggest that there are 
thoughts to be 'understood' even though these are not communicated in 
the way a textbook communicates. Instead, the reader must, in a sense, 
already know what Wittgenstein is meaning. The Tractatus , therefore, to 
use its own terms, may be able to 'show' or 'manifest' what it means despite 
the nonsensical nature of what it 'says', 
Finch (1971, pp. 228-230) explained this same possibility by noting that, as 
previously mentioned, thoughts have a dual character. A thought can be a " 
logical picture of facts" (T. 3) or "a proposition with a sense" (T. 4), So while 
a thought may be nonsensical when expressed as a proposition it may still be 
possible for it to be meaningful as a logical picture of facts. 
The importance to Wittgenstein of these thoughts that can 'only be meant' 
is confirmed by Engelmann (1967). By way of contrast Engelmann (1967) 
claimed that for philosophers such as the logical positivists "what we can 
speak about is all that matters in life" (p. 97), whereas for Wittgenstein "all 
that really matters in human life is precisely what, in his view, we must be 
silent about." (p. 97). 
In order to fully understand why Wittgenstein's final proposition is an 
injunction to remain silent about what cannot be said it is worth examining 
the steps leading up to it. It is especially important for psychologists to be 
aware of these steps since they arise from a representational, 'symbolic' view 
of language and thought. And, of course, such representational approaches 
are common in psychology. 
3.3.2 ELEMENTARY PROPOSITIONS AND TAUTOLOGIES 
Central to the scheme of the Tractatus are what Wittgenstein terms 
'elementary propositions', He stated that it is "obvious" that an analysis of 
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propositions will arrive at elementary propositions, which he described in 
the following way; 
The simplest kind of proposition, an 
elementary proposition, asserts the existence 
of a state of affairs. 
It is a sign of a proposition's being elementary 
that there can be no elementary proposition 
contradicting it. 
An elementary proposition consists of names. 
It is a nexus, a concatenation, of names. (T. 
4.21, 4.211, 4.22) 
All elementary propositions have truth-possibilities which are simply the 
possibilities of existence and non-existence of states of affairs (T. 4.3). And 
these truth-possibilities of elementary propositions are the "conditions of 
the truth and falsity of propositions" (T. 4.41). 
With this structure established it then becomes a simple matter to formulate 
the truth-conditions for a particular proposition being true. The proposition 
is analysed into its constituent elementary propositions with their 
individual truth-possibilities. Then the combinations of the truth-
possibilities that allow the proposition to be true can be clearly mapped out 
(T. 4.431-4.45). Under this system there are two extreme cases. When a 
proposition is true for all the truth-possibilities of the particular elementary 
propositions the proposition is a tautology. And when a proposition is false 
for all the truth-possibilities the proposition is a contradiction (T. 4.46). 
Both tautologies and contradictions "lack sense" (T. 4.461). However, they 
are not entirely nonsensical. As Wittgenstein (1974a) put it, "they are part of 
the symbolism, much as 'a' is part of the symbolism of arithmetic" (T. 
4.4611). 
Tautologies and contradictions share many features by virtue of being 
opposites (See T. 4.461-4.4661). For example, neither of them can determine 
reality because, "A tautology leaves open to reality the whole -the infinite 
whole- of logical space: a contradiction fills the whole of logical space 
leaving no point of it for reality." (T. 4.463). Despite this similarity it is 
Wittgenstein's characterization of the tautology which is of most interest 
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here. Therefore, the following discussion will only be concerned with 
tautologies. 
Since tautologies are always true they cannot possibly be combinations of 
signs because "only determinate combinations of objects" could correspond 
to them if they were (T. 4.466). That is, the combination of objects that 
correspond to a tautology is indeterminate since it could be any combination 
at all. Tautology; like contradiction, represents the limiting case in which 
the combination of signs disintegrates (T. 4.466). 
From this understanding of tautology an important insight is revealed. 
Since tautology is at the limit of a determinate combination of signs then 
from this vantage point it becomes possible to determine the general form 
of a proposition. And the general form of a proposition is, "This is how 
things stand." (T 4.5). All propositions, according to Wittgenstein (1974a), 
have this form. What is more, a proposition possesses this form by virtue of 
the particular elementary propositions of which it is comprised. 
Wittgenstein (1974a) described a proposition as a truth-function and the 
elementary propositions that make it up, truth-arguments (T. 5, 5.01). 
Completing the nomenclature, the truth-grounds of a proposition are 
"those truth-possibilities of its truth-arguments that make it true" (T. 5.101). 
The importance of truth-grounds is that the truth of a proposition follows 
from another proposition if "all the truth-grounds of the latter are truth-
grounds of the former." (T. 5.12). And where one proposition follows from 
another an 'inference' or 'deduction' can be made. 
But, Wittgenstein (1974a) claimed that so-called 'Laws of Inference' are 
superfluous because the propositions involved in the inference are its only 
possible justification. That· is, a law cannot provide any more justification 
for an inference than that already provided by the propositions involved. 
Because of this, "All deductions are made a priori" (T. 5.133) and, "One 
elementary proposition cannot be deduced from another" (T. 5.134). Linked 
to this understanding of inference is a claim that must be startling to the 
scientific mind. Wittgenstein (1974a) claimed; 
There is no possible way of making an 
inference from the existence of one situation 
to the existence of another, entirely different 
situation. (T.5.135). 
There is no causal nexus to justify such an 
inference. (T.5.136). 
We cannot infer the events of the future 
from those of the present. 
Superstition is nothing but belief in the 
causal nexus. (T. 5.1361). 
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This means that if propositions are made up of elementary propositions, 
and elementary propositions cannot be deduced from one another, then it 
must be impossible to infer one situation from another. Believing in a 
'causal nexus' does nothing to justify such an inference because causality 
cannot bridge the logical 'gap' between elementary propositions. This 
becomes clearer when it is understood that, "The structures of propositions 
stand in internal relations to one another." (T. 5.2). Ultimately, the only 
connection between propositions must be based on their internal structures. 
At the final level of analysis -where elementary propositions are to be 
found- it must be impossible to 'state' an external connection since such a 
statement would itself be composed of elementary propositions. And these 
elementary propositions would then have to be internally related to the 
propositions they were supposedly explicitly (externally) connecting. 
'Causality,' expressed as some sort of 'Law' or feature of reality is an attempt 
to say what cannot be said (T. 6.36). 
With these arguments concerning tautologies and the internal relationships 
between propositions Wittgenstein (1974a) was slowly preparing for his coup 
de grace. One final, and essential, concept is introduced before the finishing 
stroke is revealed. Wittgenstein (1974a) commented; 
In order to give prominence to these internal 
relations [between the structures of 
propositions] we can adopt the following 
mode of expression: we can represent a 
proposition as the result of an operation that 
produces it out of other propositions (which 
are the bases of the operation). (T. 5.21. 
Brackets added). 
Examples of operations include negation, logical addition and logical 
multiplication. Basically, an operation expresses how one proposition is 
made out of another (T. 5.23). An operation is not the "mark of a form, but 
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only of a difference between forms." (T. 5.241). In fact, "no statement is 
made by an operation"(T. 5.25). 
The concept of an operation, then, simply notes that two propositions differ 
(which in the extreme case results in contradiction) and, also, that making 
one proposition from another depends on "the internal similarity of their 
forms" (T. 5.231) (which, in the extreme case, results in tautology). 
Such operations take the place of 'logical constants' as used by Frege and 
Russell. In fact, Wittgenstein (1974a) claimed that there are no 'logical 
objects' or 'logical constants' (T. 5.4). And he argued for this by noting that 
all the so-called logical constants are inter definable which implies that their 
signs «e,g,) • .', '/'V', 'v') are not primitive signs at all (T. 5.42). Because of this 
there is always more than one combination of operations that produces the 
same result from the same base. 
This interchangeability and interdefinability of operations dissolves any 
possibility of there being a determinate sense to logical operations. 
Therefore the signs for 'logical constants' are not like names for 'logical 
objects'. Negation ( • ........,.) is not, for example, to be treated as an object. If it 
were an object then . ..-v "'V p' would say something different from 'p' because 
the first proposition would be about ''V' while 'p' would not (T. 5.44). 
It is this approach that allowed Wittgenstein (1974a) to say that "in fact all 
the propositions of logic say the same thing, to wit nothing" (T. 5.43). The 
signs for logical operations are "punctuation marks" (T. 5.4611) -they add 
nothing to what is actually said. The idea of operations simply expresses the 
fact that the relationships between propositions are internal . With a 
proposition comes "the results of all truth-operations that have it as their 
base" (T. 5.442). 
From this perspective it is only a small step to one of the most interesting 
conclusions in the Tractatus and the conclusion Bertrand Russell found 
most compelling (Ayer, 1985). Simply, Wittgenstein determined that "The 
propositions of logic are tautologies" (T. 6.1). The whole nature of logic 
understood as an underlying structure or framework to language (T. 6.124) 
leads inexorably to this conclusion. 
Much could be said, and has been said, about the implications this 
conclusion has for the study of logic. For example, it should be possible to 
do without logical propositions entirely if Wittgenstein (1974a) is correct (T. 
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6.122). But the most interesting implication is the paradox that is the subject 
of this section. The propositions of the Tractatus concern the nature of logic 
and as such must themselves be tautological. They therefore say nothing. 
The following comment by Wittgenstein (1974a), however, shows how 
important the propositions of logic are just because they are tautological; 
The propositions of logic describe the 
scaffolding of the world, or rather they 
represent it. They have no 'subject-matter'. 
They presuppose that names have meaning 
and elementary propositions sense; and that 
is their connexion with the world. It is clear 
that something about the world must be 
indicated by the fact that certain combinations 
of symbols -whose essence involves the 
possession of a determinate character- are 
tautologies. This contains the decisive point. 
We have said that some things are arbitrary 
in the symbols that we use and that some 
things are not. In logic it is only the latter 
that express: but that means that logic is not a 
field in which we express what we wish with 
the help of signs, but rather one in which the 
nature of the absolutely necessary signs 
speaks for itself. If we know the logical syntax 
of any sign-language, then we have already 
been given all the propositions of logic. (T. 
6.124). 
That the propositions of logic are tautologies reveals the ultimate and 
"absolutely necessary" nature of logic. In this ultimate sense, logic speaks 
through people rather than the reverse. The internal logical nature of 
propositions is revealed by the fact that when combined in a certain way 
they produce tautologies. This rendering of logic gives it remarkable 
properties. In logic there are no "surprises" (T. 6.1251); "process" and 
"result" are equivalent (T. 6.1251); and, "every proposition is its own proof" 
(T. 6.1265). Logic becomes something "transcendental" -a "mirror-image of 
the world" rather than a body of doctrine" (T. 6.13). 
In the same way ethics and aesthetics, which are one and the same according 
to Wittgenstein (1974a), are transcendental and cannot be put into words (T. 
6.421). The pseudo-propositions of both logic and ethics are attempts to say 
something from outside the limits of sense. The attempts must fail because 
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"All propositions are of equal value" (T. 6.4). Therefore, propositions "can 
express nothing that is higher [beyond sense]" (T. 6.42. Brackets added). 
However, the Tractatus seems to make sense despite being itself composed 
of propositions of logic. How is this possible? It is possible if what Finch 
(1971) termed "apparent sense" and "apparent logical form" are permitted 
(pp. 226-230). A tautology can appear to have sense and logical form, 
particularly in "complicated cases" where the "recognition" of their 
tautological nature may require a proof which serves as "merely a 
mechanical expedient" (T. 6.1262). This apparent sense and form that the 
Tractatus epitomizes "holds up long enough to reveal what sense is by 
revealing that there is no sense in attempting to say what it is" (Finch, 1971, 
p. 227). Like a cartoon character momentarily suspended in mid-air after 
running over a cliff-edge, the reader of the Tractatus has just enough time 
to glimpse the illusory nature of his or her support. 
Finch (1971) pointed out that fortunately Wittgenstein (1974a) himself 
mentioned some ways in which philosophy has generated nonsense. One of 
these ways is through a failure "to give a meaning to certain signs"in 
propositions (T. 6.53). Finch (1971) suggested that Wittgenstein knowingly 
failed to give a meaning for the word 'object', "the word for the 
fundamental case of meaning" (p. 227. Also, see Section 3.2.1, above). It 
should not be surprising that it is the word 'object' that finally has no 
meaning. For, even in common usage 'object' is meant to refer to that 
which is outside language and thought. Also, objects are central to the 
concept of representation since without a logical distinction between 
language and what language is about it is senseless to speak of 
representation. 
Ironically, understanding the paradoxical nature of the Tractatus is, as Finch 
(1971, p. 228) noted, the best evidence for what its propositions try to say. 
Just as tautologies show the fact that they occur, so too the Tractatus reveals 
the absolute truth of its own approach by the fact that it can be understood-
even if that understanding cannot be put into words. 
The final proposition of the Tractatus points, insofar as it can, to this 
ineffable understanding. Wittgenstein (1974a) concluded, "What we cannot 
speak about we must pass over in silence" (T. 7). To see that nothing at all 
can be said about objects is to finally understand what they are (Finch, 1971, 
p.229). 
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This realization is Wittgenstein's solution to the 'problem of life'. When an 
answer cannot be put into words then neither can the question (T. 6.5). The 
'problem of life' is basically that the world exists rather than how, in 
particular, things are in the world (T. 6.44). To feel the world in this way as a 
"limited whole" (T. 6.45) is what is mystical, according to Wittgenstein. But 
it is not difficult to see how this feeling is directly related to using the word 
'object' as a general term for the atoms that compose 'states of affairs' (facts) 
which in turn determine the world (T. 2.01, 1.11). Feeling the world as a 
whole cannot be put into words in the same way that the word 'object' has 
not been, and cannot be, given a meaning. 
Furthermore, Wittgenstein (1974a) commented; 
We feel that even when all possible scientific 
questions [questions that can be put into 
words] have been answered, the problems of 
life remain completely untouched. Of course 
there are then no questions left, and this itself 
is the answer. (T.6.52. Brackets added). 
Finch (1977, pp. 262-264) contrasted the fundamental positions of Heidegger 
and Wittgenstein on this point. According to Finch (1977), Heidegger, at least 
initially, wondered about the "existence of anything at all rather than 
nothing" (p. 263). Heidegger, that is, wondered about the justification for 
the world existing. Wittgenstein, however, simply exclaimed "How 
extraordinary that there is anything!" Such an exclamation amounts to 
silence since it says nothing determinate in much the same way that a 
startled person's sharp intake of breath says nothing. 
For the non-logician one of the most remarkable aspects of the Tractatus is 
how it links precise, systematic and even apparently technical features of 
logic to questions and issues usually considered to be the most profound 
philosophy has to deal with. This linkage arises, however, quite naturally 
from the original aim of examining the limits of what can be said. 
Psychology, when understood as a reflexive field of study, itself becomes an 
examination of limits. The following section briefly comments on some 
insights gained by applying aspects of the Tractatus' scheme of things to the 
reflexive issues in psychology mentioned in previous Chapters. 
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3.4 PSYCHOLOGY AND THE TRACTATUS 
3.4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Previous sections discussed Wittgenstein's view of the relationship between 
language, thought and the world. Essentially this view is that language and 
thought in some way represent (or 're-present') the world in a determinate 
manner. This determinate relationship ensures determinacy of sense. And 
determinacy of sense was the characteristic of language that the Tractatus 
was designed to describe, explore and explain. 
The need to explore determinate sense fully meant that one of 
Wittgenstein's main aims was to determine the limits of such sense. This 
in turn led to an examination of the necessarily formal structure of language 
and to the drawing of limits to what can and cannot be said about this 
structure. It was this formal nature of language that was used in Section 
3.2.2 to try to clarify and then dissolve the problematic nature of self-
referential sentences such as the Liar Paradox. Finally, after discussing the 
nature and role of tautologies in language, the paradox that the Tractatus 
itself manifests was discussed. 
Hopefully it will now be clearer how the problematic issues of reflexivity can 
be linked to a particular view of the relationships between language, 
thought and the world. Paradoxes that arise from self-reference are, of 
course, among the most obviously problematic aspects of reflexivity. 
At least historically, the study of psychology can be seen as a scientific 
approach to some traditional philosophical questions such as 'How do we 
know?', 'What do we know?', 'How do we perceive?', etc.. It is suggested 
here that psychology, by way of its philosophical origins, inherited an 
implicit view of the relationship between language, thought and the world 
that culminated, philosophically, in the Tractatus. According to Harris 
(1986) this view of language dominated Western philosophical thinking at 
least from the time of Augustine, carrying on right up to Russell and, of 
course, Wittgenstein in the Tractatus . If this is true then it is not surprising 
that the study of psychology has produced so many debates and problematic 
viewpoints that centre on the perceived reflexive nature of the study. 
The following is a brief discussion of the various issues raised in Chapters ---
in the light of the approach presented in the Tractatus . 
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3.4.2 THEORETICAL UNITY AND LIMITS 
The first issue raised in Chapter 1 was the question of unity. It was suggested 
that there is a deep difficulty involved in unifying psychology at the 
theoretical level. Even the desirability of unifying theory has been 
questioned. 
This difficulty can be understood now in terms of the limits of psychological 
theorizing. When psychology is understood as a reflexive discipline «e.g.) 
when explaining what people do is also seen as something people do) then 
psychological theories inevitably become problematic attempts at drawing a 
boundary around the nature and form of all human actions. In just the 
same way, logic in the Tractatus had the role of determining the nature and 
form of all language. If this parallel between logic and psychological theories 
is valid then 'propositions of psychology' may have the same fate as 
propositions of logic in the Tractatus. And, in fact, understanding 
psychological theories as ultimately tautological does help 'predict' and 
'explain' why theoretical unity in psychology is so elusive. 
Because tautologies are true for all truth-possibilities they lack determinate 
sense. "In logic", Wittgenstein (1974a) claimed, "there is no co-ordinate 
status, and there can be no classification" (T. 5.453). And also, "The number 
of fundamental operations [in logic] that are necessary depends solely on our 
notation" (T. 5.474. Brackets added). What all this means is that because 
propositions of logic lack sense any apparent classifications of logical 
processes will depend solely on the way logic is expressed, that is, on the 
notation used. Attempts to judge or even compare different logical systems 
-not that having different logical systems is a possibility the Tractatus 
allows- must be futile if the form of a particular logic is purely a matter of 
notation rather than resulting from the sense that logical propositions are 
mistakenly presumed to possess. 
The multiplicity and the apparent intellectual incommensurability of the 
many theories and approaches found in psychology were noted in Chapter 1, 
Section 1.2. These two features are to be predicted if approaches taken in 
psychology are in some sense different 'logics'. The particular 'notation' 
used by these various approaches would alone determine their forms. 
Under this view it would be misguided to compare theories in terms of the 
phenomena they supposedly refer to or 'mean' because they lack just such 
determinate sense. 
136 
The comparison being made here between propositions of logic and 
propositions of psychology is meant to be stronger than an analogy. Insofar 
as traditional logic and psychology share a view of the relationship of 
language, thought and the world, then it is difficult not to conclude that 
propositions of both logic and psychology are attempts to say things that 
their shared 'metaphysics' itself determines cannot be said. 
To the extent that both logic and psychology are attempts to discover the 
formal structure that determines language, thought and 'purposive' 
behaviour, their propositions must lack determinate sense. 'Purposive' 
behaviour is included here because of its supposed 'meaningfulness'. (See 
Chapter 2, Section 2.2.1 for discussion of radical behaviourism's treatment of 
meaning). The idea that behaviour 'means' something «e.g.) an 'intended' 
goal) implies that it has a sense in exactly the same way that propositions are 
thought to have sense. Therefore, it is suggested here that drawing a limit 
around purposive behaviour is the same exercise, in terms of the issues 
being discussed, as drawing a limit around language and thought. 
If correct, this comparison suggests that propositions such as 'There are 
stimuli/responses/ dispositions/ cognitive maps/schemata etc.', necessarily 
lack determinate sense. And any attempt to determine which notation is 
best will itself be composed of equally nonsensical propositions. 
In conclusion, the question of whether theoretical unity is possible becomes 
a nonsensical question in the following way. From the viewpoint of the 
Tractatus if propositions of psychology lack sense then it must be equally 
senseless to speak of different approaches (or even different 'notations'). It 
would also be senseless to say 'All approaches to psychology are the same'. 
Where there is no sense there can be no difference or sameness. And where 
there is no difference or sameness there can be no question of unity or 
disunity. 
Now it may seem that this 'cure' is far worse than the 'disease' itself. 
However, two points need to be made. Firstly, just as the best vindication 
for the approach taken in the Tractatus can be seen as the failure of the 
Tractatus to say anything with sense, then, so too, the inability to say 
anything that has determinate sense in psychology may be the most 
important contribution psychology can make to 'knowledge' (But, of course, 
this cannot be said). Secondly, as has been mentioned, Wittgenstein himself 
came to repudiate some of the core assumptions of the Tractatus . In 
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particular, Wittgenstein freed himself from the assumption that there must 
be some essential feature of language that produced sense. This later 
approach of Wittgenstein's is presented in more detail in Chapter 4. 
3.4.3 VALUES AND THE 'MYSTICAL' 
It was argued in Chapter 1, Section 1.3 that psychology as a discipline can 
either reject or accept the idea that values act reflexively to steer human 
actions, including the 'action' of theorizing. Both options appear 
problematic. Ignoring values may risk developing an impoverished 
understanding of human actions. For example, as Kipnis (1987) claimed, 
when using a behavioural technology the belief that people are being 
controlled by the technology can influence how the controller behaves 
towards the controllee (p. 33). 
Alternatively, attempting to incorporate values may lead to a subjective, 
qualitative, relativistic account of human actions. And this would appear to 
simply change the question from 'What is the best psychological theory?' to 
'What is (are) the best value(s)?' Also, it could be argued that the values 
that actually determine a particular human action are always implicit and 
can never be made explicit by that particular action. Therefore, a theory that 
claims to make explicit the values it is based on may be simply distracting an 
investigator from 'seeing' the values the theory actually manifests. 
This latter point, of course, relates to the discussion of self-reference in 
Section 3.2.2, above. A proposition could never be in the position of stating 
what values determine or underlie itself. This is because, as was argued, it is 
impossible for a proposition to state anything about itself (T. 3.332). 
To believe that values in some way help to determine human actions is to 
assign to them a role that is, once again, much the same as that performed by 
logic in the Tractatus. And, in fact, logic and ethics (values) were linked by 
Wittgenstein (1974a) when he described them both as transcendental (T. 6.13, 
6.421). The value of something must be outside the world because 
everything inside the world is, in a sense, accidental (T. 6.41). So values, 
lying outside the world, cannot be 'said' just as propositions of logic cannot 
be 'said'. 
Values, then, become part of what Wittgenstein (1974a) termed the 
"mystical" (T. 6.522). While they cannot be put into words -and therefore 
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could not be incorporated into any theory, psychological or otherwise- they 
still "make themselves manifest " (T. 6.522). 
One of the virtues of the scheme presented in the Tractatus is that it allows 
that there can be, and, in fact, must be, things that can be shown but not said. 
Values, therefore, cannot be denied or ignored, just as determinate sense 
cannot be denied or ignored in the Tractatus. In fact, determinate sense is, 
for Wittgenstein, just what language undeniably shows, and is just what the 
Tractatus tries to explain. It is the requirement that there must be 
determinate sense that ultimately means that logic must be transcendental, 
beyond the world. In the same way if there is any value it must be "outside 
the whole sphere of what happens and is the case" (T. 6.41). 
Much of what Wittgenstein (1974a) said about logic can be transposed onto 
values if the comparison being made here is valid. For example, if "Logic 
must look after itself" (T. 5.473), then, so too, 'value' must ultimately look 
after itself. Values that could be 'said' would only be 'accidental' features of 
human actions and therefore arbitrary and relative. So such values would 
not themselves have any value. 
Also, just as the "peculiar mark" of logical propositions is that their truth 
can be recognized from the symbol alone (T. 6.113) so too the truth (or 
'goodness', or 'badness') of ethical propositions must be recognized solely 
from the symbol. 
In conclusion, values so far as the Tractatus is concerned are part of the 
'mystical'. As such, propositions about values lack sense and, therefore, 
cannot properly be incorporated into natural science theories. However, 
since a proposition about values shows its 'goodness' directly then it could 
be argued that it is important to make value statements about a theory to 
reveal such goodness. Of course, finally even this argument would lack 
sense -which is not to say that it does not show its own goodness. Values, as 
it were, can neither be hindered nor helped by things that are said. 
3.4.4 APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY AND THE A PRIORI 
In the discussion of 'pure' and 'applied' psychology (Chapter I, Section 1.4) 
the comment was made that the distinction between the two had become 
blurred. According to some «e.g.) Middleton and Edwards, 1985) theorizing 
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in psychology should be conceived as being interwoven with actual 'real 
world' needs. Theories, that is, should be 'ecologically valid'. 
Furthermore, in the area of clinical psychology a distinction was made 
between those who advocate explicating the role of scientific method even 
in the "most intimate and moment-to-moment interactions with patients" 
(Shapiro, 1985), and those whose desire to explicate and prescribe methods is 
restrained by a competing desire for "congruence" and "empathy" between 
practitioner and client (Rogers and Stevens, 1967). This blurring of the 
distinction between 'pure' and 'applied' research is another feature of 
contemporary psychology that is explicable in terms of the comparison being 
made here between the propositions of logic and psychology. 
The first point to be made is that Wittgenstein's (1974a) concern in the 
Tractatus is not for "what we can do in a perfect language but of the way in 
which ordinary language is able to function at all" (Finch, 1971, p.2). In this 
sense Wittgenstein is not in the business of improving language or 
constructing an ideal language (Finch, 1971, p. 74). 
This claim contradicts Bertrand Russell's comments in the Introduction to 
the Tractatus where he repeatedly stated that Wittgenstein was concerned 
with the conditions for a logically perfect language (pp. ix, x). But it is now 
known that Wittgenstein was very unhappy with Russell's Introduction 
and thought it misrepresented his overall approach (Engelmann, 1967, p. 
117). And Wittgenstein (1974a) certainly seemed to think he was unearthing 
the essence of "everyday language", whose complicated form tends to hide 
its own logic (T. 4.002). In fact when Russell said in the Introduction to the 
Tractatus, "Mr. Wittgenstein is concerned with the conditions for a 
logically perfect language -not that any language is logically perfect" he was 
directly contradicting Wittgenstein's (1974a) remark that, "all the 
propositions of our everyday language, just as they stand, are in perfect 
logical order" (T. 5.5563). 
It is, then, 'everyday language' that Wittgenstein (1974a) described and 
explained in the Tractatus. Because it is the actual everyday language that is 
being examined Wittgenstein (1974a) argued against the logical possibility of 
being able to determine, a priori, the forms that language can take (T. 5.55 -
5.5571). This argument is very similar to the one presented in Section 3.2.2 
against interpreting the Tractatus as merely a theory about language. 
Wittgenstein (1974a) in this regard claimed; 
Logic is prior to every experience -that 
something is so. 
It is prior to the question 'How?', not prior to 
the question 'What?' (T. 5.552). 
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Logic in its ultimate formal role must be just that which enables it to be said 
that 'such-and-such is so'. And this is why a supposed 'theory of logic' 
which states 'Logic is so' cannot possibly anticipate actual logical form. 
Expressed differently, there can be no sayable relationship between a 'theory 
of logic' and the form of language that occurs in the actual application of 
logic. 
The necessarily a priori status of logic, ironically, makes it impossible to 
make a priori statements -which themselves must be structured by logic-
about the logical form of language. This is why Wittgenstein (1974a) said, 
"What belongs to its application, logic cannot anticipate" and, "It is clear that 
logic must not clash with its application" (T. 5.557). 
If the 'science of psychology' parallels the 'science of logic' then it is no 
wonder that a blurring has occurred between the areas of 'pure' and 
'applied' psychology. If logic cannot anticipate its application then can 
psychology anticipate its application? When psychology is understood 
naturalistically and reflexively, in the same way that logic is understood in 
the Tractatus , then the answer is 'no'. Therefore, assuming this answer is 
correct, there would be every reason to collapse the distinction between 
'pure' and 'applied' psychology. This conclusion needs explaining in more 
detail. 
Because the form and nature of logic cannot be stated a priori it is only in 
its application that logic shows itself. Similarly, propositions about human 
activity, understood reflexively do not state with determinate sense what its 
underlying nature and form is. This form must only be shown when the 
underlying nature is 'applied'. That is, when a particular, activity actually 
occurs. The 'application' occurring here is not the application of some 
theory but the instantiation of the actual underlying structure itself -the 
form of which cannot be pre-judged. Just as logic is the one thing that 
cannot be a theory but must be the thing itself (T. 5.5563. Also, see Section 
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3.2.2, above), so too, a 'psychology', understood, as it were, as logic cannot be 
a theory but must be the thing itself. 
This is why it can be said, and understood quite literally, that a 
behaviourist's world is composed of stimuli, responses and reinforcement, 
and a cognitivist's world is full of, for example, information processing. 
Furthermore, it must be logically impossible to prescribe a priori a particular 
psychological approach· for a particular situation. Wittgenstein (1974a) 
argued against defences of such prescriptions that appeal to the "so-called 
law of induction" (T. 6.31) or the law of causality (T. 6.32). These arguments 
will be mentioned in more detail below in Section 3.4.6 which examines 
causality and explanation in a reflexively understood psychology. 
Not only does the present comparison between logic and psychology seem to 
'predict' and 'explain' the blurring of the distinction between 'pure' and 
'applied' psychology, but it also accounts for the presence of the Rogerian 
concept of 'congruence'. 
As explained in Chapter 1, Section 1.4, the experience of congruence is not 
one that can be produced by following a prescribed method. Instead the 
therapist's own moment-by moment feelings must be "available to his 
awareness" so that he can "live these feelings" and "be them" (Rogers and 
Stevens, 1967, p. 53). In the present terminology, how the therapist should 
be feeling and acting is impossible to prescribe, at least with propositions 
having determinate sense. So, the attempt to explicate scientific method 
"even in the most intimate and moment-to-moment interactions with 
patients" would not help prescribe a method for producing congruence. 
Logically, at least, what a therapist might think or feel in a client-therapist 
interaction involving congruence cannot be anticipated. 
Another way of making this point is to say that there is no overlap between 
logic and its application (T. 5.557), It is impossible to give all elementary 
propositions a priori since the number of names there are with different 
meanings cannot be given (T. 5.55). The latter cannot be given because 
names are logically independent of each other which in turn means 
elementary propositions are logically independent. This independence 
means that only in the application of logic is it possible to know what 
elementary propositions will occur. 
142 
In a client-therapist interaction, what a therapist might think -or think about 
what she or he feels- is, likewise, logically independent of any theory about 
what the therapist might think or feel. 
In summary, the distinction between theory and application in psychology 
becomes blurred because of the reflexive way in which 'theorizing' is 
considered to be an example of what it is about. Such 'theories' cannot 
define their own limits a priori. So there remains a logical independence 
between theory and actuality which is not the case with theories that are not 
understood in this way. It is suggested here that it is the realization that this 
independence exists that is behind moves to integrate theory and application 
and the call for 'congruence' between client and therapist. 
3.4.5 CONSCIOUSNESS, PERCEPTION AND SOLIPSISM 
As described in Chapter I, Sections 1.5, 1.6 and 1.7 the concepts of 
'consciousness' and 'perception' are closely related. The study of perception 
attempts to causally and objectively link 'person' and 'reality'. Similarly, 
consciousness, as a concept, expresses a link between 'person' and 'reality' 
but, usually, this link is expressed in terms of a subjective property of the 
person. That is, a subject is 'conscious of' some aspect of the environment 
which is said to be 'in the consciousness' of the subject. 
Because of this similarity, the type of theory of perception followed will 
depend to some extent on how consciousness is understood, and vice versa . 
Of the possible ways of understanding consciousness one way is to see it as a 
'mental theatre' and another is to see it as a 'perceptual window' onto a 
wider reality. In the first case perception must provide a link between the 
world and its mental representation. In the second case perception must at 
least explain why, at a particular time, the window is viewing a certain 
subset of reality and not some other. Speaking in general, representational 
theories of perception would be associated with the former case while 
Gibsonian or 'Direct' theories of perception would be more suited to the 
latter case. 
Difficulties with these differing accounts of perception and consciousness 
were discussed in Chapter 1. In particular, "non-progressive" 
transformations in the history of psychology between the 'Person constructs 
Reality' and 'Reality constructs Person' poles were mentioned (Buss, 1978). 
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These transformations were compared with the different views of 'reality' 
and the 'subject' held by Nagel (1974) and Dennett (1979). Such distinctions 
and comparisons along with the problems associated with theorizing about 
consciousness (See Chapter 1, Section 1.6) can now be explained from the 
viewpoint taken in the Tractatus . 
To begin to understand why consciousness is so problematic as a concept 
Wittgenstein's (1974a) comments about the "metaphysical subject" (T. 5.641) 
should be considered. Wittgenstein (1974a) contrasted this 'subject' with 
"the human soul, with which psychology deals" (T. 5.641). It is interesting 
that Wittgenstein (1974a) called the 'subject' in psychology the "soul". 
Although never stated explicitly it is clear that by the 'soul' Wittgenstein 
meant an entity that is conceived of as being part of the world. In contrast, 
the metaphysical subject "does not belong to the world: rather it is a limit of 
the world" (T. 5.632). Just as the eye is not part of the visual field, the 
metaphysical subject is not part of the world (T. 5.633, 5.6331). 
It is from the viewpoint of the metaphysical subject that so many apparent 
problems and paradoxes associated with the subject in psychology -such as 
solipsism (See Chapter 1, Section 1.7)- can be dissolved. 
For the metaphysical subject "The world is my world" (T. 5.62). This is 
obviously not the case with the 'soul' or 'subject' in psychology -the world is 
always more than the world of a psychological subject. In simple terms, the 
argument for the equivalence of "the world" and "my world" runs as 
follows. From the viewpoint of the metaphysical subject it must be 
-
impossible to talk with sense about, and to mean, that which is beyond "my 
world". To do so would mean thinking what cannot be thought (T. 5.61). 
Wittgenstein (1974a) concluded; 
For what the solipsist means is quite correct; 
only it cannot be said, but makes itself 
manifest. (T. 5.62). 
In other words, what is right in solipsism is that "The world is my world". 
But what is wrong with solipsism, as Finch (1971, p. 152) pointed out, is the 
assertion that 'I alone exist'. The 'I' used in this way cannot possibly mean 
the metaphysical subject for the latter is not in the world but is at the limits 
of the world -which is why it can only be shown and not said. The 'I' could 
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only be referring to a "subject that thinks or entertains ideas" (T. 5.631). That 
is, a psychological subject. 
In fact, Wittgenstein (1974a) went on to argue that no such subject exists (T. 
5.631). As he remarked, if someone were to write a book called 'The World 
as I found it' the person's body and even those parts of the body which were 
or were not subordinate to the will would have to be included (T, 5.631). 
Everything that could be mentioned would be just more world which would 
go to show that "in an important sense there is no subject; for it alone could 
not be mentioned in that book." (T. 5.631). 
Because no 'real' subject exists solipsism, for Wittgenstein (1974a), is not an 
extreme form of 'idealism' but rather it "coincides with pure realism", and 
the "self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension, and there 
remains the reality co-ordinated with it." (T. 5.64). 
This latter point helps explain why Buss' (1978) transformations between the 
poles of 'Person constructs Reality' and 'Reality constructs Person' have 
occurred so frequently in psychology. For the metaphysical subject 'my 
world' and 'the world' are equivalent. Therefore, 'Reality' ('the world') and 
'Person' ('my world') are also equivalent. Such equivalence is possible only 
because the metaphysical subject is at the limits of the world and not in the 
world. 
The two poles of 'Person constructs Reality' and 'Reality constructs Person' 
reflect two aspects of the metaphysical subject. The 'Person constructs 
Reality' pole seems to emphasize the metaphysical subject's role in co-
ordinating reality (T. 5.64) and thus seeming to provide a meaningful 
structure to reality. Conversely, the 'Reality constructs Person' pole seems 
to reflect the fact that the metaphysical subject "shrinks to a point without 
extension" (T. 5.64) leaving no subject that "thinks or entertains ideas" (T. 
5.631). Such a subject could not possibly construct reality. 
These two aspects of the metaphysical subject also help to explain the 
divergence between 'representational' and 'direct' theories of perception 
and their associated approaches to consciousness. Representational theories 
of perception and 'mental theatre' views of consciousness appear to 
emphasize the experience of 'the world' as content, and therefore as 'my 
world'. The problems associated with 'content' (See Chapter 1, Section 1.6), 
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however, arise from a failure to acknowledge that it is only from the 
perspective of the metaphysical subject that 'content', as such, can be meant. 
This can be clearly shown using the example of Natsoulas' (1981) "problem 
of awareness" (See discussion in Chapter I, Section 1.6). It was noted that 
there are difficulties in speaking about the "intrinsic character" of an 
awareness as opposed to speaking about particular contents. It is suggested 
here that the "intrinsic character" of an awareness is the metaphysical 
subject's experience of 'the world' as 'my world'. And the reason why such 
an experience is so difficult to speak about is described well by Finch (1971); 
On the one hand then, all the content of the 
world is mine or content for the I , but, on the 
other hand, this cannot be said (since we 
cannot speak about content), but rather is 
meant by the border between what can be 
said and what cannot be said marking just the 
border between what I experience and do not 
experience. (p. 156). 
'Content' as sheer content, as it were, is not really even an experience. 
Rather, it is meant by the border between what is experienced and what is 
not. A similar point was made in Section 3.4.3, above, where it was 
described how logic must be prior to every experience and therefore, in a 
sense, the 'experience' of logic is not really an experience at all. 
Put simply, the problems associated with representational theories of 
perception and consciousness occur because such theories are attempts to say 
the unsayable. It should be remembered that in the Tractatus to say 
something is to say something that has determinate sense. 
With Gibsonian, or 'Direct', theories of perception 'the world' of the 
metaphysical subject remains 'the world' and the experience of content, as 
such, is ignored. There is no problem, therefore, in explaining how a 
representation relates to reality. Instead, all that need be done is to relate 
one part of the world, an organism's activity, to another part of the world, 
the structured energy that impinges upon an organism's receptors. 
However, the co-ordinated reality of the metaphysical subject that 
Wittgenstein (1974a) spoke about has no a priori order (T. 5.634). Therefore, 
if the suggestion being made here that direct perceptionists are talking about 
the world of the metaphysical subject is correct, then, the world of direct 
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perception must also have no a pnon order. So, despite the "global 
structure" of the world being lawfully organized (Michaels and Carello, 1981, 
p. 23), what an organism would perceive in a particular environment could 
never be specified prior to observing its activity. 
In other words, whichever affordances are perceived by an organism could, 
at least logically, be other than they are. Michaels and Carello (1981) try to 
argue against this arbitrariness by claiming that the fit between affordances 
and actions is "insured by the law of compatibility, which says that only 
compatible things can coexist." (p. 112). Actions, that is, could not exist in an 
environment that does not have the appropriate affordances. And, an 
action can occur because the appropriate affordance is perceived (p. 42). 
But, to the sceptic the 'law of compatibility' may be stating nothing more 
than the fact that, 'If an action does occur it can occur.' (For an example of 
such scepticism see Fodor (1980, p. 107). He stated, among other things, "The 
category 'affordance' seems to me to be a pure cheat: an attempt to have all 
the goodness out of intensionality without paying any of the price.") 
The force of this criticism can be understood well using the comparison 
between the world of the metaphysical subject and that referred to by direct 
perception theory. Since the metaphysical subject is not part of the world, 
and yet reality remains co-ordinated with it -as to a point with no extension-, 
then there is no world left over that could be used to explain this apparent 
co-ordination. Similarly, the co-ordinated, or purposive, action of an 
organism is not explained by some other aspect of reality, such as a law of 
compatibility relating affordances and actions. In fact, perception as a 
phenomenon to be explained drops out of the picture, just as the 
metaphysical subject vanishes from the world. And structural and 
transformational invariants (See Chapter 1, Section 1.7.2, above) become the 
points around which an organism's actions are co-ordinated. Actually, the 
metaphysical subject could be thought of as the ultimate transformational 
invariant. 
In summary, the viewpoint presented in the Tractatus seems to provide an 
effective way of understanding the different approaches taken towards 
consciousness and perception within psychology. Also, this viewpoint helps 
explain the difficulties associated with these approaches, for example, the 
solipsistic problems of representational theories of perception. 
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3.4.6 CAUSALITY, EXPLANATION AND LIMITS 
In Chapter I, Section 1.8 scientific knowledge was discussed in terms of three 
different views of the nature of scientific causal explanations. These three 
views were the positivist or standard view of science, scientific realism, and 
the social constructionist conception of scientific knowledge. 
In that discussion it was concluded that the standard view of science is based 
on a view of meaning as 'use over time' while scientific realism depends on 
a view of meaning as 'reference'. Social constructionism, which claims to 
overcome this dichotomy, was considered to undermine its own claims and 
to misunderstand the implications of the methodology of radical doubt. It 
was suggested that a true reconciliation of the dichotomy would require a 
convergence of rational and causal explanation. As will now be argued, 
such a convergence occurs in the Tractatus . 
At the limits of language, which for Wittgenstein in the Tractatus was 
equivalent to the limits of sense, 'Humean' or 'contingent' causality and 
'generative' causality coincide. It is the concept of logic as underlying the 
form of all language and thought that produces this coincidence. On the 
one hand logic acts as a causal generative mechanism that must have just 
the nature and form needed to produce all possible propositions having 
sense. On the other hand, the ultimate underlying status of logic moves it 
into the 'transcendental' realm of the 'mystical' about which nothing can be 
said. And if nothing can be said directly about the nature of logic then all 
that is left to talk about are the observed 'lawful' or 'contingent' 
relationships within language and thought that manifest logic. 
In the Tractatus , not only do two understandings of causality converge, but 
also rationality and causality themselves become logically (and causally) 
equivalent. Rationality, in terms of the Tractatus , can be understood as any 
language or thought that has sense. And, as has been discussed (See Section 
3.2.1, above), sense is what logical pictures represent (T. 2.221). Rational 
thought and language, therefore,have logical form. The most important 
step in uniting rationality and causality is that, in Wittgenstein's scheme, for 
picturing to be possible at all a picture and what it pictures, that is, the world, 
must have logical form in common (T. 2.2). In terms of a generative view of 
causality, rationality and causality are equivalent because they share the 
same underlying mechanism -logical form. The logical form of language 
and thought is the same as the causal form of the world. 
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This equivalence between rationality and causality becomes even more 
apparent when a 'Humean' or 'contingent' view of causality is considered. 
As already discussed (Chapter 1, Section 1.8), with contingent causality a 
phenomenon is said to be explained once it becomes subsumed under a law. 
Two comments by Wittgenstein (1974a) reveal how closely logic and 
causality are related. Firstly, he stated; 
And, secondly; 
The exploration of logic means the 
exploration of everything that is subject to 
law. And outside logic everything is 
accidental. (T. 6.3). 
The law of causality is not a law but the form 
of a law. (T.6.32). 
The first comment states that the realm of order and lawfulness is the realm 
of logic. This makes sense since logic is meant to be the formal aspect of 
language and thought that provides for determinate sense. The second 
comment reveals that causality is not a law of nature because it is the very 
insight that underpins all laws. Wittgenstein (1974a) confirmed this by 
saying; 
And; 
If there were a law of causality, it might be put 
in the following way: There are laws of 
nature. 
But of course that cannot be said: it makes 
itself manifest. (T. 6.36). 
One might say, using Hertz's terminology, 
that only connexions that are subject to law 
are thinkable. (T. 6.361). 
Lawfulness and 'thinkability' are one and the same. Of course, the logical 
positivists found in this equivalence a reason to promote science as the 
quintessential rational pursuit. 
At the limits of language then, there is no distinction between the rational 
and the causal; at least in terms of what can be said. Given this, the view of 
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knowledge promoted by social constructionists such as Gergen (1988) can be 
better understood. 
According to Gergen (1988) knowledge in psychology, and elsewhere, is a 
social construction that can be explained in terms of constructs such as 
"negotiation", "power" and "collusion" (Gergen, 1988; p. 31). Describing 
social constructionism more fully, Gergen (1988) stated; 
Inquiry of this sort is premised on the 
assumption that propositions about the world 
(including persons) are not (and cannot be) 
built up inductively from observation. 
Rather, such propositions largely represent 
historica11y contingent conventions of 
inte11igibility. Their truth or falsity, 
rationality or absurdity, reality or 
mysteriousness are all matters of social 
determination. (p. 35). 
At first sight it may appear that rationality is being causally explained in 
terms of 'irrational' or at least conventional processes such as "negotiation", 
"power" and "collusion". However, with a minimum of interpretation it is 
possible to see these so-called irrational processes as manifestations of the 
logic of language, thought and even the world. This interpretation seems 
even more plausible given the following comments by Gergen (1988); 
Regardless of the processes of social 
negotiation, co11 usion, exchange, and 
manipulation, this language [the "preformed 
mold of intelligible language"] is governed by 
existing conventions. These conventions 
will largely determine the contours of the 
propositions we commonly take to be 
knowledge. (p.36. Brackets added). 
It is these so-called "existing conventions" that seem to carry the same 
explanatory burden as that borne by logic in the Tractatus . It is clear that 
these conventions are explanatory because of the way they are assumed to 
govern -and exist prior to- particular instances of language use. And it 
seems that having this "preformed mold" of conventions is what makes 
language intelligible. Of course, logic, in the Tractatus , has just these 
features too. 
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The criticisms directed against social constructionism in Chapter 1, Section 
1.8.4 can now be understood as criticizing it for claiming to say things about 
knowledge that, if true, cannot be said. 
In summary, the Tractatus provides a framework that can conceptually 
unite contingent, or 'Humean', causality and generative causality. This 
framework also allows causality and rationality to be seen as equivalent. 
Both of these feats are possible because Wittgenstein (1974a), managed to 
push the possibility of making such distinctions into the world of what 
cannot be said. Logic, when seen as a generative causal mechanism for 
language and thought, cannot be talked about with sense and therefore 
generative and contingent causality become indistinguishable. 
Similarly, rationality and causality can be equated because both refer to the 
lawfulness and order that language, thought and the world have in 
common. Causal connections in the world must be the same as the 
connections that are possible in logic since a world that did not have the 
same connections would be illogical and, therefore, could not be thought 
about. As Wittgenstein (1974a) put it, "what the law of causality is meant to 
exclude cannot even be described" (T. 6.362). 
And, finally, it was argued that social constructionism could best be 
understood as an attempt to explain knowledge and rationality causally. But 
that this attempt fails because its putative causal constructs ("negotiation", 
"power", "collusion", etc.) manifest underlying conventions that carry the 
actual explanatory burden. And these conventions, it is claimed, occupy the 
same role in social constructionism as logic occupies in the Tractatus . 
Therefore, just as is the case with logic, propositions concerning these 
conventions must lack sense. 
3.5 SUMMARY: PSYCHOLOGY AND THE 
TRACTATUS 
It has been suggested here that much of the system presented in the 
Tractatus can be applied to psychology. The justification for this is based on 
the reflexive nature of both psychology and the Tractatus. The Tractatus is 
a book of propositions about propositions. Psychology, variously, can be 
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understood as thinking about thinking, knowing about knowing or 
behaving with respect to behaviour. 
The fact that it is possible to draw so many plausible comparisons between 
the worldview detailed in the Tractatus and various areas of debate and 
conceptual difficulty within psychology, suggests in itself that such an 
overall comparison is at least worthwhile. If so, then it may also be 
worthwhile to consider the conclusions Wittgenstein (1974a) reached and 
apply them to psychology. 
Of course, one of the main conclusions of the Tractatus was that the 
propositions of logic are tautological and therefore lack sense. If the 
propositions of psychology are similarly tautological then theorizing in 
psychology could also be said to lack sense and, therefore, substance. Just as 
all the logical constants are interdefinable (T. 5.42) it can seem, also, that 
concepts within a theory in psychology are interdefined and at no point 
'reach out' and make contact with the world. 
Gergen (1988) argued for a similar point by claiming that; 
All reasonable propositions declaring a 
functional linkage between mental terms and 
observable events are analytically true ; that 
is, their truth is derived from the structure of 
the language as opposed to their relationship 
to observables. (p. 37). 
And, Wittgenstein (1974a) made the same point when he said; 
It is clear, however, that 'A believes p', 'A has 
the thought p', and 'A says p' are of the form 
"'p" says p': and this does not involve a 
correlation of a fact with an object, but rather 
the correlation of facts by means of the 
correlation of their objects. (T. 5.542). 
That is, to 'believe', 'think' or 'say' a proposition is simply to say it with 
sense. The supposed relations between the object 'A' and the proposition 'p' 
referred to by the words 'believes', 'thinks', etc. are not relations at all. 
There are two reasons for this. Firstly, as already discussed, a psychological 
subject, or soul, does not exist (See Section 3.4.4, above). So there is nothing 
to which the proposition 'p' can be related. 
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Secondly, and more importantly in the present context, all that the words 'A 
believes ... ', 'A has the thought ... ', etc. signify is that the words 'p' have 
sense 'p'. That is, such propositions do not simply mean that certain sounds 
have been made (or certain neural activity has occurred). Rather, they 
indicate that the words have a sense which makes them part of the structure 
of logic. And once they are a part of logic the sense of words 'p' is nothing 
other than 'p'. It is then simply the logic of a particular situation that 
determines what theoretical processes can be used in a psychological 
explanation. 
It is in the light of this view of the propositions of psychology that the topics 
of unity, values, applying psychology, consciousness, perception and 
explanation in psychology have been discussed. It is claimed here that an 
understanding of the problems present in these areas has been shown to be 
possible if the approach to the relationship between language, thought and 
the world taken by the Tractatus is adopted. 
When Wittgenstein had finished writing the Tractatus he believed he had 
found the final solution to the problems of philosophy and logic (Preface to 
Tractatus-Logico Philosophicus , p. 4). So seriously did he hake this belief 
that he quit the philosophical world after its completion. Therefore, if the 
parallels are to be continued, it could well be asked whether theorists in 
psychology should likewise abandon any hope of saying anything 
substantive about so-called psychological phenomena. Should psychologists 
join the more 'anti-theoretical' approach taken by those such as Skinner 
rather than attempt to give a structural explanation of the nature of 
psychological phenomena? 
The remainder of this thesis will argue that there is an alternative to the 
dichotomy of either making tautological theories or not theorizing at all. 
This alternative, not unexpectedly, is related to the type of philosophizing 
carried out by Wittgenstein (1953; 1980; 1982) upon his return to academic 
philosophy after a ten year break. 
The following section will outline this 'Late' philosophy of Wittgenstein. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
4 THE 'LATE' PHILOSOPHY OF 
WITTGENSTEIN 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
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Although Wittgenstein resumed writing philosophy in 1929 after a break of 
a decade, none of these later writings were published during his lifetime 
(Hilmy, 1987, Preface). It seems that Wittgenstein was largely dissatisfied 
with the content of many of these manuscripts and "Wittgenstein's later 
desire to publish seems to have arisen not so much because he felt relatively 
satisfied with a significant block of material, but rather because he learned 
that his results were in circulation in watered-down and garbled form." 
(Hilmy, 1987, p. 8. Also, see Preface to Philosophical Investigations ). 
But irrespective of Wittgenstein's own evaluations of his work it is clear 
that what he presents in his 'Late' philosophy is a distinctive way of 
thinking and doing philosophy. This is supported by several passages 
quoted by Hilmy (1987) from some of Wittgenstein's unpublished 
manuscripts. For example, Wittgenstein (cited in Hilmy, 1987) wrote: 
What I should like to get you to do is (not to 
agree with me in particular opinions but) to 
investigate the matter in the right way. To 
notice the interesting kind of things (Le., the 
And; 
And further; 
things which will serve as keys if you use 
them properly). (p. 5). 
What I want to teach you isn't opinions but a 
method. In fact the method to treat as 
irrelevant every question of opinion. (p. 5). 
I don't try to make you believe something 
you don't believe, but to make you do 
something you won't do. (p. 5). 
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Even in an early version of the Preface to the Philosophical Investigations 
(abbreviated to 'P.I.' in the following discussions) -the most famous of 
Wittgenstein's posthumously published works- Wittgenstein (cited in 
Hilmy, 1987) stated, "One could call this book a text-book. A text-book, 
however, not in that it provides knowledge [Wissen] but rather in that it 
stimulates thinking [Denken]." (p. 6). 
Hilmy (1987) went on to suggest that gammg an understanding of 
Wittgenstein's method must be the first and perhaps most important step 
towards "what should be the ultimate goal of Wittgenstein research -
namely, an assessment of what philosophical conclusions he has to offer." 
(p. 3). However, an important point needs to be made about this "ultimate 
goal". If the researcher is in fact interested in having a clear understanding 
of what Wittgenstein said -perhaps in order to judge its truth or falsity- then 
the stated goal would be appropriate (although not necessarily insightful). 
But, if the researcher is instead interested in understanding the 
philosophical problems that Wittgenstein addressed , then, in an important 
sense, Wittgenstein's opinions on such problems would be irrelevant -as 
Wittgenstein's own comments, just quoted, would suggest. What would be 
relevant is the way Wittgenstein tried to clarify these problems. 
This is an important point because it heralds "a radical break with the idea 
that language always functions in one way, always serves the same purpose: 
to convey thoughts -which may be about houses, pains, good and evil, or 
anything else you please." (P.I. 304). Ironically, a susceptibility to viewing 
language in just this restricted way may be indicated by an over-eager desire 
to assess Wittgenstein's "philosophical conclusions". That is, this limited 
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view of language may be so engrained that Wittgenstein's 'conclusions', 
'opinions', 'views', etc. might be seen as expressions of thoughts about 
'objects' of thought -thus perpetuating the very activity Wittgenstein 
wanted to change. 
This point was made more clearly by Hilmy (1987) in his discussion of 
Wittgenstein's repudiation of "metalogic" (pp. 40-66). Hilmy (1987) argued 
that one of the main shifts in Wittgenstein's philosophy involved ceasing to 
view as 'metalogical' concepts such as "meaning", "understanding", 
"intention" and "virtually the whole gamut of 'psychological' concepts with 
which he was so ubiquitously preoccupied in his later writings" (p. 47). 
According to Hilmy (1987), what Wittgenstein means by 'metalogic' in his 
unpublished manuscripts and notebooks is simply "'something outside or 
beyond logic'" (p. 49). the 'somethings' that lie outside logic are the various 
psychological phenomena that can be assumed to lie behind words such as 
'meaning' and 'understanding'. In particular, Wittgenstein saw as an error 
"the notion that the meaning ... of a word is an idea ... that accompanies the 
word" (cited in Hilmy, 1987, p. 53). 
This repudiation of metalogic was apparently part of Wittgenstein's reaction 
to the scientific spirit of his time. Especially the spirit that led many of his 
contemporaries and immediate predecessors such as Bertrand Russell and 
William James to offer "pseudo-scientific psychological accounts of 
language" (Hilmy, 1987, p. 206). Wittgenstein was also reacting to some of 
his own earlier thought that had allowed psychological explanations to be 
seen as underpinning language because of his 'metalogical' view of 
'meaning', 'understanding', etc .. 
And, as Hilmy (1987) persuasively argued, it seems that it was these attempts 
to, in essence, found philosophy on psychology that led Wittgenstein, in his 
later thought (from at least 1929 on), to state that it is not the job of 
philosophy to provide explanations or philosophical theories, or, in fact, to 
'make discoveries'. For example, Wittgenstein (1953) commented: 
It was true to say that our considerations 
could not be scientific ones. It was not of any 
possible interest to us to find out empirically 
'that, contrary to our preconceived ideas, it is 
possible to think such-and-such' -whatever 
that may mean. (The conception of thought 
And; 
And, further; 
as a gaseous medium.) And we may not 
advance any kind of theory. There must not 
be anything hypothetical in our 
considerations. We must do away with all 
explanation, and description alone must take 
its place. And this description gets its power 
of illumination -Le. its purpose- from the 
philosophical problems. These are, of course, 
not empirical problems; they are solved, 
rather, by looking into the workings of our 
language, and that in such a way as to make 
us recognize those workings: in despite of an 
urge to misunderstand them. The problems 
are solved, not by giving new information, 
but by arranging what we have always 
known. Philosophy is a battle against the 
bewitchment of our intelligence by means of 
language. (P.I. 109). 
Philosophy may in no way interfere with the 
actual use of language; it can in the end only 
describe it. 
For it cannot give it any foundation either. 
It leaves everything as it is. (P.I.124). 
Philosophy simply puts everything before us, 
and neither explains nor deduces anything. -
Since everything lies open to view there is 
nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for 
example, is of no interest to us. 
One might almost give the name 
"philosophy" to what is possible before all 
new discoveries and inventions. (P.I. 126). 
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Hilmy (1987, pp. 202-203) gave further examples from Wittgenstein's 
unpublished manuscripts which reveal that the avoidance of explanation -
especially explanations of language- was, for Wittgenstein, one of the 
hallmarks of philosophy. Hilmy (1987) went on to point out that in the 
Tractatus Wittgenstein attempted to "solve philosophical problems by 
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offering discoveries about the essence or form of language" (p. 211), which 
included 'discovering' the general form of a proposition. And, further, it 
was no coincidence that this general form was "This is how things stand" (T. 
4.5) -an 'essence' of empirical statements about the world -which in turn led 
to equating meaningful propositions with the propositions of natural 
science (T. 6.53). 
It is now possible to suggest that the "radical break" Wittgenstein (1953) 
promoted in P.L 304 is a break away from a view of language that has been 
implicit in the approach taken to phenomena by natural science. 
It was in commenting on how to make a certain paradox disappear that 
Wittgenstein mentioned the need for this "radical break". The particular 
paradox Wittgenstein was referring to at the time was that the sensation of 
pain "is not a something, but not a nothing either!" (P.I. 304). While this 
paradox in itself may be of interest to psychologists what should also be 
noted is that what have been referred to here as the issues of reflexivity have 
similar paradoxical features. 
For example, it could be said that 'values' in psychology are 'not something 
but not nothing either' (See Chapter 1, Section 1.3). And the same point 
could be made about the content of perceptions (See Chapter 1, Section 1.7.1) 
and, most obviously of all, the 'nature' of consciousness (See Chapter 1, 
Sections 1.5 and 1.6). Not quite so obvious is the fact that issues of theoretical 
unity, the distinction between 'pure'; and 'applied' psychology, and concerns 
about the nature of knowledge, causality and explanation also share this 
paradoxical nature (See Chapter 1, Sections 1.2, 1.4 and 1.8). 
It is not necessary to detail, example by example, how each of these issues is 
paradoxical and, therefore, why a "radical break" from a certain view of 
language is required in each case. This is because it has already been noted 
in Chapter 1 that it is possible to see a common factor in all of these issues. 
The common factor is the presence of two distinct and often apparently 
incommensurable understandings of 'meaning': meaning as instantaneous 
reference, and; meaning as a practice or use extended over time. For present 
purposes it should therefore be enough to show that this bifurcated view of 
meaning is also at the heart of the kinds of philosophical problems and 
paradoxes that Wittgenstein addressed. 
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It is not difficult to see the way in which the Tractatusaccepts and 
incorporates this bifurcated view of meaning. On the one hand there is 
what language (understood as 'names') can mean or 'refer to'. In the 
extreme case, of course, there is that which can only be meant (See Chapter 
3). On the other hand there is that which can be said. And this involves 
the use of language over time. As Hilmy (1987) has suggested, Wittgenstein 
in the Tractatus had a 'metalogical' view of meaning which was used in an 
attempt to explain language -although this attempt ended in paradox (T. 
6.54). 
This 'metalogical' view can now be linked to the bifurcation of meaning. 
For what language and its signs must mean, or refer to, are the 'ideas' or 
'thoughts' that lie behind them (Hilmy, 1987, pp. 63-64). Yet all that is 
available to speak and think about these 'ideas' and 'thoughts' are the signs 
which are used as part of an activity over time. That is, the only way one 
person can make another person, or his-or-herself, mean the same thought 
or idea is to use everyday language. Because of this, everyday language may 
appear to be "somehow too course (sic) and material for what we want to 
say" (PJ. 120). Everyday language can seem to be merely the 'representative' 
of the 'real' meaning. 
In other words, the reflexive activity of talking about language may appear 
to be an attempt to describe what Wittgenstein called 'the primary' (Hilmy, 
1987, p. 53). 'The primary' is 'consciousness', or some-such psychological 
hinterland, in which the actual sense of the signs and sentences that occur in 
using language can be found. 
As Finch (1977) noted, it was "the peculiar activity of meaning" that 
Wittgenstein, early in his career, saw as that which allowed "complex 
things" to be treated as "simple objects" in order to establish an exact and 
definite sense for sentences (pp. 14-16). 'Meaning', therefore, was seen by 
Wittgenstein as a type of mental activity. It was only in his later writings 
that Wittgenstein (1953) commented that "nothing is more wrong-headed 
than calling meaning a mental activity!" (P.I. 693), Initially, though, it was 
these 'primary' activities that Wittgenstein believed lay hidden beneath 
language. 
The task of philosophy, therefore, may appear to be that of describing this 
pure, fundamental world behind the words. As Wittgenstein (1953) said; 
Here it is easy to get into that dead-end in 
philosophy, where one believes that the 
difficulty of the task consists in this: our 
having to describe phenomena that are hard 
to get hold of, the present experience that 
slips quickly by, or something of the kind. 
Where we find ordinary language too crude, 
and it looks as if we were having to do, not 
with the phenomena of every-day, but with 
ones that "easily elude us, and, in their 
coming to be and passing away, produce those 
others as an average effect". (P.I. 436). 
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This goal of producing a 'phenomenological language' was given up by 
Wittgenstein (Hilmy, 1987, p. 56). So was the closely related goal of 
discovering general, abstract features of language. For, as Hilmy (1987, pp. 
61-66) argued, the desire to construct, for example, the general form of a 
proposition or of a number -as was done in the Tractatus - is very likely 
connected to the assumption that there is some pure 'idea' of what a 
proposition or what a number is behind the words. The 'ideal' is what is 
precise and as clear as crystal. It must be precise -or so it seems. 
Now it can be understood why the requirement of definite sense in language 
was so compelling for Wittgenstein in his 'Early' philosophy (See Chapter 
3). This requirement was just one aspect of an intellectually pervasive and, 
basically, psychological view of how language operates. Wittgenstein (1953), 
as ever, described this compulsion well; 
The sense of a sentence -one would like to 
say- may, of course, leave this or that open, 
but the sentence must nevertheless have a 
definite sense. An indefinite sense -that 
would really not be a sense at all . -This is 
like: "An indefinite boundary is not really a 
boundary at all". Here one thinks perhaps: if 
I say "I have locked the man up fast in the 
room -there is only one door left open" -then 
I simply haven't locked him in at all; his 
being locked in is a sham. One would be 
inclined to say here: "You haven't done 
anything at all". An enclosure with a hole in 
it is as good as none. -But is that true? (P.I. 
99). 
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A sentence must have a definite sense, it seems, to be able to achieve 
anything at all. If sentences have no sense then how could orders be 
understood and followed? How could descriptions describe anything? If 
there is no exact sense somewhere in a sentence then what do propositions 
assert? But, despite the apparent necessity that language must work in this 
way it is equally clear that this whole view of language must end in paradox. 
This, of course, was precisely what Wittgenstein concluded in the Tractatus 
(T.6.54. Also, see Chapter 3, Section 3.3, above). 
It is no coincidence that the metalogical act of meaning 'such-and-such is 
the case' (P.I. 95) is exactly the same as the general form of a proposition 
'discovered' in the Tractatus: "This is how things stand" (T. 4.5). 'Meaning 
something' is to thought what the general form of a proposition is to 
propositions or language. 'Meaning something' is the essential nature of 
thought just as the general form of a proposition is the essence of 
proposi tions. 
There is a further way in which the paradoxical nature of the metalogical 
view of meaning is revealed. Wittgenstein (1953) commented, "When we 
say, and mean, that such-and-such is the case, we -and our meaning- do not 
stop anywhere short of the fact; but we mean: this-is-so." (P.I. 95). That 
'meaning something' does "not stop anywhere short of the fact" means that 
a thought, in order for it itself to mean something, must be implicitly self-
referential . 
In other words, meaning a thought cannot involve, for example, another 
thought that provides or explains the meaning of the first thought. For if 
this were the case determinacy of sense would be lost in an infinite regress of 
thoughts. And it is determinacy of sense that is required and needs 
explaining, according to this view of meaning. 
As has already been discussed (Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2) it is the failure to 
recognize the nature of formal concepts that allows the self-referential 
paradox to arise. Although Wittgenstein (1974a) never explicitly stated that 
'meaning', in the sense used here, is a formal concept it certainly has 
features in common with other formal concepts. For example, usually the 
concept 'meaning' (as intending) is expressed as a variable in terms of 
particular values. So someone might say, upon being misunderstood, "I did 
not mean 'X', I meant 'Y'." To then attempt to explain 'meaning' 
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independently of particular values would be to commit the same mistake 
that Wittgenstein (1974a) believed Russell made in trying to introduce 
separately the idea of a formal concept and the objects belonging to it. That 
is, it would be a mistake to try to state what the concept of 'meaning' (as 
intending) meant in order to, perhaps, determine if a particular object was 
'meant'. 
Whether or not the concept of 'meaning' should be thought of as a formal 
concept would require far more investigation than has been undertaken 
here. However, the important point is that there is an element of self-
reference in the view of meaning being discussed at present. And this self-
reference ends in paradox (See Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2). 
To summarize; one of the major changes in Wittgenstein's philosophy 
between the 'Early' and 'Late' periods was a rejection of a 'metalogical' view 
of meaning. This view encounters difficulties because it involves 
bifurca ting the concept of meaning. 
On the one hand are the metalogical 'meanings' hidden in 'psychological 
space'. And, on the other hand are language and propositional thoughts 
which have 'sense' and are expressed over time. This bifurcation is reflected 
in many distinctions that occur in Wittgenstein's 'Early' philosophy. The 
most relevant distinction is that between 'meaning' and 'sense' in the 
Tractatus (See Finch, 1971, pp. 211-213). Names mean objects -but that 
cannot be stated- and propositions have sense . However, the two are 
combined in thought. For what finally guarantees the definite and exact 
sense of a proposition is that its sense is meant when it is thought -the 
thought, as it were, means the sense. That is, through thought a 
proposition's sense can be meant as a simple object. As a 'simple object' the 
sense of a proposition becomes irreducible and indivisible. It therefore 
possesses the final exactness required of it (See Finch, 1977, pp. 11-13). 
If this account of Wittgenstein's understanding of the concept of 'meaning' 
in his 'Early' philosophy is correct -and if this understanding, admittedly in 
an extreme form, reflects a widespread understanding of meaning both in 
early twentieth century philosophy and psychology- then it is not difficult to 
see why psychologists should encounter seemingly intractable difficulties in 
theorizing. 'Thought' is what Wittgenstein (1974a) used to 'resolve' the 
paradoxes that arise from the original splitting of the concept of 'meaning'. 
As already mentioned in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.1.2, in order to fulfil this 
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cementing role thought itself takes on a dual nature. That is, "A logical 
picture of facts is a thought" (T. 3), and, "A thought is a proposition with 
sense." (T. 4). Therefore, to the extent that psychology deals with thought it 
is vulnerable to the problems and paradoxes arising from this dualistic 
understanding of thought. 
. What will now be discussed is how Wittgenstein in his 'Late' philosophy 
tried to avoid this metalogical view of meaning and the difficulties 
associated with it. 
4.2 'POSSIBILITY', 'MEANING' AND 
'ORDINARY LANGUAGE' 
4.2.1 'POSSIBILITY' AND 'MEANING' 
On his return to philosophy Wittgenstein saw the need for a "radical break" 
from metalogical approaches to understanding language. But, despite this 
need for a radical break from a view of language epitomized, of course, by 
the approach taken in the Tractatus , it is still possible to see Wittgenstein as 
having similar concerns in both his 'Early' and 'Late' philosophies. Finch 
(1977) characterized this similarity in terms of a "continuing commitment to 
such ideas as the primacy of meaning and the immanence of meaning in 
language ." (p. 2). In the Tractatus these ideas were expressed in the 
presuppositional status given to logic -which was of course what made logic 
so difficult to talk about with sense. Logic in this way was able to delimit the 
possible. This "fundamental perspective" belongs to what Finch (1977) 
claimed is "a long tradition in philosophy -that the actual is intelligible 
(indeed is anything) only in terms of the possible ." (p. 6). 
'Possibility', that is, provides the extra dimension that makes 'what is' 
understandable. The Tractatus explored possibility by describing the 
supposed internal structure of language which was meant to determine all 
that language could represent or say. But by the time of writing the 
Philosophical Investigations , Wittgenstein's interest in the possibilities of 
phenomena had become complete. So complete that even the idea that 
there is, in essence, just one way that language operates -that is, by 
representing the world- had to be dropped. 
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According to Finch (1977), Wittgenstein's first step towards totally embracing 
'possibility' could occur "when it became clear that any projection could be 
done in some other way, so that the hold of the idea of the 'only possible 
final interpretation' was broken" (p. 6). And it was this realization that 
finally served to undermine language. If there is no final interpretation 
then there can be no ultimate 'essence'. Wittgenstein (1953) referred to this 
changed emphasis when he said; 
We feel as if we had to pen e t rat e 
phenomena: our investigation, however, is 
directed not towards phenomena, but, as one 
might say, towards the 'possibilities' of 
phenomena. We remind ourselves, that is to 
say, of the kind of statement that we make 
about phenomena. (P.I. 90). 
An interest in the "kind of statement" made about phenomena indicates 
that the new emphasis in Wittgenstein's philosophy was on the use that is 
made of words. It is a common-place to say that in his 'Late' philosophy 
Wittgenstein claimed the meaning of a word is its 'use'. In fact, 
Wittgenstein (1953) stated as much; 
For a large class of cases -though not for all- in 
which we employ the word "meaning" it can 
be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its 
use in the language. (P.I. 43). 
But, it would be a mistake to think that Wittgenstein is here claiming that 
the way to discover the meaning of a word is simply to look and see how the 
particular word has in fact been used -as if observed uses delimit the 
meaning of a word for all time, or even for the present moment. The 
investigation requires a bit more 'intelligence' than that. 
Factual -or actual - uses of words are certainly important to Wittgenstein and 
are used in his method of "assembling reminders" to clarify philosophical 
problems. For example, Wittgenstein (1953) commented; 
When philosophers use a word 
"knowledge", "being", "object", "I", 
"proposition", "name" -and try to grasp the 
essence of the thing, one must always ask 
oneself: is the word ever actually used in this 
way in the language-game which is its 
original home? (P.I. 115). 
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But, while an appeal to the way words are "actually used" is often very 
helpful another aspect of the use of words is just as important. As well as 
the actual use of words there is the possible use of words. Finch (1977) 
believed that this distinction is revealed in the different ways Wittgenstein 
(1953) used the German words "Gebrauch " (actual or established use) and 
"Verwendung " (possible use) (pp. 27-30). The distinction is subtler than it 
may at first appear. For example, Finch (1977) noted that Verwendung is 
sometimes used by Wi ttgenstein (1953) to refer to an actual use of a word, 
"but only when the use is other than the customary one." (p. 28). The 
following examples provided by Finch (1977) clearly show how the two 
German words are used by Wittgenstein (1953); 
imaginary uses (P.I. 6), metaphysical uses (P.I. 
116), "unheard-of" uses (P.1. 133), and 
figurative uses (P.I. p. 215) are all cases of 
Verwendung; what is learnt (P.I. 6), practiced 
(P.I. 9), and defined (P.I. 30) are cases of 
Gebrauch. (p. 28). 
Such a distinction should now appear familiar since, in many ways, it 
echoes the distinction made between 'meaning' and 'sense' in the Tractatus 
(Finch, 1977, p. 27). On the one hand the established determinate uses of 
words (Gebrauch ) reflect the determinate meanings of names in the 
Tractatus . On the other hand, the possible uses of words reflect the 
necessarily indeterminate number of elementary propositions and the fact 
that only the "application of logic decides what elementary propositions 
there are" (T. 5.557-5.5571). That is, there is always the possibility of 
constructing new and previously unimagined propositions because of the 
impossibility of stating, a priori, all elementary propositions. 
Even more interesting is thatWittgenstein (1953) spoke of Verwendung in 
connection with "ideas, understanding ,expectation and the mind, while 
Gebrauch is what is prescribed and described and given an account of ." 
(Finch, 1977, p.30). This particular contrast is interesting because it shows 
very clearly the difference between, on the one hand, meaning as an idea, an 
understanding or an imagined possible use that can be "grasped in a flash"; 
and, on the other hand, meaning as a prescription for, or an account of, an 
actual use "spread out in time" (Finch, 1977, p. 30). 
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This difference is the same difference that was emphasized in the 
discussions of various reflexive issues in psychology in Chapter 1. Many of 
the problems pointed out in those discussions arose from the apparent 
incommensurability of these two views of meaning. Therefore, it would 
now be worth examining Wittgenstein's (1953) attempt to reconcile these 
views. 
4.2.1.1 Reconciling Two Forms of Meaning 
In sections 138-142 of the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein (1953) 
dealt with the difficulty of reconciling meaning as a use extended in time 
and meaning as a use that can be understood and 'grasped in a flash'. The 
first step is to present the problem; 
But can't the meaning of a word that I 
understand fit the sense of a sentence that I 
understand? Or the meaning of one word fit 
the meaning of another? -Of course, if the 
meaning is the use we make of the word, it 
makes no sense to speak of such 'fitting.' But 
we understand the meaning of a word when 
we hear or say it; we grasp it in a flash, and 
what we grasp in this way is surely something 
different from the 'use' which is extended in 
time! (P.I. 138). 
That is, if a word's meaning is just the use that is made of the word then 
how can the meaning of a word also be something that can be 'grasped in a 
flash'? In both cases the use of the word 'meaning' seems quite natural and 
valid. But the problem is: How can something that by its nature is extended 
in time also be something that can be 'grasped in a flash'? 
This dilemma is analogous to the wave/particle duality theory in physics. 
While in their day-to-day work physicists may quite comfortably speak of the 
wave/particle duality of light it remains a problem for the philosopher. For 
how can the words 'dual nature' be anything but a contradiction in terms? 
And, just as is the case with light, the two forms of meaning seem too 
discrete and mutually exclusive to be two aspects of some hypothesized 
underlying reality. As Wittgenstein (1953) went on to describe; 
When someone says the word "cube" to me, 
for example, I know what it means. But can 
the whole use of the word come before my 
mind, when I understand it in this way? 
Well, but on the other hand isn't the 
meaning of the word also determined by this 
use? And can't these ways of determining 
meaning conflict? Can what we grasp in a 
flash accord with a use, fit or fail to fit it? 
And how can what is present to us in an 
instant, what comes before our mind in an 
instant, fit a use? (P.I. 139). 
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The conflict, then, is between two ways of determining meaning. The next 
step Wittgenstein (1953) took was to suggest that what comes "before our 
mind" when a word is understood is a picture, or "something like a picture" 
(p.r. 139). He then pointed out that while such a picture can "suggest" a 
certain use it can always be used in a different way (P.I. 139). That is, for any 
picture it is possible to imagine a method of projection that would enable it 
to 'fi t' more than one use. 
However, it can often seem that a picture forces a particular application on 
those who picture it. There may then seem to be, not a logical, but a 
psychological compulsion connected with the picture (p.r. 140). But the 
feeling of compulsion stems just from the fact that while there are other 
possible applications of a picture "only the one case and no other occurred to 
us" (P.I. 140. Also, see Chapter 2, Section 2.2.4 for a discussion of Darwinian 
explanation and causality that makes a related point). Nevertheless, for 
Wittgenstein (1953); 
What is essential is to see that the same thing 
can come before our minds when we hear the 
word and the application still be different. 
Has it the same meaning both times? I think 
we shall say not. (P.I. 140). 
So far, then, there are pictures of words which can suggest ways to apply the 
words but cannot determine how they are to be used since other applications 
can 'fit' the pictures too. 
Wittgenstein's (1953) next step was to ask whether the way a picture is to be 
applied, its method of projection, can come before someone's mind and 
determine the application of a picture (P.I. 141). Of course if a picture of an 
application 'came before someone's mind' it would be possible to imagine 
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more than one way of applying this picture. So it may appear that no 
progress is made by picturing an application. 
However, introducing the concept of 'application' is vital in Wittgenstein's 
(1953) attempt to reconcile the two forms of meaning. 'Use' understood as 
an application is an intermediate case between a 'use' which is extended in 
time and a 'use' that can be grasped in a flash. This intermediate position 
was discussed by Wittgenstein (1953) in terms of the two types of criteria that 
are used to decide when a particular application comes before someone's 
mind. Wittgenstein (1953) commented; 
Now clearly we accept two different kinds of 
criteria for this: on the one hand the picture 
(of whatever kind) that at some time or other 
comes before his mind; on the other the 
application which -in the course of time- he 
makes of what he imagines. (And can't it be 
clearly seen here that it is absolutely 
inessential for the picture to exist in his 
imagination rather than as a drawing or 
model in front of him; or again as something 
that he himself constructs as a model?). (P.I. 
141). 
The helpful thing about 'use' in the sense of an application is that it is quite 
natural to speak of both a picture (or drawing, or model) of an application 
and of an application as something extended in time. 
However, there can be a 'collision' between a picture of an application and 
its application over time. But this 'collision' is not unavoidable as seemed 
to be the case with the two distinct forms of meaning. Rather, there is a 
'collision' only "inasmuch as the picture makes us expect a different use, 
because people in general apply this picture like this" (P.I. 141). That is, like 
any picture, the picture of an application does not determine but only 
suggests the way in which it is to be applied. And this quite simple point is 
the insight that will be so helpful in dissolving the problems associated with 
the issues of reflexivity (See Chapter 5, below). 
Finally, then, when someone grasps the meaning of a word 'in a flash' it 
does not have to mean that what has been grasped is the 'use' (meaning) of 
the word extended in time. What is grasped might be "something like a 
picture". It is the notion that such a picture can only be applied in one way 
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that sets up a collision between the two ways of determining meaning. For 
if by its nature the meaning of a word is its use extended in time then how 
can an instantaneous 'picture' or 'understanding' also be the meaning of a 
word? Just as the wind cannot be grasped in a fist so too a practice extended 
in time cannot be grasped in a flash. 
But rather than abandoning or emphasizing one way of determining 
meaning in favour of another -as, for example, a behaviourist of the 
philosophical or psychological type may be tempted to do- Wittgenstein 
(1953) sought to understand and thus vindicate the fact that both forms of 
meaning are called 'meaning' in everyday language. And it is in the sense 
of 'use' as an application that this understanding and vindication can be 
achieved. The concept of 'applying something' allows talk of both 
something (like a picture) to be applied and of a process of applying it over 
time. 
Despite the way in which this 'intermediate' sense of the word 'use' helps to 
clarify why both meaning as something 'grasped in a flash' and as 
something extended in time can be called the meaning of a word, it may 
seem that too high a price has been paid. For it is apparent that in the 
concept of 'applying something' there is always the possibility of applying 
something in more than one way. What has been 'lost', of course, is any 
concept of final determinate meaning. 
It can now be clearly seen that Wittgenstein (1953) completely abandoned 
what he came to see as the chimaera of determinacy. Instead, his sole aim 
was to understand things clearly: 
And; 
A main source of our failure to understand is 
that we do not command a clear view of the 
use of our words. -Our grammar is lacking in 
this sort of perspicuity. A perspicuous 
representation produces just that 
understanding which consists in 'seeing 
connexions'. Hence the importance of 
finding and inventing intermediate cases . 
(P.I. 122). 
A philosophical problem has the form: !II 
don't know my way about". (P.I. 123). 
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It may superficially seem that determinacy is the best or even the 'only real' 
way of finding one's "way about". After all, what surer path could there be 
than a determined path? And the Tractatus took just this view by insisting 
on the absolute requirement that sense be determinate. While stating that 
propositions are pictures or models of reality (T. 4.01) Wittgenstein (1974a), 
as Finch (1977, pp. 32-33) noted, treated the requirement that language must 
relate to the world in a determinate way as something more than a picture. 
As Wittgenstein (1953) said; 
A picture held us captive. And we could not 
get outside it, for it lay in our language and 
language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably. 
(P.I. 115). 
It seemed, that is, as if there was only one possible way of applying the 
picture of an 'isomorphic projection' between language and the world. This 
picture was of course a picture of an application. But nevertheless, as Finch 
(1977) commented; 
Even a picture of an application cannot 
determine how that picture itself is to be 
used. There is always the possibility of doing 
something else with it. The entire crystalline 
ontology of the Tractatus derived its power 
from the idea that the picture of an 
isomorphic mapping itself could only be 
applied in one way, i.e. the idea that that 
picture determined its own application. (p. 
33). 
The endpoint of such absolute, underlying determinacy was the paradox that 
the propositions of the Tractatus itself were nonsensical. In a sense 
Wittgenstein (1974a) tried to salvage 'possibility' from 'determinacy' by 
saying that there were things that could be shown but not said -possibility, 
that is, beyond the limits of what could possibly be said. Even the ultimate 
deterministic metaphysics presented in the Tractatus still needed, even 
begged, for a greater 'world' of possibility. And the only place for this 
'world' was outside the world. 
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4.2.2 ORDINARY LANGUAGE 
It has been said that 'good' has one enemy and that is 'evil'; but 'evil' has 
two enemies, 'good' and itself. Without any intention of shading this 
discussion with moral tones, in a similar way it could be said that 
'possibility' has 'determinism' as its only counter, but 'determinism' is 
countered both by 'possibility' and itself. In fact, one way to avoid the 
nonsensical and self-destructive endpoint of the Tractatus is to realize that 
it is possible to apply the deterministic picture of the relationship between 
language and the world in more than one way. That is, it is only by 
introducing more possibilities that determinism can be saved from itself. 
Therefore, if there is no determinate form underlying language there 
remains simply 'normal' and 'abnormal' uses of words. Wittgenstein (1953) 
described this 'conventionalism' in the following terms; 
It is only in normal cases that the use of a 
word is clearly prescribed; we know, are in no 
doubt, what to say in this or that case. The 
more abnormal the case, the more doubtful it 
becomes what we are to say. And if things 
were quite different from what they actually 
are -if there were for instance no characteristic 
expression of pain, of fear, of joy; if rule 
became exception and exception rule; or if 
both became phenomena of roughly equal 
frequency- this would make our normal 
language-games lose their point. (P.I. 142). 
It would be a mistake to think that this type of 'conventionalism' is either 
'soft', therefore allowing a drift into arbitrariness, or 'hard' in the 
determinate even causal sense used by Gergen (1988) (See Chapter 3, Section 
3.4.6, above for mention of Gergen's (1988) view of conventions). 
'Conventional' or 'normal' cases are in a sense the 'hardest' and least 
arbitrary things there are. Like 'ordinary certainties' (See Chapter I, Section 
1.8.4) they are so normal that they are hardly ever questioned or even 
noticed. Nevertheless, even these cases are conventional rather than 
determinate or causal since if they were truly determinate in the sense taken 
in the Tractatus their determinate nature could not be talked about with 
sense. 
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In both his 'Early' and 'Late' philosophies Wittgenstein began with the 
assumption that 'ordinary language' does make sense and is understood. 
People talk about phenomena and understand each other. Even when 
people do not understand each other, that too can be understood and talked 
about. However, in his 'Early' philosophy Wittgenstein further assumed 
that this capacity of language must depend on some determinate form 
common to both language and the world. This assumption moved the 
focus from 'ordinary language' and towards the 'hidden essence' of 
language. 
In his 'Late' philosophy, however, the focus of Wittgenstein's investigations 
returned to ordinary or 'everyday' language -the 'natural home' of the 
phenomena of language. Surveying the conventional and unconventional 
ways in which words are used and could be used became, for Wittgenstein, 
the means by which philosophical problems were to be understood. Hilmy 
(1987) linked this new emphasis on ordinary language to Wittgenstein's 
rejection of a metalogical view of psychological concepts and concluded in 
the following way; 
The evidence has demonstrated that by the 
early 1930s Wittgenstein had already shifted 
to ordinary language as the proper domain of 
logic and repudiated his earlier metalogical 
views, thus 'opening the gates' to the logical 
investigation of psychological concepts which 
so preoccupied him during the last two 
decades of his life. (p.66). 
As Hilmy (1987) also noted, the domain of ordinary language was viewed by 
Wittgenstein, post-1929, "not merely as the source of philosophical 
confusion (this may always have been his view) but also as the means by 
which philosophical confusions are to be eliminated" (p. 56). 
Ordinary or everyday language is "language in a common-or-garden sense" 
(Hilmy, 1987, p. 49). Wittgenstein (1953) repeatedly referred to the way in 
which language and words are "actually used" «e.g.) P.I. 117, 124, 134) and 
saw his task as bringing "words back from their metaphysical to their 
everyday usage" (P.I. 116). In fact, there is a sense in which ordinary 
language must be the correct domain of philosophy and logic as 
Wittgenstein (1953) pointed out in the following passage; 
When I talk about language (words, 
sentences, etc.) I must speak the language of 
every day. Is this language somehow too 
course [sic] and material for what we want to 
say? Then how is another one to be 
constructed ? -And how strange that we 
should be able to do anything at all with the 
one we have! 
In giving explanations I already have to use 
language full-blown (not some sort of 
preparatory, provisional one); this by itself 
shows that I can adduce only exterior facts 
about language. 
Yes, but then how can these explanations 
satisfy us? -Well, your very questions were 
framed in this language; they had to be 
expressed in this language, if there was 
anything to ask! 
And your scruples are misunderstandings. 
(P.I. 120. Brackets added). 
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Ordinary language is just the place where all the questions, understandings, 
confusions, answers, etc. are to be found. But, unlike the pure, crystalline 
world of logic that the Tractatus insisted defined the world of such 
phenomena, ordinary language is ruled by possibility rather than 
determinacy. In the domain of ordinary language problems are resolved by 
'remembering' different uses of words (P.I. 127), 'imagining' possible 
situations and uses of words (P.I. 139) and 'constructing' hypothetical 
'language-games' (See Section 4.3, below for a discussion of 'language-
games') to clarify uses of words and to bring out similarities and 
dissimilarities in the facts of language (P.I. 130). 
The phrase "ordinary language is ruled by possibility" here refers to the fact 
that ordinary language can handle, although not necessarily 'solve', any 
problem. This is because it is just this language -or the grammar of this 
language (See Section 4.3, below for a discussion of 'grammar')- that gives 
the problem its form. In this sense there are no limits to ordinary language. 
This contrasts, of course, with the limits that must be present if language is 
defined and constrained by an underlying determinate logic -even if these 
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limits cannot be said, since that would involve going beyond the limits in 
order to define them. 
In P.I. 101-108 and surrounding passages Wittgenstein (1953) highlighted this 
new emphasis on ordinary language by contrasting it with his previous 
attempts to unearth "The strict and clear rules of the logical structure of 
propositions" that lay, as it seemed, "hidden in the medium of the 
understanding" (P.I. 102). 
This new emphasis is linked to what Hilmy (1987) termed "Wittgenstein's 
thinking concerning the proper role of the 'ideal'" (p. 69). The pure, 
crystalline, 'ideal' structure was something that Wittgenstein, early in his 
career, believed '''must' be found in reality", and this because "we think we 
already see it there" (P.I. 101). The 'ideal' therefore becomes "unshakable" 
and "There is no outside; outside you cannot breathe" (P.I. 103). It is the 
need to find this 'ideal' order that causes philosophers to become 
"dissatisfied with what are ordinarily called 'propositions', 'words', 'signs'" 
(P.I. 105). But this search for the 'ideal' is misleading according to 
Wittgenstein (1953). As he put it; 
Here it is difficult as it were to keep our heads 
up, -to see that we must stick to the subjects of 
our every-day thinking, and not go astray and 
imagine that we have to describe extreme 
subtleties, which in turn we are after all quite 
unable to describe with the means at our 
disposal. We feel as if we had to repair a torn 
spider's web with our fingers. (P.I. 106). 
The narrower and narrower examination of language, encouraged by this 
view of the hidden 'ideal', only increases the problems it is supposed to 
solve; 
The more narrowly we examine actual 
language, the sharper becomes the conflict 
between it and our requirement. (For the 
crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not a 
result of investigation it was a 
requirement.) The conflict becomes 
intolerable; the requirement is now in 
danger of becoming empty. -We have got on 
to slippery ice where there is no friction and 
so in a certain sense the conditions are ideal. 
but also, just because of that, we are unable to 
walk. We want to walk: so we need friction. 
Back to the rough ground! (P.I. 107). 
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Of course, the "rough ground" is ordinary language, the place where even 
the abstract and seemingly esoteric research of the philosopher has its home. 
As the term 'ordinary language' suggests, the shift to this view of language 
meant ceasing to see language as a special phenomenon. Language becomes 
a phenomenon like any other. But, as Finch (1977) remarked, there is still a 
need "to do justice to the paradigmatic character of language" (p. 189). The 
"paradigmatic character" is that aspect of language seen as an all-enveloping 
phenomenon. The difficulty, of course, is seeing this aspect without feeling 
that one must leave language in order to see it. This difficulty is overcome 
by seeing language in terms of its aspects, of which its paradigmatic character 
is only one, "combined with the idea of a rearrangement to make an aspect 
clearly visible" (Finch, 1977, p. 189). 
The change in Wittgenstein's thinking was from seeing the essence of 
language as "something that lies beneath the surface" and must be dug up 
by analysis, to seeing essence as "something that already lies open to view 
and that becomes surveyable by a rearrangement" (P.I. 92). By rearranging 
the possibilities of phenomena a path can be found that is "equivalent to 
'seeing' the grammar of the world, but this time not as a hidden ontological 
dimension, but as the phenomena seen in a different way" (Finch, 1977, p. 
189). 
The important thing in philosophy is to gain a surveyable arrangement of 
phenomena in order to have "complete clarity" which "simply means that 
philosophical problems should completely disappear" (P.I. 133). In the 
Tractatus , and the philosophy it epitomizes, the desire for exactness became 
confused with the need for clarity so that it seemed that 'complete clarity' 
meant 'complete exactness'. Wittgenstein (1953) described this confused 
view in the following way: 
It can also be put like this: we eliminate 
misunderstandings by making our 
expressions more exact; but now it may look 
as if we were moving towards a particular 
state, a state of complete exactness; and as if 
this were the real goal of our investigation. 
(P.I. 91). 
And; 
'The essence is hidden from us ': this is the 
form our problem now assumes. We ask: 
'What is language?',' What is a 
proposition?' And the answer to these 
questions is to be given once for all; and 
independently of any future experience. (P.I. 
92). 
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This goal of exactness takes on a life of its own obscuring the fact that the 
real need is for clarity and not exactness. This 'real need' was probably what 
Wittgenstein (1953) had in mind when he made the following remark; 
The preconceived idea of crystalline purity 
can only be removed by turning our whole 
examination round. (One might say: the axis 
of reference of our examination must be 
rotated, but about the fixed point of our real 
need.) (P.I.I08). 
So there is no need in philosophy to produce an account of the nature of 
language in order to explain how it can be all-enveloping. Instead, the 'real 
need' is to see the 'grammar' of the world clearly enough to make 
philosophical confusions disappear. To emphasize this point Finch (1977) 
asked; "What is the criterion for seeing phenomena rightly or for having 
arranged them in such a way that they show their essential aspect?!! (p. 190). 
And he replied; 
Wittgenstein's answer is that we do not need 
some absolutely correct way of looking (a 
meaningless idea in any case). We are 
looking for an order which removes our 
problems and enables us to find our way 
about. We know that we are seeing things 
rightly in this way when a particular 
philosophic problem altogether disappears 
... Then we !!know where we are!! when we 
have seen the grammar correctly. (p. 190). 
From this perspective it is possible to see why psychology has difficulties 
with reflexive issues. For psychology can be seen as an attempt to give 
determinate (causal) accounts of the phenomena it deals with. It is not 
difficult to imagine how such accounts could be assumed to meet the 'real 
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need' of understanding psychological phenomena clearly while in fact they 
could be preventing such clarity, just as the account of the phenomena of 
language in the Tractatus obscured the clarity that was really wanted by 
Wittgenstein. 
Before looking once more at the issues of reflexivity (See Chapter 1) -this 
time from the point of view of the 'Late'philosophy of Wittgenstein- it will 
be useful to examine Wittgenstein's special type of phenomenalism and the 
concepts of grammar ,language-games and forms of life. This will provide 
some terminology to help discuss the issues of reflexivity. 
4.3 'LANGUAGE-GAMES' AND 'FORMS OF 
LIFE' 
To understand Wittgenstein's (1953) approach to phenomena it is essential 
to be clear about the status of the concepts of 'language-games' and 'forms of 
life'. 
In the context of the present study, perhaps the most important point to note 
about the terms 'language-games' and 'forms of life' is that they are not 
constructs in a theory aimed at explaining language. It was suggested above 
(Chapter --, Section --) that the Tractatus system also should not be thought 
of as a theory. However, while the system presented in the Tractatus could 
not be theoretical because what it dealt with had to be reality itself (T. 
5.5563), language-games and forms of life are not theoretical terms because 
they 'come before' facts and are therefore not themselves factual (Finch, 
1977, p. 71). 
From the viewpoint of the Tractatus (and of the 'logical positivism of the 
Vienna Circle' in part inspired by the Tractatus -Engelmann, 1967; Hilmy, 
1987, pp. 190ff.) talk of pre-factual entities would be as nonsensical as talk of 
propositions of logic. But when the requirement that language must have 
determinate sense is dropped then terms ('names') used in language do not 
need factual entities to validate their meaningfulness. Rather, by examining 
and describing the 'grammar' ('use') of an expression its meaning can be 
viewed clearly. 
It is important to realize that to speak in terms of 'language-games' and 
'forms of life' -to employ the grammar of these expressions- is just one way 
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of speaking. It is a way to "establish an order in our knowledge of the use of 
language: an order with a particular end in view; one out of many possible 
orders; not the order" (P.I. 132). 
For example, to say that language-games are 'primary' or 'fundamental' or 
that they are "the absolute starting point" and "can neither be explained nor 
justified" (Finch, 1977, p. 74) is not necessarily to make an ontological 
statement about the nature of language. Instead, when it is realized that 
'ontology' itself in one sense is only a part of language, then to speak of the 
fundamental character, etc. of language-games is simply to indicate or even 
to teach, the grammar ('use') of the term 'language-games'. As is so often 
the case in Wittgenstein's 'Late' philosophy the important thing is how a 
word is used, its grammar, rather than trying to discover what the word 
'really means' or refers to «e.g.) P.I. 116). 
Language-games are also called "primitive languages" by Wittgenstein (1953, 
P.I. 7). Used in this way language-games are "objects of comparison" (P.I. 
130, 131) that can isolate an aspect of language «e.g.) see the list of language-
games in P.I. 23) to shed light on the different ways in which language is 
used. In this sense language-games are 'hypothetical' or 'ideal' languages. 
But, this is not to say that such language-games are conceived of as 
fundamental 'atoms' constitutive of language. Such language-games are 
more like "measuring-rod[s]" with which people 'measure' language rather 
than representing" a preconceived idea to which reality must correspond" 
(P.I. 131). 
One of the reasons Wittgenstein (1953) chose the word 'language-game' was 
to bring out the fact that there is no 'essence' to what is called language just 
as there is no 'essence' to what is called a 'game' (P.I. 65, 66). In response to 
his own hypothetical interlocuter, who accuses him of deliberately avoiding 
the difficult questions about the essence of language by speaking of the 
multiplicity of language-games (P.I. 65), Wittgenstein (1953) described the 
different things that are called 'games' and asked what they all have in 
common (P.I. 66). He concluded that while there are relationships between 
certain games there is nothing that is common to all games. 'Games', like 
. the phenomena of language are connected by, as Wittgenstein (1953) put it, a 
"family resemblance" (P.I. 67). 
It is because of the lack of an essence to the term 'language-game' that there 
is no language-game to explain language-games -a comment on the 
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grammar of the term 'language-game' -"though there is, in philosophy 
itself, one of describing them" (Finch, 1977, p. 74). 
To reiterate; to claim that language-games, and forms of life, are pre-
ontological, is to implicitly challenge the view that language only makes 
sense when it refers to entities that exist in some absolute way 
independently of language . Wittgenstein's approach, then, is a type of 
"linguistic 'relativity theory"', an analogy he drew himself (Hilmy, 1987, p. 
138-139). It is not difficult to see why the analogy is so appealing. By 
accepting that the speed of light was in fact a constant rather than trying to 
explain it away, Einstein could be said to have rotated the "axis of reference" 
of physics about the "fixed point" of the "real need" of physics «c.f.) P.I. 108). 
And this insight was developed despite the fact that many aspects of 
relativity theory appear counterintuitive. Furthermore, light can be said to 
'underlie', or, better, provide the medium for all observations in the same 
way that language can be said to provide the medium for all meaningful 
phenomena. That is, there is no extra-linguistic means of determining 
meaning. 
One sense in which language-games are "primary" (P.I. 656) is that it is only 
the language-game that determines what counts as a 'simple' (P.I. 46ff.). A 
chessboard, for example, in one language-game could be 'simple' while in 
others it could be composite «e.g.) black and white; 64 squares; wood, 
varnish and paint, etc.). Therefore, there is no privileged 'unit of meaning' 
that could determine the structure of all language. 
This point emphasizes the fact that there can be no paramount language-
game and certainly "the attempt to develop theories about the causes for the 
development of language-games can itself be no more than an additional 
language-game, whatever else we may imagine it to be" (Finch, 1977, p. 75). 
Another sense in which language-games are fundamental is that they are an 
inherent part of language as an activity. In this respect Wittgenstein (1953) 
commented that, "the term 'language-game' is meant to bring into 
prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or a 
form of life" (P.I. 23). Life -or, rather, meaningful phenomena (see Section 
4.5, below)- and language, through the notion of 'language-games', become 
intimately entwined. 
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There is a some disagreement in the secondary literature on Wittgenstein's 
'Late' philosophy as to the relationship between 'language-games' and 
'forms of life'. In particular, there are different views on the extent to which 
the two terms should be considered equivalent. 
For example, Bilmy (1987) suggested that Wittgenstein called language-
games 'forms of life' partly to stress the fact that language-games are 
"activities or loci of linguistic practice ", and that these practices "are 
constitutive of the meaning or 'life' of signs" (p. 184). Finch (1977), 
however, claimed that the idea that language-games and forms of life are the 
same simply does not fit in with what Wittgenstein said about them (p. 90). 
In support of this claim Finch (1977) argued that the same language-games 
can function in different forms of life and "many language-games may be 
united in a single form of life" (p. 92). Forms of life, then, become for Finch 
(1977) "units of meaningful action which are carried out together by 
members of a social group and which have a common meaning for the 
members of the group" (p. 90). 
Wittgenstein (1953) used the term 'form of life' only five times in the 
Philosophical Investigations (P.I. 19, 23, 241, p. 174, p. 226). For the present 
purposes all that needs to be noted about these occurrences of the term 'form 
of life' is that in each case it is used to emphasize the inseparability of life 
(meaningful human activity) and language. For example; "And to imagine 
a language means to imagine a form of life" (P.I. 19), and, "It is what human 
beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. 
That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life." (P.I. 241). 
The expression 'form of life' and, also, the expressions 'language-games' and 
'grammar' are used by Wittgenstein (1953) to emphasize the point that 
meaning 'comes before' facts and ontology. A form of life does not therefore 
determine a particular meaning, or even "underwrite" the meaningfulness 
of an activity as Baker (1984, p. 280) would have it do. If this were so all the 
problems of extreme relativism would be present. 
In other words, if a form of life were thought to determine a meaning then 
it might be imagined that a different form of life could determine a different 
meaning. It might, therefore, seem impossible to decide between different 
meanings. But this is to forget that imagining this situation already 
involves a 'given' form of life constitutive (rather than determining) of the 
meanings of phenomena. The situation just never arises where it is 
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necessary to, as it were, choose between forms of life the way one might 
choose between metaphysical theories. A village green, for example, might 
be a cricket field or a grassy ecosystem depending on what language-games 
and forms of life were involved. It would be pointless to ask which of the 
two -or any other option- it really was. That is, the grammar of the term 
'form of life' is such that it only applies to what is prior to epistemology -
prior to what could sensibly be called 'knowledge'. 
As has already been discussed in Chapter 1, Section 1.8.4, Wittgenstein's 
(1969) book On Certainty speaks of a type of certainty that is neither known 
not doubted but simply "stands fast" for someone (O.c. 151). And these 
certainties are founded not on an "ungrounded presupposition" but on an 
"ungrounded way of acting" (O.C. 110). That is to say, "it is our acting, 
which lies at the bottom of the language-game" (O.c. 204). The reason that 
action is the foundation of language-games is because of the impossibility of 
generalized doubt. That is, every doubt must presuppose the possibility of 
certainty; -or to put it more clearly, every doubt must presuppose language 
as a meaningful activity. Doubt is expressed in language that is meaningful 
so it presupposes a meaningful activity, a form of life. 
Forms of life, language-games and grammar reflect the fact that even 
knowledge and doubt must be meaningful. As Finch (1977) put it; 
Here again Wittgenstein reverses the 
traditional picture. It is not that we have to 
k now something in order to mea n 
something, but rather our knowing too must 
have meaning, and that comes first. It would 
not make sense to talk about knowing which 
was not already a way of making sense. (p. 
81). 
Forms of life are just those meaningful activities that allow even knowledge 
to make sense and, therefore, are simply what is accepted or given (P.I. p. 
226). They are that aspect of language, understood in terms of language-
games -understood, that is, in terms of the possibilities or grammar of 
language- that provide a 'foundation' for language in the only sense in 
which it could be said that language has a foundation. 
Because of their meaningfulness forms of life are still, in one sense at least, 
part of language. (Wittgenstein in his 'Late' philosophy took the important 
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step of including in language such things as ostensive definition and other 
gestures «e.g.) P.L 28-36); samples or standards such as the one metre 
standard in Paris and colour samples -whether mental or physical- used in 
naming colours (P.L 50); and facial expressions (P.L 536-537).) It is because 
forms of life are already meaningful, and therefore are an aspect of language, 
that they cannot possibly be 'ontological' in the traditional sense of the 
word. That is, forms of life cannot be hypothesized realities independent of 
language. 
On the other hand, forms of life are unlike other 'parts' of language in that 
their meaningfulness is given and is therefore constitutive of the meaning 
of the various concepts, criteria, etc. used in association with a particular 
form of life. As already mentioned, another way of saying this is that in the 
concept 'form of life' language and reality become indistinguishable. A brief 
example should illustrate this point. 
'Calculating' is explicitly mentioned by Wittgenstein (1953) as a form of life 
(P.L p. 225-226). Understood as a form of life, 'calculating' is a meaningful 
activity shared in by members of a group. One aspect of this form of life may, 
for this group, involve judging whether a calculation has been carried out 
correctly. Parts of this judging process may seem to be part of 'reality' rather 
than language -(e.g.) giving the calculation to another person to check, 
working out the calculation with pencil and paper and comparing it to the 
original calculation step-by-step, looking up a book that supplies all the 
answers to such calculations, etc .. 
These actions seem to exist in the 'real world'. Yet for someone who did not 
share the 'calculating' form of life he or she could watch, for example, a 
calculation being checked with pencil and paper and never see such a thing 
as a calculation being checked. (And, it is important to note that it would be 
wrong to say that the observer would at least see physical movements and, 
therefore, that is really 'reality'. For there must be a form of life 
constitutive of seeing, describing, etc. physical movements, otherwise it 
would be meaningless to say, for example, "I have just seen the arm move 
from the table to the head. ") 
Bringing together language and reality via language-games, forms of life, 
and grammar is perhaps the most important step taken by Wittgenstein. 
The separation of language and reality required the existence of a connection 
or 'commonality' between the two to explain how language could make 
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sense and be of any use in the 'real' world. But, as was discovered in the 
Tractatus , any attempt to account for this connection ended in nonsense 
and paradox. The issues of reflexivity discussed in this study also depend, 
for their problematic aspects, on this separation. The reflexive problem took 
the form 'How is it possible to decide which side of the separation one was, 
or should be, standing?' Is an account of human behaviour behaviour (part 
of 'reality') or a meaningful use of language (part of 'language')? 
The answer to this question can be found in what Finch (1977) called 
Wittgenstein's "physiognomic phenomenalism" (pp. 168-191). But before 
briefly discussing this notion a major criticism of Wittgenstein's 'Late' 
philosophy needs to be addressed. It is a criticism that, if valid, would make 
Wittgenstein's philosophy as vulnerable as any other to the problems of 
reflexivity. 
4.4 IS WITTGENSTEIN'S 'LATE' PHILOSOPHY 
'EXPLANATORY'? 
Hunnings (1988) stated this criticism very directly in the following terms; 
Wittgenstein cannot have it both ways. If our 
Weltanschauungen are embedded in the 
grammar of our language-games then the 
possibility of neutral theory-free description is 
ruled out. In Wittgenstein's investigations of 
language what purports to be description 
turns out to be explanation, Le. the facts filled 
out by the concept of grammar. The 
incorporation into language of activities 
associated with language-games, colour 
samples, mental events and the analogies of 
methods of projection, games, tools and the 
later picture-theory of meaning all pertain to 
the apparatus of explanation rather than a 
description of language ... The assertion that 
(his) philosophy only demolishes houses of 
cards and in no way interferes with language 
but leaves everything as it is, is at best 
tendentious and at worst nonsense (P.I. 118, 
124) ... Grammar as conceived by Wittgenstein 
does not give us the facts but another 
interpretation of the facts. . .. Wittgenstein 
once again falls victim to his own generality 
and the life-long impulse to put an end to 
philosophy. (pp. 249-250). 
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To begin to counter this criticism it can first be noted that in his 'Late' 
philosophy far from wanting to put an end to philosophy Wittgenstein 
actually opposed the very possibility that there could ever be a final 
explanatory account of language, and therefore of the problems of 
philosophy (P.I. 92). The only sense in which Wittgenstein (1953) spoke of 
putting an end to philosophy is the following; 
The real discovery is the one that makes me 
capable of stopping doing philosophy when I 
want to. -The one that gives philosophy 
peace, so that it is no longer tormented by 
questions which bring itself in question. -
Instead, we now demonstrate a method, by 
examples; and the series of examples can be 
broken off. Problems are solved (difficulties 
eliminated), not a single problem. (P.I. 133). 
Obviously, Wittgenstein (1953) is here referring to the ability to stop 
philosophizing in a way that produces an endless vicious circle or self-
destructive outcome. Rather than being anti-philosophy Wittgenstein's 
desire is to free philosophy from the conceptual confusion that produces 
such degenerative results. Because language is not 'solvable', "once for all" 
(P.I. 92), the "idea of finality", as Finch (1977, p. 165) commented, can be 
given up, and it is this that gives philosophy peace. Conversely, it is the 
chimaera of a final solution that prevents this peace. 
Finch (1977) went on to say that Wittgenstein's philosophy does not have 
this finality and therefore "it is not a 'construction' but simply a point of 
view for getting rid of 'constructions.'" (p. 165). This is the point Hunnings 
(1988) could not accept. It is obvious that for Hunnings (1988), terms such as 
'grammar' must, at bottom, be part of an attempt to explain how language 
functions and, therefore, must themselves be part of a 'construction'. But 
'grammar', for example, does not determine the form of language; rather it 
is a description of that form (P.I. 496). As such -and this is vital- it is the 
form of language, in the only sense in which it is possible to speak of 
language having a form. That is, a form that was not a description simply 
would not enter into language. 
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Hunnings' (1988) criticism is that such a description of the "facts of our 
language" (P.I. 130) cannot possibly be "theory-neutral". Certainly, there can 
be more than one description of language. But it does not therefore follow 
that all description is 'theory-laden'. Such a conclusion is part of the 
approach that always sees description as the attempt to 'say how things really 
are' independently of language. 
This approach amounts to an attempt to explain the essence of description. 
Furthermore, it is just the sort of explanation of description Wittgenstein 
(1974a~ employed in the Tractatus and later repudiated. This approach 
presents a dilemma, for what is desired is a 'theory-neutral' description of 
the world as it actually is but all that can be given are 'theory-laden' 
descriptions. Wittgenstein's response to this dilemma is to argue that it is a 
mistake to understand descriptions as in any way theoretical. In his terms, 
. the grammar of the concepts 'theory' and 'description' simply do not relate 
in this way. 
In P.I. 240-242 Wittgenstein (1953) remarked that if language is to be a means 
of communication there must be agreements in the judgments people make 
(P.I. 242) -agreement not in opinions "but in form of life" (P.I. 241). These 
agreements in judgments provide the basis for the working of language in 
such things as giving descriptions (P.I. 240). Descriptions of phenomena 
present aspects of phenomena and, as will be shown in the following 
section, all aspects of phenomena must have equivalent status in terms of 
their 'reality' or, more correctly, their meaningfulness. To see different 
aspects of phenomena as different theories about phenomena is simply to 
invite confusion. 
From this viewpoint comes the freedom to describe phenomena in ways 
which dissolve particular problems. It is the clarification and dissolution of 
(philosophical) problems that represent "our real need" (P.I. 108) according 
to Wittgenstein (1953) ... Formulating a general problem-solving strategy such 
as "Find out what the world is really like" may solve certain problems but 
there is no reason to believe that all problems can be solved in this way. Of 
course, the problems associated with reflexivity are of the sort that are 
generated by this very problem-solving strategy, which is why this strategy 
cannot solve these problems. For the problems are all about what the world 
is really like. 
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Returning to Hunnings' (1988) criticism, the fact that more than one 
description of a phenomenon can be given does not imply that the 
phenomenon has a reality independent of any description (See Section 4.5, 
below). Therefore, each description simply presents the phenomenon in a 
possible way. And it is the possibilities of a phenomenon that are part of 
grammar. For example. to say that length does not have a colour or that 
mood has intensity or objects have mass is not to say anything about the 
nature of length, mood or objects as they exist independently of language. 
Rather, such statements are grammatical statements. In particular, they 
reveal grammar in its normative capacity, determining the correct and 
incorrect use of concepts. 
So, when Hunnings (1988) stated that no description can be 'theory-free' all 
he was noting is that every description presents one or more aspects of a 
phenomenon. This is only a problem if one is searching for the 'essence' of 
a phenomenon, understood as that phenomenon's fixed nature. Ironically, 
Wittgenstein (1953) remarked that "Essence is expressed by grammar" (P.1. 
371). That is, the 'essence' of a phenomenon is its possibilities. But, of 
course, this use of the term 'essence' is very different from the use of 
'essence' as referring to a fixed nature. In fact, it is almost the opposite use 
since 'possibilities' refers to the variety within a phenomenon rather than to 
its fundamental enduring nature. 
This is the point at which Hunnings' (1988) criticism can finally be rebuffed. 
Rather than there being a question of whether or not Wittgenstein's 'Late' 
philosophy is explanatory, the fact is that it cannot explain language (or any 
phenomenon). For example, to say that the statement "length has no 
colour" is a grammatical statement is not to say that the grammar of 
language determines or explains why length has no colour. It is simply like 
the statement of a rule in a game. In this sense, the formal sense, grammar 
is arbitrary. Now, to state that "Language can be described in terms of its 
possibilities (just as any phenomenon can be described)" likewise does not 
determine or explain anything about language (least of all why language has 
possibilities). 
In this case the game that is being played involves describing language-
games -or, as Wittgenstein might have called it, 'philosophy'. Investigating 
language in terms of its possibilities is itself just one possible way of being 
interested in language. To say that grammatical statements are like rules in 
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a game explains nothing about why the rules exist or why that game is 
played or even why the game has the form it does. {Rules cannot determine 
or explain the form of a game because rules can always be variously 
interpreted. Also, whether or not a rule has been followed or broken can 
only be given by yet more rules (P.I. 82-86).) 
Once the attraction of the 'final solution' is weakened a description can 
receive its "purpose", "its power of illumination", from the philosophical 
problems (P.I. 109). Descriptions need no longer always be seen as describing 
a reality independent of language and, therefore, necessarily 'theory-laden' 
hypotheses about reality. Instead, descriptions can be seen as a 
rearrangement of "something that is already in plain view" (p.r. 89). This, in 
order to produce "just that understanding which consists in 'seeing 
connexions tlt (P.I. 122), particularly by "finding and inventing intermediate 
cases" (P.I. 122). 
Just as 'meaning' is seen by Wittgensteinin his 'Late' philosophy as coming 
before ontology and epistemology, thus inverting the traditional view, 
'appearance' -what is in plain view- is seen as being prior to reality. 
Normally, of course, reality is presumed to come first and appearances are 
seen as secondary interpretations laid, as it were, on top of reality. However, 
from Wittgenstein's viewpoint philosophical problems, particularly 
problems of reflexivity, are clarified by investigating what is "always before 
one's eyes" (P.I. 129) rather than trying to appeal to something hidden 
beneath the phenomena. 
This priority of 'appearance' over 'reality' is part of Wittgenstein's 
'phenomenalism', which is the subject of the following section. 
The fact that, in the final analysis, Hunnings' (1988) cannot accept terms 
such as 'language-games' and 'grammar' as anything but explanatory 
constructs, despite having a thorough knowledge of Wittgenstein's 
philosophy, reveals the deeply-rooted nature of the view of language 
Wittgenstein opposes. 'Language-games', 'grammar' and 'forms of life' 
explain nothing about language. They are, instead, a way of seeing language 
(or a way in which language 'appears' -see Section 4.5, below). In particular, 
they are part of a way of seeing language in terms of its possibilities. 
Questions about the nature of language can make it look as though there is 
something to be explained -perhaps because the outward form of such 
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questions makes them look similar to questions about, for example, the 
structure of matter. Therefore, it can seem that these questions should have 
answers of the form of causal explanations that can be true or false, better or 
worse than each other, verifiable or unverifiable. 
Basically, Wittgenstein's point is that explanations too must presuppose the 
meaningfulness of language. The terms 'language-games', etc. simply bring 
out the presuppositional status of meaning -and, of course, this is not an 
ontological but a grammatical comment on the grammar of 'meaning'. 
Hunnings (1988) is not alone in seeing explanation where there is only the 
possibility of description. Wittgenstein, early in his career, and some of his 
philosophical contemporaries, such as Russell and the members of the 
Vienna Circle, were also misled by language into overestimating the 
applicability of the '''scientific' mode of reflection" (Hilmy, 1987, pp. 220-221). 
Wittgenstein summed up this attitude with the following comment; 
What a curious attitude scientists have: 'We 
still don't know that; but it is knowable and 
it is only a matter of time before we get to 
know itl' As if that went without saying. 
(cited in Hilmy, 1987, p.220). 
The danger with this attitude is that it seems possible to see every problem 
and every difficulty as a question of knowledge and therefore as a question 
of fact. And, ironically, as Hilmy (1987, pp.221-226) pointed out, it is the 
inability to differentiate between what is conceptual and what is factual that 
is at the heart of metaphysics for Wittgenstein (1980, R.P.P. 949). This is 
ironic because the 'scientific' current in philosophy was, of course, aimed at 
purging thought of metaphysics. Hilmy (1987) concluded; 
Wittgenstein, therefore, far from having an 
emotional sympathy for metaphysics and 
metaphysical theology, would have included 
among those infamous volumes to be 
committed to the flames many of the tomes 
of those would-be 'scientific philosophers' of 
our era who would do the committing. (p. 
225). 
That is, such philosophers treated as fact, and turned into a metaphysical 
theory, their view of the limits of sense in language. Thus, they could claim 
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to be justified in disposing of all language that did not fall within the 
boundaries of sense. In practice, of course, this meant disposing of any 
propositions that were not 'scientific'. 
The real irony was that philosophers such as Russell and the logical 
positivists wished to replace infe~red en,tities with logical constructions yet 
the justification for this procedure depended on -inferring the presence of 
logical simples -(e.g.) Russell's 'atomic propositions' and Wittgenstein's 
'elementary propositions' (See Hilmy, 1988, pp. 217-218). It was always 
assumed that propositions could be analysed into logical simples but it was 
impossible to tell whether such an analysis had actually been achieved. 
Inferred entities in philosophy, therefore, were being used to rid science of 
its inferred entities. 
This attempt by 'scientific philosophers' to reform language contrasts 
sharply with Wittgenstein's (1953) claim that philosophy "may in no way 
interfere with the actual use of language" and that it "leaves everything as it 
is" (P.I. 124). Wittgenstein's attitude in these comments reveals a respect for 
everyday language and the way in which it speaks about phenomena. This 
respect is the basis for Wittgenstein's special type of phenomenalism. It is 
this phenomenalism that will now be discussed. 
4.5 WITTGENSTEIN'S PHENOMENALISM 
Phenomena in Wittgenstein's 'Late' philosophy are not, as a 
phenomenologist might understand them, subtle fleeting matters "that are 
hard to get hold of, the present experience that slips quickly by, or something 
of the kind" (P.I. 436). Nor are Wittgenstein's phenomena, as Finch (1977, 
p. 172) pointed out, 'sense data' or Kantian phenomena. Instead, the 
phenomena Wittgenstein refers to are the "phenomena of every-day" as 
spoken about in "ordinary language" (P.I. 436). 
In Philosophical Grammar Wittgenstein (1974b) commented; 
And here one must remember that all the 
phenomena that now strike us as so 
remarkable are the very familiar phenomena 
that don't surprise us in the least when they 
happen. They don't strike us as remarkable 
until we put them in a strange light by 
philosophizing. (P.G. 120). 
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These phenomena are recognized, identified and 'seen' by people. That is to 
say, such phenomena are expressive or, to use Finch's (1977, p. 172) term, 
they have a physiognomic character. To see a phenomenon in this way as 
like a face is to see it as a picture that "tells me itself, just as a proposition, a 
story tells me itself" (P.G. 121). And, further; 
... it is not so much as if I were comparing the 
object with a picture set beside it, but as if the 
object coincided with the picture. So I see 
only one thing, not two. (P.G. 119). 
This once again establishes the priority of meaning over fact by beginning 
with completely meaningful phenomena instead of objects which then have 
meaning added to them. But this does not mean that the world is full of a 
dizzying array of phenomena (perhaps leading to people suffering from 
'stimulus overload'). Rather, the extent to which phenomena make an 
impression «e.g.) of familiarity, fear, etc.) can vary from none at all _"our 
wits may be completely dull"- to strong (P.G. 126). 
Interestingly, Wittgenstein (1974b) linked the idea of the "impression of 
specific familiarity" to that of determi~acy. That is, when a particular 
expressive phenomenon is highly familiar in a specific sense «e.g.) his face, 
my black shoes, a map of France) its familiarity parallels the extent to which 
it could be said to have determinate form. Thus, something appearing very 
familiar is like "our feeling at home in what we see, in our not changing our 
way of looking and the like" (P.G. 126). For example, something very 
familiar such as an outline map of New Zealand would perhaps be hard for 
many New Zealanders to see as anything but a map of New Zealand. This 
link between Wittgenstein's phenomenalism and the concept of 
'determinacy' will be implicit in the concluding discussions in Chapters 5 
and 6. 
While a phenomenon is in one sense completely meaningful in itself since, 
like a picture, it "tells me something" (P.G. 121), the other side of the coin is 
that how it 'tells me' is by the system of language. Without the activities 
that constitute language phenomena have no meaningful character of their 
own at all (Finch, 1977, p. 191). In similar fashion a series of words or signs 
can seem "dead" (P.G. 124) or meaningless when examined in isolation. 
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Wittgenstein (1974b) indicated that the reason why an isolated proposition 
appears meaningless -and, therefore, not a proposition- is because what is 
called a 'proposition' is a "position in the game of language" (P.G. 124). 
And, as Wittgenstein (1974b) continued; 
Isn't what misleads us the fact that I can look 
ever so closely at a position in a game 
-without discovering that it is a position in a 
game? What misleads us here is something 
in the grammar of the expression "position in 
a game". (P.G. 124). 
That is, the expressiveness of propositions (and phenomena) comes from 
their being part of the game of language. But sometimes this is very hard to 
notice. Without other propositions -that are part of a meaningful form of 
life- a single proposition expresses nothing, and so is not really a proposition 
(a 'position in a game'). 
Therefore, expressive phenomena, in the terminology of Wittgenstein's 
'Late' philosophy, are aspects of language-games and forms of life. This 
should not be surprising as it is consistent with Wittgenstein's insistence on 
the inseparability of life and language. Expressive phenomena are part of 
language and therefore have no independent ontological existence. As 
Finch (1977) concluded; 
To sum up this side, of Wittgenstein's 
philosophy: in the end the world for him is 
an expressive phenomenon (rather than for 
example a causal one, logical one, an organic 
one or an evolutionary one, etc.). And 
objectivity finally comes to mean the 
acceptance of appearances , rather than the 
demand for absolute objects. (p. 190). 
How things appear is given by language. Which is simply to say that there is 
an intimate connection between the grammar of the concepts of 
'expressiveness' and 'language'. Another way of saying this is that the 
physiognomy of the phenomenon of language is that of being expressive -
like a face. Language is here being treated as a phenomenon like any other 
phenomenon rather than as a "super-phenomenon" (Finch, 1977, p. 189) 
within which all other phenomena become manifest. 
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Wittgenstein's 'physiognomic phenomenalism' thus allows language and 
the world to be reconciled and the weeping wound of Cartesianism to be 
healed. The common factor between language and the world is that they are 
both expressive, they both have appearances. 
Closely connected to the central role Wittgenstein gives to expressiveness 
and appearances is his investigation of the concepts of 'seeing and 'seeing 
as', In the Philosophical Investigations (P.I. II, xi, p. 193ff.) Wittgenstein 
extensively examined and contrasts cases of 'seeing' «e.g.) "I see this") with 
cases of 'seeing as'. This latter type of case is also called by Wittgenstein 
"noticing an aspect". For example, Wittgenstein (1953) commented; 
I contemplate a face, and then suddenly 
notice its likeness to another. I see that it has 
not changed; and yet I see it differently. I call 
this experience "noticing an aspect". (P.I., II, 
xi, p. 193). 
If two drawings of the face were made, one before and one after this likeness 
was noticed, they would be identical. Yet still, the face appears different after 
the likeness is noticed. Many examples of this phenomenon are discussed 
by Wittgenstein in this section of the Philosophical Investigations including 
Jastrow's drawing of an ambiguous figure that can be seen as either a duck or 
a rabbit and a schematic illustration of a cube that can be seen at one time as 
a glass cube, another time as a wire frame and yet another time as an open 
inverted box. 
The importance of Wittgenstein's discussion of 'seeing' and 'seeing as' is 
twofold. Firstly, Wittgenstein (1953) linked 'seeing an aspect' with 
'experiencing the meaning of a word' (P.I. II, xi, p. 214). This linkage is 
important since it might seem that the possibility of experiencing the 
meaning of a word comes into conflict with the idea that the meaning of a 
word is its use. Secondly, it will be argued that the concepts of 'seeing' and 
'seeing as ' and their interrelationships bear directly on reflexive issues. 
It is not difficult to see how 'seeing an aspect' is connected to 'experiencing 
the meaning of a word'. For example, pronouncing the word 'till' as a verb, 
to mean it as a verb, seems to involve something different from occasions in 
which it is pronounced as a noun. Such an example seems to highlight the 
possibility that the meaning of a word can be 'experienced', and thus 
suggests that there are two distinct elements involved; the word and the 
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meaning that is attached to it or added on later (by means of a psychological 
process perhaps). 
In the same way, as Seligman (1976) commented, the experience of 'seeing 
as' may suggest that in 'seeing' itself there are two components; the pure 
visual element and then the interpretation laid over top (pp. 205-206). In 
fact, the experience of 'seeing as'may appear to be evidence of just such a 
dual process. However; as Seligman (1976) and Finch (1977) pointed out 
Wittgenstein (1953) argued against understanding 'seeing as' and the 
phenomenon of 'experiencing the meaning of a word' in this way. This 
should not be surprising since if he did not argue against this view he would 
have to abandon the notion of the absolute primacy of meaning. 
Wittgenstein (1953) argued that even in the case of 'seeing as' where it 
seems most appropriate to speak of two components to seeing, there is only 
ever one component. He pointed out that on 'seeing' a knife and fork one is 
not likely to say "Now I am seeing this as a knife and fork" (P.I. II, xi, p. 195). 
Rather, one would simply say "I see a knife and fork" and thus report a 
perception. However, in the case where a shift in aspect is experienced -for 
example with the ambiguous duck-rabbit picture- it is impossible to discover 
which of the aspects is most 'primitive'. That is, no aspect can be reduced to 
any other. 
Certainly, no aspect stands as a "pure and indubitable visual experience" 
(Seligman, 1976, p. 206) that might be thought to underlie all aspect-seeing 
and, by extension, all 'normal' seeing. And attempting to explain a change 
in aspect in terms of private inner pictures does not help provide a basis for 
the difference between aspects because the idea of the 'inner picture' is 
modeled on that of the outer picture which, of course, does not change 
between aspects. Neither is it helpful to explain the differences by treating 
the 'organization' of a figure as a perceptual datum like colour and shape. 
There is no feature of a visual impression that could be pointed to as its 
organization and which could then be, used to distinguish between the 
different aspects. 
If the experience of seeing an aspect does not depend on there being two 
components to the concept of 'seeing', what does it depend on? 
Wittgenstein (1953) answered this question by pointing out that only 
someone who has the ability or the capacity to make different applications 
193 
of a figure, someone who has 'mastered a technique' in a particular case, 
could have the experience of 'seeing as' (P.I. II, xi, p. 208). This logical 
condition reveals that the concept of experience used here is different from 
the concept of experience used when, for example, someone speaks of 
experiencing a toothache. "After all, you don't say that one only 'has 
toothache' if one is capable of doing such-and-such" (P.I. II, xi, p. 208). That 
is, experiencing a toothache does not depend on any ability. 
The same points made about 'seeing as' can be made with regards to the 
phenomenon of 'experiencing the meaning of a word'. There is not a word 
and then the meaning added to it just as there is not a visual experience and 
then the interpretation added to it. Rather, just as seeing an aspect depends 
on the capacity to provide a visual context, so too the phenomenon of 
'experiencing the meaning of a word' depends on the capacity to apply the 
word in certain ways (Seligman, 1976, pp. 216-217). Not that the word has to 
be applied -perhaps by saying it qUickly to oneself- only that one could apply 
it in certain ways. 
To summarize this first point about Wittgenstein's discussion of 'seeing' 
and 'seeing as'. The experience of 'noticing an aspect' does not provide 
evidence for there being two components in 'seeing'. A change in aspect 
does not imply that there is one visual datum being interpreted in two ways. 
Similarly, experiencing the meaning of a word does not imply that first 
there is the word and then the meaning is added. Rather, both 'experiences' 
imply capacities to apply the visual figures or the words in various ways. 
What is most relevant in this argument is that the primacy of meaning is 
maintained in a situation where the meaningfulness of either visual 
experience or words seems to be separate from the underlying phenomena. 
The second important feature of Wittgenstein's discussion of 'seeing' and 
'seeing as' is the direct way in which it relates to the reflexive issues that are 
the subject of this study. It is suggested here that reflexivity is closely 
connected to the concept of 'seeing as' or 'aspect seeing'. It is not difficult to 
see how this connection can be made. The main observation made in 
Chapter 1 was that the various reflexive issues discussed seemed to be 
problematic because of the presence of two distinct and seemingly 
incommensurable aspects to the concept of 'meaning'. 
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But it is not only in this general observation that the concept of 'aspect 
seeing' can be recognized. Specific examples of reflexive issues in 
psychology provide more instances. For example, in psychology people can 
be seen as both 'objects and subjects' (Chapter I, Section 1.5); theories can be 
seen as semantic pictures or as verbal behaviour (Chapter I, Section 1.2); 
knowledge can be seen as a rational structure or as socially constructed 
(Chapter I, Section 1.8); values can be seen as steering all human action, 
including the study of human behaviour, or as being of little interest 
(Chapter I, Section 1.3). 
In short, it is proposed here that the possibility of reflexivity requires 'aspect 
seeing'. And the problems associated with reflexivity are very similar to the 
problems arising when 'seeing as' is thought to involve 'seeing' plus 
something extra. It is by understanding that 'seeing as' is as fundamental as 
any other type of 'seeing' that the vicious recursive circle found in issues of 
reflexivity can be broken. 
One example should clarify the point being made here. It is common to 
speak of the theory-laden nature of observations. However, when someone 
describes what he or she observes ('sees') it is quite natural for that person to 
say, for example, 'I see he is angry'. The observer has not theorized or 
hypothesized in saying this -which reveals part of the grammar of the 
concept 'seeing'. It is only when a third person says 'That person is seeing 
him as angry' that theorizing seems to be involved. This is because the 
third person is using the concept 'seeing as' and not 'seeing'. 
The third person, that is, has either experienced a change in aspect him or 
herself when observing the original 'angry' person or is assuming that it is 
at least possible to see the 'angry' person in some other way. Both the use of 
the concept 'seeing' by the original observer and the use of the concept 
'seeing as' by the third person are quite legitimate. 
Confusion arises when the third person assumes that the original observer 
in some way theorized (perhaps 'unconsciously' or, to confuse concepts 
even more, 'implicitly') in making the observation. But this assumption 
rests on the further assumption that observation must involve two 
components in order to explain why the observer 'sees' one aspect and not 
another. The whole point of the argument above, of course, is that even in 
the case of 'aspect seeing' it is impossible to find two components in seeing. 
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Wiftgenstein (1953) made the same point in terms of the many different 
ways in which something can be described; 
And now look at all that can be meant by 
"description of what is seen". -But this just is 
what is called description of what is seen. 
There is not one genuine proper case of such 
description -the rest being just vague, 
something which awaits clarification, or 
which must just be swept aside as rubbish. 
(P.I. II, xi, p. 200). 
It is misleading to think of aspect seeing as involving the "one genuine" 
description and various other descriptions ('interpretations'), even if it is 
claimed that the "one genuine" description or 'real form' is never likely to 
be discovered. 
This latter claim seems like a final attempt to maintain belief in a reality that 
is prior to 'meaning'. It is a strange type of reality that only remains real so 
long as it is never discovered or 'seen'. (Ironically, perhaps the best way to 
understand such a belief is to consider it in terms of Wittgenstein's notions 
of 'forms of life' and 'language-games'.) 
To say that observations are theory-laden is not to say that the process of 
observing involves two components. Surely all such a term indicates is that 
the consequences of observing, for example, the duck-rabbit picture as a duck 
differ from the consequences of observing it as a rabbit. This, of course, is a 
grammatical and not an ontological point -and this is how it differs from 
radical behaviourism which it may appear to resemble in other respects (See 
Chapter 5, Section 5.3.7, below for a discussion of the important differences 
between Wittgenstein's approach and radical behaviourism). 
This example of the theory-laden nature of observations reveals the source 
of the problems caused by reflexivity. For, if the notion that all observations 
are theory-laden were applied to itself (assuming that it is itself in a sense 
the report of an 'observation') its 'truth', or at least its applicability in any 
particular situation, would be undermined. This reflexive problem is 
avoidable only when it is realized that two distinct and equally fundamental 
concepts are involved, that of 'seeing' and 'seeing as'. By keeping these 
concepts distinct the temptation to explain 'seeing' in terms of 'seeing as' by 
calling observations 'theory-laden' (which is to say they are at least partly 
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determined by theory) or, indeed, to explain 'seeing as' in terms of 'seeing' 
plus something else, can be resisted. In this way reflexivity never gets off the 
ground. 
The following chapter will return to the specific issues of reflexivity 
discussed in earlier chapters. As well as attempting to defuse the problems 
caused by these particular issues, some general conclusions will be drawn 
regarding the study of psychology. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Just how peculiar an activity is psychology? It was suggested in the 
Introduction to this study that psychology's position in the all-enveloping 
endeavour to accumulate knowledge about the world makes it vulnerable to 
what have been termed here the 'issues of reflexivity', That is, the 
naturalistic pursuit of objective knowledge that for so long has been thought 
to epitomize science has spiraled inwards until, in psychology, the 
phenomena of knowledge and thought are themselves treated as natural 
phenomena. 
While it could be argued that other areas of study have similar reflexive 
problems psychology suffers uniquely from the immediacy and poignancy of 
the reflexive dilemma. It was only in the present century that physics, for 
. example, found reflexive problems intruding into its empirical efforts. Even 
then reflexivity only became a consideration when very high speeds and 
very small sizes were being investigated. Furthermore, it may be true that 
other social scientists are more acutely aware than psychologists of such 
possibilities as the relativism of knowledge. However, they are, perhaps, 
less committed to doing full justice to psychological phenomena as aspects 
of the individual, a consideration that serves to tighten the reflexive loop. 
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In fact, in one sense it is the desire to accommodate the individual into a 
scientific psychology that accentuates and exacerbates reflexive problems. 
And this is true whether the accommodation is via cognitive constructs or 
laws of behaviour pitched at the level of the individual. For once it is 
assumed that there are phenomena at the level of the individual, then 
theories and knowledge become self-referential in a very immediate sense 
since they are uttered by individual people. And, of course, it is individual 
people who use the first-person singular pronoun, the exemplar pa r 
excellence of self-reference. (An analogy can be made here with the 
paradoxical problems Wittgenstein (1974a) found in seeing language as a set 
of internal relations existing between 'individual' names, and the world as 
relationships between 'individual', discrete objects.) Psychology, therefore, 
in attempting to investigate the unnerving opaqueness of the individual 
finds itself at the crossroads of countless dichotomies that seem to resonate 
throughout language and thought. 
The problem for psychology can be put in the following way: Every theory 
of psychological phenomena is itself the product of psychological 
phenomena -and nothing else. "Nothing else" because all talk of physical, 
chemical, biological or social processes must, for an individualistic 
psychology, become just more thoughts, verbal behaviour or some such. 
For centuries other sciences, and of course philosophies, have at least had 
the possibility of avoiding analogous conclusions by assigning reflexive 
problems to a nascent science of psychology. A psychology, perhaps, in 
which psychological phenomena are conceived as emerging from physical, 
biological and social phenomena. So long as psychology remained 
unexplored it could be used as a buffer between science and reflexivity. That 
is, a theory in physics could be seen as a product of physical phenomena plus 
psychological phenomena; a theory in biology a product of biological 
phenomena plus psychological phenomena, etc.. In this way physical 
phenomena, biological phenomena and other types of phenomena could 
retain their appearance as objective and real in the sense that they could be 
thought to exist independently of language and thought. 
Only now as attempts are made to gain systematic knowledge in an area 
swamped by many generations worth of promisory notes has the deep-
rooted nature of the problem of reflexivity become fully evident. Until 
recently it could be assumed without threat of challenge that knowledge 
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produced in the natural sciences was founded on unspecified 'psychological 
factors' and 'psychological processes'. It may also have been assumed that, 
once discovered, these factors and processes would explain and therefore 
validate just such knowledge. Thus, a nineteenth century physicist may 
well have felt assured that a scientific psychology would serve to confirm 
the certainty of measurements and observations. While it may be argued by 
some psychologists that progress has been made along these lines the 
present study suggests that it would be wise to treat any conviction of 
progress towards an enduring fund of foundational knowledge on human 
psychology as a product of programmatic zealotry, rather than arising from a 
justified confidence in the fruits of psychological research. 
The suggestion, then, has been made in this study that the problem of 
reflexivity underlies many of the theoretical dichotomies and debates in 
psychology. In particular, it has been suggested that difficulties have arisen 
because of the presence of two competing versions of the concept of 
meaning: Meaning as 'reference' and meaning as 'use over time' (See 
Chapter 1). Further, it has been argued that this ambiguity in the concept of 
'meaning' is part of a widespread and implicit view of the relationship 
between language, thought and the world - a view expressed most precisely 
in Wittgenstein's Tractatus where it is reflected in the distinctions made 
between 'meaning' and 'sense' and between what can be said and what can 
only be shown (See Chapter 3). Finally, it has been suggested that 
Wittgenstein's 'Late' philosophy reveals an approach that could dissolve the 
problematic aspects of such a view (See Chapter 4). All that now remains is 
to apply this approach to the reflexive problems in psychology. 
Three ways in which reflexivity was said to enter into the theoretical process 
in psychology were mentioned in the Introduction (Chapter 1). These were: 
(1) Reflexivity at the level of psychology'S subject 
matter. This includes the question of whether it is 
useful to conceive of people as reflexive, active agents 
and questions concerning the nature of perception, 
cognition and consciousness. 
(2) Reflexivity in the production of psychological 
theories. This includes the question of whether 
psychological explanations can give a coherent account 
of their own production. This point is important if it is 
assumed that psychological processes are involved in 
the production of theories. 
(3) Reflexivity in the evaluation of psychological 
theories. This involves the question of how to evaluate 
a theory if its form is a product of psychological 
processes. 
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The final discussion of these various issues will have the following 
structure. Firstly, a way in which the general reflexive form enters into 
language will be presented. Secondly, each of the issues of reflexivity in 
psychology mentioned in Chapters 1 and 2 will be discussed individually 
with the aim of dissolving their problematic nature. Finally, general 
conclusions will be made about psychological phenomena and about the 
prospects for a science of psychology that seeks to avoid reflexive problems 
and paradoxes. 
5.2 REFLEXIVITY IN LANGUAGE 
First of all it should be mentioned that many of the points in the following 
discussion have been foreshadowed in earlier Chapters. However, despite 
this there is a need to reiterate these points in an integrated and, hopefully, 
coherent way so that the 'reflexive form' can be clearly examined. 
After the previous extended discussion of Wittgenstein's philosophy (See 
Chapters 3 and 4, above) it is possible to 'begin to understand how reflexive 
issues, in general, find their way into language. It is also possible to see how 
the seeming inevitability of the reflexive dilemma can be avoided without 
losing anything of 'value'. 
The first point to be emphasized is that reflexive paradoxes seem to arise 
only when attempts are made to examine the limits of an assumed 'global' 
or 'universal' phenomenon. Given a basically Cartesian framework, 
thought and language are just such phenomena. In particular, if language is 
understood as a collection of words in which each word has an exact 
'essential' meaning, then the limits of language, and to an extent thought, 
become the limits of meaningfulness, or 'sense'. Thus in trying to explain 
how the meaning in language and thought is constructed or generated 
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psychology can be seen as an· attempt to draw a limit to language and 
thought and, therefore, to meaningfulness and sense. In attempting this 
psychology is also treating meaning as something distinct from words and 
sentences, something that words and sentences refer to. 
Harris (1988) called this view of language "The language myth of post-
Renaissance European culture" (p. 7) and linked it directly to the invention 
of printing. In simple terms this myth "presents languages as fixed codes 
which enable individuals to communicate their thoughts to one another by 
means of words, and portrays linguistic communities as groups of 
individuals who use the same language" (p. 7); and it "defines 
communication between human beings as thought-transference, and then 
postulates a social institution (the language) which makes that possible" (p. 
7). Harris (1988) went on to point out; 
It is essentially a language myth which 
ignores differences between individuals in 
favour of emphasizing collective 
conformities. In so doing it generates an 
internal problem of its own. Since, from the 
cradle to the grave, the personal linguistic 
history of every individual is unique, how is 
it possible that this rich variety of linguistic 
experience at the individual level should 
ever give rise to a common language of the 
kind which the myth postulates? How does 
linguistic unity emerge from linguistic 
diversity? (p. 7). 
Harris (1988) believed that historically this problem was supposedly 'solved' 
by theorizing the existence of a "biological language machine" within people 
that could conveniently ensure that this diversity resulted in unity (p. 8). 
But whether the language machine is a biological one or a logical one 
ultimately the same difficulties remain. In short, if this relationship 
between language and meaning is accepted or taken for granted self-
reference and recursion become simple possibilities. At least at first glance, 
that is, it may seem possible for a statement to refer to itself since there is a 
meaning or thought behind and separate from the statement to act as the 
referent. For example, it may seem quite sensible to say, "Even the meaning 
of this sentence is the product of psychological processes" since it is 
supposedly referring to a meaning beyond the words alone. In this scheme 
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'meaning' is, for all intents and purposes, a factual entity generated and 
explained by 'psychological processes'. 
However, in these circumstances paradox ensues because the meaning (or 
'sense') of such a sentence seems to undermine its own meaningfulness. 
This undermining does not occur because, as could possibly be argued, 
'psychological processes' are-deterministic and therefore are incapable of 
generating meaning. Rather, it happens because the only method for 
determining the meaning (or 'sense') of such a statement -and therefore the 
'reality' of the psychological processes generating such statements- is to 
determine the meaning of the sentence. Obviously, this is not very helpful 
(See Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2 on self-reference). Any meaning assigned to the 
sentence would necessarily be arbitrary since there is no way of comparing 
the assigned meaning to the actual meaning. 
To complicate matters even further the attempt to determine the sense of 
such a sentence would undoubtedly require the use of further statements. 
And, presumably, these further statements would also have senses produced 
by psychological processes. Apart from a looming infinite regress in the 
determination of sense there is also the difficulty that it seems impossible to 
know when a theory has described the 'real' psychological processes. Since 
all language and thought are generated by these supposed processes -even 
the supposition that there are such processes- the claim that a theory 
describes them or even that it is the 'best guess' at what they are like 
becomes very dubious (See Chapter 3, Section 3.3.2 on the tautological 
nature of propositions of logic, and Chapter 3, Section 3.4 on the analogy 
between propositions of logic and propositions of psychology). 
Ultimately, therefore, the meaning or sense of self-referential sentences is 
indeterminate. That is, self-referential sentences do not refer to anything 
meaningful. It follows then that any 'meaning' or 'sense' the sentences 
seem to have cannot be independent of the sentence itself. Because theories 
in psychology almost demand to be applied to themselves they too can 
appear to have an indeterminate sense. 
It should not be surprising that a referential view of meaning has difficulties 
with self-reference. If meaning is not independent of language then a self-
referential sentence cannot refer to its meaning. This is because in self-
reference there is no distinction between the sentence that refers and the 
referent of the sentence. And separation between the referent and that 
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which refers would be central to most understandings of the concept of 
'reference' . 
This indeterminacy completes the undermining since the original world-
view demanded that meaning and sense be determinate. Without this 
determinacy language and thought are nonsensical. The paradox, of course, 
is that there seems to be a class of statements, and thoughts, whose 'sense' is 
that they are senseless. 
It is more than just coincidence that it is in the academic rather than the 
'everyday' world that reflexive paradoxes are so evident. Precision of 
meaning is very highly prized in academic and scientific discourse. And it is 
the virtue of precision that has helped perpetuate the idea that all words 
must, in reality, have precise meanings and all sentences must have precise 
senses. 
Unfortunately it is far too easy for a virtue to become a necessity (See 
Chapter 3, Section 3.2.1, above). To say that something ultimately does not 
have an exact meaning is, according to this view, equivalent to banishing 
the phenomenon to the realm of nonsense and unreality. That is, if the 
meaning of something is not determinate and exact it cannot be referring to 
anything. Since there are real phenomena that can be referred to there 
must be exact sense. Yet the problem then emerges that to claim in a 
philosophical or psychological theory of 'meaning' that 'meaning' itself has 
a precise meaning hidden behind and distinct from the word -a meaning 
that the theory supposedly describes- is, paradoxically, to banish 'meaning', 
and the theory, to the same exile. This was Wittgenstein's conclusion in the 
Tractatus concerning his own 'theory'. The arguments leading to the two 
conclusions are essentially the same (See Chapter 3, Section 3.3, above). 
To summarize, there are at least three conditions necessary for the 
production of reflexive paradoxes. They are: 
(1) The examination of a 'universal' phenomenon that 
in some way «e.g.) causally, logically) is thought to 
underlie the examination itself. 
(2) A view of language in which words and sentences 
refer to meanings that are hidden 'behind' them. 
(3) Connected with (2), the belief that words have exact 
meanings and sentences have exact senses. Here, 
'exact' means just one determinate meaning or sense 
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Given these conditions, the act of self-reference seems to draw a limit to 
what can be meaningfully said about such a universal phenomenon. When 
something «e.g;) a statement; a theory; . a person) in or through language 
refers to itself, conditions (2) and (3) become mutually incompatible. 
Specifically, if meanings are entities that are separate from but hidden 
behind words (2) then, given self-reference, it is impossible that 'meaning' 
can have an exact meaning (3) for the reasons just discussed above. 
Therefore, if 'meaning' has no exact meaning talk of the exact meanings of 
other words (3) becomes meaningless. This is because the sense of such 
sentences would necessarily be indeterminate if there was a word 
('meaning') in them that did not have an exact meaning. 
Where meaningfulness is considered to depend on the separation of 
language and what it refers to (meaning as 'reference'), meaningfulness 
must disappear when language refers to itself since there is no separation 
between language and itself. The final irony is that this criticism only has 
force because it employs the same view of language that produces the 
paradox. That is, the word 'language' is thought to refer to exactly the same 
thing as the word 'itself' which is only possible if they both refer to 
something exact. Therefore, given the view of language assumed here the 
criticism is as senseless as the language it criticizes 
What will now be argued is that nothing is lost by abandoning this entire 
view of language and meaning. Nothing, that is, but paradox. 
Ironically, in order to understand language as a 'universal'phenomenon 
the view of language and meaning just discussed had to limit language. 
That is, language had to be lim.ited to that which has logical form and 
therefore makes sense. Everything outside that limit had to be nonsense 
and therefore not language. However, by limiting a 'universal' 
phenomenon the germ-seed of paradox is planted. It is suggested here, in, 
line with the 'Late' philosophy of Wittgenstein, that, rather than limiting it, 
a far better way of understanding and appreciating the universal aspect of a 
phenomenon is to investigate its possibilities . 
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Because 'possibility' is an inclusive concept rather than a proscriptive one it 
does not exclude the possibility that, for example, language is sometimes like 
a referential system. And it certainly does not deny the legitimacy of using 
language referentially. What it does deny is the conclusion that reference is 
the only way that language operates. In the terminology of Wittgenstein's 
'Late' philosophy it is, for example, possible to imagine a language-game in 
which one person asks another what particular words name. And if, in this 
game, it was asked what the word 'meaning' referred to the answer may 
well be '''Meaning' refers to the type of thing that all words refer to -and you 
either understand what I mean or you don't", or even, "At the moment we 
aren't sure but we are trying to find out." The reply to the 'answer' could be 
"But that tells me nothing!", or perhaps "Oh, I see what you mean." 
Whatever the form of such a language-game the point to note is that it is 
described in terms of the possible ways of talking about the phenomenon. 
This contrasts with the view that philosophy, or psychology, should provide 
a final exact answer to the question of what 'meaning' refers to. 
All that is lost in examining the possibilities of phenomena is the idea that 
what is needed is a final account of phenomena. In fact, the possibility that 
humans may arrive at a final account of phenomena is not excluded by an 
examination of possibilities. However, such an account would be 
understood as part of the grammar of a particular language-game in which a 
final account is an acceptable possibility. And to say this is simply to make a 
comment on the grammar of the language-game that might be called 
'examining the possibilities of phenomena.' 
It could be argued that in putting 'possibility' first one thing that is lost is 
'knowledge'. Since there are always other possible ways of determining 
what counts as knowledge it may seem that there is no real knowledge at 
all. However, the approach being recommended here does not amount to 
claiming that knowledge is arbitrary or even relative. In fact, because this 
approach does not distinguish between phenomena and language (See 
Chapter 4, Sections 4.3 and 4.5) real knowledge is just what is given by the 
grammar of the word 'knowledge' in particular language-games. It is not as 
if each language-game presents an hypothesis concerning what counts as 
knowledge while 'real' knowledge hides in some transcendental world 
above and beyond language. If knowledge is being talked about then it is 
being talked about in a language-game. 
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New language-games can, of course, always arise but the mistake is to 
imagine that since the word 'knowledge' occurs in more than one language-
game that must mean that there is something (called 'knowledge') that is 
common to all instances of the use of the word. To imagine this is to forget 
that even this imagining occurs in a language-game. (And once again it 
should be remembered that to say that 'even this imagining occurs in a 
language-game' is to comment on the grammar of the concept of a 
'language-game' and is not meant as an assertion of ontological 'fact'. 
Language-games have this grammar in order to clear away philosophical 
confusion surrounding the universal or paradigmatic aspect of language.) 
For similar reasons it would also be wrong to think that there is something 
called knowledge that is somehow 'relative' to the language-game in which 
it is mentioned. To think this is to succumb again to the temptation to build 
a theory about an overarching 'super-concept' of knowledge that is supposed 
to be common to all the various uses, in different language-games, of the 
word 'knowledge'. That is, to say knowledge is relative is already part of a 
language-game that has a grammar for the concept of 'knowledge' and it 
would be a misunderstanding to treat this language-game and its grammar 
as pre-eminent. Language-games are not arranged hierarchically -which is 
why there is no language-game to explain language-games (See Chapter 4, 
Section 4.3). Of course, this is not to suggest that the language-game in 
which talk of the relativism of knowledge occurs should be outlawed. 
Rather, it is simply suggested that to avoid the philosophical confusion of 
paradox it is best to understand talk of the relativism of knowledge as a 
language-game and not to treat it as a theory of, or guess at, what knowledge 
really is in some absolute sense. 
This approach insists that what counts as knowledge is inseparable from the 
grammar of the word 'knowledge' in any situation. There are no criteria for 
knowledge outside of particular language-games. There is, therefore, no 
transcendental 'knowledge', independent of language, that could be called 
'real' knowledge, since even talk of transcendental knowledge must have a 
grammar. 
This approach loses nothing because 'knowledge', or anything else, that does 
not have a grammar simply does not enter into language or life. And it is 
nowhere else 'waiting' to enter since, once again, even 'waiting outside' has 
a grammar and, therefore, a meaning. 
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Instead of losing-anything this approach to reflexivity in language actually 
adds something. It brings back into view the ordinary, 'everyday' situations 
and contexts -understood in terms of language-games and forms of life- that 
give rise to paradoxes. It is the loss from sight of these situations and 
contexts that infuses paradoxes with their mesmeric quality. 
5.3 REFLEXIVITY IN PSYCHOLOGY 
5.3.1 REFLEXIVITY AND THEORETICAL UNITY IN 
PSYCHOLOGY 
5.3.1.1 Discussion 
If the debate outlined in Chapter 1, Section 1.2 is representative of the 
thinking of psychologists then theoretical unity in psychology will certainly 
remain elusive. Since even the desirability of unity was found to be 
debatable it is possible that some psychologists would actively work to 
prevent one approach from monopolizing psychology. But irrespective of 
the desirability of unity there remains the philosophical question of 
whether it is possible to compare psychological theories without 
presupposing a particular theory. It is the difficulty of making such 
comparisons that stands in the way of unity. 
In Chapter 3, Section 3.4 it was argued that a strong analogy could be drawn 
between the propositions of logic as understood in the Tractatus and the 
propositions of psychology. In particular it was suggested that the 
propositions of psychology might lack sense in the same way that 
propositions of logic were found to lack sense in the Tractatus. So, trying to 
compare· psychological theories with each other would amount to 
comparing nonsense with nonsense. Therefore, it was concluded that given 
the Tractarian view of language the question of unity is itself ultimately 
nonsensical (Chapter 3, Section 3.4.2). 
However, it will now be argued that unity in psychology is both sensible and 
achievable. Such unity, though, does not depend on choosing the 'best' 
method to use in studying psychology or the 'best' picture of what people are 
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like. Attempting to -make choices in this way simply shifts the problem 
from that of choosing the best theory to choosing the best criteria for theory 
selection. Instead, unity is to be found by seeing psychology as an 
exploration of possibilities. This view will now be described in detail. 
As just pointed out, unity is problematic in psychology because of the 
difficulty of agreeing on criteria for measuring and comparing the worth of 
particular theories. Obviously this lack of agreement is connected to the 
question of which values are appropriate for psychology and what role they 
should play -the topic of the next section. But it is also a question of the 
rational unity of theories insofar as they can be understood as part of the 
same overall activity. This is a philosophical question and the problem 
underlying the question has been the general confusion and paradox 
promulgated by the type of philosophy repudiated by Wittgenstein (See 
Chapters 3 and 4, above). 
If psychology is to be free of the paradoxes and solipsisms of traditional 
philosophy its theories can no longer be understood in traditional terms as 
autonomous groups of propositions that attempt to give precise (or 
imprecise) causal explanations of universal phenomena. That is, the idea 
that it is possible for a theory to be a self-contained picture of the world must 
be abandoned. Theories or explanations can no longer be considered in 
isolation from the grammatical contexts in which they arise. 
It must be emphasized that it is the grammatical context that needs 
understanding and not, for example, the 'social' or 'cultural' context. While 
social and cultural contexts are no doubt important in explaining why a 
particular theory -or theorizing itself- arose and was developed they do not 
help in understanding theories in a non-paradoxical way. This is because 
explanations involving descriptions of social and cultural contexts are 
themselves theoretical and therefore can be construed in the same 
paradoxical ways as psychological theories. 
The fundamental suggestion of this section, then, is that 
theories in psychology should be understood as 
language-games . 
Sometimes a theory may best be seen as an inter-related set of language-
games instead of just one. There is no need to discuss here the different 
circumstances in which 'theories' can be thought of as one or several 
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language.:.games. But what is important to realize is that in understanding 
theories as, in some sense, language-games paradox is avoided. As 
language-games each theory has a grammar that specifies what is and is not 
a 'move' in the game and thus provides the appropriate context in which 
the theory is meaningful. Also, language-games are grounded in the 
activities that go to constitute a form of life rather than in metaphysical 
assumptions. Therefore there is no infinite regress of the type that can occur 
when attempts are made to justify a theory. (This is similar to the way in 
which radical behaviourism avoids the same infinite regress -See Chapter 2, 
Section 2.5.4, above- but there are important differences as will be discussed 
in Section 5.3.7, below.) 
And as language-games theories are 'pre-ontological' and 'pre-factual' 
which means that their form is only restricted by grammar -the possible 
ways of speaking about a phenomenon- and not by any explicitly stated rule 
or claim about the nature of the world. There are, therefore, no 'artificial' 
restrictions on the way phenomena can be understood. This in turn 
provides a sensible way of understanding how creative and original 
developments can occur in theory construction. "Something new 
(spontaneous, 'specific')", Wittgenstein (1953) said, "is always a language-
game." (P.I. II, xi, p. 224). It is new ways of speaking and seeing that come 
first , and these then lead to changes in concepts and in the meanings of 
words. New language-games, and thus new theories, are like the discovery 
of previously unnoticed grammatical possibilities. As Wittgenstein (1953) 
put it; 
We remain unconscious of the prodigious 
diversity of all the everyday language-games 
because the clothing of our language makes 
everything alike. (P.I. II, xi, p. 224). 
(Reference to being unconscious is, of course, just a way of speaking and is 
not a psychological explanation of how language-games are formed. There 
can be no language-game for explaining language-games since explanation 
must itself presuppose language-games (Finch, 1977, p. 74).) 
These comments obviously have implications for understanding creativity. 
But for now all that need be emphasized is that viewing theories in 
psychology as language-games leaves theorizing forever open-ended -thus 
avoiding the paradox of final dogma- but not, therefore, unjustified. For as 
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language-games theories are in no need of justification but simply provide 
the grammar for a particular activity. And the 'rules' of this grammar 
determine what is correct and incorrect in a conventional sense including 
what is called 'obeying the rules'. 
However, despite similarities this view contrasts markedly with the 
pluralism promoted by Dixon (1983) (See Chapter 1, Section 1.2).There is no 
indication that Dixon (1983) sees theories in any other way than the way just 
repudiated. For example, he speaks about "theoretical renderings" of 
"dynamic, interdependent, and multidimensional" psychological 
phenomena (p. 337). These remarks suggest that the distinction between 
language ('theory') and phenomena -here considered so problematic- is still 
present for Dixon (1983). And the faith Dixon (1983) put in a critical realist 
ontology seems to confirm this. Viewing psychological theories as language-
games allows for possible changes to theory and for the emergence of new 
theories -which presumably was the reason Dixon (1983) supported 
pluralism- but without succumbing to paradox. 
Just as the aims of pluralism are achieved by this approach without ending 
in paradox, so too the concerns of those such as Kantor (1984a; 1984b) can be 
met without psychology becoming a "single-theory science" (Dixon, 1983, p. 
338). For example, the fear that disunity results from the "specter of 
psychism" (Observer, 1982), "animism" and "spiritistic" philosophy (Kantor, 
1984a, pp. 69,70) can be allayed. This is because, as language-games, theories 
do not need to be seen as making metaphysical claims even if they explicitly 
assert such claims. Only if psychological theories were viewed in traditional 
terms would such fears be justified. 
The same point was made by Costall (1980) when he commented that 
"paradoxically, whereas behaviorists tend to view psychological terms as 
theoretical constructs, Wittgenstein saw a more direct grounding in 
behavior, and an end to further questions" (p. 130). In other words Costall 
(1980) was saying that behaviourists make the mistake of treating 
psychological constructs in traditional terms as part of theories about 
phenomena that are independent of language. This contrasts with 
Wittgenstein's view that psychological terms are used in language-games 
and are grounded in the activities that constitute such games. 
An interesting point is reached when it is part of the rules of a language-
game not to treat human language and activity as language-games but 
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instead to see them both in 'traditional' psychological terms. That is, in 
order to playa particular language-game it may be that language has to be 
treated as essentially referential and human activity treated as ultimately 
resulting from psychological processes. It might then appear that there is no 
way of deciding which of the language-games -the 'traditional' or the 'new'-
should be played since there is no pre-eminent language-game. 
This, of course, is the original paradox and the root of the debate over 
theoretical unity. But this time it is expressed in terms of language-games. 
However, what is being forgotten here is that the 'new' language-game, 
which involves treating theories as language-games, is not concerned with 
determining what language is really like. It simply shows one possible way 
of talking about language without falling into paradox. And, most 
importantly, such a language-game is played not because it has been found 
to be the 'best' way of understanding language but because it avoids 
paradox. That is, there is a context within which the 'choice' between 
language-games is made. 
There is no guarantee that choosing to see theories as language-games will 
in the future be seen as a 'good move'. All that can be said is that deciding 
whether or not it was the best choice will depend on the 'rules' of the 
language-game being used to make the judgement and not on the 'true' 
form of objective reality. And, of course, such 'rules' can always be applied 
in more than one way. 
However, if it is assumed that paradox is undesirable in a theory then there 
is some reason to believe that psychological theories which encourage a 
paradoxical world-view, once 'exposed', will not be popular. Of course, a 
theory which is 'at heart' paradoxical may still be of value and of use in 
some sense. Nevertheless, what such a theory cannot provide is a clear way 
of understanding meaningful human action. Therefore, if what is sought is 
a pragmatic goal such as the control of human behaviour or the 
development of· computer programs that mimic human action the 
paradoxical aspects of a theory may never be of concern. But when a broader 
goal is desired -such as the development of an overall understanding of 
human action- limited, 'pragmatic' theories only serve to confuse and lead 
to paradox. 
There are three circumstances in which understanding theories as language-
games avoids reflexive paradoxes. 
(1) The first occurs when theories in psychology tend 
towards 'global theories' (Hooker, 1975), 'paradigms' 
(Kuhn, 1962) or descriptions of supposed universal 
phenomena (See Section 5.2, above). 
(2) The second circumstance is when psychological 
theories are claimed to be descriptions or explanations 
of psychological reality . 
(3) Finally, the third situation arises when a particular 
theory is claimed to be the 'best' way to think about or 
perform psychology. 
What should be noted is that all three situations 
concern the way in which psychological theories are 
understood and not the content of particular theories. 
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However, the point is not that psychologists should stop talking about their 
theories in these ways. Rather, this approach is just a way of understanding 
such talk without falling into the paradox of the 'reflexive trap'. In fact, it is 
often perfectly appropriate to speak of the 'best' theory, or to say that 
explanations are concerned with 'real' psychological phenomena. That is, 
often these words are the 'best' tools to use in a language-game, so to speak. 
Paradox only occurs when terms such as 'best' or 'rear are removed from 
their 'natural' contexts and instead are, for example, thought to refer to an 
entirely independent way· of judging theories or to a reality entirely 
independent of language. If, in these circumstances, psychological theories 
are not understood as language-games they will soon fall into the 'reflexive 
trap', Once in the trap unity is easily lost. 
Conversely, unity of a sort can be found once psychological theories are seen 
as language-games. Specifically, psychology can be understood as a unified 
collection of language-games each of which emphasizes and explores the 
different grammatical possibilities of various psychological phenomena. In 
the final section of this chapter a view of psychological phenomena that is 
based on this approach will be outlined in more detail. However, in the 
following discussion only the aspects of this approach that promote unity 
will be mentioned. 
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(1) When psychological theories approach 'global' or 'paradigm' status they 
can appear to be incommensurable with other theories. However, when all 
theories are seen as language-games they can be compared with each other 
in terms of their grammars. Carefully examining and describing the 
grammar of language-games can help reveal points of contrast and 
similarity . 
. Of course, Wittgenstein himself carried out just this sort of examination in 
his 'Late' philosophy. A good example of this activity has already been 
discussed above where Wittgenstein's (1953) examination of the 'experience' 
of 'seeing an aspect' (P.L II, xi, p. 208) was discussed (Chapter 4, Section 4.5). 
Experiencing a change in aspect, it will be remembered, has as a logical 
condition the mastery of a technique. However, this is not the case with 
other types of 'experience' such as experiencing a toothache. Thus, a 
grammatical difference in the use of the concept 'experience' is discovered 
that helps to clarify why the same word can be used in markedly different 
contexts 
In a similar way a grammatical investigation of, for example, the concept of 
'language' would help reveal why it is amenable to a behavioural 
explanation in some ways and in other ways to a cognitive explanation. 
(2) Because of the grammar of the word 'language-game' it is impossible that 
theories understood as language-games could have anything to say about a 
reality that transcends language-games. Such a reality would only be 
meaningful in the context of a particular language-game. Thus, very simply, 
psychological theories cannot be about psychological 'reality'. Therefore, all 
the paradoxical problems associated with seeing theories as hypotheses about 
'reality' are avoided. A theory'S worth is not checked against reality but 
against what is grammatically possible, which leads to point (3). 
(3) Debates that concern which of several competing theories is the "best' 
would cease completely if theories were viewed as language-games. Since 
language-games come complete with grammars that specify in a 
conventional way correct and incorrect uses of terms the only sense to the 
claim that a particular theory is the 'best' would be found in the language-
game involved in making the judgement. This means that the 'best' theory 
would be the one that satisfied the criteria used in that game. However, this 
does not invite relativism into theory assessment. Rather, it highlights the 
fact that there is always a context within which judgements are made. And 
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it is important to understand this context, or language-game, in order to 
understand the reason why a judgement is being made in a particular 
situation. 
Once attention is drawn to the context and reason for making a judgement, 
it becomes possible to avoid the ultimately dissatisfying infinite regress that 
is an inevitable by-product of the vain attempt to discover universally 
acceptable criteria for theory assessment. Therefore, debates that centre on 
finding such a set of criteria become redundant and are replaced by 
investigations that clarify what is 'desired' from the act of theorizing. The 
word 'desired' is used here to emphasize that these investigations would 
not be attempts to characterize the 'function' of theorizing. What is 
definitely not needed is another theory, this time about a function that exists 
independently of language. In contrast there is no sense in speaking about 
having a 'theory' of what one desires. Wittgenstein (1953) made a similar 
point when he claimed that; 
It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a 
joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it 
supposed to mean -except perhaps that I am 
in pain? (P.I. 246). 
Just as having a pain is not a case of 'knowing' so too having a desire is not a 
case of theorizing. In the 'final analysis' they are both instances of human 
action. And this, of course, is a grammatical point. 
This emphasis on the purpose and context of theorizing in a particular 
situation leads on naturally to the question of the role of values in 
psychology, which is the topic of the next section. But first, concluding 
comments will be made about unity in psychology. 
5.3.1.2 Conclusion: Reflexivity and Theoretical Unity in Psychology 
The purpose of this discussion has not been to predict whether or not one 
theory will come to dominate theoretical psychology. No doubt many social, 
cultural and economic factors bear on the popularity of any approach and 
therefore on its prospects for domination. Rather, the question addressed 
has been whether theoretical unity is possible from a logical and intellectual 
viewpoint. 
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It has been concluded here that unity is not possible so long as theories are 
viewed as explanations or descriptions of phenomena that are independent 
of language. However, what is possible is unity at the philosophical level. 
This unity is based on seeing theories as language-games. In their aspect as 
language-games theories, on the one hand, have no prospect of being 
misunderstood as privileged accounts of reality, and, on the other hand, do 
not descend into relativism. 
Much of the theoretical disunity found in psychology can be placed at the 
door of 'traditional' philosophy. In particular, that form of philosophy that 
can be traced back to Descartes and which has for the most part maintained 
implicit, and sometimes explicit, links with the world of science. By 
abandoning this type of philosophizing, and adopting instead the approach 
that has here been associated with Wittgenstein, the 'cause' of disunity is 
removed. 
The twin fears of dogmatism and relativism, equally abhorrent in the eyes of 
traditional philosophy, allow for two equally defensible -or indefensible-
viewpoints. This perhaps explains why many people immersed in this 
world view advocate some compromise position in the middle of the 
continuum -as far away from the two aversive stimuli as it is possible to get. 
In contrast, as argued in Chapter 4, Section 4.3, above and, briefly, in this 
section, the Wittgenstein-inspired approach put forward here avoids this 
continuum altogether. That is, if the idea of the language-game is 
understood properly, it is impossible to treat a language-game either as 
dogma or as completely arbitrary. Hopefully, by allaying both fears this 
approach will be acceptable to pluralists and 'unificationists'. 
Clearly, the more a theory relies for intellectual support on traditional 
philosophy the less likely it is that a theorist assuming the perspective 
advocated here will feel comfortable in accepting and working within such a 
theory. The task of systematically sorting through the various theories in 
psychology from this perspective has not been attempted in this study. 
However, others, such as Heil (1981) and Williams (1985), have examined 
cognitive psychology in the light of some of Wittgenstein's arguments. Heil 
(1981) argued that any representational theory based on the assumption that 
internal states can act as representations in their own right rests on a 
mistake. Williams (1985) suggested that Wittgenstein considered it 
impossible for there to be such a thing as a cognitive science and, further, 
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that cognitivists such as Fodor and Stich have essentially conceded 
Wittgenstein's arguments for this conclusion without actually accepting the 
conclusion itself. 
Some of the points made by these authors will be considered in the sections 
to come. Also, in Section 5.3.7, below, radical behaviourism will be 
examined to see if it fares any better than cognitive psychology from the 
present perspective. 
For the moment all that needs to be noted is that it is not only cognitive 
psychology that needs completely rethinking. In fact, as may already have 
been suspected, the suggestion that psychological theories should be 
understood as language-games heralds an even greater conceptual shift. 
Without wanting to pre-empt the arguments of the following sections it can 
finally be concluded that unity is possible in psychology -but only by 
radically changing the way scientific activity and psychology itself is 
understood. 
5.3.2 REFLEXIVITY AND VALUES IN PSYCHOLOGY 
5.3.2.1 Discussion 
In Chapter 1, Section 1.3 it was remarked that there is a tendency within 
psychology and science in general to treat values as subjective and relative. 
It was also said that, taken to the extreme, this tendency left psychologists 
with two contrasting options. Either values could be 'ignored' by promoting 
such values as objectivity, observation and precise measurement, or values 
could be incorporated into psychology by, for example, viewing people as 
reflexive, active agents. 
Furthermore, when examined from the viewpoint of the Tractatus it was 
found that any values that could be 'said' must be part of the world and, 
therefore, part of what is accidental and without value (See Chapter 3, 
Section 3.4.3). It was concluded that any real value must ultimately belong 
to what is beyond words; the 'mystical". 
It should be noted that the tendency to relativize values is part of the view 
of language adopted in extreme form in the Tractatus . That is, calling 
values 'accidental' is the same as calling them relative or subjective. 
However, there is at least one remaining difference between the Tractarian 
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position and the perspective of· those debating the role of values in 
psychology. The difference is that while Wittgenstein saw values as part of 
what is mystical and beyond the world, psychologists have tended to argue 
over whether values exist in the world. 
It seems that for psychologists and scientists in general if values are not in 
the world they are at best irrelevant and at worst illusory. This attitude 
would explain why those arguing for the retention of values want to see 
them incorporated into psychological constructions of the subject. Placing 
values outside the world in the 'mystical' would probably be seen as 
conspiring with those who wish to ignore values. So, in order to defend 
values it is simply insisted that they become a real element in theory. Once 
in the world they have to be taken seriously. 
It is interesting that in his 'Late' philosophy Wittgenstein made no mention 
of the 'mystical'. This is not because Wittgenstein no longer saw values as 
important or interesting. Rather, it is suggested here that the fact that 
Wittgenstein did not treat values as an object of analysis signifies an even 
greater respect for their importance than was found in the Tractatus . 
Ethics, for Wittgenstein, is "completely immanent in the philosophy (or in 
the human situation seen from that point of view). and, therefore, does not 
have to be given a special place." (Finch, 1977, p. 217). 
Values are so embedded in the approach being recommended here that their 
position is unassailable. While psychologists subjectivize values and the 
Tractatus could find no place for them in the world the present perspective 
based on Wittgenstein's 'Late' philosophy sees human action as inevitably 
ethical and 'founded' on ethical valuations. To understand how this is 
possible it should be remembered that human actions -language-games and 
forms of life- are in the final analysis groundless. This is a very important 
point in terms of values and ethics since it means that no action is justified 
or determined by something external to the action itself. That is, action is 
not determined by'·' ideas (or ideologies), nature, causality, reason, will, or, 
indeed, any authority or external standard understood as a determinant of 
value" (Finch, 1977, p. 218). 
Once it is realized just how groundless actions are then all responsibility 
devolves onto the individual. There is, as it were, nothing for the 
individual to hide behind. There is no rationality, natural order, causality, 
divine commandment or even personal will that can justify -or indeed be 
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blamed for-a particular course of action. All of these things are simply more 
language-games and cannot therefore be explanations of how human 
actions are determined (See Chapter 4, Section 4.4). The individual is left, so 
to say, completely alone and unaided. 
Alone, the individual is left to make the ultimate and awesome ethical 
decision: whether to allow or not to allow a particular course of action. 
This decision involves a "taking of sides" (Finch, 1977, p. 217). And it is a 
decision that can have no justification but must simply be lived out. Just as 
life and language are inseparable in Wittgenstein's 'Late' philosophy so too 
are life and the ethical. It is interesting to note in this regard that Libet (1985) 
concluded in his neurophysiologically based account of volition that the 
conscious will acts to permit rather than initiate voluntary acts. 
Two points need to be clarified before continuing. 
(1) To say that responsibility devolves onto the 
individual does not mean that a view of humans as 
active agents is being condoned. The term 'individual' 
does not here refer to a psychological organism or 'ego'. 
Humans are not the source of action in any remotely 
psychological sense. Action, as has already been 
emphasized, is groundless, uncaused and 
undetermined. The only role for individuals is to allow 
or not to allow an action. To use Finch's (1977) phrase, 
the freedom available here is "a certain kind of response 
to the sources of action" (p. 218). 
(2) Interestingly, although the approach described here 
leaves the responsibility firmly on the shoulders of the 
individual this in no way implies that individuals can 
be ultimately condemned or blamed for their actions. 
This is because the act of blaming or condemning is 
itself, as an act, ultimately ethical and therefore 
unfounded. 
So, from this perspective there is no way that valuing ('ethics') can be 
dismissed as irrelevant. It is implicit in the groundlessness of human 
action. Therefore, insofar as psychology is part of human activity values are 
important to it. 
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- At the finer grain the question remains as to what should be valued. And 
obviously this question is relevant to determining what values 
psychologists should value. In answer to these questions the present 
approach suggests that what is to be valued will be found in the grammar of 
the language-game being played. More specifically, it will be connected to 
the 'point' or 'purpose' of the language-game. Of course, it is important to 
realize that this 'purpose' is not something like a psychological intention. It 
is an aspect of grammar and cannot, therefore, be treated as if it were a fact 
since grammar is 'pre-factual' (See Chapter 4, Section 4.3) .. 
In this respect it is interesting to note that while Wittgenstein (1953) did not 
speak explicitly about values, on several occasions he mentioned the aims 
and purposes of his own investigations and philosophy in general «e.g.) P.I. 
109, 127, 132, 133, 309). It is dear from almost any account of Wittgenstein's 
life that his philosophical aims and those things he struggled for and 
defended in philosophy reflected very closely his values as an individual 
«e.g.) See Engelmann, 1967; Hilmy, 1987). 
Therefore, if values are related to the language-game being played, and 
theories in psychology are like language-games, it may seem that values are 
relative to the theory being used. 
But from the present point of view this is not quite the end of the story. For 
if the aim or purpose of a language-game reflects its values it should be 
possible to achieve greater agreement on values by agreeing on the aim or 
purpose of an activity. It is suggested here that the reason why there appears 
to be two different 'cultures' in psychology (Kimble, 1984) is not due so 
much to the fact that the two cultures possess incommensurable sets of 
values. Rather, it is due to the fact that there has been little discussion about 
the purpose or aim of studying psychology. And this lack of discussion may, 
perhaps, have been encouraged by the assumption that psychology involved 
studying 'real' phenomena that are available for all to see -and therefore can 
be studied for their own sake. 
By understanding theories in psychology as language-games the aims of the 
'humanistic' culture can in some measure be met without abandoning the 
aims of the 'scientific' culture. The holistic understanding of human action 
as essentially free and active that is desired by the humanistic culture is 
reflected in the concepts of 'grammar', 'language-games' and 'forms of life' 
and is guaranteed in the idea of the groundlessness of action. In fact, such 
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freedom is even more embedded in the present approach than in the 
humanistic approach. This is because freedom does not depend on the 
positing of a Cartesian theoretical construct termed the 'ego' or the 'human 
subject'. That is, freedom is so fundamental that it cannot even be restricted 
to the possession of a psychological organism. Also, many of the humanistic 
values mentioned by Kimble (1984), such as the importance of intuition and 
field study, could be seen as part of an investigation of the grammar of 
human action. 
On the other hand the values of the scientific culture are not denied 
(Kimble, 1984). However, what is denied is that there is no limit to the 
usefulness and appropriateness of these values. For example, the pursuit of 
universal nomothetic laws and elementistic-atomistic-analysis (Kimble, 
1984) was clearly circumscribed in the Tractatus (See Chapter 4, Section 4.1 
on the difficulties of seeking exactness and determinate sense). And in fact it 
was the lessons drawn from the Tractatus about the general applicability of 
such values that prompted Wittgenstein's shift in his 'Late' philosophy. So, 
while the values of a scientific culture are not denied the aim -perhaps held 
by some psychologists- of complete exactness and completely universal laws 
is denied. 
These limits on the applicability of scientific values indicate, therefore, the 
limits of a scientific psychology. Also indicated by these limits are the types 
of questions that need to be answered grammatically rather than causally. 
And the hallmark of these answers, of course, will be conceptual clarity 
ra ther than the conceptual confusion that arises from the search for 
exactness. So-called scientific values are not, therefore, being replaced by 
something subjective and vague as might be the fear. Questions that can 
still be dealt with sensibly in a scientific way can be answered scientifically. 
However, it may be surprising to discover just how few questions that are of 
interest to psychologists can be answered 'scientifically'. 
Although the above discussion has been very brief it has hopefully shown 
that from the present perspective humanistic and scientific values do not 
need to be in conflict. But this accommodation is only possible if there is an 
awareness of the aims of research. In particular, psychologists need to think 
clearly about what questions they are really trying to answer in doing 
psychology. And if the questions are found to be grammatical rather than 
causal the 'answers' should be understood grammatically rather than 
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factually. That is, they should be understood as part of an investigation into 
the actual and possible uses of words and not as the description of 
phenomena that are independent of language. 
In the natural sciences the two aims of understanding phenomena and 
using that understanding to develop a technology were for centuries both 
satisfied by the same methodology. This is epitomized by Lord Kelvin's 
remark that he could only ever understand a phenomenon if he was able to 
make a machine that could produce the phenomenon (Harris 1988, p. 15). 
The difficulty for psychology is that the understanding that is often desired is 
just the type of understanding that a mechanistic or, a fortiori, deterministic 
account cannot give. That is, ultimately a causal account of psychological 
phenomena does not provide a clear understanding that is free from the 
problems of reflexivity. 
5.3.2.2 Conclusion: Reflexivity and Values in Psychology 
Far from being considered arbitrary and subjective it has been argued here 
that values and ethics are an integral and unavoidable feature of human 
action. This is because all action is groundless in that it is not determined by 
any 'outside' influence such as causality, reason or nature. Therefore, 
allowing or not allowing an act to occur is ultimately based on an ethical 
valuation whose 'rightness' cannot be shown to be founded on anything 
external to the act. 
It has been suggested that deciding what particular set of values 
«e.g.)'humanistic' or 'scientific') psychology should adopt, depends on 
identifying the aims of research and study. Without this understanding any 
attempt to select values for research will be confused and open to 
accusations of arbitrariness. If the aims are not clear and agreed upon it 
becomes possible for different psychologists to be playing different language-
games, so to speak. For example, in the natural sciences the twin aims of 
'gaining a clear understanding of phenomena' and 'understanding 
phenomena in a causal/mechanistic way' are both achieved through causal 
explanation. However, often the questions asked about psychological 
phenomena are not causal but grammatical. Only by realizing that there are 
two aims -that is, gaining a causal/mechanistic understanding and gaining a 
clear non-paradoxical understanding of phenomena- is it possible to 
222 
understand why different sets· of values exist. (A special case is that of 
behaviourism which will be discussed in Section 5.3.7, below.) 
A subtle yet vital point is that aims must be expressed in terms of what 
individual psychologists value if a debate over aims is to help psychologists 
determine appropriate values for psychology. For example, the supposed 
aim of 'discovering what the world is really like' can appear, in one sense, to 
be the ultimate in value-free goals. But it leads only to fruitless argument 
because there is no way of determining reality that is independent of so-
called 'subjective' features such as values. In fact, it is because this aim is 
expressed in what masquerade as value-neutral terms that notions such as 
the relativism of values and, even more strongly, the illusory nature of 
values, tend to gain credence. 
Therefore, it would be far more constructive and helpful -although 
admittedly unlikely- for individual psychologists to express what value they 
see in 'discovering what the world is really like'. For instance, a 
psychologist may aim to 'discover what the world is really like' in order to 
'see the truth' about life and his or her role in it so as to gain peace of mind. 
Alternatively, and less charitably, another psychologist may have the same 
aim but in order to win theoretical debates and therefore gain professional 
status and advancement. Clearly, each of these value-laden aims implies 
different emphases, 'agendas' and strategies. That is, the points of the 
language-games and forms of life involved are very different. 
Constructive debate can only occur once these value-laden aims have been 
revealed. And it is only then that agreement over psychology's aims and 
values will at least be possible. This is not to say that aims 'exist' and, in 
some sense, wait to be revealed. Rather, discussing aims is just a way of 
deciding which values should be valued without descending into 
relativism. 
The final conclusion of this section, then, is that values have to be 
introduced explicitly into psychology not only because human actions are 
inevitably ethical, but also because their omission stands in the way of 
effective debate over psychology's raison d'etre. 
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5.3.3 REFLEXIVITY AND 'PURE' AND 'APPLIED' PSYCHOLOGY 
5.3.3.1 Discussion 
In Chapter 1 Section 1.4 it was noted that the distinction between 'pure' and 
'applied' psychology was becoming blurred in the minds of many 
psychologists. For example, Middleton and Edwards (1985) suggested that 
the distinction between 'pure' and 'applied' psychology could be 
circumvented by viewing psychology as both 'theory' and 'need' driven. 
This led to a recommendation that psychologists should adopt an 
'ecological' approach emphasizing "how people function in naturally 
occurring circumstances" (p. 149). 
Similarly, a trend was noted in which clinical work was being understood as 
research in its own right «e.g,) Shapiro, 1985; Watts, 1984). It was suggested 
that this helped explain why clinical psychology, at least in the United States, 
was growing fast, dealing directly with issues such as racism and 
delinquency rather than having its efforts directed by theories produced in 
'pure' psychology. Also, this understanding was used to explain Watts' 
(1984) criticism that 'applied' psychology in Britain was more concerned 
with producing theoretical and methodological illumination than targetting 
issues of immediate clinical concern. 
In simple terms, these authors and others have challenged the idea that 
theories produced by 'pure' psychology -developed by examining the so-
called 'basic principles' of human psychology- should act as the framework 
for 'applied' psychology. This challenge gains some support from the fact 
that the distinction between 'theory' and 'fact' has also become blurred. 
Both of these distinctions implicitly assume that the phenomenon a 
psychologist might study in the laboratory is not the same as the natural 
phenomenon. 
Given this assumption, theories developed in 'pure' psychology can quite 
easily be assigned a secondary role in 'applied' psychology. That is, if this 
perspective is assumed then it follows that the most 'appropriate' theories 
will be developed amongst 'naturally' occurring phenomena and not in the 
laboratory or the 'pure' research situation. 
However, adopting this perspective does not end debate. As was discussed 
in Chapter I, Section 1.4, at the extremes two possible, and contrasting, 
conclusions can be drawn. Either the scientific method -the method 
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employed by 'pure' psychology- could be used directly in applied settings, or 
applied areas could develop their own methods. 
In other words one possibility is to treat both 'pure' and 'applied' research as 
'pure' research and therefore use the methods of 'pure' research in both. 
The second possibility is to treat both 'pure' and 'applied' research as distinct 
areas of 'applied' research. In this case each area of research would be 
required to develop its own idiosyncratic methods. 
The former option is recommended by Shapiro (1985) while sympathy for 
the second option can be found in such concepts as 'congruence' in Rogerian 
psychotherapy (Rogers and Stevens, 1967) and the advocacy of 'eclectic' 
therapy «e.g.)Feldman, 1985). Both options take knowledge to be relative to 
a particular context. However, the second option takes this assumption 
further than the first by bringing into question whether useful knowledge is 
always a product of the scientific method. 
Finally, it was concluded in Chapter 3, Section 3.4.4 that when understood 
from the viewpoint of the Tractatus the blurring of the distinction between 
'pure' and 'applied' psychology is inevitable. This was explained largely in 
terms of the inability to determine, a priori, the underlying form of human 
psychology. Thus, 'pure' psychology cannot produce prescriptive accounts 
of human behaviour that could rightfully be used in 'applied' settings. An 
analogy was drawn in this way with the impossibility, expressed in the 
Tractatus of determining the underlying logical form of language. 
Using the arguments presented in the previous section it can now be shown 
how the difficulties in the 'pure/applied' distinction can be avoided, and 
how the two options that arise from the blurring of this distinction can be 
reconciled. 
When understood as language-games theories can be seen as an exploration 
of grammatical possibilities. Thus, theories developed in 'pure' research 
and theories developed in more applied settings simply express different 
grammatical possibilities. In this s-ense 'pure' and 'applied' approaches are 
distinct since they involve different language-games and forms of life. 
However, because they are both examples of possible language-games using 
similar or related concepts theories developed in 'pure' research can still be 
used in more 'applied' areas. That is, there are not different causal or even 
logical structures determinately underlying the difference in the forms of 
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'pure' and· 'applied' research· which might prevent, in principle, the 
application of theories developed in 'pure' research. 
Thus, laws discovered through an experimental analysis of behaviour, for 
example, could be helpful in areas where people can be 'taught' how to play 
the particular language-game of reinforcement by consequences (See Section 
5.3.7, below). Of course, 'being taught' does not here imply that it is 
necessary to explicitly teach reinforcement contingencies. Behavioural 
control can occur without the subject being told of the manipulation. But 
this does not mean that the manipulation should therefore be understood 
causally. There is a sense in which people follow a rule 'blindly' (P.1. 219) 
and so could be said to playa language-game 'blindly'. 
Similarly, Wittgenstein (1953) spoke of the phenomenon of "aspect 
blindness" (P.1. II, xi, p. 214) in which people are unable to see something as 
an aspect of a phenomenon. That is, people can be said to be 'aspect blind' 
when they cannot see alternative 'forms' of a phenomenon (See Chapter 4, 
Section 4.5 on the concepts of 'seeing' and 'seeing as'). Thus, in such a 
situation people may be playing a particular language-game without seeing 
its aspect as, for example, a sequence of stimulus-response-reinforcement. 
But this does not detract from the fact that it is still a case of a game being 
played rather than of action being causally determined. If this situation were 
understood causally reflexive paradoxes would be difficult to avoid. 
It is important to emphasize that the justification for using theories 
developed in 'pure' research in applied settings is not that 'pure' research 
discovers the fundamental structure or universal laws of human action. 
Rather, what justification there is amounts to nothing more than the fact 
that such theories reveal ways of speaking and acting that are grammatically 
possible. The decision of whether or not to use 'pure' theories in areas such 
as clinical psychology and psychotherapy ultimately remains an ethical act -
that is, an act without justification. 
At this point connections can be clearly seen between the debate over 'pure' 
and 'applied' research and the issues of values and theoretical unity 
discussed above. If a challenge is being made to the idea that 'pure' research 
can provide psychology with generally applicable theories then obviously 
theoretical unity is also being challenged. And the question of when to use 
'pure' theories in applied settings once again introduces values into 
research. 
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Furthermore, the claim that it is possible to use theories developed in 'pure' 
research in applied areas does not mean that the importance of ecological 
validity in psychological research is being denied. In fact, 'ecological 
validity' can be interpreted quite readily in terms of language-games. 
Language-games that arise in 'pure' research can often appear to be in 
conflict with 'naturally occurring' language-games. It is suggested here that 
this occurs because the conceptual relationships and distinctions between 
the two types of language-games are often obscured by the surface 
appearance of language (P.I. II, xi, p. 224). And it is this obfuscation that 
gives rise to the claim that a theory lacks ecological validity. 
For example, some of the claims radical behaviourists make about people 
and human action have been the subject of both public and professional 
dispute. Such debates arise, it is suggested here, when it is not realized that 
the same word can be used in different but related ways in different 
language-games, and that no one way is the only way to use the word. So 
long as debate is thought to be about so-called substantive claims about 
phenomena it will be unresolvable. By understanding the conflict in 
grammatical terms it can be seen that no challenge to 'substantive' reality 
can possibly be being made. 
Such an emphasis on the grammatical aspects of intellectual conflicts may 
help to avoid some of the misunderstandings described by Czubaroff (1988) 
in the following quote; 
Whether through genuine or willful 
misunderstanding or because of dogmatic 
commitment to substantively different 
positions, scholars engaged in strategic 
scientific debates frequently refuse to take 
each other seriously and as a consequence 
their discussions degenerate into fruitless 
cross-purpose exchanges. (p. 329). 
Czubaroff (1988) was particularly interested in the controversies 
surrounding Skinner's work but the point is a general one. Essentially, it is 
claimed here, such misunderstandings result from a blindness to the 
grammar of other approaches. 
So, conceiving of theories as language-games allows for a distinction to 
remain between 'pure' and 'applied' research. However, 'pure' research is 
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no longer seen as the provider of foundational knowledge which can then 
automatically be put to work in applied situations. Instead, 'pure' research 
is seen as a setting that is grammatically related to so-called 'natural' settings 
and is as likely as any setting to uncover helpful grammatical possibilities 
and insights. (As an aside it is interesting to speculate that perhaps the 
traditional emphasis on 'pure' research has more to do with the 
institutionalization of science than with any intellectual heritage. That is, a 
'pure' form of research could have become established once scientists were 
housed in their own buildings, therefore allowing distinctive forms of life to 
arise. Before this point only private wealth or unrestricted patronage would 
have enabled 'pure' research to take place. However, such speculations are 
not central to the aims of this study.) 
The present perspective can also shed some light on the concept of 
'congruence'. It was suggested in Chapter 1, Section 1.4 that 'congruence' is 
not a prescriptive method -and in a sense not useful- in much the same way 
that the instruction "Be spontaneous!" is not prescriptive. The term, of 
course, is meant to suggest a certain type of openness on the part of the 
therapist, allowing a consistency between how the therapist acts and feels. 
Seen grammatically it is perfectly conceivable that 'congruence' is a useful 
concept in psychotherapy. That is, despite the fact that it prescribes nothing 
in particular it is obviously part of a language-game. As such it is irrelevant 
whether or not explicit criteria can be given for its use. All that would 
matter is that a therapist learnt how to play the language-game that could be 
called 'being congruent'. In fact, that there are no explicit criteria for its use 
may simply be part of the grammar for the concept and thus part of what is 
involved in learning how to play the language-game. However, saying this 
in no way ensures that 'congruence' is an effective tool in psychotherapy. 
Of course, if the concept of congruence were to be viewed in this way all 
speculations about there needing to be a kind of mystical symmetry between 
a therapist's inner feelings (understood as some sort of psychological state) 
and outward actions could be summarily discarded. 'Congruence', that is, 
should not itself be considered to be some sort of psychological state of 
affairs. The fact that explicit criteria cannot be given for whether or not a 
therapist is being congruent should not mean that in order to defend the 
concept inner criteria have to be postulated. To be taken seriously from a 
grammatical perspective 'congruence' needs neither objective, explicit 
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criteria nor subjective, implicit criteria. (A similar point is made in Section 
5.3.4.1, below where it is argued that the word 'I' sometimes does not denote 
a person. But this does not mean that the word'!' is thus being used 
wrongly or misleadingly. All that is meant is that 'I' has a distinct grammar 
of its own.) 
In similar fashion the Rogerian concept of 'empathy' can be understood 
from a grammatical perspective despite the fact that it seems to prescribe 
nothing in particular. 
In Chapter 4, Section 4.5 it was argued that the concepts of 'seeing' and 
'seeing as' are distinct and should not be confused. In particular, it was 
suggested that the concept of 'seeing as' should not be thought of as 'seeing' 
plus something else. 'Aspect seeing', it was claimed, is just as fundamental 
as any other type of seeing. 
In the therapeutic situation 'empathy' can be seen as an attempt on the 
therapist's part to use the concept of 'seeing' in preference to the concept of 
'seeing as'. For example, if a client were to express a deep fear about some 
object the therapist employing 'empathy' might to some extent try to see the 
object as frightening. Therefore the therapist could say quite naturally "Yes, 
I see how frightening it is." 
However, presumably the therapist is able to see the object in other ways too. 
Thus, seeing the object as frightening is just one of several aspects that the 
therapist can see in the object. And, further, the therapist may see his or her 
fear in several ways «e.g.) as a physical reaction, as a consequence of 
childhood conditioning, as an attempt at therapy) whereas the client may see 
his or her fear in one way «e.g.) as a reason for avoiding the object). 
Although this point has only been discussed in brief the following 
suggestion can be made. Through 'empathy' a therapist hopes to help a 
client to master the technique of 'aspect seeing' in a particular situation. 
That is, if a therapist can 'see' something as a client sees it ('seeing') but is 
also able to see it in other ways ('seeing as') the client could be helped by the 
therapist to learn how to see different aspects of the situation. For the client 
this 'learning' involves being able to use the concept of 'seeing as' instead of 
'seeing'. As mentioned in Chapter 4, Section 4.5 this ability to shift between 
aspects is not logically connected to any aspect of an object or to any 
psychological event. What has to be taught is the mastery of a concept. 
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5.3.3.2 Conclusion: Reflexivity and 'Pure' and 'Applied' Psychology 
When psychological research is applied issues of reflexivity become acute. 
Perhaps this should not be surprising since psychological intervention is 
probably the most direct of all interventions. And perhaps it should not be 
surprising, too, that assessing the rights of making such interventions and 
their validity and worth is apriority for many psychologists and non-
psychologists. It is in the light of these concerns that arguments regarding 
the relationship between 'pure' and 'applied' psychology have been 
considered in this study. 
So, what right does a theoretical psychologist have to apply a theory in the 
'real' human world? And how valid are 'pure' theories in the world 
beyond the research setting? In fact, is it worth even trying to apply 'pure' 
theories outside of the laboratory? Such questions seem important because 
of the simple observation that psychologists "after all" are only people 
making theories about people. This observation suggests the possibility that 
even the objective approach of 'pure' science is just one of several subjective 
perspectives. And this in turn challenges the traditional view that 'pure' 
psychology should provide the theories and 'applied' psychology should 
apply them. 
The endless reflexive arguments which often ensue over the 'rights', 
'validity' and 'worth' of 'pure' theories can, it is claimed here, be avoided by 
understanding the distinction between 'pure' and 'applied' psychology in 
terms of language-games. Such arguments are avoided because attempts to 
explicitly establish 'rights', 'validity' and 'worth' can be abandoned. Instead, 
as was described in the preceding discussion, such attempts can be replaced 
by thorough and careful examinations of the grammatical relationships 
between theories ('language-games') produced in 'pure' psychology and the 
naturally occurring language-games in applied settings. If careful note is 
made of the different ways in which various concepts are used in these two 
settings then theories from 'pure' psychology need not be seen as lacking 
'ecological validity'. Rather, they represent particular grammatical 
possibilities. 
But on the other hand this does not mean that such theories should be 
applied. In fact, it has been argued that as a consequence of this approach 
'pure' psychology would have to abdicate the aloof, pre-eminent position 
suggested by its name. This would in no way devalue the role played by 
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'pure' psychology in the exploration of the possibilities of human action. 
Nevertheless, it would mean that 'pure' psychology could no longer be 
understood as a search for the fundamental building blocks of human 
action. 
Finally, as was noted in the preceding discussion, choosing to apply a theory 
or method -whether from 'pure' or 'applied' psychology- is an ethical act 
without justification. 
It could be said that the distinction between 'pure' and 'applied' psychology 
is blurred insofar as both approaches are understood in terms of language-
games. Since there is no pre-eminent language-game the relationship 
between 'pure' and 'applied' psychology cannot be hierarchical -thus the 
blurring. However, this does not mean to say that 'pure' theories lack 
'ecological validity' or that 'pure' research is worthless in the 'real' world. 
Rather, such theories emphasize and express aspects of grammar that are 
sometimes quite different from those emphasized and expressed in 
'naturally occurring' language-games. 
An example should help illustrate this comment. 
Given the present perspective the principles of behaviour modification do 
not represent any fundamental laws of human action. However, in certain 
situations -such as education in schools- it may be easy to see human activity 
as a manifestation of behavioural principles. 
This would especially be so if a particular, perhaps more traditional, view of 
what 'schooling' involved was assumed «e.g.) performing knowledge 
related tasks, remembering facts and methods, etc.). Behaviour modification 
and this view of education have clear grammatical relationships and 
similarities. In fact, it could probably be said that similar language-games are 
played in both settings. Therefore, in this instance at least, behaviour 
modification could appear to be 'ecologically valid'. (Of course, if a different 
view (,language-game') of education and schooling was adopted the 
grammatical relationships between this new view and behaviour 
modification could be obscure.) 
But in another setting, for example counselling, the grammar of behaviour 
modification may seem to bear little resemblance to the grammar of the 
language-games employed by the client. Therefore, applying behaviour 
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modification techniques in this instance may appear to 'miss the point' of 
the client's problem and therefore lack 'ecological validity'. 
In this regard it is interesting that Skinner's (1957) book Verbal Behavior 
can quite easily be seen as a translator's guide between the language of 
behaviour analysis and many expressions in 'everyday' language. And the 
many literary examples Skinner uses to such good effect in this book 
reinforces such an impression. 
In conclusion, the following view of 'pure' and 'applied' psychology is 
suggested. Concern for the 'validity', ecological or otherwise, of theories in 
psychology should be replaced by the effort to understand the aims of an 
instance of research. Once the aims of a piece of research are understood 
then any theory (,language-game') that achieves these aims can be 
employed. 
The aim of 'pure' research could be understood in broad terms as the 
exploration of the grammatical possibilities of psychological concepts. Thus, 
the theoretical exercise could be seen as a process of discovering, clarifying 
and then exploring aspects of grammar. In this task 'theoretical constructs' 
are simply tools (models, metaphors, etc.) for giving training in aspects of 
grammar. Because of this the appropriateness of a theory developed in 
'pure' research for a particular 'applied' situation could be judged solely in 
terms of the aims and needs in the applied setting. This is because by seeing 
'pure' research as the exploration of grammar rather than as the discovery of 
the basic laws or structure of human action applied practitioners are free to 
accept and reject the insights of 'pure' research on their own terms. That is, 
accepting and rejecting theories in terms of what is needed or desired in a 
particular situation. 
Yet from this viewpoint the discoveries made in 'pure' research would still 
be respected since they would provide insights into the possible ways of 
understanding people. This should not be confused with possible ways of 
'picturing' what people are like. For, as will be argued in Chapter 6, below, 
understanding is not just a case of having a 'picture' of something. And, 
further, perhaps the 'better' theories would be those that incorporated more 
grammatical insights and subtleties. 
In fact, understanding 'pure' research in this way would more than likely 
reveal what Wittgenstein (1969) termed "framework facts" about 
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psychological phenomena. For Wittgenstein (1953) that what cannot be any 
other way is what is grammatical. This is brought out in the 
presuppositional and normative roles of 'grammar' (Finch, 1977, pp. 153-
161). For example, the fact that two objects cannot occupy the same place is, 
for Wittgenstein, an aspect of grammar. Discovering such 'facts' in 
psychology would highlight the points at which new theoretical perspectives 
could be developed, thus helping in theory 'generation'. 
So from the present perspective 'pure' psychology remains distinct from 
'applied' psychology by virtue of its aim of exploring the grammar of 
psychological concepts and phenomena. 
5.3.4 REFLEXIVITY AND CONSCIOUSNESS IN PSYCHOLOGY 
5.3.4.1 Discussion 
The tangled nature of the concept of 'consciousness' has been simplified 
greatly in psychological theorizing. Not surprisingly, it is difficult to 
encompass in one theory the subtleties and varied uses of such a concept. 
For example, uses such as being 'knocked unconscious or semiconscious ',a 
'conscious decision' -with its connections to the concepts of 'responsibility' 
and 'guilt'- and 'consciousness raising' arise in very different contexts. Each 
context adds to the list of characteristics that supposedly belong to a unified 
concept of 'consciousness'. 
As a construct in psychology 'consciousness' has most often been 
understood in terms of a factual psychological state. That is, consciousness 
has usually been seen as an individualized state of mental awareness of the 
world and, in humans, the 'self'. This view of consciousness was 
discussed.in Chapter I, Section 1.6. 
In the following considerations three topics will be examined from the 
perspective outlined earlier in this Chapter. (1) The first topic concerns the 
transformations between the poles of 'Person constructs Reality' and 
'Reality constructs Person' which Buss (1978) claimed help to explain the 
historical revolutions and counter-revolutions in theoretical psychology. (2) 
The second topic is the difficulty of distinguishing between the specific 
contents of an awareness and the 'intrinsic character' of an awareness 
(Natsoulas, 1981; See Chapter I, Section 1.6.1). (3) The third topic is the 
nature and role of the psychological subject. 
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Before examining these topics an important point has to be made 
concerning a fundamental difference between the traditional view of 
consciousness and that of the present perspective. Implicit in most 
constructions of consciousness is the assumption that consciousness is a pre-
condition for having meaningful phenomena or, even more strongly, that 
consciousness actually generates meaning. But the approach presented in 
. this chapter suggests that if paradoxical conclusions are to be avoided 
meaning cannot be said to have a factual pre-condition. And meaning 
certainly cannot be said to be a product of something factual. 
This is an extremely important difference and follows from the primacy of 
meaning which is an implicit principle in Wittgenstein's 'Late' philosophy 
(See Chapter 4, Section 4.2.1). Ultimately, it is suggested here, 
meaningfulness does not depend, in a causal or factual sense, on the 
awareness of a conscious perceiver. From the dominant Cartesian 
perspective it is difficult to understand how this could be possible since 
without a subject to notice the meaningfulness of a phenomenon 'meaning' 
becomes a meaningless concept. How it is possible to conceive of meaning 
without it being factually dependent on a conscious perceiver will be 
clarified when the nature of the psychological subject is discussed later in 
this section. 
(1) 'Person constructs Reality' or 'Reality constructs Person'? 
When theorizing in psychology much depends on whether people are 
thought to create reality or reality is thought to create people. However, 
despite this fact, choosing between the two options can seem quite arbitrary. 
Unfortunately this arbitrariness cannot be avoided by claiming that both 
options are correct to some extent. For even in that case there would still be 
the difficulty of determining which of the two options is appropriate in 
different circumstances. 
So it is suggested that if reflexive paradoxes are to be avoided both options 
should be considered unsuitable. If people construct reality then the 
paradoxical aspects of solipsism and extreme relativism of knowledge 
beckon. And if reality constructs people then the question of which person 
would presume to comment on such a reality looms large. That is, any 
comments a person made about reality would be constructed by a 'reality' 
forever tantalizingly hidden. 
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So instead of opting for one or the other of the two approaches it would be 
more profitable and satisfying in terms of reflexive problems if these 
difficulties were understood from a grammatical perspective. In this respect 
it will be helpful to remember the discussion of the two concepts of 'seeing' 
and 'seeing as' in Chapter 4, Section 4.5. It was argued there that these two 
concepts are distinct and should not be confused. In particular, the concept 
of 'seeing as', it was claimed, should not be thought of as 'seeing' plus 
something else. That is, 'aspect seeing' is just as fundamental as any other 
type of seeing. 
It is now possible to understand the 'Person constructs Reality' pole in terms 
of the concept of 'seeing' and, conversely, the 'Reality constructs Person' 
pole in terms of the concept of 'seeing as'. 
In the first case, if the concept of 'seeing' is taken to be the more 
fundamental of the two concepts then theoretical psychology will end up 
promoting some form of solipsism. The inevitability of this solipsistic 
world, at least for a computational psychology, was suggested by Fodor (1980) 
(See Chapter 1, Section 1.7.1). In such a world all meaningful phenomena 
reduce to what individual people 'see' in some sense. Thus, there is 
nothing but what people 'see' -and in the extreme there is nothing but what 
one particular individual sees. That is, all there is is what 'I' see. 
The paradox involved in this approach was mentioned by Katz and Frost 
(1979) and has already been discussed fully elsewhere (See Chapter 1, Section 
1.7.1). In Chapter 3, Section 3.4.5 this paradox was explained in terms of the 
concept of the 'metaphysical subject' -a term used by Wittgenstein (1974a) in 
the Tractatus. Briefly, the solipsist, it was argued, makes the mistake of 
treating the metaphysical subject as if it were a part of the world or a special 
kind of object, whereas in fact it only defines the limit of the world. 
However, the present perspective suggests that the vital mistake is to think 
that 'seeing' in the 'first person' case must always be understood as 
belonging to a person -whether factual or metaphysical. The alternative, of 
course, is to understand the concept grammatically. When understood in 
this way the necessity to think in terms of the familiar Cartesian subject 
disappears. 
In the discussion below on the nature of the subject it will be argued that in 
expressions such as "I see such-and-such" the term 'I' does not refer to a 
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person. However, at the moment all that need be understood is that 
'seeing', like any other concept, has a grammar. And its grammar is 
independent of any factual concerns such as the presence of a psychological 
subject. 
In contrast to the 'Person constructs Reality' pole, it will now be argued that 
the pole of 'Reality constructs Person' emphasizes the concept of 'seeing as'. 
Instead of simply 'seeing' something it is possible to have the experience of 
seeing something as just one aspect of several possible aspects. That is, each 
person -and also the same person at different times- could be conceived as 
seeing different aspects of reality. This view may be particularly appealing 
for a theoretician who himself or herself can see the various aspects of a 
situation that other individuals 'see' separately -that is, without seeing 
something as an aspect. It could be said that such a theoretician is actually 
seeing other people's 'seeing' as if it were a case of 'seeing as'. 
If the theoretician does not realize that there are important grammatical 
differences between the two concepts of 'seeing' and 'seeing as' a seemingly 
innocent assumption is waiting to be made. It may be tempting, that is, to 
think that individuals 'see' only particular aspects of a reality that is 
independent of any particular instance of 'seeing'. This is exactly the same 
assumption that Wittgenstein (1953) criticized in respect of ambiguous 
figures such as the 'duck-rabbit' picture (See Chapter 4, Section 4.5). With 
such figures Wittgenstein (1953) argued that it would be a mistake to think 
that there was something -such as, for example, sense data- that was then 
interpreted in various ways. 
The problems involved in this two-tier view of 'seeing as' have been 
described well by Seligman (1976) and were discussed in Chapter 4, Section 
4.5. Put simply, noticing that there are several aspects to reality does not 
mean that there must therefore be one reality which is variously interpreted 
or 'seen' in various ways. This mistaken conclusion implies that 'reality' 
can exist independently of all instances of 'seeing', which are now 
understood as interpretations. It is not surprising that once 'reality' has this 
priority over 'seeing' the further conclusion that this reality constructs 
people becomes more feasible and even compelling. In other words, if it is 
assumed that there is a reality independent of all seeing then this reality 
cannot be something that is constructed by persons. Thus, if a causal chain is 
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still desired, the only option left is to assume that it is this reality that 
constructs people. 
By realizing that 'seeing' and 'seeing as' are distinct concepts, and that one is 
not more fundamental than the other, it is possible to avoid both sets of 
paradoxical conclusions. It is enough, as it were, to simply realize that the 
seemingly arbitrary nature of the choice between the two poles of 'Person 
constructs Reality' and 'Reality constructs Person' can be traced to the use of 
two grammatically distinct concepts. Any attempt at further explanation 
would only end in an infinite regress. That is, explaining why people see 
different poles would have to be done from the point of view of one of the 
two poles. Thus, if the situation is not understood in terms of grammar an 
infinite regress will be generated. 
All of the above arguments highlight the fact that there are limits to causal 
explanation and that these limits have been reached once reflexive issues 
are discussed. And once again reaching these limits simply re-emphasizes 
the fact that meaning must be prior to everything, including ontology and 
epistemology. Ontology, of course, is basically an attempt at an explanation 
of reality. 
So, in conclusion, the two poles of 'Person constructs Reality' and 'Reality 
constructs Person' cannot be understood ontologically if reflexive paradoxes 
are to be dissolved. Instead they should be understood grammatically. In 
particular, they can be understood as stemming from the use of two quite 
distinct concepts: 'seeing' and 'seeing as'. 
(2) 'Contents' of Awareness versus the 'Intrinsic Character' of Awareness 
According to Natsoulas (1981) there is a problem involved in trying to 
distinguish between the particular 'contents' of an awareness and its 
'intrinsic character'. This problem was described in Chapter 1, Section 1.6. It 
was also suggested in that discussion that the 'intrinsic character' of 
awarenesses is related to Nagel's (1974) notion of a 'subjectivity' that is 
ultimately beyond the scope of human concepts. Further, in Chapter 3, 
Section 3.4.5 the idea was put forward that this 'intrinsic character' or 
'subjectivity' is the same as Wittgenstein's (1974a) notion that the 
metaphysical subject can experience 'the world' as 'my world'. Given this 
similarity it was concluded that from the viewpoint of the Tractatus 
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'intrinsic character' -or content as sheer content- is an attempt to say the 
unsayable. 
The distinction between the 'contents' and 'intrinsic character' of an 
awareness can now be understood as a mistaken attempt to explain 
meaningfulness. As was mentioned in Chapter 1, Section 1.6 the problem 
that arises in making the distinction hinges on the difficulty of 
incorporating meaning into a theory of consciousness. That is, if meaning 
were understood as a function of the 'intrinsic character' of an awareness 
there would be a paradox involved in speaking meaningfully about the 
concept of 'intrinsic character' itself. This paradox is analogous to that 
surrounding attempts in the Tractatus to speak meaningfully about logic. 
Alternatively, if meaning were understood as a function of the 'contents' of 
an awareness then the concept of 'awareness' would become meaningless. 
This is because there would never be anything other than contents. 
Therefore the relationship between contents and awareness itself would 
only be expressed as a further content. Thus there would be no access to 
awarenesses understood as something distinct from contents. 
As just mentioned, in the terminology of the Tractatus the 'intrinsic 
character' of awarenesses reduces to the extensionless point of the 
metaphysical subject. In particular, 'my world' epitomizes what is intrinsic 
to all awarenesses -that is, the 'myness' of awarenesses. Or to put it another 
way what is intrinsic to all awarenesses is the 'seeing' that is co-ordinated 
with the metaphysical subject. Conversely, the factual contents of 
awarenesses are analogous to 'the world' of the metaphysical subject. 
However, by the time of the Philosophical Investigations even the 
metaphysical subject as the co-ordinating point of the world is abandoned. 
Instead, the difference between 'content' (what is 'seen') and 'intrinsic 
character' or 'myness' (the 'seeing' itself) is expressed as a· grammatical 
difference between 'first' and 'third' person language. (Actually, it will be 
argued in the following section that it is something of a misnomer to call 
the use of 'I' the 'first person 'case). That is, the uniqueness of the first 
person experience is admitted but the ownership or metaphysical privacy of 
this experience is denied (Finch, 1977, p. 108). The first person experience, so 
to speak, is not metaphysically unique but grammatically unique. Of course, 
implicit in this is the undermining of the metaphysical existence of the 'I' -
but again this is to be discussed below. 
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It is being assumed that the supposed 'intrinsic character' of an awareness is 
nothing more than the traditional, Cartesian, solipsistic, belief that what is 
common to all instances of 'seeing' or consciousness is that they all belong 
to 'I'. This belief is being challenged here so it is worth examining the 
arguments that Wittgenstein (1953) made against it. According to 
Wittgenstein (1953) the solipsist wants to say that, "when I imagine 
something, or even actually see objects, I have got something which my 
neighbour has not" and, further, "At any rate only I have got THIS." (P.I. 
398). And the solipsist imagines that 'THIS' is like the actual 'seeing' itself 
that is being seen and 'referred to'. The point Wittgenstein (1953) goes on to 
make is that 'THIS' is not a question of seeing at all. It is, as it were, 
something other than anything that is seen. It is not possible to see this 
'seeing' and therefore it is not possible to 'have' or 'possess' 'THIS', 
However, Wittgenstein (1953) claimed to understand what the solipsist 
means here. Thus; 
But what is the thing you are speaking of? It 
is true I said that I knew within myself what 
you meant. But that meant that I knew how 
one thinks to conceive this object, to see it, to 
make one's looking and pointing mean it. I 
know how one stares ahead and looks about 
one in this case -and the rest. (P.I. 398). 
Wittgenstein (1953) used the example of the 'visual room' as opposed to the 
material room to explain his point further. About this room he stated; 
I can as little own it as I can walk about it, 
look at it, or point to it. Inasmuch as it 
cannot be anyone else's it is not mine either. 
In other words it does not belong to me 
because I want to use the same form of 
expression about it as about the material 
room in which I sit. (P.I. 398). 
What belongs to someone (including 'me') can be pointed to, looked at, 
walked around -perhaps-, etc.. It is because the solipsist wants 'THIS' to 
belong exclusively to him or her that it cannot belong to him or her at all. 
For if the solipsist were able to own 'THIS' the wayan object could be owned 
it should be able to be looked at, pointed to, etc .. Yet Wittgenstein's point is 
that 'THIS' -the 'visual room'- cannot even be seen let alone possessed. 
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Rather, the supposed disc{)very of the 'visual room' is really a "new way of 
speaking, a new comparison" or even "a new sensation" (P.I. 400). It is a 
"grammatical movement" or a "new way of looking at things" and not a 
"quasi-physical phenomenon" (P.I. 401). It is not as if this 'seeing' is a new 
kind of object. Rather, it is a new aspect. 
In particular, 'THIS' is really just the immediacy, indescribability, and 
incomparability of the 'first person' case, or what is correct in solipsism (See 
Finch, 1977, pp. 122-123). Ultimately this immediacy expresses itself solely as 
the grammatical uniqueness of a particular language-game and not as the 
experience of a subject. 
So, in conclusion, it can be said that the problems involved in 
distinguishing between the 'contents' and 'intrinsic character' of 
awarenesses stem from a failure to appreciate a difference in grammar. 
Experiencing the 'intrinsic character' of awarenesses -their immediacy, 
indescribability and incomparability- as being distinct from the 'contents' of 
awarenesses is not a factual matter. In fact, it is probably misleading to even 
speak of 'immediacy', 'indescribability' and 'incomparability' as these may 
appear to represent factual differences. Rather, the 'discovery' of the 
'intrinsic character' is actually a grammatical change and not the discovery 
of a new kind of object. 
The shadow of the 'subject' has fallen over much of the preceding 
discussion. This shadow will now be examined. 
(3) The Nature and Role of the Psychological 'Subject' 
Perhaps no concept is more closely related to the problems caused by 
reflexivity than the concept of the 'subject'. For there can seem nothing 
more compelling than the idea that it is subjects who think, feel, imagine, 
understand and theorize. Therefore, it must be subjects who think and 
theorize about 'subjects'. The appeal of such an idea is witnessed to by the 
fact that in the centuries since it was formalized by Descartes it has 
remained, in some form, the common currency in the commerce of both 
everyday and intellectual thought. And this despite the many philosophical 
problems that have been associated with the Cartesian perspective by 
various philosophers. 
Psychology, of course, has not been immune from the influence of 
'Cartesianism'. The reaction to Skinner's (1971a) suggestion that 
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'autonomous man'should be thrown out of psychology shows how strong 
the influence has been. 
The following discussion will first summarize comments made earlier in 
this study about the psychological subject. Then, an understanding of the 
'subject' that avoids the difficulties associated with the concept without 
abandoning anything valued by the 'Cartesian' will be presented. 
In Chapter I, Section 1.6.2 the psychological 'subject' was discussed in terms 
of the 'causal agent self' and the concept of 'intentionality' was considered to 
be an essential feature of this model. This approach was contrasted with 
social constructionist accounts of the subject. In particular, mention was 
made of accounts which examined social forces -such as psychology-
supposedly maintaining 'individualism' and 'personal identity'. 
n was suggested in that discussion that the 'intentionality' which gives rise 
to so many reflexive problems in an individualistic psychology is not 
overcome by the social constructionist approach. This is because even a 
social constructionist account of the 'subject' could be seen as the product of 
individuals rather than as the product of social forces. That is, social 
constructionism does not show why the subject is not the primary causal 
force, which is what would be needed to ease reflexive problems. The best 
such accounts can do, so to speak, is to set up a rival 'paradigm' to 
individualism and then hope that the new paradigm outlasts the older one. 
n was concluded in Chapter 1, Section 1.6 that 'consciousness' is a construct 
that can supposedly be referred to but is difficult to know how to use -a 
dilemma that echoes the distinction between meaning as 'reference' and 
meaning as 'use over time'. This dilemma, it was claimedl'is closely related 
to the conceptual problems surrounding the notion of the 'subject'. 
A central problem with the concept of the 'subject' is that people can be 
understood as both objects and subjects (Buss, 1978, p. 59). People are, as it 
were, both conscious and in the consciousness of others. Thus, on the one 
hand it seems valid to assume that as objects people should be able to be 
studied. On the other hand all such study is the product of a 'subject' and is 
therefore ultimately 'subjective'. Delimiting people as objects seems to deny 
their status as subjects. Yet, presumably, it is in their capacity as subjects that 
people do the delimiting. In a manner of speaking it is at the heart of the 
reflexive paradox that, apparently, it is people who study people. 
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The pivotal suggestion of this section,and one that will hopefully help to 
dissolve reflexive problems, is that in some uses the term 'I' does not denote 
a person (P.I. 410). In particular, it is suggested that 'I' does not denote a 
person in first person expressions that deal with psychological phenomena. 
This is the case, for example, with expressions such as ItI see the blue sky", ItI 
am in pain" and "I have a toothache". This is a very important point since 
if there are cases in which 'I' does not denote a person the uniqueness of 
'first person' experience can more clearly be seen to result from a unique 
grammar for the word 'I' rather than from a unique metaphysical 
perspecti ve. 
Finch (1977, pp. 115-116) described two cases of the use of 'I' mentioned by 
Wittgenstein in the Blue Book. In the first case the use of the word 'I' is on 
a par with the third person usage and denotes a person. Examples of this 
case would include statements like "I have a scar on my legit and "I have 
grown a centimetre". 'I' is used here as an object. In the second case'!' is 
used as a subject. This happens in statements of the kind "I am in pain". 
Wittgenstein's (1953) point was that in such statements 'I' does not refer to a 
person. This distinction is argued for by revealing differences in the 
grammars of the words 'I' and 'person'. As Wittgenstein (1953) noted; 
"When I say 'I am in pain', I do not point to a 
person who is in pain, since in a certain sense 
I have no idea who is." And this can be 
given a justification. For the main point is: I 
did not say that such-and-such a person was 
in pain, but "I am ... " Now in saying this I 
don't name any person. Just as I don't name 
anyone when I groan with pain. Though 
someone else sees who is in pain from the 
groaning. 
What does it mean to know who is in pain? 
It means, for example, to know which man in 
this room is in pain: for instance, that it is 
the one who is sitting over there, or the one 
who is standing in that corner, the tall one 
ever there with the fair hair, and so on. -
What am I getting at? At the fact that there is 
a great variety of criteria for personal 
'identity'. 
Now which of them determines my saying 
that T am in pain? None. (P.I. 404). 
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There are no criteria for the personal identity of 'I'. And, as has already been 
argued, even given a private world of experience such as the 'visual room' -
a world which might seem to be a sufficient criterion for identifying 'I' as 
the person who is in pain- there is no indication of who owns this world. It 
may be insisted that "Of course, r own this world" but this still does not 
reveal who 'I' is. 
This approach is very different from the position Wittgenstein (1974a) took 
in the Tractatus . The person behind 'I' in these first person cases is 
introduced in the Tractatus as the metaphysical subject. It is true that such a 
'person' is said to be transcendent. Nevertheless, this "point without 
extension" (T. 5.64) unmistakably takes on the role of the person who owns 
the world, at least in the grammar of the Tractatus. However, in the 'Late' 
philosophy of Wittgenstein, as has already been indicated, even talk of a 
.. subject who is out of this world is shown to be misleading. 
Finch (1977) argued that even in cases of "telling other people who r am 
Wittgenstein [in his 'Late' philosophy] maintains that there does not have 
to be a connection between r and person and who" (p. 117. Brackets added). 
This completion of the separation between 'personal identity' and 'I' is 
achieved by becoming familiar with the conceivable case of feeling pain in 
another person's body. For example, 'I' could feel pain in someone else's 
body by being surgically hooked up to another person's brain. In such a case 
feeling pain would not be a criterion for who was, for example, being given 
an electric shock (P.I. 409). And this shows that there is no logical 
connection between 'I' and 'person' even in this case. That is, the fact that 
'I' am feeling pain does not help to identify who is being shocked. 
If in saying "I can't feel his pain" more is meant than simply that 'I' am not 
usually hooked up to his body, then what is being expressed is a grammatical 
difference between first and third person cases and not a metaphysical 
difference between 'I' and 'her' or 'he'. That is, if in this case 'I' does not 
denote a person then such a statement shows the unique grammar of the 
word 'I' -and that is all. 
Further arguments that show why'!' does not denote a person are extensive 
and will not be mentioned here. Far more important are the implications of 
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this position, if it is accepted, for the concept of the psychological 'subject' 
and for understanding reflexivity in psychology. 
As Finch (1977) noted, for Wittgenstein "persons have names and identities 
and pains and sufferings II but "l's have none of these things" (p. 118). Of 
course, this is not a comment about a psychological entity called 'I' that 
cannot experience or have pains, sufferings, etc.. It is instead a comment 
about how the word 'I' is used. To put it more pointedly, 'I's' do not have 
pains or sufferings because 'I' and a pain, for example, are not separable in 
grammar. There is, as it were, no room for two entities here. There is 
therefore no Cartesian 'self' or 'ego' with its own private world of 
sensations and feelings. In other words such sensations and feelings do not 
need the postulation of a private world to explain or justify their existence -
they are sufficient in themselves. 
The self-sufficiency of sensations and feelings is closely related to a point 
that Hilmy (1987) made about Wittgenstein's approach to psychological 
concepts in his 'Late' philosophy. For Wittgenstein, according to Hilmy 
(1987), such psychological concepts are only intelligible "relative to the 
specific language games, calculi or systems of communication constitutive of 
their sense" (p. 139). That is, rather than seeing psychological concepts as 
referring to psychic states Wittgenstein considered them to be "meaningful 
only relative to language" (p. 140). This view is consistent with the idea that 
in first person cases involving psychological concepts 'I' does not denote a 
person. That is, if 'I' does not refer to a person then obviously statements 
such as "I think ... ", "I believe ... " or "I expect ... " could not be referring to 
specific psychological states since they would not be states of any person. 
Instead, 'thinking', 'believing', etc. are given wholly by language. 
This view of the psychological subject -that is, that'!' is specified and 
understandable only in terms of its unique grammar rather than in terms of 
a unique metaphysical perspective- is connected to Wittgenstein's claim that 
his own philosophy is similar to 'relativity theory'. For with such an 
approach, for example, "The expression of an expectation is the expectation", 
and the anticipation is language itself and "cannot go outside of itself" (TS 
213, pp. 355-6, cited in Hilmy, 1987, p. 140). Here there is no approach, such 
as a psychological one, that could allow one to stand aloof from or outside of 
language in order to characterize supposed factual psychological states. All 
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possible characterizations must be relative to the language-game in which 
they occur. 
Of course, denying the correctness of the idea of the psychological subject 
does not imply that 'thinking', 'expecting', 'feeling', etc. are illusory. It is 
just that they are present not as facts but as grammar. In a sense this is a far 
more prestigious position for such phenomena than that which they occupy 
in the traditional Cartesian perspective. For as aspects of grammar there is 
no possibility of their being usurped by the world of facts. An expression 
such as "1 feeL." or "1 expect..." becomes a human act embedded in life by 
virtue of the unity of language-games and forms of life. If someone were to 
say in response to such expressions, "Are you sure you really feel! expect 
that?" this would be an invitation into another language-game and not a 
question of fact. Harre (1989) noted the same point in Wittgenstein's 
approach to the first person case and went further to argue that such uses 
bring the speaker into the world of moral commitment. But this suggestion 
should be tempered by the discussion of values and ethics above (Section 
5.3.2). 
This view of first person psychological experience may seem similar to that 
of radical behaviourism. However, despite apparent similarities there is an 
important difference between this view of psychological concepts and the 
view presented by Skinner (1974). This difference will be discussed in 
Section 5.3.7, below. 
In conclusion, therefore, people are not both objects and subjects. This is 
because the 'subject' use of 'I' does not denote a person. As objects, in the 
third person case, people feel pain, think, understand, feel ecstatic and bored, 
etc. and there are criteria for all of these in language. But in the first person 
case there are no criteria for experiencing such phenomena because 'I' is not 
a person but is part of a unique grammar which simply reflects, as it were, 
the 'immediacy' of human action. 
5.3.4.2 Conclusion: Reflexivity and Consciousness in Psychology 
In the preceding discussion three topics relating to the difficulty of 
incorporating the concept of 'consciousness' into psychology were 
examined. In each case it was suggested that the reflexive problems 
involved could be avoided but only by adopting a grammatical perspective. 
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In relation to Buss' (1978) poles of 'Reality Constructs Person' and 'Person 
Constructs Reality' it was suggested that the difference between the two is 
not a case of incommensurable 'theories' or of a hidden reality that only 
presents aspects of itself. Rather, the difference can ultimately be seen as 
dependent on the use of the quite distinct concepts of 'seeing' and 'seeing 
as'. The question of which pole is preferable for psychology cannot be 
answered in terms of matters of fact. Since the difference is grammatical 
choosing between the two is part of unjustifiable, and therefore ethical, 
human action (See Section 5.3.2, above). 
Similarly, the distinction between the 'intrinsic character' and the 'contents' 
of awarenesses was found to depend on the grammatical uniqueness of the 
first person case and not on the existence of a unique metaphysical 
perspective belonging to the'!'. It was suggested that the 'immediacy', 
'indescribability' and 'incomparability' of the first person case is in fact given 
a uniqueness in terms of grammar that cannot be achieved from the 
metaphysical perspective. 
However, the uniqueness of the first person case brought into question the 
nature and role of the psychological subject, which was the final topic 
discussed above. It was concluded that when talking about psychological 
phenomena the first person use of 'I' does not denote a person. Thus, it was 
argued that the supposed psychological subject is not in fact a person. 
Instead, 'I' statements can only be understood relative to the language-game 
in which they occur and not as referring to psychological entities. 
These arguments bear directly on the concept of consciousness. For if there 
is no psychological subject and if the distinction between the 'intrinsic 
character' and the 'contents' of awarenesses is a matter of grammar then 
trying to understand consciousness as a factual mental state is misguided. 
And the goal of explaining consciousness is an impossible one. Not, of 
course, because there is something (that is, 'consciousness') which language 
cannot put into words. Rather, the goal cannot be achieved because there is 
nothing to give an account of. The feeling that consciousness is 
characterized by -to use Finch's (1977, p. 123) term- a "sheer qualitative 
given " arises from a misunderstanding of the use of language. 
This misunderstanding is revealed in the following quote from 
Wittgenstein (1953); 
"I" is not the name of a person, nor "here" of 
a place, and "this" is not a name. But they are 
connected with names. Names are explained 
by means of them. It is also true that it is 
characteristic of physics not to use these 
words. (P.I. 410) 
246 
If this point is not realized then when someone says "By 'consciousness' I 
mean all of THIS" it may be thought that something is being named by 
'THIS'. Yet nothing is lost by seeing that 'THIS' does not name anything. In 
fact, if anything, it could be said that in realizing this, true expression can 
finally be given to the immediacy and sheer 'reality' of the world. For if 
'THIS' refers to nothing then there is nothing left to interpose between 
phenomena and the 'non-Cartesian subject'. 
Closely related to the concept of 'consciousness' is the matter of perception. 
And it is to the subject of perception that discussion now turns. 
5.3.5 REFLEXIVITY AND PERCEPTION IN PSYCHOLOGY 
5.3.5.1 Discussion 
Trying to give an account of what it means to perceive the world inevitably 
brings to the fore various understandings of how the world and the 
psychological organism relate. In Chapter 1, Section 1.7 'representational' 
and 'Gibsonian' views of this relationship were examined in order to 
discover how concerns about reflexivity influence such approaches. 
'Representational' theories of perception were found to involve the 
postulation of internal representations which categorize and, therefore, refer 
to the world they represent. Fodor (1980) believed that it was necessary to 
impose what he called the 'formality condition' on such computational 
theories of the mind. The formality condition states that if mental processes 
are formal they must only be able to operate on the formal rather than the 
semantic properties of representations. This is because representations, 
according to Fodor (1980), only have a causal role by virtue of differences in 
their formal properties. And, since the property of representation is itself a 
semantic property, the computational. approach must inevitably be 
solipsistic. 
Solipsism, it was suggested, is related to reflexive problems via the 
referential view of meaning implicit in the concept of 'representation'. 
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Further, the "cognitive paradox" described by Katz and Frost (1979) seemed 
to be connected to the reflexive difficulty of incorporating 'reality' into 
representational theories of perception. This paradox and Fodor's (1980) 
formality condition are based on a similar insight. However, while Katz and 
Frost (1979) saw the paradox as a fatal flaw in any representational 
approaches to cognition Fodor (1980) saw his condition as just that -a 
limitation on computational/representational theories. 
Also, the schemata based theory of perception proposed by Neisser (1976) 
was said to bring the 'cognitive paradox' into starker contrast rather than 
presenting a way of avoiding the paradox. This is because schemata 
themselves have to possess the dual nature of being enduring mental 
structures and the embodiment of what the world is really like. 
'Gibsonian' or 'Direct' theories of perception were discussed as an 
alternative to the problematic representational and schemata based 
approaches. Instead of internal representations the 'Direct' perceptionists 
suggest that rich and meaningful information is already present in the 
environment in the form of structured energy. In particular, invariants 
which are present in energy structures and are constant over time and/or 
space are perceived in the form of affordances. An 'affordance' is basically 
what the environment might mean to a perceiver and therefore what it 
affords. 
While the direct perception approach undoubtedly avoids the solipsistic 
problems of representational theories it was suggested that it is still open to 
criticism. Firstly, it could be argued that any environment affords just about 
anything. That is to say, given a complicated enough mathematical or 
geometrical manipulation an invariant could be found for anything an 
organism with a 'properly attuned' perceptual system might do in a 
particular environment. If this is true then ultimately what an organism 
perceives in an environment is given by what action it ends up taking. 
This is, of course, similar to the criticism often made of evolutionary biology 
that the fitness of an organism is ultimately given by the simple fact of 
whether or not it survives. If the same is true of affordances in 'direct 
perception' then the claim that affordances and invariants are somehow 
already objectively present in the environment becomes either dubious or 
empty. Obviously this is an extreme criticism and does not allow for the fact 
that despite its seemingly tautological nature evolutionary biology, at least, 
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has been a very fruitful approach. Presumably there is no reason to suspect -
that 'direct perception' would be any the less fruitful. 
However, in Chapter 1, Section 1.7.2 it was claimed that there is a second 
criticism of the theory of 'direct perception' that, potentially, is far more 
damaging. Simply, the criticism is that 'direct perception' avoids the 
problems of solipsism and paradox only by redefining all perceptual 
phenomena and concepts. In this way it becomes incommensurable with 
representational theories of perception. And, in turn, this 
incommensurability means that it is logically impossible to compare the 
two approaches. Thus, there appears to be no rational way of choosing one 
approach over the others. The point here is the same as that made in 
Section 5.3.1, above, where incommensurability seemed to undermine 
sensible debate over the prospects of theoretical unity in psychology. 
However, it will now be argued that in respect of reflexive issues all of these 
theories of perception are flawed. 
It is clear that any theory of perception could be construed as an attempt to 
explain the meaningfulness of the world. For example, the categories 
prod uced by representations could be said to determine meaning in the 
'representational' approach. And in the 'direct perception' approach 
meaningfulness could be thought to be determined by the structured energy 
in the environment that reveals invariants over time and space. The 
invariants then allow an organism to perceive the affordances present in an 
environment. In fact, Michaels and Carello (1981) stated the connection 
between meaning and 'direct perception' explicitly when they said that "an 
affordance is what the environment means to a perceiver" (p. 42). 
In line with the overall approach that has been adopted in this chapter it is 
suggested that the problems of paradox, solipsism, tautology and 
incommensurability are a direct result of the misguided belief that theories 
of perception try to explain meaning. In trying to explain meaning the 
fundamental primacy of meaning is lost -thus, the difficulties. 
The alternative is to understand meaning in terms of language-games. 
Meaning, that is, should not be thought of as a property of either mental 
structure or structured energy in the environment (or, in fact, of 'Dasein' as 
Fodor (1980) suggested). That is, meaning is not in the organism or in the 
environment. Instead, meaning can be understood as relative to a language-
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game and form of life. And, of course, as has already been argued (See 
Chapter 4, Section 4.3), language-games are not factual entities and therefore 
they are not mechanisms that generate meaning. 
From this perspective the interesting question is not what explains 
perception. Rather, it involves understanding the grammatical 
relationships between phenomena. For example, the question "Why does 
'A' perceive 'X'?" is not answered either by the statement "Because 'A' has 
mental representations 'a', 'b' and 'c' that have been manipulated in such-
and-such a way", or by the statement, "Because 'A's' perceptual system is 
attuned to such-and-such an invariant present in the structured energy in 
the environment". Rather, all that can be expressed -and, in fact, all that is 
really of interest and use- are the grammatical relationships between 'X' and 
other phenomena. 
Both types of statement, that is, are best seen as reflections of grammatical 
relationships. In computational explanations of perception, for example, the 
manipulations carried out over representations can be seen as a form of 
'constructed' or hypothesized grammar. The mistake that leads to reflexive 
problems is, of course, to treat this 'grammar' as if it were factual. 
Similarly, in 'direct perception' invariants in a sense can be understood as 
manifestations of aspects of grammar -albeit sometimes expressed in 
complicated ways. But, again, the mistake is to consider them to be, 
ultimately, factual. In 'direct perception' invariants are factual aspects of the 
environment rather than of the mental world but the error is the same. To 
put it differently, the mistake is to consider perceptual phenomena as being 
something separate from, and factually independent of, language. The 
inseparability of language and phenomena, especially psychological 
phenomena, has, of course, been one of the main insights drawn from the 
philosophy of Wittgenstein in this study (See Chapter 4, Sections 4.3 and 
4.5). 
This grammatical approach has some similarities with that of 'direct 
perception' which deserve comment. Perhaps the most important of these 
similarities is the emphasis in 'direct perception' on the "animal-
environment system" as the unit of analysis (Michaels and Carello, 1981, p. 
17). The, perhaps commendable, unwillingness to deal with either the 
animal or the environment in isolation from the other seems to reflect the 
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impossibility, just mentioned, of maintaining a distinction between 
language and phenomena 
However, even if this similarity exists a difference remains between 'direct 
perception' and the grammatical approach being suggested here. While 
language-games and forms of life are not factual -and cannot be if they are to 
reconcile the distinction between language and phenomena- animal-
environment systems could quite easily and mistakenly appear to be matters 
of fact. That is, if treated as 'traditional' theoretical entities animal-
environment systems are as vulnerable to reflexive problems as theories 
that postulate mental representations. 
In other words, and in conclusion, while the perception of particulars is a 
factual matter perception, per se , is not. That is, whether or not someone 
did or did not perceive a particular phenomenon or event is a matter of fact 
-and the criteria for matters of fact are provided by the grammar of the 
relevant language-game. But a general or universal process of perception 
could not be a question of fact. This is because to perceive anything is to 
perceive something that is meaningful. Thus, to postulate a general process 
of perception would be to postulate a general process for the production of 
meaning. As has already been argued several times, if the problems of 
reflexivity are to be avoided the primacy of meaning must be accepted. Once 
this is accepted there is, of course, no need to postulate a process that 
produces meaning. 
5.3.5.2 Conclusion: Reflexivity and Perception in Psychology 
Each approach to perception discussed was found to have conceptual 
problems that were related to the question of reflexivity. Computational 
approaches, it was argued, suffer from unavoidable solipsism and paradox 
when seen in a reflexive light. In contrast, the 'direct perception' approach 
avoids these problems but has its own difficulties with tautology and 
incommensurability. 
Consistent with the argument presented in Section 5.3.1, above, it was 
suggested that these problems could only be dissolved by understanding 
theories of perception grammatically. In particular, it was claimed that by 
understanding such theories in this way the mistake of seeing such theories 
as explanations of 'meaning' could be prevented. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that perception is one example of an area within theoretical 
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psychology that would benefit, at least intellectually, from viewing theories 
as language-games. 
It was also claimed that without the burden of having to understand 
theories of perception as more or less factual accounts of factual phenomena 
they could be viewed as revealing grammatical insights into the phenomena 
of perception. Thus, what people can perceive is not limited by supposed 
factual constraints but is given in terms of grammatical possibilities. 
However, what people do perceive in fact, as it were, is given by criteria 
that are part of the particular language-game employed. The facts of 
perception are therefore internal to particular language-games. 
However, this whole view of theories of perception carries an implicit 
challenge to some well established ideas on 'explanation' and 'causality'. 
For, if perceiving something meaningful in the environment is not a matter 
of fact then a causal explanation of what an organism perceives cannot be 
dealing with matters of fact either. 
The following section is a re-examination of the concepts of 'explanation' 
and 'causality' as they were outlined in Chapter I, Section 1.8, above. 
5.3.6 REFLEXIVITY AND KNOWLEDGE, CAUSALITY AND 
EXPLANATION IN PSYCHOLOGY 
5.3.6.1 Knowledge 
One of the primary concerns that motivates an examination of the 
phenomenon of reflexivity is that of the status of knowledge. The truth, 
falsity, rightness and wrongness of assertions has long been a central issue in 
philosophy. In fact, this near obsessive concern over knowledge could be 
said to culminate in the Tractatus where it was assumed that if language has 
any substantive content it has so only insofar as it pictures true or false states 
of affairs in the world. Thus, from this viewpoint all meaningful language 
reduces to statements that are nothing more than knowledge claims about 
the way the world is. 
In Chapter I, Section 1.8 three epistemologies were described, each connected 
to one of three approaches to science and, in particular, psychology. The 
positivistic 'standard view of science' was said to hold to a foundationalist 
epistemology. This epistemology is, of course, epitomized by Descartes' 
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concluding, 'indubitable' axiom, "I think, therefore I am". A version of 
scientific realism outlined by Manicas and Secord (1983) was also described 
and was found to have a fallibilist epistemology. In this case, knowledge is 
understood as a social and historical product. However, knowledge is still 
rationally possible and is given by criteria generated by the science 
concerned. Finally, and further along the continuum of justified 
knowledge, the social constructionist epistemology based on radical doubt 
(Gergen, 1979; 1985) was critiqued. Gergen's version of social 
constructionism was found to completely eschew even the possibility of 
there being rational criteria for the truth of knowledge claims. 
Criticisms of these epistemologies were detailed (See Chapter 1, Section 1.8) 
and it was concluded that all three were essentially inadequate. Despite the 
fact that both scientific realism and social constructionism espouse, to 
different degrees, an anti-foundationalist' approach to knowledge they 
nevertheless appear to succumb to the belief that, ultimately, for knowledge 
to be knowledge it must be rationally founded. For example, the 'fallibilist' 
epistemology of scientific realism comes linked with a realist ontology. This 
seems to be a deliberate strategy aimed at showing that theoretical 
knowledge and theoretical activity is rational. And social constructionism 
seems to promote radical doubt as a safeguard against the irrational 
foundations of knowledge. That is, social constructionism remains 
suspicious in the extreme of anything that is not rationally founded. 
Ironically, this appears to indicate a respect for rationality despite the fact 
that social constructionism assumes that rationality as such does not exist. 
The belief that knowledge is only knowledge when it is rationally founded 
was argued against in Chapter 1, Section 1.8.4 using Wittgenstein's (1969) 
remarks in his book On Certainty. The foundations of knowledge, it was 
concluded, are not absolute certainty or even 'ungrounded presuppositions'. 
Rather, they are ungrounded ways of acting. That is, they are forms of life 
and language-games. And these constitute what can be called ordinary 
certainties . 
What the approaches of scientific realism and social constructionism fail to 
recognize, it is suggested here, is that all knowledge inevitably exists as part 
of human activity. This means that there is no need to finally found 
knowledge in some rationally-rooted metaphysics. All that really needs to 
be guarded against are the confusions, ambiguities, omissions, etc. that arise 
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in discourse. And these require attention only because they are the kinds of 
things that, in a grammatical sense, undermine knowledge. 
Despite the simplicity of this point -that there is no need to found 
knowledge- it seems that even the pick of the 'post-foundationalist' crop of 
philosophers have failed to realize it, even though their answers to this 
modern dilemma are undeniably enlightening. Sullivan (1987), for 
example, outlined the 'post-foundationalist' strategies of Richard Rorty and 
Alasdair MacIntyre. In respect of MacIntyre this strategy, according to 
Sullivan (1988), involves a process of narrative and counter-narrative. And, 
as Sullivan (1987) went on to explain; 
... the starting point of the narrative must be 
explicitly evaluative.... The 'new' kind of 
history can incorporate all the critical work of 
modern scholarship, while it rejects the 
modern pretense of the purely detached point 
of view and takes its stand self-consciously in 
the commitments of a specific context that is 
the source of the history's evaluative 
standards. (p. 37). 
The difference between this, admittedly insightful, approach and that being 
promoted here is fundamental. While the explication of one's values are 
apparently vital for MacIntyre, from the present approach it is considered 
impossible to be self-conscious of, and state explicitly, the value context of 
one's immediate practice. And this is part of the grammar of the words 
'context' and 'values'. No matter how explicitly values are stated they will 
not be the values that that particular human activity involves. Rather, 
such supposedly 'foundational' values and contexts are given in the activity 
or language-game itself, so to speak. The confusion, and the attempt to 
avoid confusion, arises from thinking of values and contexts as the things 
that actually underlie meaningful language and action. Once again, then, 
the trouble comes from trying to get prior to 'meaning': as if this were 
something that needed doing! 
Of course, there is a feeling that might be called "waking up from [or to ] a 
context". And this feeling may seem to suggest that one has experienced a 
context. But this is not really an experience at all and is more like 
'experiencing' what Ackermann (1988) calls the "horizons" of a language-
game. But these 'horizons' are not things that need explicating. In fact, this 
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is one distinction between Wittgenstein's treatment of the 'limits of 
language' in the Tractatus and in his 'Late' philosophy. While the 
Tractatus was all about trying to explicate and explain the limits of language 
this concern was overtaken in the 'Late' philosophy by the desire to 'see' 
and 'show' the limits. Talk of the 'horizons' or limits of language-games 
simply indicates or shows that more than one language-game can be played, 
just as the notion of 'time' simply indicates that more than one event can 
occur. And just as the notion of 'time' does not place any limits on what 
particular events can occur so too the idea of 'horizons' places no artificial or 
a priori limits on what can be expressed in language. The only limits that 
can ever be shown are grammatical limits. But these limits are not imposed 
from the outside, so to speak. They are found already there in language as it 
is used. 
When theorizing, understood in terms of language-games, is itself seen as 
human action then talk of such-and-such an approach being limited simply 
indicates that more than one approach is possible. At this level there is no 
sense in speaking about 'limits' to the knowledge supposedly embedded in a 
particular theory. For to talk of limits here is to assume that there is a 
notion of 'unlimited' knowledge with which 'limited' knowledge could be 
contrasted. Obviously, in this situation there is no such notion. 
Understanding and explicating the context of a theory or historical approach 
is itself a language-game which can be engaged in by those who are skilled at 
playing it. It is not and cannot be a guarantee against the foundationless 
nature of human action. Once again it must be stressed that no guarantee is 
needed . 
In conclusion, then, theoretical knowledge in psychology is not akin to the 
assertion of facts. Instead, it more resembles an invitation to playa 
language-game or participate in a form of life. 
5.3.6.2 Causality and Explanation 
In the attempt to explain phenomena two very different concepts of 
causality have emerged (See Chapter I, Section 1.8). On the one hand is 
'generative' causality which stresses the need to postulate hidden causal 
mechanisms that produce the patterns observed in phenomena. This 
structural conception of causality implicitly emphasizes what has been 
termed the 'referential' view of meaning. Theories, that is, refer to 
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structures that explain phenomena. This type of causality is promoted by 
Manicas and Secord (1983) in their version of scientific realism and is said to 
provide a rational understanding of phenomena and to produce fruitful 
theorizing. 
On the other hand, causality has been understood simply in terms of 
contingent relationships between observed events. This view of causality is 
sometimes called 'Humean' and, it was argued, emphasizes a conception of 
meaning as 'use over time'. That is, causality reduces to seeing contingent 
relationships between events over time. Emphasizing this relationship, it is 
believed, enhances the chances for prediction and control. 
A 'Tractarian' view of the two concepts of causality was offered in Chapter 3, 
Section 3.4.6 in which they were said to merge together in the transcendental 
realm beyond language. However, given the conclusions of the Tractatus it 
may seem that a merger beyond language is accomplished only by forfeiting 
sense. 
An alternative way of achieving a reconciliation between the two forms of 
causality will now be outlined. This reconciliation mirrors that achieved by 
Wittgenstein (1953) between meaning as 'reference' and meaning as 'use 
over time' (See Chapter 4, Section 4.2.1.1). 
It will be remembered that Wittgenstein (1953) found an intermediate case 
between meaning as something that can be 'grasped in a flash' and meaning 
as something that is extended over time. If meaning is understood as use 
over time, use in turn can be understood as an application . Use as an 
application has the virtue of being something that can both be grasped in a 
flash, or 'pictured', and extended in time. What distinguishes this type of 
use from 'use over time' is that the former is a human act while the latter 
can seem to be an objectively observed fact. So, when 'use' is understood as 
an application it is already assumed to be part of meaningful human 
activity. And human action, as has already been argued, is fundamentally 
unfounded and undetermined. 
A similar sort of strategy can be used to show that the two forms of causality 
are not entirely incompatible. The first step in this process is to view 
generative causal theories as 'pictures' of causal structures. In order to 
explain the observed patterns of contingent relationships in phenomena 
these 'pictures' have to be applied in such a way as to reveal how the 
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patte-rns are produced from the pictured structures. For example, in order to 
understand how a clock works a connection has to be shown between the 
inner workings of a clock and the observed, contingent movements of the 
hands. 
Now, in most cases the way in which a picture is to be applied is a matter of 
convention. That is, there are 'normal' and 'abnormal' cases of the 
application of a particular picture (P.I.141). However, as Wittgenstein (1953) 
argued, there is always a gap between a picture and the way it is applied (P.I. 
140. Also, see Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2.1). And this is true even if pictures of 
how to apply the picture are given. While pictures may suggest how they 
are to be applied they can never determine such an application (P.I. 139). 
So, no matter how many pictures are given the actual application of a 
picture turns out to be essentially undetermined. And it is this fact that can 
appear to be ultimately a contingent fact since the application simply 
follows the picture without there being an intervening causal mechanism. 
Any postulated mechanism would still stand in a contingent relationship to 
its application. 
One 'error' involved in theories of generative causality is the assumption 
that there is a reality to the hypothesized causal mechanisms that somehow 
underlies the phenomena under study. Causality seen in this way is like a 
transcendental glue holding phenomena together and upon which the 
ultimate coherence of the world depends. This, instead of seeing theories 
about causal mechanisms as 'pictures' that can always be applied in more 
than one way. 
The second step in this attempted reconciliation is to notice that Humean 
causality accepts and emphasizes the gap between a 'picture' and its 
application. Because this gap exists it can be argued that any picture of 
hidden causal mechanisms is, in effect, arbitrary. In some sciences this 
criticism may not be a serious impediment to generative causal theorizing 
and explanation. However, in psychology the criticism is more poignant 
because theories can themselves be seen reflexively as psychological 
products. Thus, theorizing about causal structures can seem futile and 
possibly even harmful since the acceptance of a particular picture of causal 
structures and of its application could influence many interventions made 
by psychologists in society. 
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Humean causality and nomic ('law-like') explanation retreat from such 
theorizing and come to settle in what is observed or 'seen' -that is, the 
contingent relationships found in the data. (It should be remembered that at 
least in the case of radical behaviourism what is 'seen' can be interpreted 
very broadly -see Chapter 2) Since 'pictures' of causal structures can never 
determine an application no matter how many. 'pictures' are given-and 
since causality is all about determination- the 'picturing' side of the gap is 
abandoned entirely. Thus, causal relationships must necessarily be 
confined to contingent relations. 
However, one 'error' in theories of contingent causality is the assumption 
that contingent causal relationships are somehow more fundamental than 
generative causal relationships. As if, that is, contingent relationships are 
what is 'seen' and generative relationships are 'interpretations' of what is 
seen. This is the same point that has been made with respect to the concepts 
of 'seeing' and 'seeing as' in Chapter 4, Section 4.5. There it was argued that 
none of the two concepts is more fundamental than the other. So, while 
seeing situations in terms of contingent relationships may improve 
prediction and control it does so at the cost of inhibiting 'aspect seeing'. And 
it could quite easily be argued that seeing new aspects of situations is often of 
vital importance. 
In other words, Humean causality is itself a 'picture' in need of a 
conventionally based application. It is thus on a par with other causal 
explanations. As with all 'pictures' there remains a gap between this 
'picture' and how it is to be applied. And the clash that occurs between 
generative and Humean causality is a clash between two 'pictures'. The 
clash is resolved in just the same way as Wittgenstein (1953, P.I. 138-142) 
tried to resolve the clash between meaning as something 'grasped in a flash' 
and meaning as a practice extended in time. The very fact that both views of 
causality are 'pictures' that can be applied in more than one way means that 
the appearance of conflict need not persist. 
'Seeing' or 'picturing' contingent relationships is no different from 'seeing' 
or 'picturing' generative causal relationships. In both cases there is no room 
for determinism since 'pictures', at most, can only suggest how they are to 
be applied. Thus, the ironic and perhaps surprising result of this 
examination is that neither generative nor Humean causality support the 
doctrine of a deterministic world. 
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Therefore, it can be concluded that both generative and Humean causality 
emphasize different aspects of psychological theories understood as 
'pictures' in need of applications. Once again this leaves intact the notion 
that human action is undetermined and unfounded, this time by 
maintaining a separation between causal factors -such as generative 
mechanisms and contingent relationships- and action. 
Of course, it should not be thought that human action involves the 
application of some 'mental' picture as this would only be a further picture 
which could itself be applied in various ways. Rather, this view of 
psychological explanations as 'pictures' needing to be applied is a 
grammatical comment about psychological phenomena when they are 
understood in the light of issues of reflexivity. Ultimately, that is, 
psychological phenomena are not determined by either contingent 
relationships or generative causal mechanisms. 
5.3.6.3 Conclusion: Reflexivity and Knowledge, Causality and Explanation 
in Psychology 
In the preceding discussion questions concerning both knowledge and causal 
explanation were answered by removing the barrier between these 
phenomena and language. On the one hand debates over the rational 
foundations of knowledge were completely side-stepped by founding 
knowledge instead in language and human action. On the other hand the 
seemingly divergent approaches of generative and Humean causal 
explanation were shown to have a common basis as grammatical 'pictures'. 
In the case of theoretical knowledge it may appear that what has been argued 
for is the abolition of 'knowledge'. But all that has really been abolished is 
the notion that knowledge is a psychological entity or something that 
manifests itself in theories. 
Further, in the discussion of causal explanation it may be questioned 
whether anything has actually been resolved. But by removing 
determinism from causal explanation two things are achieved. Firstly, the 
heat is taken out of arguments over the nature of causality since all theories 
of causality can themselves be seen as part of meaningful, non-causal 
human activity. That is, rival theories of causality are not competing over 
the ultimate causal form of the world -the stakes are not that high. 
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Secondly,with the loss of determinism comes the prospect of seeing the 
activity of psychology in an entirely new way. 
For many the archetypal deterministic approach in psychology is thought to 
be Skinnerian behaviourism. Given the comments just made it would now 
therefore be interesting to discuss radical behaviourism from the perspective 
being. promoted in this chapter. 
5.3.7 REFLEXIVITY AND RADICAL BEHAVIOURISM 
5.3.7.1 Discussion 
Radical behaviourism was discussed in Chapter 2 as an example of one of 
the few approaches within psychology that has attempted to deal 
comprehensively with issues of reflexivity. To this end the distinctive 
conceptions of 'meaning', 'knowledge', 'causality' and 'explanation' 
employed in radical behaviourism were examined. It was concluded that, to 
a degree, radical behaviourism does manage to incorporate the reflexive 
aspects of psychology in a coherent manner (Chapter 2, Section 2.5). 
However, it was suggested that there remains at least one crucial area in 
which lingering, and ultimately fatal, doubts about radical behaviourism's 
ability to handle reflexive problems are brought into sharp focus. This area 
concerns the status of 'private events' as 'private stimuli' (Chapter 2, 
Sections 2.3 and 2.4). The way in which private events are conceptualized is 
crucial to radical behaviourism not only because it determines Skinner's 
approach to many psychological phenomena traditionally understood as 
mental events, but also because it differentiates radical behaviourism from 
other forms of behaviourism (Skinner, 1974). 
Basically, the difficulty with radical behaviourism's treatment of private 
events comes from the implied claim that first person reports of private 
events provide knowledge about the presence of yet to be analysed private, 
physical stimuli (See Chapter 2, Section 2.4). It was argued that first person 
reports cannot be tacts of internal events because the verbal community has 
no access to them and therefore cannot reinforce contingent on the presence 
of such events. Because of this, attempts to 'discover' controlling stimuli for 
first person reports cannot be justified in terms of the prior presence of 
'private stimuli'. 
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The reason why radical behaviourism has such difficulties with private 
events can now be related to the discussion in Section 5.3.4, above, 
concerning the unique grammatical status of the term 'I' when used in 
connection with psychological concepts. The main difference between the 
two approaches to private events hinges on the metaphysical stance taken by 
Skinner. 
Radical behaviourism is in part an apologetics for behavioural analysis. As 
such it argues for and attempts to justify the use of behavioural analysis. In 
order to justify behavioural analysis a physicalist and materialist monism is 
claimed and is combined with the assumption that behaviour is lawful 
(Costall, 1980. Also, see Chapter 2). It is this metaphysics that is behind 
Skinner's (1974) comment that, "the behaviors of both scientist and 
nonscientist are shaped by what is there but in different ways" (p. 127). It is 
this 'shadowy' reality, responsible for shaping all behaviour that Skinner 
promotes to the status of ontology. This is in marked contrast to the 
following remark from Wittgenstein (cited in Finch, 1977); 
Is possibility a sort of shadowy reality? 
Where is the shadow? There really is such a 
shadowy reality. It is your language. (p. 148). 
For Wittgenstein it seems that the only 'shadowy' reality was the world of 
possibility to be found in the grammar of language and not some world 
beyond language -or, in Skinner's case, beyond all behaviour. 
Skinner's metaphysical position is revealed even more directly in the 
following remark; 
What is lacking is the bold and exciting 
behavioristic hypothesis that what one 
observes is always the 'real' or 'physical' 
world (or at least the 'one' world). (Skinner, 
1945, p. 293). 
Once again, for Wittgenstein, the "one world" could only be the 'world' of 
phenomena. But these phenomena cannot be separated from the language-
games in which they occur. In this sense they cannot be observed 
'objectively' as belonging to a 'real' or 'physical' world that is distinct from 
language. In fact, the "one world" Skinner (1945) mentioned can only be the 
world of phenomena and grammar. For it is only this world that 
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encompasses all possibilities and therefore all the varied, meaningful 
phenomena that can be said to be 'seen'. 
It is Skinner's commitment in the extreme to a physicalist metaphysics and 
the lawfulness of behaviour that ultimately causes the radical behaviourist 
account of reflexivity to founder over its treatment of private events. 
An alternative to treating private events as 'private stimuli' has already 
been foreshadowed in Section 5.3.4 where the first person use of 'I' was 
examined. In line with that examination the claim is made here that reports 
of private events cannot be clearly understood if they are thought to imply a 
particular object -whether that object is a mental event or a stimulus. 
Instead, reports of sensations, feelings, -etc. are intelligible only in terms of 
language-games. They are moves in a game rather than 'responses' to 
'private stimuli'. 
First person reports have no referents. A report of 'pain', for example, can 
be taken to imply the presence of something -such as a break in a bone. But 
taking this implication is itself simply a move in the language-game, no 
matter how compelling it may appear. When psychological phenomena are 
reported in the first person they are human actions that take their meaning 
from the language-game in which they occur. There is no further analysis 
possible. Understanding first person reports simply means sharing in that 
form of life. 
The 'picture' of a stimulus-response relationship between a private event 
and a first person report, it is concluded here, is as misleading in terms of 
reflexive problems as is the 'picture' of sensations, etc. as mental entities. At 
the level of the individual it is confused to think that there is a private 
stimulus and then a response to it. There is only meaningful human action. 
Perhaps the most significant thing to come from giving up the idea that first 
person reports are responses to 'private stimuli' is the breaking of the circle 
of determinism in radical behaviourism. If the argument is accepted that 
private events cannot be successfully understood as 'private stimuli', then 
entry into the world of grammatical possibilities is unavoidable. And this 
world is not ultimately 'causal' or 'deterministic'. Rather, it is phenomenal. 
In a phenomenal world 'meaning' is not, to misuse a comment by Skinner 
(1974, p. 90), properly regarded as a property of a response or a situation or of 
the controlling contingencies that are responsible for both the topography of 
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behaviour and the control exerted by stimuli (See Chapter 2, Section 2.2.1 
for the original quote). 'Meaning' is not a property of anything. It comes 
from the inevitability of participating in life. 
This retreat from determinism need not be understood as a mortal wound 
in the side of radical behaviourism, however. It is quite possible to 
reconceive many behavioural principles in terms of language-games. For 
example, the concept of 'control' may seem to depend entirely on some 
notion of determinism. But even this concept can be understood quite 
clearly without determinism -and without denying that control of human 
behaviour is possible. 
Finch (1977) commented that one aspect of games is that they have a point 
(pp. 77-78). But, importantly, this point is completely self-contained in the 
language-game. As Finch (1977) put it; 
There must be no further raison d'etre for 
the language-game; it must be done for its 
own sake, or we will not be able to see its 
formal nature. (p. 78). 
The control that the consequences of behaviour seem to exert on behaviour 
is closely related to the point of a language-game. That is, in its formal 
sense a language-game can be carried out correctly or incorrectly and there is 
always the possibility of success or failure. By understanding the point of a 
language-game it then becomes possible to alter the 'rules' of the game in 
order to manipulate or control the behaviour of a person 'playing' the game. 
The fact that behavioural control always seems possible, at least in theory, is 
a reflection of the fact that it is always possible to see language-games in their 
formal aspect as having a point. 
So, in summary, the consequences of behaviour can be assimilated to the 
point of a language-game. But it should be re-emphasized that it is not that 
language-games have points as part of their nature. Rather, it is just that it 
is grammatically possible to see that aspect of language-games. 
In passing, it might be possible to argue that the language-games played by 
children and the mentally handicapped tend to be 'primitive' (P.L 5). Now, 
it may be that the point of a 'primitive' language-game is particularly 
transparent. If this were so behavioural control would be easier to achieve 
with children and the mentally handicapped than with 'normal' adults. 
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Presumably, the experience of behavioural scientists would reveal how true 
this is. However, there is a danger here of trying to construct a 
developmental thesis concerning language-games. Such a thesis should, of 
course, be avoided as language-games are not theoretical entities (See 
Chapter 4, Section 4.3). 
What is important to understand is that despite the (grammatical) possibility 
of controlling people's behaviour this does not mean to say that people's 
actions are determined. Or, to put it another way; determinism is not like 
an outside force that drives people along. From this perspective human 
actions are not determined by mechanisms, contingent laws or by the 
process of differential survival used in the 'Darwinian' type of causality that 
Skinner seems to prefer (See Chapter 2, Section 2.2.3). The possibility of 
control, instead, comes from understanding and participating in language-
games. It is directly analogous to 'controlling' the behaviour of a field full of 
rugby players by kicking the ball down one end of the field and having them 
'magically' run after it. 
In Beyond Freedom and Dignity Skinner (1971a) argued against the notion 
of 'autonomous man' and for viewing human behaviour as determined. In 
contrast, the present Wittgenstein-inspired perspective manages to avoid 
determinism without yielding to the temptation of postulating causal agent 
selves. When language and phenomena are understood grammatically 
there is no room for an autonomous agent who is in the position of using 
language. Language, for Wittgenstein, might be like a tool-box full of tools 
(P.I. 11) but using the tools is not subject to the will (Finch, 1977, p. 77). 
Using the 'tools' must simply be something that people do since explaining 
why the 'tools' are used in terms of causal agent selves or even determinism 
is just using more 'tools'. 
A further aspect of the philosophy of radical behaviourism that can be 
understood from the present perspective is the status of predictions. The 
conclusion drawn in Chapter 2, Sections 2.5.3 and 2.5.4 was that, in its own 
terms, predictions made from a behavioural analysis predict nothing in 
particular. The prediction, for example, that 'effectiveness' will be accepted 
as a criterion of truth, it was argued, does not predict what topographical 
types of behaviour might survive. This inability for a behavioural analysis 
to make predictions that have 'substantive' content can be seen as reflecting 
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- the fact that ultimately the use of words -such as 'effective'- is not 
determined by the presence of a referent that is independent of language. 
Concepts such as 'stimulus' and 'response' can be understood in a similar 
way to the concept of 'control'. 
Perhaps one of the commonest criticisms of the behaviourist approach in 
psychology is that it often fails to provide a thorough understanding of the 
'meaningfulness' of human behaviour. And, in practical situations 
behavioural analysis can often seem far too clumsy and coarse to 
recommend it as a course of action. For example, the single-minded attempt 
to reinforce or extinguish a particular behaviour may generate problems in 
some related area of a person's life. Or, behaviour modification may be 
attempted with a far too Simplistic view of the contingencies maintaining 
behaviour. This problem is exacerbated by the ability of people to see ways of 
gaining reinforcement without changing their 'target' behaviour. 
Of course, none of these criticisms is substantive. That is, they need not be 
seen as reflecting a deficiency in the behaviourist approach as such. Rather, 
they could be interpreted as 'deficiencies' in the approach of individual 
behaviourists. For example, such problems could be said to be due to an 
insufficient emphasis on determining the baseline contingencies that are 
operating. 
The present view helps reveal why such criticisms can be made. Only by 
having a clear understanding of the language-games being 'played' in a 
particular situation, it is argued here, can the behaviourist identify the 
appropriate contingencies of reinforcement supporting a behaviour. This 
derives from the view that 'seeing' contingencies is best seen as a 
grammatical possibility and not as something that is itself produced by 
contingencies of reinforcement. Asserting that such 'seeing' is produced in 
turn by contingencies of reinforcement is an act of unnecessary obeisance to 
the doctrine of determinism. ('Unnecessary' because nothing but reflexive 
paradox and polemical rhetoric is lost by abandoning determinism.) And it 
is an act which ignores the unavoidable meaningfulness of all human 
action. 
Day (1969b) stated that; 
For Skinner, natur al con trolling 
contingencies are observed to take place. Yet 
the perception in this is not totally trusted: 
the disposition is there to regard whatever is 
seen as dependent upon a previous history of 
reinforcement. (p. 505). 
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It is suggested here that this 'disposition' simply goes too far when it is 
raised to the level of philosophy. If clarity of understanding is to be sought 
then this disposition too should be seen as a language-game and not as 
something that has resulted deterministically from a history of 
reinforcemen t. 
Since consequences are an aspect of language-games -an aspect that is related 
to the point of language-games (see above)- the contingencies supporting a 
behaviour can only be recognized by understanding a particular language-
game. And, 'understanding' a language-game means being able to move 
around in it. Identifying inappropriate contingencies of reinforcement is 
just a reflection of failing to identify the language-game being 'played' or 
perhaps being unable to play it. Thus, the prediction could be made that 
someone who is successful at behaviour modification in practical settings 
will be someone who is experienced in the many varieties of language-
games and their subtle aspects as well as the relationships between them 
(See Section 5.3.3, above, on applying theories understood as language-
games). In fact, without at least some understanding of language-games it 
would be impossible even to begin the task of behaviour modification. 
One final point mentioned in Chapter 2, Section 2.5.4 concerned Skinner's 
value of 'survival'. Ultimately, all behaviour is judged, according to 
Skinner, by whether or not it survives. However, even this value, it is 
suggested here, cannot be considered a final or ultimate value. This is 
because concern for survival must be embedded in a language-game and all 
language-games are on the same level -which, of course, is part of the 
grammar of the term 'language-game'. 
It would be a complete misunderstanding of the present approach to think 
that language-games are the kinds of things that compete in a race for 
survival. For trying to describe the nature of language-games in this way 
would only involve another language-game. If this were possible it would 
mean that no progress in understanding the issues of reflexivity is made by 
using the concept of the 'language-game'. Only grammatical points can be 
made about language-games. 
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There can be no explanation for why a language-game emerges or why it 
fades away. This is one respect in which language-games are not like 
cultural practices or social facts. There is a language-game for describing 
particular language-games ('philosophy') but there is no language-game for 
explaining language-games (See Chapter 4, Section 4.4). This may seem 
unfortunate as when Ackermann (1988) lamented the fact that there is no 
social or political side to Wittgenstein's philosophy and that he provides no 
forms for the resolution of social and language conflicts (p. 222). 
Ackermann (1988) went on to say; 
Perhaps the legacy of Wittgenstein has run 
thin, perhaps it has turned into the 
hermeneutical problems of his texts or has 
flowered in movements inspired by his 
insights but grafted into the service of alien 
goals, because the resolution of genuine 
conflict in our language and in our lives was 
not allowed a substantial place in the 
direction of his thought. (p.224). 
But to feel disappointed at these apparent omissions is to misunderstand the 
'grammatical perspective'. For the whole point of this perspective is to 
show that conflicts are not resolved in the way that people, and 
philosophers in particular, would like them to be resolved. Conflict can 
never finally be resolved by the rightness of argument, which is no doubt 
why Wittgenstein wanted to avoid theorizing in philosophy. Rather, it is 
always resolved by seeing in new or different ways. Wittgenstein's claims 
that he wants not to change people's opinions but to change what they do 
(See Chapter 4, Section 4.1, above) are best seen in this light. By enabling 
people to see in different ways conflict can be resolved -or at least it becomes 
unimportant. 
In conclusion, then, perhaps it could be said that all that 'survives' in the 
long run is seeing in new ways. 
5.3.7.2 Conclusion: Reflexivity and Radical Behaviourism 
In the preceding discussion it was suggested that the reason radical 
behaviourism finally fails to deal with the problem of reflexivity is because 
of its unnecessary insistence on the doctrine of determinism. It may seem 
extreme to advocate the abandonment of this doctrine as it has long been 
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considered to be a founding assumption of scientific endeavour. However, 
nothing is lost by this strategy since behaviour modification, for example, 
still remains possible. The difference is just that it is now seen as 
grammatically possible rather than necessarily possible, and stemming 
from the presumed deterministic nature of the world. 
It was also argued that there is nothing ultimate about the value of 
'survival' since concern for survival exists only in a language-game. 
Values, as has already been discussed (See Section 5.3.2, above), are not 
ultimately justified but are founded in ungrounded action. 
There is no doubt that the similarities noted between the philosophy of 
Wittgenstein and Skinner's radical behaviourism exist (See, for example, 
Day, 1969a; 1969b; Costall, 1980). However, despite this congruence in 
outlook Skinner failed to accept the final consequences of his position and 
so did not follow Wittgenstein into the world of grammar. In much the 
same way, and as already noted in Section 5.3.1.2, above, Williams (1985) 
suggested that cognitivists such as Fodor and Stich conceded Wi ttgenstein's 
arguments without drawing his conclusions. This reluctance on the part of 
Skinner, Fodor and Stich no doubt demands further examination. 
However, in the following and final chapter of this study a new 
understanding of the activity of psychology will be presented in a way that 
will hopefully allay any fears that might be underlying such reluctance. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
6 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS: 
REFLEXIVITY AND PSYCHOLOGY 
6.1 DISCUSSION 
If an historical account of scientific psychology were to be given its advent 
might be explained in terms of a growing frustration with philosophy. 
Seemingly caught in endless debate over fundamental questions about the 
nature of knowledge, people and human society, philosophy, to some, must 
have paled next to the clear and practical successes of science. Whether 
fanciful or not this speculative reason for the emergence of a science of 
psychology helps to explain why the problems of reflexivity have permeated 
present day psychology. For the form of many of the questions of interest to 
'traditional' philosophers is inherently paradoxical and essentially reduces 
to what has been called in this study the phenomenon of reflexivity. So, in 
trying to answer questions similar to those posed by 'traditional' philosophy 
psychology has adopted more than a little of 'traditional' philosophy itself. 
The concept of 'knowledge' can be given as an example of one of the 
problematic aspects of 'traditional' philosophy embraced by psychology. 
'Knowledge' has most often been viewed as a reflexive concept in the sense 
that a 'subject' knows/ observes/ examines/ reflects on an 'object'. 
Unfortunately for the prospects of a scientific psychology, science is in no 
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better shape for dealing with reflexive concepts than is 'traditional' 
philosophy. Fundamentally, this is because science and philosophy are 
equivalent insofar as they are only a part of human activity. So, by 
attempting to causally explain reflexive concepts science must do the 
impossible and reach beyond itself in much the same way that a 
philosophical theory must reach beyond itself in trying to logically explain 
reflexive concepts. 
The most important thing to notice in the example of the concept of 
'knowledge' -and in fact all such reflexive concepts- is that the phenomenon 
of reflexivity is being treated as if it were a psychological process or ability. It 
is this insight that is the clue to disentangling all of the complex problems 
associated with the issues of reflexivity as they have been understood in this 
study. 
This insight should not be that. surprising since, as has already been 
discussed in Chapter 4, Section 4.1, above, Hilmy (1987) persuasively argued 
that the central change between Wittgenstein's 'Early' and 'Late' philosophy 
stemmed from Wittgenstein's growing realization that he had allowed 
himself to view concepts such as 'meaning' and 'understanding' in just 
such a restricted 'psychological' or, more precisely, metalogical way. In fact, 
it was the implicit idea that such concepts refer to some hidden 
psychological processes or states that resulted in the transcendental view of 
logic in the Tractatus . That is, it was only because 'meaning', 
'understanding', etc. were thought to refer to a psychological hinterland 
behind and beyond words and language that Wittgenstein had to finally 
conclude that all talk of logic must lack determinate sense. And this is why 
propositions of logic, and the Tractatus itself, were paradoxical in that they 
tried to say with sense what cannot be said with sense. 
Therefore, consistent with this insight and with the overall approach taken 
in this final chapter the following suggestion can be made; 
The phenomenon of 'reflexivity' should not be 
understood metalogically, that is, as a psychological 
process . Instead, 'reflexivity' is best understood 
grammatically. 
Most of the reflexive dilemmas and paradoxes referred to in this study 
hinge, it is claimed here, on viewing 'reflexivity' in this metalogical way. 
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However, it is realized that relinquishing the metalogical approach has been 
a hard enough pill for philosophers to swallow so it is not likely to be any 
easier for psychologists. In fact, the enduring commitment to determinism 
and the belief that science has to be about causal explanation -if it is about 
any thing- may in itself decide many psychologists against taking the 
medicine. 
But despite this potential reluctance on the part of psychologists there may 
still be some polemical worth in outlining the advantages of a grammatical 
view of 'reflexivity'. In order to do this it will be expedient to take another 
look at the comments made by Margolis (1989) which have already been 
quoted in the Introduction to this study (See Chapter 1, Section 1); 
Psychology is a reflexive discipline, however 
cleverly it may camouflage its practice in 
surveys and experiments. The observers and 
observed are one. All the human sciences are 
infected with that benign disease. Hence, on a 
reasonable theory, even the physical and 
formal sciences owe their objective standing 
to a steady orderliness perceived within the 
flux of the other. It is that reflexiveness, of 
course, that accounts for the otherwise 
extraordinary speculative leap that connects 
the fate of our theories of persons and selves 
to the fortunes of the largest philosophical 
puzzles. (p. 329) 
Now, if the "reflexiveness" Margolis (1989) speaks of here is understood as 
something along the lines of a 'psychological' fact, that is, if it is understood 
metalogically, the reflexive "disease" will not be so benign and will result in 
all the confusions and paradoxes discussed in this study. It is understanding 
reflexivity metalogically that in fact accounts for the "speculative leap" from 
theories about people to philosophical puzzles. Judging by the following 
remarks by Margolis (1989) it appears that some symptoms of malignancy are 
present in his account of reflexivity; 
The reflexive nature of discovering our 
nature implicates the ontologized prejudice 
of doing so. We can hardly abandon that 
study: it permeates the most unlikely 
inquiry; and we can hardly correct for its 
intrusion: every would-be correction is 
. another instance of it, if any correction there 
be. Reflection, therefore -hardly reducible to 
the introspection and self-perception favored 
by canonical empiricists and rationalists- is at 
once a first-order and a second order 
undertaking. Every empirical statement of 
what man is is perceptibly encumbered by 
assumptions, however inchoate, of what it 
would be coherent and tenable to suppose are 
the conditions under which distributed such 
pronouncements may be responsibly put 
forward. There is enough in that admission 
to refute, globally, any disjunction between 
science and the legitimative reflections of 
philosophy that might pretend to secure the 
self-corrective autonomy of any merely first-
order empirical inquiry. (p.330). 
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Even though Margolis (1989) in this quote eschews the understandings of 
reflection posed by empiricists and rationalists there remains, by his own 
standards, a commitment to what could be called an 'ontology of reflexivity'. 
That is, the seriousness with which the phenomenon of 'reflexivity' is being 
treated suggests that for Margolis (1989) it is beyond dispute that reflexivity 
does permeate so much inquiry. Talk of "discovering our nature" and of 
"assumptions, however inchoate" "encumbering" empirical statements of 
"what man is" tend to reinforce this view of Margolis' (1989) commitment. 
Despite the obvious depth in Margolis' (1989) understanding of the 
phenomenon of 'reflexivity' he remains caught in a reflexive trap 
concerning 'reflexivity' itself. It is a trap that is held tight by his insistence 
that the study of "our nature" cannot be abandoned and the implication that 
"our nature" includes a reflexive capacity. For this trap is identical to the fly 
bottle -referred to in the following remark made by Wittgenstein (1953)- that 
keeps the solipsist enclosed; 
What is your aim in philosophy?-To shew 
the fly the way out of the fly-bottle. (P.I. 309). 
(That this is a reference to the solipsist is convincingly argued for by Finch 
(1977, p. 106». The 'fly-bottle' that has trapped Margolis (1989) is the 
apparent impossibility of escaping from the perceptible "assumptions" and 
"ontologized prejudice" of theorizing. Just as solipsists believe that they are 
unavoidably confined by the constraints of their own private world Margolis 
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(1989) believes theorists are restricted by the apparent impossibility of being 
free of assumptions and prejudice. 
The way out of this trap is already clear. The grammatical perspective treats 
the act of identifying assumptions and prejudice as a language-game having 
its own grammar. 'Assumptions' and 'prejudice', that is, are not seen as 
explaining theories and human action. Rather, -and simply- the way in 
which these terms are used is examined. There is an end to presuppositions 
and this becomes evident by realizing that 'presupposing' itself has a 
grammar. 
In a sense freedom from the trap could be said to be gained by seeing that 
what is right with Margolis' (1989) point is the realization of the immediacy 
of human action. (It is the immediacy of action that seems to make the 
limitations unavoidable. They, as it were, cannot be defended against 
because they slip in immediately prior to any action that even a highly 
reflective person might take.) But this 'immediate action' is not something 
that is caused by 'assumptions' or 'prejudice' or, for that matter, 'history' -
whether social or personal- just because it is 'too' immediate; and any talk 
of 'assumptions', etc. cannot do full justice to this immediacy. Action is, 
instead, completely unfounded (See Chapter 5, Section 5.3.2, above). 
In this way even the phenomenon of 'reflexivity' can be freed from its 
'superontological' shackles and seen grammatically in its own right as part 
of meaningful activity. 'Reflexivity', that is, can best be understood by 
viewing its grammar since even it must have a grammar. And this is also 
why explanation must be finally relinquished if human action is to be 
understood completely. In order to show that this is so a different view of 
what 'understanding' involves will be 'presented below. Trying to explain 
reflexivity obscures just that aspect of the grammar of the word that it is so 
important to see. 
The alternative to this grammatical approach involves 'ontologizing' 
reflexivity by hypothesizing explanations for it. But this alternative 
continually misses the most important insight offered by the possibility of 
the act of reflection. This insight, gleaned from the reflexive act, is not that 
all theorizing and thinking is limited and constrained by 'assumptions', 
'history' or even 'context', all of which can be unearthed by reflective 
thought -although it is, of course, quite tempting to draw this conclusion. 
And certainly, such a conclusion would be preferable to an unreflective 
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confidence in "the self-corrective autonomy of any merely first-order 
empirical inquiry". 
However, there is a far more profound lesson to be learnt: The grammatical 
possibility of the act of r,eflection shows that the human world of 
meaningful action is always, and 'essentially', a world of grammatical 
possibility, and not of epistemological or ontological fixity. This is shown, 
as it were, by the simple fact that it is possible to discern, examine and 
question 'assumptions' and 'prejudices' no matter what theory or 
explanation is proposed. But to see that it is possible to reflect in this way on 
the assumptions of a theory should not force one to think of reflection as an 
almost mystical ability of the psyche (for this is simply a pointless regression 
into the language-games of epistemology and ontology). And, most 
importantly, it should not force one to conclude that human action is 
determined by the assumptions, etc. that reflection reveals. 
There are important differences between the consequences that stem from 
each of these two conclusions. If the former conclusion is drawn then there 
is likely to be a call for theoretical plurality in the search to discover what 
people are like. That is, the production of more and more causal 
explanations will be encouraged in order to guard against the limitations of 
'unreflective' explanatory theory. 
However, if the second conclusion is drawn it follows that a complete 
understanding of people and human action is not, and cannot (this is a 
limit to be found in grammar), be given by any number of explanations. So, 
the attempt to provide explanatory theories, whether scientific or 
philosophical, can be abandoned before it begins. That is not to say that 
psychology should cease -or even that what has come to be called theorizing 
in psychology should end. Rather, what have so far been called 
psychological theories can now be seen as grammatical movements 
exploring the 'world of the possible'. To some degree this whole orientation 
towards psychological theories helps to answer Howard's (1985) speculation; 
Consider what might occur if we viewed 
research in psychology as giving us 
knowledge regarding human possibilities 
rather than human realities or human 
necessities. (p. 262). 
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This portrayal of theories -and, in fact, thinking itself- is not unlike that 
proposed by Hooker (1982). For example, Hooker (1982) claimed; 
The essence of a sense of the epistemic seems 
to me to lie in this sense of openness to 
development [a development that could be 
said to stem from reflective thought] at all 
levels in interaction with reality (the cosmos, 
the One-- whatever one wishes to label it). (p. 
128. Square Brackets added). 
And a way of capturing this sense is to; 
... construe cognition as the exploration of 
possibility structures, to construe theories as 
hierarchicall y organised conjectures 
concerning possibility structures, and to 
construe systems of norms (expressing 
values) as conjectural theories. (p. 128). 
Hooker's (1982) intuitions are in basic agreement with the approach 
explicated here. However, it is suggested that he is mistaken in his 
understanding of where this world of 'possibility structures' lies. The 
exploration of these 'structures' cannot be carried out by anything so 
psychological as cognition (unless, of course, 'cognition' were to be 
construed as 'thought' in the ordinary sense and use of the word rather than 
as something psychological). Rather, these 'structures' are none other than 
grammatical possibilities. Similarly, when Natsoulas (1978) commented 
that one way of accommodating psychological possibility is to view the 
world as something that is 'infinitely faceted' he was making the mistake of 
trying to place 'possibility' in the world. In contrast, if the arguments 
presented in this study are correct then 'possibility' must remain a 
grammatical phenomenon. 
Furthermore, theories are not "conjectures" about 'possibility structures'. 
Instead, they actually teach grammatical possibilities insofar as they are only 
understood once one can make one's way about in the language-game 
involved. Of course, there is a difference between what might be called the 
language-game of theorizing and the language-game that a theory presents 
or, better, teaches.. But this difference is clarified in the notion that theories 
are part of the training in a language-game. It could be said that instead of 
training being achieved or caused by presenting somebody with a theory 
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about what has to be done the opposite is in fact the case. That is, training in 
a language-game is what a theory is. And of course there can be no 
explanation of training or teaching -the concept of 'training' just indicates 
that someone comes to play this language-game. There is no explanation of 
'training' except in the quite ordinary sense of how people might describe 
how a particular instance of training was carried out. 
There is a further -interesting, but speculative, connection that could be 
made between the present approach and the writings ?f Hooker. When 
Hooker (1975) described .global theories it is hard from the present 
perspective not to see this as an attempt to delineate the world of grammar -
at least when global theories in psychology are considered. The comment 
can be made here that the concept of 'grammar' is as close as one is likely to 
come to a global theory in psychology. But, of course, as has been 
emphasized (Chapter 4, Section 4.3) grammar cannot be considered as a 
theoretical construct without misunderstanding the concept. 
In an historical sense this role for psychological theorizing is quite 
appropriate. It was suggested in the purely speculative history proposed at 
the beginning of this chapter that modem scientific psychology began as an 
attempt to answer some of the traditional concerns of philosophy. In its 
turn this new formulation for psychology can be seen as once again 
addressing philosophical concerns, but now the concerns are of what could 
be called a 'Wittgensteinian' approach to philosophical problems. 
One particular concern of this 'Wittgensteinian' approach, of course, is that 
the way in which psychological theories are understood should not 
interfere with, or be a distraction from, the attempt to gain a perspicuous 
understanding of meaningful human action. What follows from this 
concern is that understanding people involves something very different 
from explaining them. That is, from the present perspective 
'understanding' does not stem from having an explanation that is like a 
theoretical 'picture' of what something is like. Rather, it is more like being 
able to find one's way about in a language-game (Ackermann, 1988, p. 185; 
Wittgenstein, 1953, P.I. 143ff.). 
The importance of this view of 'understanding' cannot be stressed enough 
for it is the key to understanding the grammatical approach itself. An 
example of a case of 'understanding' should be helpful here. The 
grammatical approach is learnt in just the same way that counting is learnt. 
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IT a child· waited to understand some formula, rule or 'picture' to produce 
the series of counting numbers (1,2,3,4, etc.) he or she would never get past 
'I'. At some point a step just is taken and this is not determined by any 
helpful 'picture' -either 'internal' or 'external'. The child could reflect for 
an eternity trying to 'understand' how to generate the next number. 
Therefore, to 'understand' reflexivity grammatically -that is, in a non-
metalogical way- no 'explanation'of it need be given as this would be to 
treat reflexivity metalogically as a special kind of factual process or entity. 
Instead, by surveying the ways in which the term 'reflexivity' is used in 
language it becomes possible to 'find one's way about' in language-games 
that involve it. Ceasing to insist that a theory or 'picture' of reflexivity is 
needed in order to understand it is part of learning how to approach 
phenomena grammatically. This is, as it were, an instruction -in a process of 
training- about the grammar of the grammatical approach to reflexivity. 
'Reflexivity' is demystified by viewing it grammatically. For example, a 
grammatical examination reveals that the meaningful act of reflection is not 
itself reflexive. That is, if something is reflected upon it is certain (it is part 
of the grammar of 'reflexivity') that the act of reflecting is not itself being 
reflected upon. In this way 'reflexivity' can be seen (in a sense 'observed') in 
its own right as a meaningful part of human activity instead of as some 
near-transcendent act forever paradoxically beyond what is meaningful and 
what can be understood. By examining its grammar 'reflexivity' becomes 
just another meaningful human activity. 
Perhaps now it is an appropriate time to clarify why 'language-games', 
'forms of life' and 'grammar' are not things that can be explained . 
'Language-games', for example, are not facts with determinate forms that 
could be produced or caused -and this is part of the grammar of 'language-
games'. 'Understanding' the term 'language-game' involves being able to 
carryon in this language-game and does not involve having a theory or 
'picture' of a language-game. It would be to miss the point entirely if the 
complaint were made that "I cannot continue on in this language-game 
because I do not know what a language-game is!". The proper reply to this 
complaint would be, perhaps, "Don't worry about not knowing what a 
language-game is, just look and see how the word is used and you will pick 
it up". 
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Perhaps the most unfortunate and confusing consequence of seeing 
explanatory theories as 'pictures' or representations of the world is that this 
'picture' often results in the belief that theoretical knowledge is limited -for 
a 'picture' is something that is, as it were, bounded by its 'frame'. When this 
belief is combined with a metalogical view of reflexivity theories come to be 
seen as limited pictures generated by the reflexive act. Thus, paradox is 
ensured. All knowledge is theoretical; there is more than one theory (an 
observation suggested by the metalogical, generative view of reflexivity); 
therefore, each theory must inevitably be a limited monad; the only escape 
from each monad is by the reflexive act; But finally, and fatally, all 
knowledge of reflexivity is similarly a monadic 'picture'. By following this 
'picture' through to its conclusion every 'picture' or theory seems to be 
undermined and degenerates into chaos -except of course for the 'picture' of 
chaos. 
'Understanding' is more a case of 'being able to find one's way about in a 
language-game' than a case of having a theoretical 'picture' of what 
something is like. For when theories are seen as 'pictures' there is always 
the realization that they could be different pictures -and even then any 
'picture' could be applied in more than one way depending on what 
'assumptions', etc. were operating. This produces the fear, induced by 
reflexive concerns, that theoretical knowledge is relative which, in turn, 
encourages the call for theoretical pluralism. But when theories are 
indissolubly linked to language-games and the process of teaching language-
games, it becomes senseless to speak either of limits or of meaningless chaos. 
It could be said in conclusion that psychological theories reveal just what 
they appear to show -and there is nothing more to be said. The knowledge 
they provide is just what people who understand the theories know. This 
may not seem much but really it is everything and it is impossible that 
anything more should be needed. 
Therefore, by accepting that even the phenomenon of 'reflexivity' must be 
understood grammatically -if it is to be understood clearly and non-
paradoxically-, the immediacy and the 'reality' of human action, and life 
itself, can be salvaged from the surreal ghostland of 'objectivity' and 
'theoretical knowledge'. 
Whatismore, the grammatical perspective thrusts psychologists, and 
theorists in general, back into the 'real' and ordinary world. Thus, it 
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undermines in a most fundamental way any elitist 'otherworldliness' that 
might be encouraged by a confused 'intellectualism' and, in particular, a 
cultic approach to science. That is, it provides, hopefully, a coherent account 
of what might be inspiring the following comment by Margolis (1989) -and 
perhaps a reason for agreeing with it at least in a limited sense; 
One can no longer just state one's theory 
flatly, the theory one means to defend against 
all competitors, meaning by that that the 
world will in due course yield the confirming 
evidence of its timeless truth. We are more 
interested in the risky process of theorizing 
viewed as a way of actually existing , of 
generating scientific and philosophical claims 
within a flux that denies the fixities of self 
and world -on the easy assumption of the 
reliability of which our shifting theories were 
once thought to be straightforwardly tested. 
Theorizing and theorized are one: the 
assessment of theories is the work of the 
theories assessed; and, for the purposes of 
dispute, an independent world and a neutral 
judge are doubtful creatures of argumentative 
invention. (Preface, pp. x-xi. Emphasis 
added). 
It is now possible to look again at the three issues of reflexivity as they were 
outlined in the Introduction to this study. 
(1) Reflexivity as a property of psychology's subject 
matter. 
The recommendation that the phenomenon of 
'reflexivity' should not be understood as a psychological 
process obviously prohibits the view that psychological 
subjects have a reflexive capacity akin to a psychological 
ability. The ability to reflect is a grammatical possibility 
and must remain purely in the grammatical world. 
Which is just as well as this more than anything else 
guarantees the 'reality' of the ability to think and reflect 
-a 'reality' also argued for by Margolis (1989). Such a 
'reality' is, of course, internal to language and human 
forms of life. But this is exactly why it is 'real' as 
opposed to hypothetical or theoretical. 
In other words, the fact that it is possible to reflect even 
on a theory that postulates people as reflexive active 
agents -and thus opening the door to seeing people in 
other ways- signals that the 'property' of reflexivity 
constitutes a grammatical point and not a theoretical 
point. 
This point is very closely related to the fact that the 
Cartesian 'subject' has been banished. For the Cartesian 
'subject' is actually a theoretical construct. So, if 
reflexivity is seen as a property of this 'subject' the 
reality of the act of reflection becomes limited to the 
context of this Cartesian theory of the 'subject'. In 
contrast, seeing reflexivity as a grammatical possibility 
allows the act of reflection -that is, reflective thought- to 
always be a real possibility in a way that a theoretical 
possibility can never be. (And, of course, this is a 
comment on the grammar of the terms 'grammatical' 
and 'theoretical'). Reflecti ve thought, therefore, is 
placed where it should be placed -as a meaningful and 
real part of a human form of life. 
(There is an interesting sense in which the concepts of 
'reflexivity', 'grammar' and 'intelligence' relate. For an 
intelligent person could be said to be someone who 
reflects a lot on 'ideas'. This process could now be 
understood as the exploration of grammar and 
grammatical possibilities. Although the details will not 
be considered here -and, in fact, have not been 
thoroughly thought out- this possible connection 
between 'intelligence' and 'grammar' may help to 
understand why the construct of 'intelligence' has been 
so difficult to define in psychology. The pre-factual 
status of grammar may make it grammatically 
impossible to define intelligence.) 
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(2) Reflexivity of psychological explanation 
The particular issue in this regard is whether 
psychological explanations can give a coherent account 
of their own production. From the preceding 
discussion it should be no surprise that the conclusion 
to be drawn here is that no psychological explanation 
can coherently account for the possibility of being able to 
reflect on the explanation itself. 
The reasons for this are basically the same as those 
given in (1) above. Firstly, 'reflexivity' is well and truly 
situated in the realm of the grammatical and as such it 
is not an appropriate 'object' for explanation. This is 
connected to the arguments given in Chapter 4, Section 
4.3 concerning the non-factual, or pre-factual status of 
'grammar', 'language-games' and 'forms of life'. 
Secondly, explanations -whether causal or 'logical'- are 
inevitably 'internal' to language, which is to say that 
their grammar is such that there can be no explanation 
of grammatical aspects of language such as 'reflexivity'. 
Viewing psychological theories as 'language-games' 
sheds some light on the role of 'context' in 
psychological explanations. 'Context' can now be 
understood as the grammar of the language-games 
involved. As such it is in no way a factual matter so the 
concept cannot be reduced to the 'environment' or 
'situation'. It is suggested here that a similar 
conceptualization of 'context' was being sought by 
Jaeger and Rosnow (1988) when they commented; 
For contextualists, the context is an integral 
part of human actions, to be sure. An act or 
event cannot be said to exist independently of 
the act or event to which it refers ... These 
contexts are not orderly or invariant external 
entities that can be pulled apart and the 
separate parts specifically labelled and finally 
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reduced to ·unilinear causal patterns. A 
change in context can alter the meaning, and 
consequently, the identity (or texture) of an 
act, as much as change in the elements (or 
strands) of an act can instigate changes in its 
context. (p. 66). 
However, it is claimed here that such an understanding 
of 'context' cannot be achieved in a coherent manner 
isolated from the overall approach of language-games, 
forms of life and grammar as presented by Wittgenstein 
(1953) and described in this study. 
(3) RefleXivity in the production and evaluation of 
psychological theories . 
The difficulty of trying to independently evaluate 
psychological theories is perhaps the most central 
concern of this study. In rather different terms Margolis 
(1989) examined this same difficulty under the heading 
of "Enculturing Psychology" (pp. 329-370). 
When psychological theories are themselves 
understood as language-games the question ceases to be 
one of independent evaluation. That is, evaluation 
cannot finally be achieved by applying a prescriptive set 
of criteria -even though, in a contingent sense, this may 
be what in fact happens. Rather, evaluating a theory -
like all human action- is an unfounded ethical act. That 
is, choosing one theory over another is a quite ordinary, 
and quite real, meaningful act in life. At some point the 
choice is made (or is not made), 
This approach to evaluation should not, of course, be 
confused with philosophical pragmatism. Even 
pragmatic reasons cannot found an act. 
To say that an evaluative choice is unfounded is not to 
say that evaluation is hopeless. All that is implied is 
that evaluation takes place in a language-game and 
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form of life. Therefore, the process of evaluation need 
not be concerned with establishing some transcendent 
viewing platform but can instead focus on the actual 
point of making the evaluation. And the point is of 
course given by the point of the language-game. In this 
way any disagreements regarding the point of making 
an evaluation will surface and can in turn become the 
focus of discourse. This, instead of their remaining 
hidden, obscured behind the pursuit of ultimate 
evaluative criteria. 
The attempt by Margolis (1989) to involve 
Wittgenstein's notion of a 'form of life' in preliminary 
moves to try to explain the enculturation of psychology 
is misplaced. For it is an attempt to, as it were, 'descend' 
from the grammatical viewpoint. It is clear that 
Margolis (1989) himself saw this vulnerability in his 
account. In the 'Epilogue' he commented; 
Our best thought is transient, risked in the 
extreme. And yet we press on in the direction 
of closure and invariance and universality. 
The effort is not illegitimate, though what it 
finds is doomed to be replaced 
discontinuously and incommensurably. We 
content ourselves with the saliencies of our 
perceived world that serve us as best 
depictions of what we imagine are the 
underlying fixities of the real world. (p. 371). 
Of course, the effort is not illegitimate -but perceiving it 
in terms of an irresistible drive towards closure and 
universality is part of a confusion. The effort, and 
Margolis' (1989) work, have their place in the language-
games and forms of life in which they do occur. That 
is, amongst those who are concerned about 
understanding the problems brought into the social 
sciences by the phenomenon of reflexivity. 
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And after all, the lesson of the 'effort' is not about a 
drive towards closure. It is about, perhaps, a very real 
but ultimately unnecessary fear of openness. Like 
fledglings perched on the edge of the nest there 
remains, at the last, a hesitancy to leave the solidity of 
the nest (the world of explanations) and exchange it for 
the freedom of flight (the world of 
possibility / grammar). 
There is an end to explanation. But this is not an 
attempted slight on explanatory theory. Instead it is a 
way of seeing explanations more clearly -to allow even 
explanation the honour of being seen as it is. 
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It is the final conclusion of this study that there is no hope that psychology 
will ever explain people to the extent that their reflexive 'capacity' would 
also be explained. But for two reasons this should not lead to 
disappointment. Firstly, -and perhaps of least consolation-, the fact that 
even traditional philosophizing cannot meet the challenge of reflexivity 
may help to alleviate any feelings of failure in this regard. 
Secondly, -and immeasurably more important-, by demonstrating that even 
scientific attempts to explain human behaviour can never be the last word 
on understanding people, psychology, by its very presence, acts as a constant 
reminder, signposting an awesome freedom. A freedom that is immediate 
and total. A freedom to live beyond any idea or conception of what it is like 
to be human. In short, a freedom to live in just that world that one finds 
oneself -without ultimately having to bring into question either that world 
or oneself. Acting as such a signpost is no small role for psychology to play. 
There is a third reason why psychologists should not be disappointed by the 
final conclusion of this study. When understood as language-games 
psychological theories provide people with 'grammatical moves' that can be 
made in life. That is, they can provide grammatical insights into the ways 
people act in particular circumstances -serving to teach people about more 
and more possibilities of action. However, without the caveat of the final 
conclusion drawn in this study psychology will always appear to close off the 
one possibility that it cannot close off -the possibility of 'possibility' that can 
be found in the world of grammar. 
284 
The (almost) final word will be given to Ackermann (1988), here quoted 
slightly out of context; 
We participate in human life; we do not 
view it as we view a film, from the outside. 
Our participation in life allows us to 
understand a film and also to understand 
language ... (p.203) . 
... and also to understand ourselves. 
6.2 SUMMARY OF MAIN CONCLUSIONS 
The arguments presented in this study -and indeed the various areas of 
psychology examined- may appear to be quite diffuse and sometimes even 
unrelated. However, whether they appear this way or not they all converge 
on the following points: 
(1) Accepting that 'reflexivity' is a part of meaningful 
human activity presents insurmountable difficulties for 
the overall coherence of explanatory theories in 
psychology. 
(2) Because of (1) the phenomenon of 'reflexivity' must 
be understood grammatically and not metalogically . 
(3) There is therefore an irredeemably grammatical 
'flavour' to theorizing in psychology -given the 
understanding of 'grammar' presented here (See 
Chapter 4, Section 4.3). 
(4) Given (1), (2) and (3) it is in the realm of psychology 
that science merges back into what, for want of a better 
word, could be called the 'ordinary' world. 
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